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Three Writers and a Punishment
Être un reste, ceci échappe à la langue humaine. Ne plus 
exister, et persister, être dans le gouffre et dehors, reparaître 
au-dessus de la mort, comme insubmersible, il y a une cer-
taine quantité d’impossible mêlée à de telles réalités. De là 
l’indicible. Cet être,—était-ce un être?—ce témoin noir, était 
un reste, et un reste terrible. Reste de quoi? De la nature, 
d’abord, de la société ensuite. Zéro et total.
To be a remnant, such a thing escapes human language. To 
no longer exist and yet persist, to be in the abyss and outside, 
to reappear beyond death, as if unsinkable, there is a certain 
amount of impossibility mixed with such realities. Hence the 
inexpressible. This being,—was it a being?—this dark witness, 
was a remnant, and a terrible remnant. A remnant of what? Of 
nature first, and then of society. Nothing and everything.
—Victor Hugo, L’Homme qui rit, book 1, chapter 5, in Œu-
vres complètes, on the remains of a hanged man
“The death penalty is the special and eternal sign of barbarity,” Victor 
Hugo declared in 1848.1 His contemporary, the poet Charles Baudelaire, 
vigorously begged to differ. Lethal justice, he argued, was sacred and ven-
erable: “It aims to save (spiritually) society and the culprit” (OCB 1:683). 
Albert Camus reversed this claim a century later. After relating the nausea 
his father experienced upon his return from an execution, the Nobel lau-
reate affirmed: “[The ultimate penalty] is no less repulsive than the crime, 
and  .  .  . this new murder, far from atoning for the offense committed 
against society, adds a new stain to the first one” (OCC 4:128).
4 ❘ Introduction
Three major authors from the country of the guillotine thus expressed 
strong and disparate views about a single institution, capital punish-
ment, across the post-Revolutionary period.2 Hugo, the portraitist of 
crime and injustice, Baudelaire, the poet of evil, and Camus, the writer 
of the Absurd and Revolt, did not just probe the nature and function of 
the death penalty. All three figures also wondered what literary repre-
sentations could and should cast light on them. Hugo warned against 
returning to Renaissance poetry after Robespierre’s guillotines (OCH 
2:460). Baudelaire vowed that he would someday write a counterpoint 
to Hugo’s own Claude Gueux, an edifying narrative whose likeable pro-
tagonist is eventually beheaded (OCB 1:598). Camus, for his part, wor-
ried that writings about the death penalty only, and wrongly, adopted 
hushed tones (OCC 4:128).
Capital Letters examines both the poetic choices these famous au-
thors made in their literary works that feature lethal justice and the 
critical ramifications that ensue. It explores their contribution to the 
representation and understanding of absolute punishment in the mod-
ern and contemporary eras. It is my contention that their writings es-
tablish an ongoing dialogue about the status and experience of those 
condemned to death, the violence of the killing state and its imaginary, 
and literature itself.3 Beyond post-Revolutionary France, this dialogue 
provides a critique that retains considerable contemporary relevance: as 
a punishment that suspends society’s prescription not to kill, the death 
penalty is among the most pressing ethical issues faced by the state and 
the individual today, with about a third of countries around the world 
still maintaining the right to kill, including twenty-nine states in the 
largest Western democracy, the United States.
France did not abolish the death penalty until 1981, the last decapi-
tation having occurred in 1977. The prohibition of capital punishment 
itself appeared in the Constitution only in 2007.4 This right to kill 
was—and still is, in the nations where lethal justice remains—insepara-
ble from, and hinged upon, the way in which it was performed and per-
ceived.5 In the nineteenth century, France first spectacularly exhibited its 
scaffolds on public squares to edify the people before these contraptions 
were removed from the city center by the state authorities in 1832; 
the scaffold then disappeared altogether following the Crémieux decree 
(1870), and the death penalty ultimately metamorphosed into a con-
cealed ritual in 1939. From then on, executions took place in the court-
yards of prisons following a politics and aesthetics of secrecy established 
for the sake of public order. Hugo, Baudelaire, and Camus share an 
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acute awareness not only of the exceptional power that underlies state 
killing and the significance of this punishment—moral, sociopolitical, 
and symbolic—but also of this central role played by staging and public 
perception. Through the language they forge to give lethal justice a face 
and an imaginary, all three authors illuminate its operation, claims, and 
reliance on the effect produced. They also put themselves in a position 
to inflect the conception of state killing through their representations.6
Numerous nineteenth- and twentieth-century French literary works 
feature the death penalty beyond those of the three writers examined in 
this study.7 In particular, Romanticism and, to a lesser extent, Realism 
and fantastique literature have frequently portrayed state killing. These 
“capital” publications include abolitionist poetry and drama from the 
first third of the nineteenth century, such as Lamartine’s ode “Contre la 
peine de mort” (1830) and Vigny’s play La Maréchale d’Ancre (1831); 
prose fiction, such as Stendhal’s Le Rouge et le noir (1830), which fa-
mously gives Julien Sorel his theatrical moment on the scaffold, exalted 
by a satirized Mathilde de La Mole, and Balzac’s apology of the ex-
ecutioner (El Verdugo); historiography and nonfiction, as exemplified 
by Michelet’s and Chateaubriand’s contrasting accounts of executions 
during the French Revolution in Histoire de la révolution française 
(1847–53) and Mémoires d’outre-tombe (posth. 1849–50); and short 
stories, as illustrated by the fantasized figuration of capital punishment 
found in Villier de l’Isle-Adam’s fin-de-siècle Contes cruels (1883). Crit-
ics have mainly focused their attention on this rich nineteenth-century 
corpus.8 They have shown that these works largely process and tap into 
an imaginary of the French Revolution and the contemporary fait divers 
(sensational news item), sometimes, but not always, for political ends. 
In addition, and importantly, the existing scholarship has established 
that, together, these publications allow for the emergence of a modern, 
transgressive aesthetics replete with dramatic scenes and figures.9 Works 
of reference have also placed a heavy emphasis on the Revolutionary 
icon, the guillotine,10 whether through the prism of literary, historical, 
or cultural studies.11
Of interest to me, in the wake of these analyses of the death pen-
alty in the French context, is to investigate the particular and recipro-
cal relationship between poetics and ethics in a more diversified and 
longue durée corpus. This material reveals an unsuspected conversation 
between three major writers across texts and centuries, and, while the 
crossroads of poetics and ethics is vast and long standing, the represen-
tations of capital punishment examined here arguably probe it anew. 
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Hugo’s, Baudelaire’s, and Camus’s literary works make poetic expres-
sion shed light on institutionalized lethal violence in unique and nondis-
cursive ways. Instead of controlling or neutralizing this violence, their 
writing alternately takes it on, absorbs it, and is subjected to it. The 
antithetical models commonly used to account for the intersection of 
poetics and ethics, namely their association through politics in littéra-
ture engagée or, conversely, their radical separation in a literary “art for 
art’s sake,” are equally incapable of accounting for what these works 
achieve. Transgressing a number of literary and aesthetic standards, 
clear-cut affects, and argumentative strategies, the corpus under consid-
eration articulates a complex critique of both capital punishment and 
literature that complements the abundant legal, historical, philosophi-
cal, moral, and political discourses that have supported or disqualified 
the death penalty throughout the modern and contemporary periods.
Time is one of the obvious differences that set Hugo, Baudelaire, 
and Camus apart. Between the publication of the first work on capital 
punishment considered here, Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné (The Last 
Day of a Condemned Man; 1829) and 1960, the year Camus’s acciden-
tal death interrupted his writing of Le Premier Homme (The First Man; 
published posthumously in 1994), more than a century elapsed, and 
that century saw a number of decisive sociopolitical shifts. France went 
from a restored monarchy to the Fifth Republic, between which the July 
Monarchy, the Second Republic, Napoleon’s second imperial regime, 
and the Third and Fourth Republics unfolded. In addition, the country 
experienced the major upheavals of the July Revolution, the 1848 Rev-
olution, the 1851 coup d’état, and the Paris Commune, as well as the 
two world wars that marked the twentieth century. Equally important 
over this long century, from the 1950s onward, was the process of de-
colonization ending the colonial domination that had culminated under 
the Third Republic. At the time Le Premier Homme was being written, 
the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62) was raging.
Nevertheless, from the early nineteenth century to the second half of 
the twentieth, the definition of capital punishment as “the mere depriva-
tion of life” (Article 2 of the Penal Code of 1791) remained unchanged 
in France. For almost two centuries, this ultimate penalty was obtained 
in the same way: through head severance and, in Dr. Joseph-Ignace 
Guillotin’s words, “by means of a simple mechanism” (Article 6), that 
of the guillotine promoted by Dr. Antoine Louis, permanent secretary of 
the Académie de chirurgie (Academy of Surgeons).12 This institutional 
heritage, informed by ideology, science, and technology, unifies the sub-
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stantial period spanning 1791 to 1981, from the time the Louisette—as 
the guillotine was nicknamed, after its promoter’s last name—was ad-
opted, up until the year of abolition.
The enduring use of the guillotine can be explained in part by the 
perceived virtues with which it was originally associated. During the 
French Revolution, a humanitarian and progressive spirit motivated pe-
nal reform, in particular the abolition of cruel modes of killing, supplices 
(brutal corporal punishment usually leading to death) such as the wheel, 
quartering, and burning at the stake. This reform had its roots in the Eu-
ropean Enlightenment, and more specifically in the thought of the Italian 
philosopher and jurist Cesare Beccaria (1738–1794), an avid reader of 
Montesquieu, Rousseau, and the French Encyclopedists. In 1764, Becca-
ria published an anonymous, groundbreaking treatise entitled Dei delitti 
e delle pene (On Crimes and Punishments). It defended a secular and 
liberal definition of penalty, provocatively stating in its twenty-eighth 
chapter that “the death penalty is not a matter of right . . . but is an act 
of war on the part of society against the citizen that comes about when it 
is deemed necessary or useful to destroy his existence.” He then solemnly 
stated, “But if I can go on to prove that such a death is neither necessary 
nor useful, I shall have won the cause of humanity.”13
Abbé Morellet translated Dei delitti e delle pene into French at the 
end of 1765, and such major figures as d’Alembert, Grimm, and Voltaire 
warmly welcomed it.14 In 1766, Voltaire also published a Commentaire 
on the treatise and sent Beccaria his Relation de la mort du Chevalier 
de la Barre (Account of the Death of the Chevalier de la Barre). This 
“enlightened” movement peaked in 1795 with the décret du 4 Brumaire 
de l’an IV, whose first article ensured that the death penalty would be 
abolished “as of the date of publication [of the declaration] of general 
peace.”15 While this prospect proved vain, the guillotine’s inauguration 
in 1792 gave shape to the egalitarian and liberal aspirations of the era’s 
law makers. The machine guaranteed the same, supposedly painless and 
immediate execution for all men convicted of a capital crime regardless 
of the specifics of what had been committed and the condemned man’s 
social status.16 Although the Code pénal of 1810 abandoned the con-
ditional abolitionist provision of 1795, it upheld the stipulation that 
“Every individual condemned to death will be beheaded” (Article 12, 
formerly Article 3). Notwithstanding the fact that its thirteenth article 
arguably restored cruelty by requesting the severance of the hand for 
parricides, it thereby sustained most of the reformist principles that mo-
tivated the Louisette’s adoption and legitimation.17
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In addition, one founding event turned capital punishment by guil-
lotine into a historical emblem: the Reign of Terror. In 1793 and 1794, 
the recourse to death sentences was systematized with the paradoxical 
aim of “building a new world in which capital punishment would no 
longer have reason to exist,” as the historian Jean-Claude Farcy has 
noted.18 The Terror marked the climax of a sanctified bloody justice.19 
Seventeen thousand individuals were executed on order of Revolution-
ary tribunals and about the same number died in prison as “suspects.”20 
Decades—indeed centuries—after it ended, the French and European 
cultural imagination, and particularly literary works, still bear the 
imprint of this judicial terror. Post-Revolutionary literature in French 
also frequently features the death penalty because, despite a marked 
overall decline in death sentences as one moves toward the twentieth 
century, sporadic increases in condemnations and executions, as well 
as debates about the legitimacy of lethal justice, recur at key junctures 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: the First Empire, the Second 
Restoration, the Revolutions of 1830 and 1848, the 1850s, the Belle 
Époque, the two world wars, and the Algerian War of Independence.21
Hugo, Baudelaire, and Camus are united not just by this dense politi-
cal and cultural heritage of the Revolution and by the largely unchanged 
definition and practice of capital justice that spanned the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Their works also epitomize what is fundamentally 
at stake in this lengthy period, namely mankind’s new sense of responsi-
bility. The 1790s and the guillotine marked the advent of secularization, 
a process that radically altered French society’s understanding of the 
world. Most obviously, the fall of the absolute monarchy supported by 
divine right put an end to the idea that society depended exclusively 
on a transcendent divine authority. Louis XVI’s decapitation and the 
weakening of the Catholic Church, confiscation of its assets, and the 
civil constitution of the clergy established in 1790 formed part of this 
major political and religious shift that enacted a distancing from the 
sacred. These events conjured up the possibility of numerous absences: 
the absence of a postmortem salvation, about which Hugo’s condemned 
man wonders; the absence of a divine justice capable of compensating 
for man’s flawed judgment; the absence of a superior causality that may 
supersede human intelligence.
A reconsideration of man’s position and powers on earth thus oc-
curred in the post-Revolutionary period. The resistance it produced 
in the form of counter-Revolutionary movements, restorations, or the 
preservation of faith could not erase these events and the dramatic 
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symbolic upheaval they caused: society had now caught sight of a new 
configuration of the world in which human agency prevailed. This sec-
ularized consciousness permeated the legal and judicial institutions. 
Their representatives and, more broadly, society could no longer rely on 
God so fully to guide their judgment or correct their errors when they 
carried out justice. Capital punishment therefore became a more human 
matter at the turn of the nineteenth century and in the decades that 
followed.22 Nineteenth-century literature was impelled to reflect this 
anthropocentric revolution, and twentieth-century history only made 
more acute this question of the weighty burden of human responsibility 
in the administering of killing.
There remain, of course, acute literary and ideological differences 
between Hugo, Baudelaire, and Camus. The first has come to embody 
French Romanticism and the belief in the progressive function of art. 
His works have been reputed to show an increasing commitment to 
humanitarianism.23 In contrast, the second marked the advent of a 
modern French poetry that dismantled the traditional association of 
beauty with goodness. Baudelaire praised dandyism and amoral, if not 
immoral, aesthetics over the reformist political, social, and moral ideals 
of his predecessor.24 As opposed to Hugo, who was prolific in all literary 
genres, Baudelaire’s œuvre is essentially composed of poetry. Conversely, 
Camus favored the novel and drama. He rejected the supposed gratu-
itous aestheticism of Baudelaire, who claimed to be “depoliticized” after 
the Revolution of 1848. Camus stubbornly refused to detach literature 
from the realities of its time. Yet despite a brief early affiliation with the 
Communist Party and a clear left-wing sensibility, he also resisted any 
binding party-based ideological and political allegiance. Likewise, he 
opposed the mature Hugo’s desire to have literary works serve a pre-
scribed sociopolitical and moral agenda. Furthermore, unlike Hugo, the 
Nobel laureate never represented a particular literary school, although 
he is often mistakenly presented as an existentialist. Lastly, it seems that 
Hugo’s and Camus’s styles could not be more at odds, if one thinks of 
the former’s ample and emphatic prose and of the latter’s often “blank 
writing” (écriture blanche), in the words of Roland Barthes.25
Examining the three writers’ treatment of the death penalty helps 
us to comprehend some of these remarkable divergences and allows us 
to qualify others. It reveals biographical, but also, more importantly, 
literary and philosophical points of contact. In his youth, Baudelaire 
read Hugo’s most important work of fiction on the death penalty, Le 
Dernier Jour d’un condamné. Later, he wished to rebut not just Claude 
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Gueux (1834), as mentioned previously, but also Jean Valjean, the pro-
tagonist of Les Misérables.26 The young Camus too knew Le Dernier 
Jour: the first prose piece he ever published, in the inaugural issue of 
the high school publication Sud, was entitled “Le Dernier Jour d’un 
mort-né” (The Last Day of a Still-Born; 1931). Later on, in such works 
as L’Étranger (1942) and “Réflexions sur la guillotine” (1957), Camus 
would appropriate some of the issues, central images, and enunciative 
and narrative devices foregrounded in Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné, 
all the while criticizing what he called Hugo’s “good convicts” (OCC 
4:159). L’Homme révolté (The Rebel; 1951) would also examine both 
Baudelaire’s status as a “poet of crime” and a dandy relishing terror, 
and Joseph de Maistre, the poet’s supposed favorite reactionary thinker.
Beyond these sporadic literary encounters, all three authors inter-
rogate the human condition, and the ways literature may portray it. 
Killing, both legal and illegal, feeds into these interrogations and of-
ten sheds light on the crossroads of the historical and the metaphys-
ical. Hugo reflected on killing through direct and indirect evocations 
of the French Revolution and its legacy in narratives such as Han d’Is-
lande (Hans of Iceland), Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné, and Qua-
trevingt-Treize (Ninety-Three). Albeit less extensively, Baudelaire and 
Camus followed suit in Mon cœur mis à nu (My Heart Laid Bare) and 
L’Homme révolté respectively. All three writers’ texts also carried the 
imprint of the capital crimes that seemed to characterize post-Revolu-
tionary France, whether owing to the brutal political ruptures, expo-
nential growth of cities and rampant pauperization that marked the 
nineteenth century (Hugo and Baudelaire) or due to the climax of mass 
murder reached with the Second World War and twentieth-century to-
talitarianisms (Camus). Bloody crimes, political crimes, crimes of pas-
sion, gloomy faits divers, gratuitous crimes, or what we now call crimes 
against humanity, all punishable by death, occupy a privileged place in 
the poetic and fictional writings considered here.
Both a substantial corpus and an original triangular reflection on 
paroxysmal violence, and more particularly on lethal crime and state 
killing, can therefore be found in Hugo, Baudelaire, and Camus. The 
chapters that follow focus on works of particular literary richness in 
these authors’ extensive œuvres: Hugo’s early novel Le Dernier Jour 
d’un condamné, Baudelaire’s celebrated collection Les Fleurs du mal 
(The Flowers of Evil), as well as what is commonly called his Journaux 
intimes, and Camus’s novels L’Étranger, La Peste (The Plague), and Le 
Premier Homme. These writings present individuals in contexts that 
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challenge their humanity and humaneness. They portray characters and 
personae who experience forms of exclusion, imminent destruction, 
as well as self-questioning and tentative resilience in the face of the 
death penalty understood literally, figuratively, or both. Hugo features 
an anonymous criminal awaiting his execution; Baudelaire conjoins the 
condemned man and the poet as actors of a society, if not of a human 
race, marked by devastation and corruption; Camus produces other sce-
narios and protagonists exploring lethal justice: the innocent criminal 
convicted because he “does not play the game” and “wanders, on the 
sideline, at the outer edge of private, solitary, sensual life” (OCC 1:215), 
the humble people resisting all forms of death, and the simple man dis-
covering his solidarity with even the most brutal murderer.
Above all, what connects these writings is the sophisticated poetic 
work undertaken to bring to life the cas limite of a unique institution 
and its imaginary. It gives the condemned man, the executioner, the vic-
tim, and the spectator greater visibility, or a new ability to see. Hugo, 
Baudelaire, and Camus present the reader with what could be called 
“capital literature”: not only does it feature capital punishment and its 
imaginary, but such literature also deals with matters of life and death 
that challenge both conscience and representability, and it undertakes 
crucial work in sharpening our critical understanding of justice at the 
extremes. The death penalty is extreme in that it delineates multiple, 
stratified limits: between life and death, of course, but also between 
illegal and legal murder, between criminal and victim, since one may 
be transformed into the other when death looms, and between various 
mental states. And, in the case of decapitation, limits between head and 
body, between the visible and the invisible—for the moment of behead-
ing is so swift witnesses have sometimes deemed it imperceptible27—be-
tween understandable penalty and unintelligible, unbearable violence, 
or between intense suffering and insensibility. The three authors share 
a quest for words and images that address these limits and the zone 
between them.
A word on method is in order. Encompassing works in prose and 
verse from the Romantic, post-Romantic, and contemporary periods, 
this book emphasizes the close reading of major texts. It aims to dissect 
the linguistic and imagistic devices the authors use to represent capital 
punishment, but also to reflect on the impact that the institution of cap-
ital punishment may have on literature. It is my contention that state 
killing and its imaginary lead Hugo, Baudelaire, and Camus to inter-
rogate the function, tools, and limits of their art. While foregrounding 
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textual analysis, this study also aims to remain attentive to the specific 
sociopolitical, judicial, and literary contexts in which the narratives and 
poems appeared. This careful contextualization accounts for the out-
line chosen and its chronological basis. The monograph begins with a 
detailed examination of Hugo’s most significant narrative on the death 
penalty and goes on to examine Baudelaire’s and Camus’s works taken 
both individually and comparatively. 
Where this proves fruitful, the close readings proposed in this book 
are informed by the reflections of Giorgio Agamben, Michel Foucault, 
René Girard, and Jacques Rancière on actual or symbolic violence, dis-
course, and state power. Ultimately, my readings attempt to cast light 
on encounters between poetics and ethics. I take “poetics” to refer to 
“everything that concerns the creation or the composition of works for 
which language (le langage) is at once the substance and the means,” in 
accordance with Paul Valéry’s etymologically inflected definition of the 
term.28 “Ethics” is understood, with Paul Ricœur, as meaning “to live 
well, with and for the other, in fair institutions.”29
Part I analyzes the groundbreaking abolitionist poetics deployed 
in Hugo’s Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné. This text, which takes the 
form of a condemned man’s diary, specifically stages the intersection of 
capital punishment and writing. Chapter 1 shows how, and with what 
effect, the novel turns on its head conventional modes of representation 
and replaces them with a regime of expression that transforms the read-
er’s usual perception of the death penalty. Chapter 2 examines one of 
the results of this poetics, namely Hugo’s critique of a penal modernity 
assumed to move away from pain and toward Enlightenment values 
such as human rights.
Part II considers Baudelaire’s pro–death penalty statements and proj-
ects on the death penalty as well as his verse foregrounding capital vi-
olence and bloodshed. Chapter 3 contextualizes Baudelaire’s trenchant 
defense of capital punishment in several prose pieces and interrogates 
his redefinition of this institution as a kind of sacrifice in relation to Hu-
go’s and Joseph de Maistre’s work. Chapter 4 turns to Baudelaire’s 1855 
essay “De l’essence du rire et généralement du comique dans les arts 
plastiques” (On the Essence of Laughter and Generally on the Comic in 
the Plastic Arts) and to the most graphic poems of Les Fleurs du mal in 
order to determine how their imaginary of execution problematizes the 
poet’s praise of sacrifice.
Part III further probes the relationship between lethal punishment, 
poetic craft, and ethical reflection, with a focus on Camus’s novels 
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featuring the death penalty and, peripherally, his plays and the essay 
“Réflexions sur la guillotine.” It studies both the idiosyncrasies of 
these works and their relation to Hugo’s and Baudelaire’s critique of 
state killing. Chapter 5 explores the figuration of the death penalty in 
L’Étranger, La Peste, and Le Premier Homme and the decisive role it 
comes to play in their storylines and characterizations. Chapter 6 ad-
dresses the question of language as it preoccupies not just Camus but 
also Hugo and Baudelaire, when they represent lethal justice and its 
imaginary. It investigates how their works engage with the writer’s re-
sponsibility as he portrays the death penalty. Together, I argue, the three 
writers establish both a transhistorical dialogue on the status of modern 
lethal law and a profound critical reflection on modern literary modes 
of engagement.

Part I
New Abolitionist Poetics
Hugo’s Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné
Dans le jury, il suffisait parfois d’une voix pour sauver la 
tête d’un homme. Combien ont été sauvés parce que les jurés 
avaient lu Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné?
In the jury, one vote was sometimes enough to save a man’s 
life. How many were saved because the jurors had read The 
Last Day of a Condemned Man?
—Robert Badinter, preface to Choses vues à travers Hugo: 
Hommage à Guy Rosa (2007)
Hugo’s Scaffolds
The death penalty was both familiar and repulsive to Victor Hugo 
(1802–1885) from a very young age. He reportedly caught sight of the 
remains of hanged men suspended from trees in Italy in 1807 and saw a 
terrified Spanish man who had been condemned to death walking to the 
scaffold in 1812, the year his own godfather, General Lahorie, was exe-
cuted.1 In 1820, Louis Pierre Louvel, the murderer of the duc de Berry, 
was also led to the scaffold before Hugo’s eyes. This, and the greasing of 
the guillotine he witnessed before the execution of a young man guilty 
of a crime of passion in September 1827, allegedly led Hugo to write 
his work of fiction that focuses exclusively on capital punishment: Le 
Dernier Jour d’un condamné (1829).2
Hugo arguably developed the most extensive portrayal of and ethi-
cal reflection on state killing of the nineteenth century. In myriad other 
texts, he created a gallery of memorable visions and brought forward 
moral, sociopolitical, and religious arguments in favor of abolition. Not 
16 ❘ New Abolitionist Poetics
only did the issue of capital punishment permeate many of his novels, 
from Bug-Jargal (1820, 1826) to Han d’Islande (1823), Notre-Dame de 
Paris (1831), Claude Gueux (1834), Les Misérables (1862), L’Homme 
qui rit (The Man Who Laughs; 1869) or Quatrevingt-Treize (1874), but 
it also punctuated his dramatic, poetic, and visual works.3
As he became a figure increasingly committed to social progress and 
the defense of all misérables, the death penalty also found itself at the 
center of his most forceful political speeches.4 The one he delivered 
before the Assemblée constituante on September 15, 1848, famously 
called for “l’abolition pure, simple et définitive de la peine de mort” (the 
pure, simple, and definitive abolition of the death penalty), as opposed 
to the abolition of the death penalty for political crimes only. In 1851, 
he spoke against capital punishment at the Cour d’assises de la Seine 
when his own son Charles was put on trial and sentenced to six months 
in prison for criticizing an execution. In addition, he supported the abo-
litionist cause abroad, acting as a tireless rhetorician and a sort of moral 
guarantor for a number of foreign authorities seeking to question lethal 
justice. Most important, perhaps, the author intervened publicly and in 
private in favor of men condemned to death. Among them were such 
individuals as John Charles Tapner, the English criminal he defended 
in vain before his botched hanging in 1854; the American abolitionist 
John Brown, executed in 1859; and the condemned men of the Paris 
Commune.
Contextualizing “le livre de la tête coupée”
The two chapters that follow limit themselves to the investigation of 
Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné, both because of space constraints and 
because the text’s literary richness and emphasis on the death penalty 
are unequaled. It laid the groundwork for major reflections on and rep-
resentations of the death penalty by such prominent figures as Fyodor 
Dostoevsky, Albert Camus, and Robert Badinter. Written for the most 
part in December 1828, Hugo’s novel was first published in early Feb-
ruary 1829. It relates, in the form of a first-person account, the experi-
ence of a man condemned to death, from his sentencing to the day of 
his decapitation. Hence the telling nickname that the author gave to 
his creation: “le livre de la tête coupée” (the book of the severed head; 
OCH 9:1275).
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Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné came out at a time of economic hard-
ship and strict penal measures. A dramatic increase in poverty marked 
the end of the 1820s in France. The price of bread, which went up by 
65 percent between 1826 and 1828, made the lower classes extremely 
vulnerable.5 Fearful of the misdeeds that might tempt such misérables, 
the wealthier workers and owners pushed for harsher penalties. Ex-
treme penal severity characterized the reign of Charles X (1824–1830), 
and the Code pénal of 1810 did not do away with capital punishment 
despite the 1795 decree according to which the death sentence was to 
be abolished as of the date of publication of the declaration of general 
peace. It found over thirty-five crimes punishable by death, established 
that parricides would have their hand cut off, reinstated branding, and 
made aiding and abetting a capital crime in certain cases.6 Attempted 
capital crimes were also subject to the death penalty.7 An additional 
drastic measure was adopted in 1825, making the death penalty appli-
cable to acts of sacrilege.
Against this exacting justice, an abolitionist campaign was launched. 
In 1826, the Société de la morale chrétienne in Paris and the comte 
de Sellon in Geneva organized two concours (essay competitions) on 
capital punishment and abolition. Newspapers such as Le Globe and 
La Gazette des Tribunaux published articles on the subject, and politi-
co-penal essays by Benjamin Constant, François Guizot, Charles Lucas 
(winner of the two 1826 concours), and Pierre-Simon Ballanche, among 
others, argued to varying degrees for the inappropriateness, the useless-
ness, or the illegitimacy of lethal justice.8
This activism failed to affect the law.9 Yet the liberals had a strong 
voice in the Chambre des députés, and 114 people were sentenced to 
death in 1828, compared to over 500 in 1816 and 1817, and 304 in 
1820.10 Historians have argued that, because of the severity of the 1810 
penal code, which led to more capital sentencing than in the last decades 
of the Ancien Régime, juries began to circumvent the death penalty, 
either through acquittals or through petitions in favor of more tailored 
and humane treatments of individual cases.11 Hugo’s fiction relies on 
a potent investigative and literary protocol that appears to echo this 
concern with the inhumane nature of capital justice: a protagonist’s 
close observation and writing of distress in a situation of radical ex-
clusion and imminent death that the reader perceives through imposed 
voyeurism.
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“Fantaisie” vs. Politics?
A number of reviewers have expressed a particular reservation about 
Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné, however. Addressing this hesitation 
before turning to the novel’s substance is useful in that it calls for a 
closer examination of its production and specificities. The reservation in 
question concerns the nature of Hugo’s enterprise and authorial inten-
tion. Some critics have asked: Is his book an opportunistic “fantaisie” 
(preface of 1829, 641)—a figment of the imagination at the basis of 
a formally free work in keeping with the trend of the day—or a true 
abolitionist plea?12
Hugo was not the first French writer to address the death penalty in 
the 1820s. A friend of his, the Romantic author Jules Lefèvre-Deumier, 
had written several poems on the issue by 1825.13 In 1828, Vidocq, a 
former criminal turned director of the Brigade de sûreté, published the 
first two volumes of his famous memoirs, and in 1829, a melodrama 
about the beheaded Revolutionary heroine Charlotte Corday, proud 
murderer of the Jacobin Jean-Paul Marat, came out.14 In addition, in 
or shortly after 1830, such renowned Romantic writers as Alphonse 
de Lamartine, Alfred de Vigny, and Charles Nodier denounced lethal 
justice.15 Lesser-known writers also dealt with the subject.16 Thus one 
might have reason to believe that Hugo’s work essentially is a literary 
exercise designed to emulate his era’s many publications on a popular 
and sensationalistic question. Proponents of this view have argued that 
Hugo’s text was defined as a defense of the abolition of capital pun-
ishment only a posteriori. They have noted that he used neither the 
term “plea” (plaidoyer) nor an explicit and fully developed abolitionist 
argument until 1832, when he grafted onto his novel an extensive and 
emphatic preface explicitly condemning capital punishment.
Notwithstanding the fact that authorial intention may not be as im-
portant as artistic content and form, and besides the possibility that 
several motivations may underlie a single work of art, one should not, 
however, neglect meaningful data. First, evidence reveals that Hugo 
wished to take part in the impassioned campaign against lethal justice 
previously mentioned. The postscriptum that closes his letter of January 
3, 1829, to his editor Gosselin indicates that he aimed for Le Dernier 
Jour to influence this public ethical and political debate: “It is import-
ant to send The Condemned Man to press quickly, if you want it to be 
published before the Chamber [convenes], which is of the utmost im-
portance [sic]” (1243). Hugo here refers to the debate that was to occur 
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on February 28, 1829, at the Chambre des députés about the possible 
reconsideration of counterfeiting as a capital crime.17
Second, as early as February 28, 1829, “A Comedy about a Tragedy,” 
the play-preface that was inserted in the book just three weeks after 
its first publication and that set out to mock its detractors, mentions 
Hugo’s abolitionist intent most explicitly and suggests that it was well 
understood by readers:
quelqu’un: Mais, ce roman, dans quel but l’a-t-il fait? . . .
un philosophe: À ce qu’il paraît, dans le but de concourir à 
l’abolition de la peine de mort. (65)
someone: But, this novel, for what purpose did he write it? . . .
a philosopher: Rumor has it it was to contribute to the 
abolition of the death penalty.
At the end of this satirical addendum, a “thin Monsieur” laments, 
“Maintenant on veut abolir la peine de mort, et pour cela on fait des 
romans cruels, immoraux et de mauvais goût, le Dernier Jour d’un Con-
damné, que sais-je?” (Now people want to abolish the death penalty, 
and to that end, cruel, immoral, and inappropriate novels are written, 
The Last Day of a Condemned Man, or what have you?; 654). A note 
added to the edition of 1832 also highlights the avalanche of hostile 
political, moral, and literary criticism that Le Dernier Jour elicited as a 
participant in the public debate on abolitionism in the late 1820s (643).
Le Dernier Jour was intended as an abolitionist plea from the start, 
then, and well before Hugo wrote a substantial second preface to his 
book in 1832.18 That the novel itself is abolitionist in nature does not 
prevent it from also functioning as a “fantaisie” in the sense of an imag-
inative work. Quite the contrary: part I investigates the particulars of 
this very interface between politics and creation. It shows that the nov-
el’s compelling efficacy as a “plea” is lodged in the poetic modalities of 
Hugo’s narrative.19
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Chapter 1
The Death Penalty, from 
Representation to Expression
On louait des tables, des chaises, des échafaudages, des 
charrettes. Tout pliait de spectateurs. Des marchands de sang 
humain criaient à tue-tête:
—Qui veut des places? 
Une rage m’a pris contre ce peuple. J’ai eu envie de leur crier:
—Qui veut la mienne?
People were renting tables, chairs, scaffolding. The whole 
place was bursting with spectators. Dealers in human blood 
were shouting their heads off:
“Who would like seats?” 
A rage against this people came over me. I felt like shouting 
at them:
“Who would like mine?”
—Victor Hugo, Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné, chapter 
XLVIII
When, in 1829, Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné first came out, Victor 
Hugo did not oppose the death penalty in his own name: this publication 
was initially anonymous. Nor did he seek to articulate religious or utili-
tarian abolitionist arguments.1 Before him, Chateaubriand, the Catholic 
writer he so revered, and, at greater length, Pierre-Simon Ballanche had 
asserted that the crucifixion of Christ constituted an exceptional and 
sufficiently bloody expiation of man’s sins, which terrestrial justice was 
therefore not to replicate. The eighteenth-century jurist Cesare Beccaria, 
and the French and European philosophers who followed his lead, had 
tended to insist on the useless, if not counterproductive, character of 
the death penalty by focusing on a cost-benefit calculation that pointed 
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to the negative political consequences of capital justice.2 As if antici-
pating Robert Badinter’s claim that “one does not overthrow scaffolds 
with arguments but with words, images, and emotions to which they 
give birth,” Hugo instead forged a new kind of writing to reach the 
affectivity of his audience, in addition to using reason.3 In 1825, he had 
indirectly set a challenge for himself:
Tu veux être poète—
—Sais-tu quelle pensée agite
Une tête qui va tomber? (OCH 2:961)
You want to be a poet—
—Do you know what thought agitates
A head about to be cut off?
Four years later, the form of Le Dernier Jour arguably answered this 
question thanks to formal reinvention.
Undoing Classical Representation
Once an ultraconservative whose political sensibility became increas-
ingly progressive, Hugo sided with the literary Moderns in 1823, when 
he gushingly praised the anti–death penalty poetry of Jules Lefèvre- 
Deumier, author of Le Parricide, poëme suivi d’autres poésies.4 He com-
mended its “strong and daring imagination . . . often rough and reckless 
in its conceptions,” its “expression, new and picturesque . . . frequently 
bizarre,” and the “torture” it sometimes imposed on poetic language 
(OCH 2:51). The proponents of Classicism deemed both the topic cho-
sen and the manner used to be iconoclastic and undesirable (50).5 Hugo, 
who attended the execution of the parricide Pierre-Louis Martin with 
Lefèvre-Deumier in 1820,6 had in fact already featured the death pen-
alty in his own first two novels, Bug-Jargal (1820, 1826) and Han d’Is-
lande (1823). They bore the imprint of the Gothic and of what Charles 
Nodier named the “Frenetic School,” which challenged the topical and 
poetic standards imposed by Classicism.7 But Le Dernier Jour set out to 
move beyond both these early narratives and the originality that Hugo 
hailed in Lefèvre-Deumier.8 It displayed even more radically revolution-
ary features to decry capital punishment, including the unpicking of 
time, space, events, and character.
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Dead time prevails in Le Dernier Jour. Forty-nine concise chapters 
providing glimpses into the condemned man’s consciousness are brack-
eted between the pronouncement of a death to come (the exclamation 
“Condamné à mort!” [Condemned to death!] inaugurates and punc-
tuates the novel) and death itself: an interrupted ending and the capi-
talization of the final words “quatre heures” (four o’clock) point 
to the imminent moment of the legal killing. Spatially, the novel is also 
locked in: enclosure reigns in the courtroom, the cell, and, above all, the 
mind. The condemned man is “en prison dans une idée” (imprisoned in 
an idea), that of the death sentence, “courbé sous son poids” (bent over 
under the weight of it; I, 657). An embedded incarceration, judicial and 
mental, therefore frames the narrative and has it function as a peculiar 
tragedy in which little room is left for action.
Except for writing, no significant deed marks the condemned man’s 
experience. Rather, he inhabits a world of fearful thoughts and mi-
cro-events, and, even when it comes to these modest happenings, he is 
unable to partake in them fully or actively. In his recollection of his trial, 
he remains inert despite his desire to speak; during most of his captivity, 
he finds himself reduced to watching the walls of his cell and interacting 
superficially with the prison guards and his fellow convicts. This inac-
tivity clearly distinguishes the protagonist from Hugo’s other famous, 
and always dynamic, convicts, from Claude Gueux, to the man in the 
iron mask, to Jean Valjean. The knowledge that all the other characters 
(his peers, the judicial and state authorities, and the people) are shown 
to have of the condemned man’s status and the repeated reminders of 
his impending execution bring home his inescapable passivity.
Instead of relating a dynamic sequence of events, the novel fore-
grounds the protagonist’s moral and emotional wandering through 
internal focalization. This results in a relative diegetic discontinuity 
within the narrative’s dead time: analepses, prolepses, and digressions 
alternate in the condemned man’s prose as his mind races to come to 
terms with his sentence. The narrative breaks with the conventions of 
early nineteenth-century French fiction, which did explore the interior 
life and subjectivity of characters in depth but was still concerned with 
the unfolding of a plot or a particular destiny—from Chateaubriand 
to Constant, de Staël, Stendhal, or the early Balzac. In contrast, Hugo 
stages a nameless and, even more strikingly, story-less protagonist.
Indeed, the chapter  meant to reveal the condemned man’s life and 
misdeed (XLVII) is left blank. Contrary to what some critics have as-
serted, his identity and history are not erased entirely, however.9 Several 
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cues suggest that he is educated (III, 662) and belongs to a relatively 
privileged social sphere: his knowledge of Latin, his manners, his disgust 
when he wakes up on a pallet bed in the prison infirmary (XIV, 674), 
and his clothing, elegant and unworn (XXIII, 689), for instance. The 
condemned man’s portrayal therefore constitutes what might be called 
a countersketch: it is minimalistic, but provides enough information for 
him to emerge as the counterpoint to the stereotypical nineteenth-cen-
tury criminal. Hugo thereby reverses the figure of the irredeemable 
proletarian gangster found in contemporary medical and criminolog-
ical discourses.10 And while the narrative is structured as a tragedy, the 
represented subject is not an aristocratic or heroic figure. Hugo replaces 
these forms of characterization imposed by deterministic sociology and 
rigid literary genres with a suffering silhouette into which the bourgeois 
reader is absorbed.
The overlap created between character and reader is furthered by the 
occasional confusion of voices and other modes of conflation between 
character, author, and audience. The injunctive formula “Condemned 
to death!” that inaugurates the text and recurs throughout cannot be 
assigned to a single voice, for instance, although that of the condemned 
man otherwise predominates. Rather, this exclamation leads the reader 
to wonder whether it constitutes a performative utterance emanating 
from the judicial institution; the whisper of the alienated condemned 
man’s interior voice—he does claim, after all, that “une voix a mur-
muré à [son] oreille” (a voice has whispered in [his] ear; I, 658); or a 
collective hateful shout (661). With this opening phrase, whose source 
remains unclear and whose repetition in the first chapters gives it a 
chorus-like quality, Hugo raises the question of who is responsible for 
the death sentence, as an utterance and a reality. Such enunciative in-
stability disorients the reader, all the more so as we quickly become the 
possible doppelgänger of each of the actors liable to utter these ominous 
few words: the judge, hearing and assessing the protagonist’s case; the 
stunned protagonist himself, into whose shoes we are put; and the peo-
ple, reacting with emotion and voyeurism to a criminal’s condemnation.
Symmetrically, doubts arise regarding the text’s recipient. For if, in 
theory, the condemned man’s writing in the first person comes across as 
self-addressed and diaristic, several moments of interpellation trouble 
this logic. He repeatedly hints at the presence of some possible reader-
ship or witness. First, he envisages the future publication of his story 
and, later, considers its reception by “ceux qui condamnent” (those who 
pass judgment; VI, 664) and by a wider, indefinite audience: an all-em-
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bracing “on” (they; 698).11 Second, the frequent use of exclamations 
and rhetorical questions calls for outside sympathy or indignation in the 
present time of his writing:
Depuis l’heure où mon arrêt a été prononcé, combien sont 
morts qui s’arrangeaient pour une longue vie! Combien 
m’ont devancé qui, jeunes, libres et sains, comptaient bien 
aller voir tel jour tomber ma tête en place de Grève! Com-
bien d’ici là peut-être qui marchent et respirent au grand air, 
entrent et sortent à leur gré, et qui me devanceront encore!
Et puis, qu’est-ce que la vie a donc de si regrettable pour 
moi? (III, 662)
Since the hour when my sentence was pronounced, think 
how many have died who were all set for a long life! How 
many have preceded me, young, free, and healthy, who were 
fully expecting to go and see me lose my head this or that day 
on the Place de Grève! Before that time comes, how many 
are there walking and breathing in the open air, coming and 
going as they please, who might yet still die before I do!
And besides, what is there about my life that I will regret 
so much?
Such apostrophic rhetoric de facto forces us into the fictional space of 
the novel.
Likewise, the author occasionally brings himself into the diary. He 
is the implicit figure who proves the condemned man wrong when the 
protagonist declares himself unable to “voir un être humain qui [le] 
croie digne d’une parole et à qui [il] le rende” (see any human being 
who believes [him] worthy of being either spoken to or about; III, 662). 
Hugo also injects an italicized citation from his own Han d’Islande into 
the condemned man’s prose in chapter III and, throughout, distills anal-
ogies between himself and his protagonist. While the first edition of Le 
Dernier Jour was anonymous, subsequent editions were not and capital-
ized on Hugo’s name, which was hardly unknown after the publication 
of his Préface de Cromwell of 1827, the manifesto of French Romantic 
drama.12 More important, a passage superimposes writer and character 
independently of Hugo’s particular identity: chapter VI thematizes the 
question of writing and conjoins the condemned man penning his or-
deal and, at the metafictional level, the author crafting his novel. After 
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the condemned man questions the point of transcribing his thoughts 
and feelings onto paper, he concludes that his enterprise is legitimate 
and ends up justifying the very form and agenda Hugo adopted for his 
book:
Ce journal de mes souffrances, heure par heure, minute par 
minute, supplice par supplice, si j’ai la force de le mener 
jusqu’au moment où il me sera physiquement impossible 
de continuer, cette histoire, nécessairement inachevée, mais 
aussi complète que possible, de mes sensations, ne portera-t-
elle point avec elle un grand et profond enseignement? N’y 
aura-t-il pas dans ce procès-verbal de la pensée agonisante, 
dans cette progression toujours croissante de douleurs, dans 
cette espèce d’autopsie intellectuelle d’un condamné, plus 
d’une leçon pour ceux qui condamnent? Peut-être cette lec-
ture leur rendra-t-elle la main moins légère, quand il s’agira 
quelquefois de jeter une tête qui pense, une tête d’homme, 
dans ce qu’ils appellent la balance de la justice? Peut-être 
n’ont-ils jamais réfléchi, les malheureux, à cette lente succes-
sion de tortures que renferme la formule expéditive d’un ar-
rêt de mort? Se sont-ils jamais arrêtés à cette idée poignante 
que dans l’homme qu’ils retranchent il y a une intelligence; 
une intelligence qui avait compté sur la vie, une âme qui ne 
s’est point disposée pour la mort? Non. (VI, 664)
This daily record of my sufferings, hour by hour, minute by 
minute, ordeal by ordeal, if I have the strength to carry on 
with it until the moment when it will be physically impos-
sible for me to continue, this story of my sensations, nec-
essarily unfinished, but as complete as possible, won’t it 
contain a great and profound teaching? Won’t there be, in 
these minutes of agonizing thought, in this increasing pro-
gression of pain, in this sort of intellectual autopsy of a 
condemned man, many a lesson for those who condemn? 
Maybe this reading will make them less heavy-handed in the 
future, when it comes to throwing a thinking head, a man’s 
head, into what they call the scales of justice? Maybe, poor 
them, they have never thought about this slow succession of 
ordeals contained in the expeditious formula of a death sen-
tence? Have they ever paused to consider this poignant idea 
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that, in the man they are removing, there is a mind; a mind 
that had counted on life, a soul that did not prepare itself for 
death? No, they haven’t.
Some of the terms used here possess a manifesto-like quality and antic-
ipate those Hugo will choose for his preface of 1832. They thus chal-
lenge the text’s internal focalization. As if by means of ventriloquism, 
the character accounts for the author’s didactic enterprise of laying bare 
the psychic reality behind capital punishment.
Le Dernier Jour therefore destabilizes spatiotemporal coordinates, 
atomizes plot and action under the pressure of the obsession of death, 
empties out character, represents an unexpected subject, intermittently 
conflates protagonist, author, and audience, and blocks off the possibil-
ity of a dénouement by making the spectacle and narrative of (his own) 
decapitation inaccessible to the protagonist. In so doing, it resolutely 
undoes key tenets of classical representation. Instead, what prevails is a 
discourse disorganized by fear.
Further Disorder: Narrative Inconsistency  
and Defictionalization
There is more to the literary disorder orchestrated by Hugo. The book’s 
very title, when confronted with its actual content, creates an aporia. 
Several time markers point to a duration that far exceeds the twen-
ty-four hours it promises to the reader (I, 657; II, 661). We in fact wit-
ness the last week of the condemned man’s existence, and the month 
and a half subsequent to his condemnation is also narrated. The text os-
cillates between retrospection and contemporaneity, and the latter does 
not take over until the chilling wake-up call of chapter XIX: “C’est pour 
aujourd’hui!” (Today’s the day!; 679). In addition to these narrative 
inconsistencies, the condemned man, against all verisimilitude, seems 
to have the strength, time and ability to put pen to paper continuously 
until his very last hour.13
Contrary to what one might expect, however, these breaches of the 
narrative ethos do not generate mistrust in the speaker or an estrange-
ment effect that points to the illusory nature of the condemned man’s 
story. While they do fulfill the Brechtian agenda of making the audience 
a “consciously critical observer” led to ponder sociopolitical matters, 
the opposite of a distancing occurs: the discontinuities and incoherence 
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of Le Dernier Jour lead to the reader’s full adhesion to the protago-
nist’s experience, as they appear to both reveal and be produced by the 
irresistible violence and inner turmoil triggered by the sentence pro-
nouncement that launches the book’s inexorable race to the scaffold. 
The condemned man’s prose implements a peculiar realism anchored in 
the immediate life of a threatened psyche and thereby creates a litera-
ture that refuses to regulate anguish.
The genre of Le Dernier Jour partakes in this removal from the realm 
and rules of fiction. Jean Rousset has argued that the text marked the 
invention of the “roman-journal” (novel-diary).14 Combining a single 
protagonist, a single locus (the prison), and a single, autocentric dis-
course allowed Hugo to deepen the sense of intimacy characteristic of 
writings based on self-expression, such as first-person narratives, au-
tobiographies, and epistolary novels, which, from Rousseau to Laclos, 
had flourished during the French eighteenth century. The faux diary also 
suppresses the minimal distancing found in the published poems, nov-
els in the third person, short stories, and memoirs that addressed the 
issue of capital punishment in the 1820s. Instead, it exposes a speak-
er’s experience and subjectivity as unaffected by the social codes and 
intersubjective dynamics present in some of these other highly popular 
genres, pushing to its limits the sense of veracity and privacy they strove 
to achieve.
What further defictionalizes the novel-diary is the context in which 
it was produced and the paratext with which Hugo envelops the con-
demned man’s account. As an early reviewer did not fail to notice, the 
book came out after periodicals published first-person narratives re-
lating the in extremis experience of actual men condemned to death.15 
One such publication was the diary of a Corsican convict who starved 
himself to death, all the while reporting on his slow and painful de-
mise.16 Another was the testimony of an Englishman who miraculously 
survived his hanging. Published in Le Globe on January 3, 1828, the 
latter piece is strikingly similar to the novel in several respects. Not only 
does the title of the article in which it is inserted, “Dernières sensations 
d’un homme condamné à mort” (Last Sensations of a Man Condemned 
to Death), bear an obvious likeness to the title of Hugo’s novel; the 
framing, descriptions, and analytical quality of the Englishman’s diary, 
which Le Globe summarizes as “everything he felt from the verdict until 
his execution,” including “the gradual extinction of all moral thought, 
sensory perceptions becoming clearer and more distinct as the faculties 
of the soul grow weaker, the almost-absolute impossibility of turning to 
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religious ideas,” are also the same as those of Le Dernier Jour.17 The re-
peated anticipation of the execution, visions, hallucinations, and alter-
ations of the condemned man’s consciousness that pervade Le Dernier 
Jour structure this British source text as well. Hugo complemented these 
testimonies, presented as genuine, with accurate or colorful depictions 
of the realities of carceral life with which he sought to become familiar 
through direct and indirect examination, including visits to the Bicêtre 
prison.18
Le Dernier Jour reinforces such a reality effect through an efficient 
paratext. The book’s first edition of 1829, as well as the following one, 
comprised two elements: a preface suggesting that the condemned man’s 
story may (or may not) have been transcribed from a “liasse de papiers 
jaunes et inégaux” (bundle of discolored papers of various sizes; 641) 
and, more remarkably, a foldout facsimile of the argot song heard by 
the condemned man from within his cell, reportedly annotated by him, 
and found in his papers following his death (712; see also Figure 1). 
The process that underlies these multiple defictionalizing devices is 
one of recording: the novel stages the exhaustive logging of the con-
demned man’s mental, physical and social experience. It was Dosto-
evsky, such an avid reader of Le Dernier Jour that he referred to it when 
he himself faced a mock execution, who perhaps best pinpointed the 
psychological dimension of this quest for exhaustiveness. He argued 
that Hugo’s fiction, just like his own short story “A Gentle Creature” 
(1876), has a “fantastic element” to it that paradoxically makes it “one 
of the most realistic and most truthful [novels the Frenchman] ever 
wrote.” In the Russian writer’s opinion, the novel functions as if the 
transcription of a “psychological sequence” in its totality could be car-
ried out by a “stenographer” while a character would tell “a story, inter-
rupted by all sorts of digressions and interludes . . . in a rather rambling 
way . . . sometimes . . . speaking to himself, sometimes . . . addressing 
an invisible listener, a sort of judge.”19
The fact that Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné stages diaristic writing, 
inserts itself into a paratext and lineage of documents presented as genuine, 
and resorts to a hybrid scientific-administrative procedure of comprehen-
sive recording that brings realism to border on the unreal may account for 
the label that Hugo’s own satirical play-preface, “Une comédie à propos 
d’une tragédie,” attributes to his fiction: that of “nouveau roman” (647). 
He coined this now-familiar phrase long before Émile Henriot proposed it 
in 1957 and before Alain Robbe-Grillet subsequently adopted it to describe 
the enterprise of twentieth-century writers themselves eager to break away 
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from the consecrated genre of the novel.20 Negative critiques published 
shortly after Le Dernier Jour first came out emphasize the unacceptability 
of its new generic and poetic features—which have also puzzled twenti-
eth-century critics.21 Hugo’s own sales-oriented publisher, Charles Gosselin, 
shared this concern and also expressed reservations about the unique genre 
of Le Dernier Jour. But Hugo responded that he wished to publish an “an-
alytical” novel devoid of antecedents (1242–43).22
The “drame intérieur” of Le Dernier Jour thus appears to actualize 
deliberately, in the realm of prose fiction, what Hugo’s radical Préface de 
Cromwell of 1827 prescribed for the theater: a liberated form, a drama 
redefined as a kind of complete and modern poetry that renders reality in 
all its variety and starkest tensions. The narrative inconsistencies, hyper-
realism, and defictionalization used to shed crude light on  an “agonizing 
thought” reinforce the novel’s break away from what Jacques Rancière has 
called “representative poetry”: “Representative poetry was composed of 
Figure 1. Victor Hugo. Foldout facsimile insert included in the first edition of Le Dernier 
Jour d’un condamné. 1829. Maison de Victor Hugo, Paris / Guernesey.
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stories submitted to principles of concatenation, characters submitted to 
principles of verisimilitude, and discourses submitted to principles of deco-
rum.”23 By contrast, Hugo crafts a transgressive poetics that problematizes 
any palatable representation of the capital experience and abolishes the 
protective distance usually enjoyed by the reader of fiction, showing the 
inability of both to do justice to a story of life and (state-imposed) death.  
Crisis of Communication
The question of speech and communication prolongs that of a deliber-
ately troubled representation in Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné. A pro-
found crisis of linguistic exchanges pervades the novel. It problematizes 
the very articulation of language and key functions of verbal communi-
cation: expressive, conative, phatic, and referential.
Upon the pronouncement of his sentence and as the president of the 
court consults his lawyer concerning how the punishment should be 
applied, the condemned man’s phonation apparatus partly fails. His 
tongue is petrified, his breath short, and his bodily and verbal expres-
sion is reduced to a single motion and a sole monosyllable: 
J’aurais eu, moi, tout à dire, mais rien ne me vint. Ma 
langue resta collée à mon palais. 
. . . Mille émotions . . . se disputaient ma pensée. Je vou-
lus répéter à haute voix ce que je lui avais déjà dit: Plutôt 
cent fois la mort! Mais l’haleine me manqua, et je ne pus que 
l’arrêter [mon avocat] rudement par le bras, en criant avec 
une force convulsive: Non! 
I myself would have had so much to say, but nothing came 
to me. My tongue remained stuck to the roof of my mouth. 
. . . A thousand emotions . . . were competing for my 
thoughts. I wanted to repeat out loud what I had already 
told him [my lawyer]: I’d rather die a hundred times! But I 
didn’t have enough breath left, and all I could do was stop 
him briskly with my arm, shouting with convulsive force: 
No! (II, 661) 
This semiparalysis symbolizes the weight of a disproportionate institu-
tional violence that crushes the accused (whose past bravado vis-à-vis 
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his lawyer becomes ironic) and shows this violence to block off complex 
dialogue and efficient refutation.
The metaphorical deafness of the protagonist’s interlocutors mirrors this 
dictional difficulty. Immediately after he leaves the courtroom, we are told 
that two young women show their excitement in anticipation of the day of 
the execution. Their exclamation “Ce sera dans six semaines!” (It will take 
place in six weeks! II, 661) and, even more patently, the body language one 
of them displays, clapping her hands out of impatient enthusiasm, indicate 
that the phrase “Condamné à mort!” can take on a jubilatory quality for 
some auditors. On several occasions, the text emphasizes this process of 
loss or perversion of meaning, following a gradation that culminates in 
the description of a voluble crowd whose voice becomes “plus vaste, plus 
glapissante, plus joyeuse encore” (even more vast, more yelping, more joy-
ful) once the execution is imminent (XLVIII, 711).
The priest, the very actor whose task is to comfort the condemned 
man, prepares the ground for such uninhibited contre-sens. His logor-
rheic speech has
rien de senti, rien d’attendri, rien de pleuré, rien d’arraché à 
l’âme, rien qui vînt de son cœur pour aller au mien, rien qui 
fût de lui à moi. Au contraire, je ne sais quoi de vague, d’in-
accentué, d’applicable à tout et à tous; emphatique où il eût 
été besoin de profondeur, plat où il eût fallu être simple; une 
espèce de sermon sentimental et d’élégie théologique. . . . Et 
puis, il avait l’air de réciter une leçon déjà vingt fois récitée, 
de repasser un thème, oblitéré dans sa mémoire à force d’être 
su. Pas un regard dans l’œil, pas un accent dans la voix, pas 
un geste dans les mains. (XXX, 693)
nothing heartfelt about it, nothing tender, nothing tearful, 
nothing torn from the soul, nothing coming from his heart 
to mine, nothing from him to me. Quite the opposite, some-
thing vague, flat, applicable to everything and everyone; em-
phatic when he should have needed to be deep, plain when 
he should have been simple; a sort of sentimental sermon 
and theological elegy. . . . Besides, he seemed to be going 
over a lesson that he had already recited twenty times, to re-
hearse a theme, obliterated in his memory because he knew 
it like the back of his hand. Not a look in his eye, not a stress 
in his voice, not a gesture with his hands.
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The mechanical rhetoric described here jeopardizes the expressive 
function of language.24 It is no surprise that, correspondingly, the re-
ception of such messages should be hindered, if not nullified. The con-
demned man cannot establish true contact with or hear the words of 
his interlocutors from the religious and judiciary orders without some 
reticence: “Mais ce bon vieillard, qu’est-il pour moi? que suis-je pour 
lui? un individu de l’espèce malheureuse, une ombre comme il en a 
déjà tant vu, une unité ajoutée au chiffre des exécutions” (But this 
good old man, what is he to me? What am I to him? An individual 
of the desperate kind, a shadow like the many he has already seen, 
a simple unit added to the number of executions; XXX, 694). One 
also thinks of the “paroles caressantes” (caressing words) of the jailer, 
“prison incarnée” (prison incarnate), whose “œil . . . flatte et . . . espi-
onne” (eye . . . flatters and . . . spies; XX, 680), or of the cynicism that 
lies behind judicial transcription as it appears in chapter XXIII: “Nous 
ferons les deux procès-verbaux à la fois, cela s’arrange bien” (We will 
complete the two certificates at the same time, that’s quite convenient; 
686). While the mechanical, duplicitous, or cynical use of language 
may be a common trait of human communication, the condemned 
man’s critical situation appears to systematize it and to associate it 
closely with cruelty, intentional or otherwise. It morphs into a marker 
through which his interlocutors disavow his individuality, minimize 
the value of his existence, and contribute actively but inconspicuously 
to his fate.
What about the condemned man’s language itself, then? It has dif-
ficulty being in touch with the outside world. On the one hand, this 
struggle manifests itself in a disconnect from factual reality: the pro-
tagonist’s writing alternates between segments that refer to and then 
shut out actual events. His alienated consciousness, shocked upon 
hearing the death sentence, pays attention to his objective environ-
ment only in a discontinuous manner before returning to the obses-
sion of his execution. So much so that actuality repeatedly takes him 
by surprise, such as when he gets off his cart and seems to catch sight 
of the guillotine:
Entre les deux lanternes du quai, j’avais vu une chose sinistre.
Oh! c’était la réalité! (XLVIII, 711)25
Between the two lanterns on the quay, I had seen a sinister thing.
Oh! T’was reality!
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On the other hand, the words of the man condemned to death some-
times come across as inoperative. He is unable to make the bailiff and 
the priest realize that the bad news of the day is his beheading (chap-
ter XXII), does not manage to talk an old gendarme into exchanging 
clothes with him (XXIII), and, even in the course of a most elementary 
conversation with the prison’s clerk, he is unsuccessful at making him-
self truly heard:
—Il fait beau, dis-je au guichetier.
Il resta un moment sans me répondre, comme ne sachant 
si cela valait la peine de dépenser une parole; puis avec 
quelque effort il murmura brusquement:
—C’est possible. . . .
—Voilà une belle journée, répétai-je.
—Oui, me répondit l’homme, on vous attend. (II, 659)
“Lovely weather,” I said to the desk clerk.
A moment went by without him responding to me, as if 
he didn’t know if it was worth his wasting a word; then, 
with some effort, he muttered abruptly, “Could be.” . . .
“Today’s a fine day,” I repeated.
“Yes,” the man answered, “they are waiting for you.”
In this instance, the mere attempt at bringing the other closer by way of 
a phatic, innocuous chat fails. Beyond the fact that scathing irony colors 
the protagonist’s tentative small talk about the nice weather on the very 
day he is sentenced to death, a dismissive reply is obtained at the cost 
of self-repetition. The state employee is also quick to send the protago-
nist back to the cold institutional reality that awaits him and to signal 
that he can no longer enjoy the status of legitimate interlocutor even 
before the condemnation has been pronounced. He has already become 
a paradoxical figure, both invisible and overexposed, undeserving of the 
most trivial words and acting as society’s absolute center of attention. 
All surround and watch him, the “juges chargés de haillons ensang-
lantés . . . trois rangs de témoins aux faces stupides . . . deux gendarmes 
aux deux bouts de mon banc . . . les têtes de la foule . . . les douze 
jurés’ (judges in bloodied rags . . . three rows of witnesses with stupid 
faces . . . two gendarmes at either end of my bench . . . the heads of the 
crowd . . . the twelve jurors; II, 659). His hybrid position, at once subal-
tern and “royal”—“vous serez seul dans votre loge comme le roi” (you 
The Death Penalty, from Representation to Expression ❘ 35
will be alone in your own box like the king; XIII, 670)—largely com-
promises the possibility of standard social contact through language.
Communication is thus aborted in many ways in Le Dernier Jour. 
This breakdown goes as far as to affect the heart of human linguis-
tic exchanges, namely the message itself. While there are moments 
of relative linguistic transparency in the novel-diary, as when the 
condemned man clinically recounts his premortem grooming (chap-
ter XLVIII) and other dehumanizing processes, Hugo intermittently 
inflects or suspends the immediate intelligibility of such prose. As 
if corroborating the impossible elementary linguistic interactions 
noted earlier, the idioms of the speaker and the judicial institution 
at times reject literal meaning, highlight paradoxes, and point to the 
duplicity of the sign. The protagonist wields dark humor when he 
leaves the sick room, for example: “Malheureusement, je n’étais pas 
malade” (Unfortunately, I wasn’t unwell; XV, 676). Later, he under-
lines the linguistic hypocrisy of the prison director, who, careful to 
show concern for the condemned man, emphatically calls him mon-
sieur and, against all expectations, asks, on the day of the execution, 
whether he slept well with the most courteous turns of phrase (XIX, 
679–80). Here, as in the scene where the condemned man officially 
finds out about the rejection of his appeal, the satire of the paternal-
istic and falsely gracious masquerade that drapes the death penalty 
is denounced through the exhibition of a language centered on form 
and devoid of much content. The elaborate and dignified rhetoric 
with which the protagonist mockingly mimics the bailiff’s wooden 
speech underscores this critique:
—Monsieur, m’a-t-il dit avec un sourire de courtoisie, je 
suis huissier près de la cour royale de Paris. J’ai l’honneur de 
vous apporter un message de la part de monsieur le procu-
reur général. . . .
—C’est monsieur le procureur général, lui ai-je répondu, 
qui a demandé si instamment ma tête? Bien de l’honneur 
pour moi qu’il m’écrive. J’espère que ma mort lui va faire 
grand plaisir? car il me serait dur de penser qu’il l’a sollicitée 
avec tant d’ardeur et qu’elle lui était indifférente. . . .
—L’arrêt sera exécuté aujourd’hui en place de Grève. . . . 
Nous partons à sept heures et demie précises pour la Con-
ciergerie. Mon cher monsieur, aurez-vous l’extrême bonté de 
me suivre? (XXI, 681)
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“Sir,” he said to me with a courteous smile, “I am a bailiff 
for the Royal Court of Paris. I am honored to deliver a mes-
sage to you on behalf of his honor the Attorney General.” . . .
“Is his honor the Attorney General,” I answered, “the one 
who requested so insistently that I be decapitated? Honored 
indeed that he should write to me. I hope that my death will 
greatly please him? For it would pain me to think that he re-
quested it with such ardor and that it left him indifferent.” . . .
“The decision will be carried out today on the place de 
Grève. . . . We are leaving for the Conciergerie at seven and a 
half sharp. My dear Sir, will you be so very kind as to follow 
me?”
Civility here paradoxically reveals barbarity. The ‘message’ presented 
on behalf of the attorney general is a pure formality denying the con-
demned man’s status as an interlocutor. As the “arrêt” then confirms, 
both as a thing (an irrevocable judicial decision signifying his death) 
and as a telling noun (evocative of termination), what is presented as a 
“message” masks pure violence and may indeed constitute such violence 
itself.
Irony, grating overtones, deceptive ornamentation: the signified is 
subject to caution in the condemned man’s account. So is the signifier, 
whose gratuitous nature is underscored by the text. The protagonist 
twice evokes the mysterious combinations of letters that could be fatal 
or providential to him: “guillotine” (XXVII, 691), with its ten graph-
emes portrayed as repulsive and “Charles” (XL, 701), the name of the 
king who can grant pardon, with its seven letters. The two signs have 
the formidable power to make fundamental and contrasting realities 
exist: death and life. “Il suffirait qu’il écrivît avec cette plume les sept 
lettres de son nom au bas d’un morceau de papier, ou même que son 
carrosse rencontrât ta charrette!” (It would suffice for him to write with 
this quill the seven letters of his name at the bottom of a piece of paper, 
or even for his carriage to come across your cart!; 701). This insistence 
on the arbitrariness inherent in the signifier and in the occurrence of the 
king’s name or appearance points to another arbitrary reality: that of 
the death penalty.
By thus staging the vanity, fraudulence, and randomness of the sign 
along with failing intersubjective relationships, Hugo designs a poet-
ics of dysfunctional, if not impossible, communication. In this light, 
the conspicuous blank space in which the speaker’s “story” is engulfed 
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(chapter XLVII) seems as much caused by the lack of time before his 
execution (as indicated by a “note de l’éditeur”) as it symbolizes com-
municational failure. Another suspension of speech adds to this silence: 
that of all the executed men unable to testify about the experience of 
beheading. The “rusted” and “fragment[ed]” written traces they are re-
duced to leaving on the walls of the protagonist’s cell materialize their 
muteness. His own diary ends abruptly. After writing down the time 
of the day at which he is taken from his cell for the last time, “quatre 
heures” (four o’clock; XLIX, 711), he seems noiselessly driven to 
death. This forced quietness marks a final climax in the indistinction 
and unverifiability of language that several episodes had announced. 
It also underlines the limits of literature which the text seeks to resist 
actively by giving a voice to the soon-to-be-executed prisoner.
If language and its uses undergo various processes of suspension, 
what Le Dernier Jour ultimately reveals is the possibility of absolute 
inaudibility, be it that of the loudest cries. “Je ne distinguais plus les 
cris de pitié des cris de joie, les rires des plaintes, les voix du bruit; tout 
cela était une rumeur qui résonnait dans ma tête comme dans un écho 
de cuivre” (I could no longer tell the cries of pity from the cries of joy, 
the laughter from the wailing, the voices from the noise; all that was a 
rumor resounding in my head as in a brass echo; XLVIII, 710), says the 
condemned man on his way to the execution. His ultimate cry, the one 
likely to be uttered out of fear on the scaffold, is also obliterated from 
the narrative. Nevertheless, the cry as a sound does occupy a prominent 
place in Hugo’s text, from the vociferation that opens and traverses it, 
to the impatient clamor of the crowd (chapters II, XXII, XXVI, XLVIII), 
the shouts of the convicts (XIII), and, more centrally, the condemned 
man’s own screaming against his condemnation (II) and the ghastly vi-
sions that form in his imagination (XIII).26 While the latter occurrences 
seem absorbed by the text’s overarching narrative—the reduction of 
man to silence by lethal justice—the novel-diary preserves the prop-
erties of the condamné’s cry: its violence, power of interpellation, and 
immediate intelligibility. Indeed, it exacerbates them by forging an ex-
pressive poetry.
Toward Expressive Poetry
The contraventions of conventional dramatic and novelistic represen-
tation and of human communication that Hugo stages find a periodic 
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point of contact and contrast in a language able to realize immediate 
and potent expression; “expressive poetry,” as Rancière defines it, in 
opposition to representational poetry: 
The new poetry—expressive poetry—is made of sentences and 
images, sentence-images that have inherent value as manifesta-
tions of poeticity, that claim a relation immediately expressive 
of poetry. . . . In opposition to the primacy of fiction, we find the 
primacy of language. In opposition to its distribution into genres, 
the anti-generic principle of the equality of all represented sub-
jects. In opposition to the principle of decorum, the indifference 
of style with respect to the subject represented. In opposition to 
the ideal of speech in action, the model of writing.27 
Following in Gustave Planche’s footsteps, Rancière identifies Notre-Dame 
de Paris (1831) as the work that, “much more than Hernani, symbolizes the 
scandal of the new school.”28 Le Dernier Jour is already exemplary of this 
shift, in fact. Not only does it ignore the rules of Aristotelian representation, 
as shown earlier, but it also establishes the primacy of language and pro-
duces meaningful “sentence-images” as described by Rancière. They enable 
the telling of the unique realities and sensations experienced by the con-
demned man as his horizon narrows and his decapitation draws closer.29
The primacy of language constitutive of expressive poetry may 
emerge surreptitiously, through the combination of the literal and the 
figurative, via word plays, or prosodic modulations. These devices allow 
a number of sentences to conjure up the existential questioning and ex-
ceptional violence set off by capital punishment. Marie, the condemned 
man’s daughter, describes the death of her father as follows: “Il est dans 
la terre et dans le ciel” (He is in the ground and in heaven; XLIII, 705). 
Imbricating the prosaic and the poetic, the material and the spiritual, her 
observation captures the totality of his fate and interrogations (chapter 
XLI). Other passages likewise bring together the metaphorical and the 
literal. The condemned man calls the thought of his death “l’horrible 
idée à se briser la tête au mur de son cachot!” (this idea so awful as to 
make you want to smash your head against your own cell wall!; VII, 
665), using a predicate that points to the actual beheading that awaits 
him. Later on, he also employs a telling adverbial phrase to underline 
the popular excitement, and the commercialization, that surround his 
imminent execution: “Des marchands de sang humain criaient à tue-
tête” (Dealers in human blood were shouting their heads off), he notes, 
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about those who hire places from which to see the scaffold (XLVIII, 
709). Read literally, “à tue-tête” suggests that those participating in the 
spectacularity of the punishment are co-responsible for the beheading.30
In the same chapter, as the condemned man’s cart passes by them on 
its way to the scaffold, the people shout “Chapeaux bas! Chapeaux bas!” 
(Hats off! Hats off!) and ask that he be greeted like the king. “Eux les 
chapeaux, moi la tête!” (Off with their hats and off with my head!), he 
replies (709). The appropriation of the idiom “Chapeau bas!” through 
this added image of head severance juxtaposes a symbol of deference—
not devoid of irony—and one of butchery, an idea soon highlighted by 
the name of a tower about which the condemned man inquires while his 
cart is passing by it: “Saint-Jacques-la-Boucherie.” In these instances, the 
poetic properties of language, including the ability to move from one level 
of meaning to another and to multiply and inflect images, make them the 
guarantor and reminder of a most brutal reality.
Repeatedly in the novel, prosody and rhythm alone also convey 
meaning with immediacy. The dilation or interruption of a syntagm, 
the repetition of a term or phoneme make sense by virtue of the sounds 
produced:
Hé bien! avant même que mes yeux lourds aient eu le temps 
de s’entr’ouvrir pour voir cette fatale pensée écrite dans 
l’horrible réalité qui m’entoure, sur la dalle mouillée et su-
ante de ma cellule, dans les rayons pâles de ma lampe de 
nuit, dans la trame grossière de la toile de mes vêtements, sur 
la sombre figure du soldat de garde dont la giberne reluit à 
travers le cachot, il me semble que déjà une voix a murmuré 
à mon oreille:—Condamné à mort! (I, 658)
Well then! before my heavy eyes even had the time to half 
open to see this fatal thought written into the horrible reality 
around me, on the wet and oozing paving stone of my cell, in 
the pale rays of light of my night lamp, in the coarse weft of 
the cloth of my garments, on the sombre face of the watch-
man whose cartridge pouch gleams through the dungeon, it 
seems to me that a voice has already whispered in my ear:—
Condemned to death!
In this sentence-stanza, rugged ([r]), liquid ([l]), and whistling ([s]) 
sounds partake in the deliquescence that the condemned man describes 
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in his environment. His distorted perception, which affects the surface, 
texture, chromaticism, grain, and light of the setting, also shows through 
a stretched, hypotactic construction. Hugo’s prose is poetic in its mu-
sicality in addition to its images.31 The signifier sporadically shortcuts 
the signified and the incommunicability that prevails in the condemned 
man’s world. In fact, the signifier may become a self-sufficient signi-
fied—the protagonist’s inner state. This use of language helps fulfill the 
agenda he sets out for his text: to allow his daughter and, implicitly, the 
reader to “sa[voir] par [lui] [s]on histoire” (know [his] story through 
[him]; XLVI, 706).
Hugo’s expressive poetry may take on a more overt and spectacular 
form: that of the argot used by the convicts (chapters V, XVI and XXIII), 
for example.32 This idiom radically counters the disembodied speech 
of the judicial, penitentiary, and religious authorities that encircle the 
condemned man.33 It shows itself to be fully aware of the duplicity of 
conventional language previously mentioned: the condemned man re-
ports that, in slang, “la langue” (both language and tongue) is called 
“la menteuse” (the liar). While its traits are coarse, vaudevillian, or gro-
tesque—“c’est toute une langue entée sur la langue générale comme 
une espèce d’excroissance hideuse, comme une verrue” (it is a whole 
language grafted onto general language, like some kind of hideous ex-
crescence, like a wart; V, 663)—and while its words sound “difformes 
et mal faits, chantés, cadencés, perlés” (misshapen and badly formed, 
sung, rhythmic, pearl-like), as in the young woman’s song (XVI, 678), 
this argot allows for a newfound dynamic orality thanks to its “éner-
gie singulière” (V, 663), phonic and metaphorical. For the first time, it 
ruptures the competing monologic dynamics of lethal justice and of the 
condemned man’s stream of consciousness: the sociolect is taught by the 
convicts and learned by the speaker, who then rephrases it, so that the 
reader, the other learner of this language, can assimilate it.
A certain roughness accompanies this regained life and transitivity of 
language. Discordant and sordid, the convicts’ dizzying lexicon about 
capital punishment entertains a mimetic relationship with its referent 
and an environment marked by social misery. It feels “sale et . . . pou-
dreux” (dirty and . . . dusty) like a “liasse de haillons qu’on secouerait 
devant vous” (bundle of rags being shaken in front of you; V, 663). The 
aural and imagistic harshness of the argot appears to be necessary, nev-
ertheless: it exposes the reality of state killing in contrast to the various 
langues de bois (double talk, literally “wooden speech”) that conceal 
it.34 It makes palpable for the reader and the condemned man the fact 
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that the death penalty is about leaving traces of blood behind oneself 
(“du raisiné sur le trimar” [claret on the path]; 663), about an eerie inti-
mate union with the noose (“épouser la veuve” [marrying the widow]), 
and about turning a rational mind, “la sorbonne,” into a severed head, 
“la tronche.”
As rare as it is in the novel-diary, a positive intersubjective relation-
ship emerges from this ruthless and dissonant renaming of the world. 
Although the condemned man does not feel like he belongs to the com-
munity of convicts, he receives a message of sympathy from them. “Ces 
hommes-là me plaignent, ils sont les seuls. Les geôliers, les guichetiers, 
les porte-clefs,—je ne leur en veux pas,—causent et rient, et parlent de 
moi, devant moi, comme d’une chose” (Those men feel sorry for me, 
and they’re the only ones. The jailers, the counter clerks, the guards with 
the keys—I am not cross with them—chat and laugh, and talk about 
me, in front of me, as they would of a thing; 663). Overturning the lin-
guistic concealment of lethal justice by making its violence perceptible 
to the mind’s eye and ear, l’argot thus sometimes displays the capacity 
to perceive and, for a moment, preserve the condemned man’s human 
status.
A second kind of manifest poetic expressiveness complements the 
imagistic and aural freedom of l’argot. It is born from the numerous 
hallucinations that pervade the novel-diary. Within the metaphor of 
mental incarceration that frames Le Dernier Jour and the condemned 
man’s tentatively lucid account of his wait for and obsession with his 
execution, one repeatedly finds fantastic “sentence-images” through 
which these visions come into being.35 They include the “pensée infer-
nale” (infernal thought) of the death sentence, “comme un spectre de 
plomb à mes côtés, seule et jalouse . . . dans mes rêves sous la forme 
d’un couteau” (like a specter of lead next to me, alone and jealous . . . in 
my dreams in the shape of a knife; I, 658); the “fantasmagorie des juges, 
des témoins, des avocats, des procureurs du roi” (phantasmagoria of the 
judges, witnesses, lawyers, king’s prosecutors) in addition to the “deux 
masses de peuple murées de soldats” (two masses of people walled in by 
soldiers) and their “faces béantes et penchées” (gaping and tilted faces) 
that seem moved by threads converging toward the condemned man (II, 
658, 659); the mental picture of a severed head spinning around in a 
limbo-like landscape after the execution (chapter XLI); and the ghastly 
dream of a witch-like incarnation of death, “petite vieille, les mains pen-
dantes, les yeux fermés . . . sans voix, sans mouvement, sans regard” (lit-
tle old lady, with lolling hands, her eyes closed . . . voiceless, motionless, 
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with no gaze; XLII, 703). These nightmarish apparitions depend on a 
performative power of language that conjures them up, makes them as 
real to the reader’s mind as they are to the speaker’s, and dissolves them.
A dramatic phantasmagoria illustrates both this process and its figu-
ration. It turns the wall of the protagonist’s cell into a palimpsest. After 
he has symbolically torn off the spider’s web that covers their names, 
anonymous and well-known beheaded criminals (“Jacques,” “Pa-
pavoine,” “Bories,” and the rhyming “dautun,” “poulain,” “martin,” 
“castaing”) come to converse in a free cacophony that culminates in 
an apocalyptic vision: the severed bodies of these murderers are brought 
back to life:36
Il m’a semblé tout à coup que ces noms fatals étaient écrits 
avec du feu sur le mur noir; un tintement de plus en plus 
précipité a éclaté dans mes oreilles; une lueur rousse a rem-
pli mes yeux; et puis il m’a paru que ce cachot était plein 
d’hommes, d’hommes étranges qui portaient leur tête dans 
leur main gauche, et la portaient par la bouche, parce qu’il 
n’y avait pas de chevelure. Tous me montraient le poing, ex-
cepté le parricide.
J’ai fermé les yeux avec horreur, alors j’ai tout vu plus 
distinctement. (XII, 669)
It seemed to me all of a sudden that these fatal names were 
written with fire on the black wall; an ever-hurried chiming 
burst out in my ears; a reddish glow filled up my eyes; and 
then it became apparent to me that this dungeon was full of 
men, strange men who carried their heads in their left hands, 
and carried them by the mouth, because there was no hair. 
All of them showed me their fists, except for the parricide.
I closed my eyes with horror, then saw everything more 
distinctly.
The views of the imagination become visible here only through a language 
that cultivates spectacularity, hyperbolism, and supernaturalism. As though 
through a self-reflexive movement, the names of fire on the prison cell point 
to the ability of a violent distortion of imagery to advance the reader’s un-
derstanding of the condemned men’s distress and fate.
If these “sentence-images” (Rancière) emerging from an internal per-
spective may give a vivacious life to the impalpable, they may, con-
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versely, erase reality. Following the pronouncement of his sentence, the 
condamné envisions the world with new eyes. By way of a metaphor, his 
surroundings undergo a sudden metamorphosis. While a warm chro-
maticism and luminosity initially characterize the scene, this landscape 
is abruptly obscured once the clerk of the court utters the death sen-
tence. “Ces larges fenêtres lumineuses, ce beau soleil, ce ciel pur, cette 
jolie fleur, tout cela était blanc et pâle, de la couleur d’un linceul” (These 
large, luminous windows, this beautiful sun, this pure sky, this pretty 
flower, all of that was white and pale, the color of a shroud; II, 661; my 
emphasis). Reality is anaesthetized, the world discolored and made uni-
form in a hallucinatory vision. Meschonnic has also noted such radical 
transformations as men ceasing to be fully animate and the jail ceasing 
to be inanimate to become an all-encompassing, vigorous, smothering 
hybrid in the novel.37
These many metamorphoses largely rely on metaphors that present 
the unimaginable as real—through the strong, stative verb “to be” and 
the presentative turn of phrase “c’est” (this/it is), in particular: “Ces 
guichetiers, c’est de la prison en chair et en os. La prison est une espèce 
d’être horrible, complet, indivisible, moitié maison, moitié homme. Je 
suis sa proie, elle me couve, elle m’enlace de tous ses replis” (These 
counter clerks, ’tis prison made flesh and blood. The prison building 
is a sort of horrible being, complete, indivisible, half-house, half-man. 
I am its prey, it envelops me, it wraps its folds around me; XX, 680). 
As the text progresses, the condemned man’s prose crafts, revisits, or 
annihilates the same object through figuration, be it the yellow hue of 
light, the jail, or the thought of death. Reality comes to be annexed or 
subverted by poetic language just as it is appropriated by his anguished 
subjectivity. Through this expressive poetry, language no longer seems 
in charge of conveying his perception in the diary; rather, it becomes live 
perception itself.
Directly accessing the intimate obsession with, and fear of, a programmed 
death through language: such is Hugo’s tour de force in Le Dernier Jour 
d’un condamné. The novel serves the abolitionist cause through a poetic 
revolution that infiltrates and makes permanent the condemned man’s 
absolute distress in the face of execution. Literary creation, as if pushed 
by the gravity of its subject matter, goes against the grain of established 
codes to create a new voice that sounds eminently real in the alternately 
shocked and lucid perception of its environment and its desperate at-
tempts to cling to life. Hugo creates a strange, indefectible solidarity 
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between his desperate condemned man and the reader through the culti-
vation of a representational disorder that explodes classical representa-
tion and the rules of fiction. Le Dernier Jour refuses, as Flaubert noted, 
“to offer reflections . . . on the death penalty.”38 Indeed, its power stems 
from the way its unique narrative and dramatic tactics instead force the 
reader into the inescapable grip of capital punishment so that voyeur-
ism morphs into our living the sentence ourselves. The novel thereby 
turns around the popular spectacle of the execution, during which the 
condemned man is typically keenly watched from the outside. The un-
derstanding, or rather the shared experience of his ordeal is doubled by 
another rupture staged in the novel-diary: verbal communication and 
intersubjectivity are shown to fail in numerous ways once death has 
been decreed. Hugo sporadically overturns this incommunicability: a 
regime of expression through which the fixed idea of death, the execu-
tion, and the attempts at escaping them are conjured up with immediacy 
and violence through imagistic and phonic plays. It is also through this 
episodic liberation of language that Le Dernier Jour satisfies the de-
mand implicit in the challenge laid down for the aspiring poet and cited 
in the introduction to this chapter: to earn his title as poet, Hugo finds a 
form to both penetrate and formulate the innermost thoughts of a dead 
man walking, at the border of humanity.  
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Chapter 2
Pain and Punishment
The Guillotine’s Torture
It is easy enough to have such an unfailing machine built; 
decapitation will be completed in an instant according to 
the spirit and intention of the new law. . . . Such a device, if 
it were necessary, would cause no sensation and would be 
scarcely noticed.
—Antoine Louis, permanent secretary of the Académie royale 
de chirurgie, “Avis motivé sur le mode de la décollation,” 
March 14, 1792
Hugo’s poetic revolution, which shatters the representation of the cap-
ital spectacle, goes hand in hand with a reconsideration of the pro-
gressive aspirations that underlay France’s penal evolution after the 
Revolution. At first sight, Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné echoes the 
penal mutations that Michel Foucault summarizes in “Le Corps des 
condamnés” (The Body of the Condemned), the first section of Sur-
veiller et punir: Naissance de la prison (Discipline and Punish: The 
Birth of the Prison). Foucault argues that, from the second half of the 
eighteenth century onward, the soul replaced the body as the target of 
punishment in France: 
It was an important moment. The old partners of the 
spectacle of punishment, the body and the blood, gave 
way. A new character came on the scene, masked. It was 
the end of a certain kind of tragedy; comedy began, with 
shadow play, faceless voices, impalpable entities. The ap-
paratus of punitive justice must now bite into this bodi-
less reality.1 
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Hugo’s fiction may seem to reflect this evolution in two respects, examined 
earlier. First, its plot visibly centers on the condemned man’s mind. Second, 
it deprives the reader of the spectacle of the execution: while the narrative 
foregrounds the death sentence, the protagonist’s beheading constitutes a 
blind spot. Yet the temporal and psychological window Hugo carves out, 
as well as his figuration of the condemned man’s physical and political tra-
jectory, in fact question the gradual disincarnation and detheatricalization 
of judicial penalties that Foucault identifies with profoundly incisive effect.
Unexpected Erasures:  Body, Monstrosity, Hierarchy
Few main characters in literature remain as mysterious as Victor Hugo’s 
condemned man. His “faceless[ness]” and “impalpab[ility],” to take up 
Foucault’s terms, are literal. As noted in chapter 1, his portrayal might 
better be described as a (counter)sketch, insofar as the author skillfully 
avoids portraying his criminal exhaustively, providing just enough in-
formation to contradict an expected lower-class stereotype. However, 
this erasure has little to do with the trend toward penal disembodiment 
mentioned by Foucault—and by Hugo himself in his preface of 1832 
about the increasing discretion of executions. Instead, the writer sub-
verts this trend.2 His protagonist’s minimal visibility does not serve to 
give the impression that punishment has been humanized and that its 
barbarity has disappeared after the suppression of lengthy and vicious 
penal spectacles. Rather, it highlights his captivity and frailness. The first 
thing we learn about the condemned man’s body is that it is in chains 
in a cell. The evocations of his physiognomy that follow are limited to 
his joints (wrists, neck, elbows, armpits, knees) and bodily extremities 
(hands, foot, chin, and ears; chapters XII, XLVIII), which emphasize the 
natural boundaries of his physical being, in contrast to their imminent 
transformation through the slash of the guillotine. By highlighting these 
articulations and contours, Hugo exposes an anatomy that is generic, 
helpless, and easily objectified. It suspends the sense of an individual 
humanity. Hugo’s paintings and drawings representing executed bodies 
in the 1850s and 1860s would take up this very technique (see Figures 
2 to 4).
Erasure occurs at the level of moral characterization as well. Hugo 
invalidates not just the stereotype of the proletarian criminal but also 
that of the criminal-as-moral-monster that legitimized capital punish-
ment in the eyes of its supporters. As Foucault noted in his Histoire de 
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la sexualité, “Capital punishment could not be maintained except by 
invoking less the enormity of the crime itself than the monstrosity of the 
criminal, his incorrigibility, and the safeguard of society. One had the 
right to kill those who represent a biological danger to others.”3 While 
the novel reveals that the condemned man caused blood to be shed 
before his condemnation (chapter XI), it does not specify whether this 
led to the victim’s death and suggests that the crime for which he is to 
be beheaded is not due to any perverse essence: “Si on lit un jour mon 
histoire, après tant d’années d’innocence et de bonheur, on ne voudra 
pas croire à cette année exécrable, qui s’ouvre par un crime et se clôt par 
un supplice; elle aura l’air dépareillé” (If people read my story some day, 
they won’t believe that this atrocious year, which begins with a crime 
Figure 2. Victor Hugo. “Ecce lex” (Le Pendu). 1854. 
Maison de Victor Hugo, Paris / Guernesey.
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and ends with agony, followed so many years of innocence and happi-
ness; it will seem out of place; XXXIV, 698). The protagonist, whose 
exact crime remains the text’s fundamental ellipsis, can therefore hardly 
be considered monstrous.4
Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné in fact displaces monstrosity. It finds 
its embodiment, first, in the guillotine, an awe-inspiring and personi-
fied, murderous figure. “Quand j’ai vu au-dessus des têtes ces deux bras 
rouges, avec leur triangle noir au bout, dressés entre deux lanternes du 
quai, le cœur m’a failli” (My heart skipped a beat when I saw, above the 
heads, these two red arms with their black triangle at the end, standing 
between the two lanterns on the quay; XLVIII, 707); second, in a so-
cial body that is homogenized by its direct or indirect endorsement of 
the death penalty. Through their resolution, resignation, indifference, or, 
conversely, their excitement, as well as through the satirical portrayals 
Figure 3. Victor Hugo. Ecce. 1854. Maison de 
Victor Hugo, Paris / Guernesey.
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to which they are often subject, the representatives of the judicial and 
legal system, the simple state employees, the members of the clergy, the 
convicts, and a restless “populace” (709) appear to aggregate around this 
legal practice as one gargantuan character. Nonetheless, Hugo does single 
out the people as the most frighteningly buoyant—and the largest—in-
carnation of this giant execution-condoning social body. “Tout ce peuple 
rira, battra des mains, applaudira” (The whole crowd will laugh, clap 
their hands, applaud; 706), the speaker bitterly remarks in chapter XLV. 
And later: “l’horrible peuple qui aboie, et m’attend, et rit” (the horrible 
throng barking and awaiting me, and laughing; XLVIII, 707).
The process of penal effacement that Hugo distorts by having era-
sure affect the condemned man’s physical and moral portrayal is ex-
tended to his individuality. The protagonist is but “un condamné.” 
Figure 4. Victor Hugo. Gibet de prison. Ca. 
1867–69. Maison Vacquerie–Musée Victor 
Hugo, Villequier—Dept. 76.
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His name never appears in the diary, and, as noted previously, the 
chapter that should relate his story (XLVII) is left blank. The journal 
also comes to an end without any signature. These multiple lacunae 
render impossible the new investigative and analytical processes that 
Foucault identifies as participating in “the knowledge of the criminal, 
one’s estimation of him, what is known about the relations between 
him, his past and his crime, and what might be expected of him in the 
future”; these processes, “behind the pretext of explaining an action, 
are ways of defining an individual.”5 Hugo precludes a multifaceted 
examination based not only on this knowledge of the criminal’s per-
sonality and personal history, but also on his physiognomy and cranial 
structure, at a time when the ideas of Johann Kaspar Lavater and 
phrenologist Franz Joseph Gall were popular.6 He replaces this sci-
entific and institutional passion for qualification—a passion that also 
affects the curious reader—with an aesthetics of indefiniteness that de-
liberately opposes it, as the preface of 1832 underlines: “Et pour que 
le plaidoyer soit aussi vaste que la cause, il a dû, et c’est pour cela que 
Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné est ainsi fait, élaguer de toutes parts 
de son sujet le contingent, l’accident, le particulier, le spécial, le relatif, 
le modifiable, l’épisode, l’anecdote, l’événement, le nom propre, et se 
borner (si c’est là se borner) à plaider la cause d’un condamné quel-
conque, exécuté un jour quelconque, pour un crime quelconque” (And 
to make the defense speech as vast as the cause, he had to trim—and 
this is the reason why Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné is the way it 
is—the contingent, the accidental, the particular, the special, the rela-
tive, the modifiable, the episodic, the anecdotal, the event, the proper 
name throughout and to limit himself [if indeed it be a limitation] to 
defending a random condemned man, executed on a random day, for 
a random crime; OCH 4:480).
Such blurring of identity, which simultaneously bars the protagonist’s 
demonization and resists a criminologico-penal diagnosis, is pushed fur-
ther by the conflation of the figure of the condemned man with that of 
the king.7 Bicêtre has “un air de château de roi” (something of a royal 
castle about it; IV, 662); when the convicts are chained in the prison, 
the condemned man sits overlooking the spectacle, “seul dans [sa] loge 
comme le roi” (alone in [his] own private box, like the king; XIII, 670), 
and almost enjoys a monopoly on speech; while expecting the ultimate 
moment of decapitation and facing the clamoring crowd, he also re-
marks, “Si fort qu’on aime un roi, ce serait moins de fête” (Much as 
a king might be loved, there could not be more of a greeting for him; 
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XLVIII, 708). But the longest and most explicit parallel is drawn when 
the condemned man asserts:
Il est singulier que je pense sans cesse au roi. J’ai beau 
faire, beau secouer la tête, j’ai une voix dans l’oreille qui me 
dit toujours:
—Il y a dans cette même ville, à cette même heure, et pas 
bien loin d’ici, dans un autre palais, un homme qui a aussi 
des gardes à toutes ses portes, un homme unique comme toi 
dans le peuple, avec cette différence qu’il est aussi haut que 
tu es bas. (XL, 700)
Remarkably, I can’t stop thinking about the king. How-
ever much I try and shake my head, a voice in my ear keeps 
telling me: “In this very city, at this very hour, and not very 
far from here, in another palace, there is a man, who also has 
guards at all of his doors, a man as exceptional in society as 
you, the only difference being that he is as high above as you 
are down low.”
Here, the king is the inverted figure of the condemned man; in all the 
other instances, he is a comparable one. This repeated superimposition 
of the two figures, which covertly recalls the Revolutionary regicide, 
further invalidates the condemned man’s expected monstrosity and 
sheds light on the possible subjection of every member of society to the 
guillotine. In other words, the king–condemned man analogy stresses 
the unconditional power of the modern judicial institution to reduce 
any life, regardless of its sociopolitical status, to death. 
In Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1995), Giorgio 
Agamben has theorized the resemblance between the sovereign and a 
particular lawbreaker condemned to death, namely the homo sacer, an 
outcast characterized by “the unpunishability of his killing and the ban 
on his sacrifice” in Ancient Rome.8 The Italian philosopher argues that 
both are at once inside and outside of the law: the rule “suspend[s] 
itself” for the sovereign, and thereby produces an exception that still 
exists in relation the rule; as for the sacred man, his inclusion in the 
juridical order takes the form of exclusion (he may be killed by anyone 
in almost any way).9 The homo sacer is comparable to Hugo’s con-
demned man in that, from the perspective of human experience, both 
await certain death. From a legal standpoint, both are also defined by 
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their capacity to be killed in a way that is not considered homicidal after 
the pronouncement of their sentence—even if, contrary to the sacred 
man, the condemned man cannot be eliminated by anyone in almost 
any way but must be decapitated by the executioner following a precise 
protocol.10
The homo sacer and the condemned man also fall prey to the same 
paradox of a legal exclusion from within, for the social and legal con-
tract that binds the modern man to society—a contract to which he 
subscribes—is ruptured by the application of the lethal law: once he has 
been sentenced to death, the protection of his life is short-lived. He be-
comes analogous to an enemy in time of war, as Rousseau puts it in Du 
contrat social so as to be able to legitimize his defense of the death pen-
alty.11 The philosopher must transform the citizen into a sort of hostis 
humani generis to condone lethal justice. Although he was an admiring 
reader of Rousseau, Beccaria did not support this view and underlined 
the high improbability that a man be willing to surrender his life as one 
of the fragments of liberty he must cede to benefit from protection and 
a number of rights: 
By what right can men presume to slaughter their fellows? 
Certainly not that right which is the foundation of sover-
eignty and the laws. For these are nothing but the sum of the 
smallest portions of each man’s own freedom; they repre-
sent the general will which is the aggregate of the individual 
wills. Who has ever willingly given up to others the authority 
to kill him? How on earth can the minimum sacrifice of each 
individual’s freedom involve handing over the greatest of all 
goods, life itself?12 
Similarly, participants in the 1791 debate on capital punishment at the 
Assemblée constituante, such as Pétion, remarked that what drives men 
to gather together is a search for protection at odds with anyone’s con-
sent to punishment by death.13
Le Dernier Jour makes visible a double change, of both state and 
status, that accompanies the condemned man’s exclusion from within 
and his redefinition by the law as a being whose prominent property 
is his “capacity to be killed” (Agamben) following a specific procedure 
after he has been sentenced—a sentencing that Hugo places at the very 
beginning of his work to better shed light on its causal relationship to 
these two changes. As far as the protagonist’s change of state is con-
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cerned, a revealing passage reveals the numbness and feeling of radical 
alienation that affect him, early on, “Une révolution venait de se faire 
en moi. Jusqu’à l’arrêt de mort, je m’étais senti respirer, palpiter, vivre 
dans le même milieu que les autres hommes; maintenant, je distinguais 
clairement comme une clôture entre le monde et moi” (A revolution had 
just occurred within me. Before my death sentence, I could feel myself 
breathing, my heart throbbing, and my whole life in the same environ-
ment as other men; now, I clearly saw a barrier between the world and 
me; II, 661). Later, when the condemned man’s young daughter visits 
him in his cell and fails to recognize him, she exclaims, after being asked 
about her father, “Ah! vous ne savez donc pas? il est mort” (Why, so 
you don’t know? He is dead; XLIII, 705).14 Soon, the condemned man 
abandons all hope with these words: “La dernière fibre de mon cœur 
est brisée. Je suis bon pour ce qu’ils vont faire” (The last piece of my 
heart is broken. I am ready for what they are going to do; 706). Repeat-
edly, the protagonist’s capital condemnation is  represented as triggering 
forms of premature death before the guillotine’s activation.
This physical and moral decline sparked by the application of the 
death sentence runs parallel to a change of status. While the judicial 
death sentence retains the sociopolitical status of the condamné in order 
to punish him legally, this status seems simultaneously abrogated, as we 
just saw with Rousseau. Here, Hugo does converge with Foucault in 
shedding light on “an economy of suspended rights.”15 His novel shows 
how, after the pronouncement of the sentence, the condemned man be-
comes the object of rituals and events that the legal and judicial pow-
ers initiate or monitor and through which they deprive him of agency. 
Under their pressure, he metamorphoses into a helpless, empty subject. 
The novel highlights the cruel contradiction between his new, void sta-
tus and the extreme care with which he is kept alive as a vacant subject 
until, or rather for, the moment of decapitation. His diary relates the 
meticulous organization-ritualization that precedes the execution: the 
hopeless visits paid, his shortened interview with the priest, his final 
“toilette” consisting of a haircut, the trimming of his shirt, the binding 
of his hands and feet so that his movements are limited when he is led 
to the scaffold, his final ride in the condemned man’s cart escorted by a 
“cortège” (XLVIII, 709).
The condemned man has no say in the mechanics of execution. He 
constitutes a mere, and increasingly faint, physical presence. He is shown 
to morph into a “bare life,” in the words of Walter Benjamin appropri-
ated by Agamben, that is to say a being stripped of all its attributes 
54 ❘ New Abolitionist Poetics
other than biological, a zoē.16 Many passages indicate that the death-
bound prisoner loses his sociopolitical existence. As early as chapter III, 
he notes that there is not much that the executioner can take away from 
him, for he has already been reduced to a caged creature who is hardly 
spoken to (662). “Les geôliers, les guichetiers, les porte-clefs,—je ne leur 
en veux pas,—causent et rient, et parlent de moi, devant moi, comme 
d’une chose” (The jailers, the warders, the key keepers—I don’t hold 
a grudge against them—chat and laugh and talk about me, in front of 
me, as they would do if I were a thing; V, 663). Reification even looms 
behind this extreme metamorphosis into bare life: “C’était une machine 
sur une machine” (It was adding a machine to a machine; II, 659), says 
the condemned man about the handcuffs that are placed on him, with a 
tautology suggesting that the atomization of his being infects language, 
which also finds itself impoverished. He also remarks, on his way to the 
Conciergerie, “J’étais devenu machine comme la voiture” (I had become 
as mechanical as the vehicle; XXII, 683). And when an architect hired 
to modernize the jail measures his cell, his physical presence is com-
pared to that of a mineral: “Moi, j’étais là, comme une des pierres qu’il 
mesurait” (As for me, I stood there, like one of the stones he had been 
measuring; XXXI, 695).
By effacing the criminal’s anticipated monstrosity, his exact physi-
cal identity, the hierarchy at the bottom of which this outcast usually 
stands, and his human integrity, Hugo counters several stereotypes and 
readerly expectations. These strategic erasures go hand in hand with the 
scrutiny of the condemned man’s sociopolitical demotion and the expo-
sure of his premature and polymorphous annihilation. Together, these 
devices enforce a significant role reversal: he no longer appears to be a 
culprit as much as the victim of a crushing lethal justice.
New Spectacles
Let us return to the diagnosis established in Surveiller et punir: from the 
second half of the eighteenth century onward, Foucault traces the emer-
gence of a penal “comedy,” with “impalpable entities,” in lieu of “a certain 
kind of tragedy” centered on “the body and the blood.” Hugo proposes 
an alternative to these two genres. As chapter 1 demonstrated, Le Dernier 
Jour does away with the classical representation that characterized trag-
edy and largely focuses on the protagonist’s mental ordeal—rather than 
corporeal punishment. But this does not result in the comedic “shadow 
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play” Foucault describes. Instead, Hugo’s innovations identified earlier 
result in a new tragedy: one that is catharsis-free.17 The readers who feel 
pity and fear in the face of the condemned man’s torment and fate, or the 
excited witnesses to whom the narrative refers for that matter, cannot 
have access to any Aristotelian purgation. Catharsis is blocked both by 
the exclusion of the climactic act of violence—the execution—from the 
plot, and perhaps more importantly by the fact that, instead of being 
aware of the nonreality of what is before their eyes, the reader is under 
the impression that mimesis has been replaced by actual life. The novel 
eradicates the possibility of leaving behind the condemned man’s experi-
ence and the pleasure and liberation that ensue. This device is precisely 
what some contemporaries described, and reproved:
I do not know whether reading this book had made me tired 
or lightheaded; but while leaving the hero on the place de 
Grève, when this living being is already climbing up the 
scaffold, when this human thought is about to end, under 
the blade that falls, I was hardly able to judge or remem-
ber anything. This narrative of the moral torture that kills 
the condemned man gradually and prematurely; this strange 
language of pain, made exclusively of dark and funereal 
words, was buzzing in my ears like a warning bell; this story 
of a poor wretch with only twenty-four hours to live, and 
whose every thought is a thought of death, all this had some-
how left me broken and exhausted; and, when I closed the 
book, I was like a man who has been spinning around and 
who could no longer feel the earth beneath his feet.18
Assailed and exhausted, the reader is subjected to what Jules Janin, who 
parodied Le Dernier Jour with L’Âne mort et la femme guillotinée (The 
Dead Donkey and the Guillotined Woman; 1829), named “a three-hun-
dred-page agony.”19 Interestingly, Le Dernier Jour employs the same 
substantive as Janin—“une agonie de six semaines” (a six-week agony; 
XXXIX, 700)—but in order to qualify the modern death penalty. While 
the new, early nineteenth-century, punitive “tragedy” relied on inflicting 
pain in a much less visible and lengthy way, Hugo’s catharsis-free trag-
edy reverses this objective and seeks to have the character’s suffering 
contaminate the reader.
The novel revisits the spectacle of punishment in parallel to this im-
plosion of catharsis. It emphasizes the crowd’s taste for bloody spec-
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tacles decades after the Reign of Terror. Hugo’s earlier narrative Han 
d’Islande had already warned readers that “a strange feeling within the 
human heart urges men to behold the spectacle of torture . . . to seize 
the thought of destruction on the distorted features of the man who 
is going to die” (OCH 2:395). Le Dernier Jour shows that, while the 
swift guillotine has replaced extended supplices, man’s thirst for the 
display of a fellow human being’s final despondency and death is intact. 
It stresses the persistence of a penal ritual of humiliation rather than any 
progressive evolution:
Vis-à-vis . . . il y a des cabarets, dont les entresols étaient 
pleins de spectateurs heureux de leurs belles places. Surtout 
les femmes. La journée doit être bonne pour les cabaretiers.
On louait des tables, des chaises, des échafaudages, des 
charrettes. Tout pliait de spectateurs. Des marchands de sang 
humain criaient à tue-tête:
—Qui veut des places? (XLVIII, 709)
Opposite . . . there are cabarets whose mezzanines were 
packed with spectators delighted to have such a good view. 
Especially women. Today must be a good day for innkeepers.
People were renting out tables, chairs, scaffolding, carts. 
The whole place was brimming with spectators. Dealers in 
human blood were shouting their heads off: “Who wants a 
seat?”
Moral regression is at work here, for the audience’s impatience is now 
accompanied by the cynical commercial interests generated by the show. 
All are condemned by seething sarcasm, and, outside of the fictional 
space, we the readers, the mirror image of this public, also fall prey to 
the protagonist’s caustic examination of man’s malevolent curiosity. The 
crowd craves the severance of his fully fledged head, and the omission 
of the moment of the decollation can only amplify the sense of unlaw-
fulness and folly that saturates this depiction of “spectateurs avides et 
cruels” (XLVIII, 710).
Throughout, the novel problematizes this ocular voracity. Numer-
ous scenes bar visibility or force the gaze to be oblique. They symboli-
cally invalidate both man’s basest interest taken in the degradation of 
others and the punishment itself, while at the same time highlighting 
how difficult it is to grasp another man’s suffering. Hugo prevents the 
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condemned man himself from seeing fully, from within his cell, the 
chaining of convicts in the prison’s courtyard. While his observation 
tower enables him to overlook the scene, he is trapped behind “une 
fenêtre grillée” (a barred window) like the “prisonniers, spectateurs de 
la cérémonie,” whose “visages maigres et blêmes” (gaunt and pale faces) 
are “encadrés dans les entre-croisements des barreaux de fer” (framed 
within the crisscrossed iron bars; XIII, 670). And he eventually becomes 
the object of the spectacle, as they suddenly see him watching and turn 
toward his window. In other words, the spectators themselves become 
the spectacle at key junctures of Le Dernier Jour. Penal spectacularity 
thereby finds itself repeatedly subverted, and at times even turned on its 
head, so to speak. 
A double visibility, that of the condemned man’s mind and that of 
popular reaction, counters the “instant of invisibility” with which the 
guillotine was supposed to be synonymous.20 Yet Hugo’s strategy is not 
devoid of ambiguity: while it proves necessary to expose the invisible 
(the condemned man’s psychic agony), it also relies on the very sensa-
tionalist penchant that the narrative and its preface identify in the col-
lective behavior elicited by executions. As the writer unveils the capital 
trial and the premortem carceral experience, scrutinizing precisely what 
Han d’Islande calls “the thought of destruction on the distorted features 
of the man who is going to die,” he exploits our voyeurism even as he 
turns it into a painful and critical experience.
Although the new spectacle—and intrusion—Hugo proposes cen-
ter on a man’s anguish, on his reduction to bare life, and on the eager 
observers of punishment, it does not altogether do away with the old 
penal spectacle, namely the destruction of the condemned body. In the 
novel, this body returns through the profound destabilization of the 
traditional Christian and Cartesian divides between body and soul, and 
body and mind. The psyche and the body are presented as inseparable 
after the pronouncement of the sentence. “Ne sont-ce pas les mêmes 
convulsions, que le sang s’épuise goutte à goutte, ou que l’intelligence 
s’éteigne pensée à pensée?” (Whether blood runs out drop by drop, or 
intelligence dies out thought by thought, are they not the same spasms?; 
XXXIX, 700), the protagonist asks.21 Corporeality characterizes the 
soul and mind. The condemned man imagines that, following his de-
capitation, he might find himself “sur quelque surface plane et humide, 
rampant dans l’obscurité et tournant sur [lui]-même comme une tête 
qui roule” (on some flat and humid surface, crawling in the darkness 
and turning round and round like a head as it rolls; XLI, 701). The text 
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hypothesizes a postmortem visual and tactile sensibility that allows for 
a precise perception of space—its shape, temperature, and luminosity. 
The simile of the spinning head, which verges on the grotesque, furthers 
the “capital hypertrophy” and the materiality that pervade Le Dernier 
Jour.
Indeed, the protagonist’s discourse often favors the head over the soul 
and tends to transform the conventional Christian body/soul dyad into 
an anatomical body/head dyad—even if Christianity underlies Hugo’s 
abolitionism.22 “Que gardent-ils de leur corps incomplet et mutilé? Que 
choisissent-ils? Est-ce la tête ou le tronc qui est spectre?” (What do they 
keep of their incomplete and mutilated body? What do they choose? 
Does the head or the body turn into a specter?; XLI, 702). The con-
demned man’s reflections on the spirit as surviving the body are highly 
incredulous and his ensuing encounter with a priest whom he summons 
to elucidate his metaphysical interrogations is another remarkable ellip-
sis in the narrative (chapters XLI–XLII).23 “Hélas! qu’est-ce que la mort 
fait avec notre âme? quelle nature lui laisse-t-elle? qu’a-t-elle à lui pren-
dre ou à lui donner? où la met-elle? lui prête-elle quelquefois des yeux 
de chair pour regarder sur la terre et pleurer?” (Alas! What does death 
do with our souls? What form does it leave them? What does it have 
to take from them or leave them? Where does it put them? Does it ever 
offer them eyes of flesh so they can look down on earth and weep?; XLI, 
702). Here again, the condemned man refers to the flesh when evoking 
the soul. He imagines it as endowed with body parts and as functioning 
organically. Over and over, the novel represents a body of the mind. The 
very phrase that defines the narrative, “autopsie intellectuelle,” encap-
sulates this materialism.
Such materialism, questioning of an immaterial soul, and emphasis 
on sensation have far-reaching critical implications. First, they refute 
those who support capital punishment because of religious beliefs that 
focus on man’s afterlife: by intimating that human beings know little 
about life postmortem, Hugo’s protagonist counters the reassuring re-
tentionist argument according to which divine justice will correct an 
imperfect human justice—one that may execute innocent individuals, 
for instance.24 Second, the novel’s uninterrupted stress on embodied ex-
perience directly contradicts the theory of painlessness that legitimated 
the adoption of the guillotine from 1791 onward.25 Antoine Louis fa-
mously declared, “It is easy enough to have such an unfailing machine 
built; decapitation will be completed in an instant according to the 
spirit and intention of the new law. Such a device, if it were necessary, 
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would cause no sensation and would be scarcely noticed.”26 Two years 
earlier, on December 1, 1789, Dr. Joseph Ignace Guillotin had evoked 
the machine’s quasi-magical quality: “Gentlemen, with my machine, I 
can slash off your head in the blink of an eye and you will not suf-
fer. . . . The device strikes like thunder, the head flies off, blood spurts 
out, the man is no more!”27 Le Dernier Jour begs to differ, and does 
so cumulatively, foregrounding sensations to relate the capital experi-
ence. “Il y a à peine deux pages sur ce texte de la peine de mort [sic]. 
Tout le reste, ce sont des sensations” (Barely two pages of the text are 
on the death penalty. The rest is all about sensations; “Une comédie à 
propos d’une tragédie,” 650), quips Hugo as he parodies the critics of 
his novel.28 His condemned man himself explicitly questions the pro-
gressive claims of modern capital punishment: “On ne souffre pas, en 
sont-ils sûrs? Qui le leur a dit? Conte-t-on que jamais une tête coupée 
se soit dressée sanglante au bord du panier, et qu’elle ait crié au peuple: 
Cela ne fait pas de mal!” (How can they be sure that it’s painless? Who 
told them? Have you ever heard of a severed head standing on the rim 
of the basket and shouting to the people: It doesn’t hurt!; XXXIX, 700).
A symbolic manipulation of language foregrounding the act of cut-
ting shows painlessness and the absence of sensation to be fictional. 
This is the other way in which the novel reminds the reader of the phys-
icality of capital punishment. The book as a whole is broken up into 
a considerable number of compact chapters given its limited length. 
These forty-nine sections themselves are marked by paragraph fragmen-
tation, the use of strong punctuation markers, aposiopeses (XXXIX, 
700; XLVIII, 707; XLIX, 711), and the alternation of specialized dis-
courses—penal and argotique, for example—that all produce rhythmic 
or semantic ruptures.29 Beyond this structural level, severance appears 
both conspicuously, in the form of a vast lexical field throughout the 
diary, and more covertly: Hugo often relies on synecdoche, a device 
that requires incision, to refer to the guillotine, the condemned man, 
and the crowd;30 he also stages slashing at the lexical level, as when the 
condemned man declares to the priest, “Je ne suis pas préparé, mais je 
suis prêt” (I am not prepared, but I am ready; XXI, 680). The syntactic 
parallelism contained in this statement, as well as the quasi-homophony 
between the initial syllable of the first epithet and the second epithet, 
make “paré” stand out in the opening negative clause (“je ne suis pas 
pré/paré, mais je suis prêt”). With this adjective born out of truncation, 
another sentence reads, between the lines: “[Je ne suis pas] paré” (I am 
devoid of protection).
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This linguistic emphasis on cutting is particularly visible in the nov-
el’s references to the sentence and decapitation. The protagonist’s young 
daughter struggles to decipher the “–A, R, ar R, E, T, rêt” (XLIII, 705) 
that officializes his sentencing, for instance. And in the following string 
of self-interrogations about the protagonist’s antemortem writing proj-
ect, form and content merge as plosive consonants, multiple monosyl-
lables, and a remarkable polyptoton (“coupe”/“coupée”) symbolically 
highlight the act of beheading: “Pourquoi? à quoi bon? qu’importe? 
Quand ma tête aura été coupée, qu’est-ce que cela me fait qu’on en 
coupe d’autres?” (So what? Why bother? What for? What’s the use? 
When my head has been cut off, what difference does it make to me if 
Figure 5. Victor Hugo. Justitia. 1857. Maison de Vic-
tor Hugo, Paris / Guernesey.
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they cut off others?; VII, 665). I noted earlier that the protagonist cuts 
up the word “guillotine” by merely evoking its ten letters. Strikingly, he 
comments, “Chaque syllabe est comme une pièce de la machine. J’en 
construis et j’en démolis sans cesse dans mon esprit la monstrueuse 
charpente” (Each syllable is like a part of the machine. I keep building 
and dismantling its monstrous frame in my mind; XXVII, 691).31 Lan-
guage witnesses the process of dismemberment, in sum. In this instance, 
it concerns the machine, but in all the other cases, language operates as 
an anatomical substitute that participates in a veritable demonstrative 
tactic. Not unlike some of Hugo’s drawings, it showcases the physi-
cal violence of the death penalty that late eighteenth- and early nine-
teenth-century reforms sought to mitigate through both technique and 
representation (Figure 5).32
Tortured and Bare Life
Foucault’s inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, L’Ordre du 
discours (1970), underlines society’s “anxiety about what discourse 
is in its material reality as a thing pronounced or written; anxiety 
about this transitory existence which admittedly is destined to be 
effaced, but according to a time-scale which isn’t ours.”33 Using pre-
cisely this “ponderous, formidable materiality” of discourse, Hugo 
shortcuts what Foucault identifies as procedures designed to limit 
possible discursive eruptions and to implement exclusion. Although 
the philosopher’s lecture calls for the questioning of the “sovereignty 
of the signifier,” Hugo engages with the latter to resist at least two 
negating procedures: that which excludes the condemned man from 
society and that which denies the physical painfulness of modern 
capital punishment.34 The language deployed in Le Dernier Jour is 
endowed with efficient performativity—a quality that Foucault does 
not mention in his reflections, either in L’Ordre du discours or in his 
brief commentary on Hugo’s novel in Surveiller et punir. It incarnates 
the condemned man’s future severed silhouette and bars its forgetting 
or erasure by making it perennial on paper. An en-abyme analogue 
to the wall of the prison cell, this language exhibits “inscriptions 
mutilées . . . phrases démembrées . . . mots tronqués, corps sans tête 
comme ceux qui les ont écrits” (mutilated inscriptions . . . dismem-
bered sentences . . . truncated words, headless bodies like those who 
wrote them; XI, 667).
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The critique built into Hugo’s fragmentation of the signifier does 
not only pertain to the physical pain that persists in the modern imple-
mentation of the death penalty. The 1791 Code pénal that led to the 
adoption of the guillotine stipulated that capital punishment was to cor-
respond to “the simple deprivation of life, without the possibility that 
the condemned ever be subjected to any torture.”35 Hugo’s torsion of 
language may be so extreme as to verge on verbal destruction: the diary 
occasionally regresses into a prelanguage made of short exclamations, 
monosyllabic calls, “rugissement[s] étouffé[s]” (muffled howls; XLVIII, 
708). “Les mots manquent aux émotions” (Words fail to capture these 
feelings; 710), the condemned man admits as he takes in every detail of 
his final ride to the Hôtel de ville. These uses of and reflections on lan-
guage highlight how unbearable, and inconceivable, the protagonist’s 
punishment is before the extreme physical violence that awaits him.
The denunciation of some sort of torture at work in modern capital 
punishment also occurs in an explicit fashion. The “chevalier,” a sati-
rized character in Hugo’s play-preface, implies that the death penalty 
is to post-Revolutionary France what torture was to the Ancien Ré-
gime: “Dans l’ancien régime, quelqu’un qui se serait permis de publier 
un roman contre la torture!” (It’s as though under the Ancien Régime, 
someone had dared to publish a novel against torture!; OCH 3:653; 
my emphasis). The condemned man himself refers to this concept in the 
main body of the text by way of a metaphor that highlights the mental 
ordeal he endures: 
Eh! Qu’est-ce donc que cette agonie de six semaines et ce râle 
de tout un jour? Qu’est-ce que les angoisses de cette journée 
irreparable, qui s’écoule si lentement et si vite? Qu’est-ce que 
cette échelle de tortures qui aboutit à l’échafaud? 
Hey! What about this six-week agony and this day-long 
rattle, then? What about the anguish endured through this 
fateful day, which passes so slowly and yet so quickly? What 
about this rising scale of torture that ends on the scaffold? 
(XXXIX, 700; my emphasis) 
Later, concerning the ritual leading up to the scaffold, he repeats, “Cha-
cun de ces détails m’apportait sa torture” (Each of these details brought 
me its own torture; XLVIII, 710; my emphasis). This figurative torture 
seems to lie in the acute awareness of his imminent decapitation and in 
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his scrutiny of the slow and often paradoxically protective procedures 
that precede it. But the term’s metaphorical status finds itself undone 
by a number of physiological reactions that bring back the literality of 
torture: the condemned man comes close to “défaillir” (fainting; 710) 
and sways. “Ma vue s’est troublée, une sueur glacée est sortie à la fois de 
tous mes membres, j’ai senti mes tempes se gonfler, et j’avais les oreilles 
pleines de bourdonnements” (Everything became a blur, icy sweat sud-
denly covered my every limb, I felt my temples throb, and my ears were 
filled with a buzzing noise). “Ivre, stupide, insensé” (confounded, stu-
pefied, senseless; 710), he feels both paralyzed and “chancelant . . . du 
coup” (staggering . . . from the blow; 711).36 Oscillating between acute 
sensations and “diminished sensitivity,” his bipolar body language is 
typical of the experience of torture, even if the physical pain that is cen-
tral to this experience is not inflicted at any point before the execution.37
This may precisely be the point: Le Dernier Jour shows modern lethal 
justice to reinvent torture. Not only does the condemned man display 
the stigmata of this practice without having been subject to brutaliza-
tion (yet). The very structure of torture, which, as Elaine Scarry has 
shown, “consists of a primary physical act, the infliction of pain, and a 
primary verbal act, the interrogation,” is also shown to be modulated.38 
The condemned man internalizes this interrogation: his agony largely 
stems from the many self-addressed questions that his death sentence 
triggers: When will they come? How does decapitation feel? Will I be 
pardoned? Am I really going to die before sunset? etc. (XXVI, 691). The 
conflation of “the modes of the interrogatory, the declarative, the imper-
ative, as well as the . . . exclamatory” that Scarry says is specific to the 
torturer’s speech constitutes a prominent trait of the condemned man’s 
prose.39 Torture is shown to recenter on a single agent, and physical pain 
is also produced by a psychological ordeal that the sentence pronounce-
ment has sufficed to launch. A new form of torture emerges, subtle and 
insidious. It is initiated by a law that denies the possibility that pain 
be experienced and is subsequently sustained within and intensified by 
the condemned man himself. Hugo thereby intimates that modernity’s 
lethal justice has reached a perverse degree of sophistication.
I referred earlier to Agamben’s work on the homo sacer and to the 
reduction of his status to “bare life” in antiquity. It is worth adding that 
the Italian philosopher demonstrates that France’s post-Revolutionary 
era marked the advent of a fusion and a confusion between zoē (biolog-
ical life) and bios (political life) in discarding the divine and promoting 
The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.40 For Agam-
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ben, this (con)fusion founds modern biopolitics: “The fact that . . . the 
‘subject’ is, as has been noted, transformed into a ‘citizen’ means that 
birth—which is to say, bare natural life as such—here for the first time 
becomes (thanks to a transformation whose biopolitical consequences 
we are only beginning to discern today) the immediate bearer of sov-
ereignty.”41 Conjuring up the question of the body in an original lan-
guage, Hugo’s fiction insists that the distinction between zoē and bios 
cannot be eclipsed. It denounces the modern French state’s deceptive 
ideology according to which the body is endowed with political rights 
from birth—so that this body is not, at first, “bare life.”
This does not mean that Hugo sheds light on zoē exclusively at the 
expense of bios. He does not cease to complicate and look beyond the 
merely corporeal existence of his condemned man–homo sacer. Agam-
ben highlights a crucial aspect of the homo sacer’s life that Hugo puts 
at the heart of his novel: “He [the homo sacer] is pure zoē, but his zoē 
is as such caught in the sovereign ban and must reckon with it at every 
moment, finding the best way to elude or to deceive it. In this sense, 
no life, as exiles and bandits know well, is more ‘political’ than his.”42 
I would argue that the power to act that Hugo places in his language 
provides a way for the condemned man to “elude” his condition and 
to reassert the political status that both his sentencing and his ensuing 
bodily and mental incarceration take away from him. This power to act 
located in language, the depository of a biological and a political life, is 
made visible in a perennial way. It reminds the reader of the existence 
of two inhumane pains: one that appears to last interminably, as the 
condemned man awaits his execution, and one that occurs in “half a 
second” but whose intensity is ineffable:
Se sont-ils jamais mis, seulement en pensée, à la place de 
celui qui est là, au moment où le lourd tranchant qui tombe 
mord la chair, rompt les nerfs, brise les vertèbres. . . . Mais 
quoi! une demi-seconde! la douleur est escamotée. . . .
Horreur! (XXXIX, 700)
Have they ever placed themselves, only mentally, in the po-
sition of the one lying there, at the instant when the heavy, 
falling blade bites into the flesh, severs the nerves, breaks 
the vertebrae.  .  .  . Come on! Half a second! The pain is 
eclipsed. . . .
Horror!
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Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné subverts the practical and ethical 
shift toward relative discreetness and progressivism that characterized 
the modern death penalty in France. While Hugo eclipses the moment 
of decapitation from his novel and reduces a minima the visibility of 
the condemned man’s body proper, he avoids illustrating the slow move 
away from the body as a focal point of punishment that Foucault high-
lights, with an emphasis on the beginning of the nineteenth century.43 
Instead, the novel suggests that, before justice even lays a hand on the 
condemned body by decapitating it, it “no longer takes public respon-
sibility for the violence that is bound up with its practice,” a violence 
that nevertheless affects both body and psyche.44 Through a destabi-
lizing mise-en-scène and by means of a process of delocalization that 
transposes the biological into the poetic, Hugo applies to his text’s body 
the severance that awaits the condemned man. He contests, and even 
abolishes, the body/soul dichotomy on which, Foucault argues, moder-
nity’s penal system increasingly relied. The interdependence of man’s 
anatomy and man’s interiority finds itself affirmed and actualized, as 
language acts as the symbol, the prolepsis, the written trace—and, con-
sequently, as the future memory—of a “tortured, dismembered, ampu-
tated body . . . exposed alive or dead to public view.”45 In fine, Hugo’s 
verbal manipulations allow him to turn the thesis of “one death per 
condemned man, obtained by a single blow, without recourse to those 
‘long and consequently cruel’ methods of execution,” into a farce.46 
They shed light on the way state power may demote a full human life 
to mere physical life, on the emergence of a new form of torture, and on 
society’s attempt to suspend a political existence.
*  *
*
The representational and poetic devices cultivated in Hugo’s fictional 
diary have an argumentative power of their own.47 Avoiding analysis, 
didacticism, and polemic, they differ from the tools used in the nov-
el’s overtly militant preface of 1832. Paradoxically, this may account 
for the effectiveness of Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné. The hostile 
reactions that the book elicited, as well as the parodies it inspired, 
including Janin’s L’Âne mort et la femme guillotinée (1829) and the 
vaudeville Le Doge et le dernier jour d’un condamné (The Doge and 
the Last Day of a Condemned Man, 1829), testify to the powerful 
effect this strategy had on Hugo’s contemporaries, as well as to how 
seditious it appeared to some of them. La Gazette de France deemed 
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the book nightmarish and “extremely dangerous . . . for the minds al-
ready predisposed to rebel against the laws,” while Deputy Salverte 
viewed it as “execrable” and responsible for the instauration of exten-
uating circumstances in 1832.48
Hugo never repeated quite a comparable tour de force in his other 
works of fiction, which, according to Victor Hugo raconté par un 
témoin de sa vie (Victor Hugo by a Witness of His Life) “continued 
Le Dernier jour d’un condamné” (chapter LI).49 By zooming in on the 
increasingly bare life of a nameless human being, and by giving him a 
voice in a highly heterodox narrative, Hugo created an unprecedented 
proximity to and revulsion for the agony that human justice may cause. 
Le Dernier Jour could thus be said to attack both literature, in its con-
ventions, and the law, in its humanitarian ambition. “Nous l’avons déjà 
dit ailleurs, et plus d’une fois, le corollaire rigoureux d’une révolution 
politique, c’est une révolution littéraire. Que voulez-vous que nous y 
fassions? Il y a quelque chose de fatal dans ce perpétuel parallélisme 
de la littérature et de la société” (We have already said it elsewhere, 
and more than once, the direct corollary of a political revolution is a 
literary revolution. What do you want us to do about it? There is some-
thing fatal in this perpetual parallelism between literature and society; 
OCH 5:29), the poet insisted in the preface to Littérature et philosophie 
mêlées (Medley of Philosophy and Literature; 1834).50 Through its po-
etics, Le Dernier Jour has literary revolution serve a political revolution: 
it deconstructs the philanthropic premises underlying the reform of jus-
tice that occurred during the French Revolution, led to the perennial 
adoption of its icon, the guillotine, and failed to deliver the abolition 
promised by the decree of 1795.
Part II
Words That Kill in Baudelaire
Savoir, tuer et créer.
To know, to kill, and to create.
—Charles Baudelaire, Mon cœur mis à nu
Baudelaire /ba d e l a i r e
Unlike Hugo, Charles Baudelaire is not usually considered an author of 
“capital literature.” Yet he is, to a significant extent, a poet of violence, 
if not the poet of modern violence: physical, moral, socioeconomic, aes-
thetic, and symbolic. The death penalty inscribes itself in these mul-
tilayered reflections on, and representations of, violence.1 Upon close 
examination, it constitutes a persistent component of the imaginary de-
ployed in his works.2
Superficially, capital punishment is found in a host of discreet yet 
recurring references in Baudelaire. This scattered corpus includes odd 
anecdotes about or by the poet, aborted projects, and an overarching 
narrative through which he stages himself and his publications. He insis-
tently likened both his patronym and his facial profile to the badelaire, 
a weapon of execution;3 his conduct and sartorial appearance led some 
contemporaries, such as Jules Barbey d’Aurevilly (OCB 1:1196) and the 
Goncourt brothers, to name him “le guillotiné” and to view him as a 
martyr-executioner;4 he apparently planned to compose an oneiric prose 
poem on “his” death sentence and another on the last words of Jan Hus, 
a reformist Czech priest condemned to death for heresy in the fifteenth 
century (1:367, 369, 371); and he also intended to write a novel or short 
story on a “parricidal love” that ended with an execution (1:588, 597).
After 1857 in particular, Baudelaire also worked the death penalty 
into the imagery relating his personal itinerary and that of his verse. 
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He used the tropes of the capital sentence and severance to drama-
tize the various rejections he had experienced, and their consequences. 
Among them were the “conseil judiciaire” that granted a notary con-
trol over his inheritance and expenditure in his youth, the trial during 
which he was accused of offending public morality, as well as the sup-
pression of poems from Les Fleurs du mal that ensued, his late aes-
thetics of the fragmentary, his poverty, and public disgrace.5 The death 
penalty thereby serves as an efficient running analogy in the story that 
Baudelaire forged to portray himself and his poetry, both for himself 
and for posterity.
Defending the Death Penalty
There is more. Other planned narratives, Mon cœur mis à nu (My 
Heart Laid Bare) and, to a lesser extent, “Notes nouvelles sur Edgar 
Poe,” the unfinished pamphlet Pauvre Belgique! (Poor Belgium!), and 
key poems explore the anthropological and symbolic ramifications 
of the death penalty. Both Baudelaire’s projects of novels and short 
stories and Mon cœur mis à nu take on a rather truculent form. 
They claim to legitimize capital punishment, attributing a sacrificial 
function to it in the polis. The second section of folio 24 in “Liste de 
titres et canevas de romans et nouvelles”  (List of Titles and Sketches 
of Novels and Short Stories), which revolves around the process of 
“conver[ting]” reprehensible actions and drives into rightful ones, 
reads:
L’envers de Claude Gueux. Théorie du sacrifice.
Légitimation de la peine de mort. Le sacrifice n’est com-
plet que par le sponte sua de la victime. (OCB 1:598)
The opposite of Claude Gueux. Theory of sacrifice.
Legitimation of the death penalty. Sacrifice is only com-
plete with the victim’s sponte sua.
Folio 25 proposes a spectacular embodiment of this sacrificial “theory” 
according to which a man condemned to death should embrace his ex-
ecution actively. It imagines a peripety during which the convict would 
oppose his own liberation by the crowd: 
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Un condamné à mort qui, raté par le bourreau, délivré par le 
peuple, retournerait au bourreau.—Nouvelle justification de 
la peine de Mort. 
A man condemned to death who, having been missed by the 
executioner’s hand, and then been freed by the crowd, would 
go back to the executioner.—New justification for the death 
penalty. (OCB 1:598)
These two key passages find an echo in other writings, including the 
central section of folio 12 of Mon cœur mis à nu:
La peine de Mort est le résultat d’une idée mystique, totale-
ment incomprise aujourd’hui. La peine de Mort n’a pas pour 
but de sauver la société, matériellement du moins. Elle a pour 
but de sauver (spirituellement) la société et le coupable. Pour 
que le sacrifice soit parfait, il faut qu’il y ait assentiment et 
joie de la part de la victime. Donner du chloroforme à un 
condamné à mort serait une impiété, car ce serait lui enlever 
la conscience de sa grandeur comme victime et lui supprimer 
les chances de gagner le Paradis. (OCB 1:683)
The death penalty results from a mystical idea, which is en-
tirely misunderstood nowadays. The death penalty does not 
aim to save society, at least not in a material sense. It aims 
to save (in the spiritual sense) society and the culprit. For 
the sacrifice to be perfect, there must be consent and joy on 
the victim’s part. Administering chloroform to a man con-
demned to death would be impious, for it would take from 
him the consciousness of his grandeur as a victim and would 
deprive him of the chance to reach Paradise.6
Such considerations on the function and logistics of the death pen-
alty complement Baudelaire’s singular view on the condemned 
man’s volition. The poet reclaims lethal justice as a transcendent 
enterprise benefiting all of society, a martyrdom of sorts function-
ing through the protagonist’s full awareness and accepted suffering. 
Baudelaire thereby elevates the condemned man to new—or perhaps 
age-old—heights. 
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Conversely, he castigates those who oppose capital punishment. Fo-
lio 14 pursues this criticism openly:
Observons que les abolisseurs de la peine de mort doivent 
être plus ou moins intéressés à l’abolir.
Souvent ce sont des guillotineurs. Cela peut se résumer 
ainsi: “Je veux pouvoir couper ta tête; mais tu ne toucheras 
pas à la mienne.”
Les abolisseurs d’âme (matérialistes) sont nécessairement 
des abolisseurs d’enfer; ils y sont à coup sûr intéressés.
Tout au moins ce sont des gens qui ont peur de revivre,—
des paresseux. (OCB 1:684–85)
Let us note that those for the abolition of the death pen-
alty must have a vested interest in its abolition, to a greater 
or lesser extent.
Often they are guillotiners. It could be summed up like 
this: “I want to be able to cut your head off; but you shall 
not touch mine.”
Abolitionists of the soul (the materialists) are by necessity 
abolitionists of Hell; to be sure, they have an interest in the 
matter.
At best they are people who are afraid to live again—lazy 
people.
As the author of the above-mentioned Claude Gueux and as an “abolis-
seur de la peine de mort” par excellence, Hugo plays a prominent role 
in these reflections. Chapter 3 examines this as well as Baudelaire’s pro-
death penalty corpus.
Poetry on and for the “Pendables”
At a more figurative level, the death penalty also has its place in Baude-
laire’s poetry. He considered prefacing Les Fleurs du mal with an axiom 
proclaiming the universality of capital punishment: “Nous sommes tous 
pendus ou pendables” (We are all hanged or hangable; OCB 1:183). A 
profound sense of man’s condemnation—to boredom, sin, crime, pain, 
and death—traverses the collection. So do motifs, themes, and actors 
emblematic of lethal justice.
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Scaffolds surface in the allegory that concludes the inaugural poem 
“Au lecteur” (To the Reader), in “Chant d’automne” (Autumn Song) as 
the speaker’s anxiety grows at the end of the summer months, and in 
“Les Litanies de Satan,” where the proud man condemned to death, sup-
ported by the devil, looks down upon the beholders of his beheading. The 
victim-executioner duo is another prominent component of Baudelaire’s 
imagistic appropriation of the death penalty in Les Fleurs du mal. It fre-
quently appears in his love poems to revisit the overlap, or the tension, 
between Eros and Thanatos. Les Fleurs arguably enlarges the particular 
figure of the executioner by foregrounding a range of avatars, namely the 
butcher, the torturer, and the vampire (in “Le Vampire,” “Les Métamor-
phoses du Vampire,” “L’Héautontimorouménos” [The Self-Tormenter], 
“À une Madone” [To a Madonna], for instance). Along with, or beyond, 
this vision of love as an often fatal and always unstable affective duel—a 
vision confirmed in Fusées (OCB 1:651)—the victim-executioner duo 
allows the poet to probe a single tormented human being, or even the 
tormented human race as a whole, as we will see in chapter 4.
Completing this death-penalty overview is the presence of severed 
and aching heads throughout Les Fleurs du mal, from the caput mor-
tuum that rests on a bedside table in “Une martyre” to the numerous 
damaged heads—suffering or broken skulls, minds, “cerveaux” and 
“cervelles”—found in “Au lecteur,” “Spleen” (76), “Spleen” (78), “Le 
Cygne” (The Swan), “Danse Macabre,” “Brumes et pluies” (Mists and 
Rains), “La Béatrice,” “L’Amour et le crâne” (Love and the Skull), “Le 
Reniement de Saint Pierre” (St. Peter’s Denial), “La Fin de la journée” 
(Day’s End), and “Le Voyage.” The motif of the severed head in other 
art forms also fascinates Baudelaire, particularly in his 1855 essay on 
laughter. In his poems, it is accompanied, if not valorized, by instru-
ments of dismemberment, torture, and execution, such as the guillotine, 
whose presence is implied in that of the scaffold but also the wheel, the 
gibbet, and the noose.
In some poems, Baudelaire presents more comprehensive capital 
scenes. “Un Voyage à Cythère” and “Le Voyage” respectively portray 
animals attacking the decaying corpse of a hanged man and allude to 
the sadism of the executioner and to the popularity of bloody spectacles. 
Albeit in a more enigmatic way, the prose poem “Une mort héroïque” 
(A Heroic Death) also examines the transgression and process that lead 
to an execution: an artist is denounced for trying to overthrow his sov-
ereign before performing a stupendous pantomime that fails to stop him 
from being put to death.7
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Capital punishment thus permeates both Baudelaire’s prose and po-
etry in distinct ways. The former appears to adopt a retentionist posi-
tion on unexpected grounds, while the latter cultivates a colorful and 
highly symbolic “capital aesthetic.” Part II attempts to examine the con-
textual and poetic specificities of these two faces of capital punishment 
in Baudelaire’s writings as well as the the interaction between them.
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Chapter 3
Prose Praising Sacrifice
Hugo, Maistre, and Beyond
“Sache qu’il faut aimer, sans faire la grimace,
Le pauvre, le méchant, le tortu, l’hébété,
Pour que tu puisses faire, à Jésus, quand il passe,
Un tapis triomphal avec ta charité.”  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Et l’Ange, châtiant autant, ma foi! qu’il aime,
De ses poings de géant torture l’anathème;
Mais le damné répond toujours: “Je ne veux pas!”
“I order you to love without a sneer
The mad, the wretched, those in poverty,
To make for Jesus, when he passes here,
A regal carpet, of your charity.”
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Good God! the Angel, who corrects and loves,
Twists in his fist the sinner from above;
Answers the damned soul, “I will not obey!”
—Charles Baudelaire, “Le Rebelle”
Baudelaire articulated his defense of the death penalty at a time when 
state killing underwent a paradoxical evolution. With the decrease in 
capital cases, the reduced number of executioners,1 the introduction of 
extenuating circumstances for capital crimes (1832), relocation of the 
scaffold by the barrière Saint-Jacques (1832), and short-lived abolition 
of the death penalty for capital crimes in 1848, France adopted mea-
sures that weakened lethal justice in the second third of the nineteenth 
century.2 In some respects, the country was gradually coming closer to 
undermining what Hugo had identified as the three pillars on which the 
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social edifice of the past had rested: the priest, the king, and the execu-
tioner (OCH 4:495). But in the late 1840s and early 1850s, France also 
maintained the guillotine and rejected bills in favor of the general and 
definitive abolition of capital punishment. Baudelaire’s writings seem to 
align themselves with this “retentionist” politics. If anything, they rad-
icalize it. Understanding this stance calls for contextualization. In par-
ticular, two of the poet’s tutelary figures, Hugo and Joseph de Maistre, 
play a crucial role in illuminating Baudelaire’s prose texts that claim to 
legitimize the death penalty. A complex and evolving relationship united 
him to Hugo.3 Léon Cellier has noted that Baudelaire had two kinds of 
model: some seemed constant, while others elicited more volatile ap-
preciation. Hugo fell into the latter category, for Cellier.4 Baudelaire’s 
“raison d’État,” in Paul Valéry’s words, allegedly was to exist as a poet 
despite and next to the overwhelming presence and poetic production 
of the Romantics, chief among them “l’homme-siècle.”5 Admiration, 
competition, and contempt certainly alternate in Baudelaire’s attitude to 
Hugo. Conversely, Cellier classified Joseph de Maistre as one of Baude-
laire’s unvarying models, just like Poe. Whether and how Baudelaire’s 
fervent praise of lethal justice confirms this rapport to Hugo and Mais-
tre remains to be seen.
Baudelaire’s “légitimation de la peine de mort”  
in Perspective
In October 1848, a relatively young Baudelaire reportedly scared the 
readers of a conservative periodical in Châteauroux by praising the 
proponents of the Reign of Terror for their coherence: “His first article 
began thus: ‘When Marat, this gentle man, and Robespierre, this de-
cent man, respectively asked for three hundred thousand heads and the 
permanence of the guillotine, they abided by their system’s inescapable 
logic.’ Although the conclusion recalled an authoritarianism à la Joseph 
de Maistre, everybody acted outraged—and poor Baudelaire did not 
last long in Châteauroux.”6
Other sources suggest that, with or without Maistre, Baudelaire rel-
ished the shock value of killing, the guillotine, and the criminal imagi-
nary. In notes on novelistic projects, he reminds himself that he should 
write to his publisher Malassis to ask him for books on bandits and 
sorcerers from the post-Revolutionary era. Among other embryonic 
ideas, he mentions the figure of Germany’s most famous criminal, Schin-
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derhannes—who died by the guillotine—and lists a variety of places 
and practices liable to elicit horror: “Witchcraft/Kidnappings/Palaces 
and prisons (underground).” He then concludes, with some amusement, 
“And torments [supplices] and horrors!” (OCB 1:593). Perhaps these 
notes figured among the “pile of sketches and accumulated projects” 
the poet claimed to have reviewed before writing to François Buloz, the 
director of the Revue des Deux Mondes who received complaints from 
his subscribers after publishing eighteen “flowers of evil” in early June 
1855: “Alas! Sir, I must confess—to my embarrassment? to my advan-
tage?—that I did not find many humane feelings, or feelings that may 
come across as such. All I saw in them, isn’t it ludicrous to admit it, was 
an attempt to cause surprise or horror” (CB 1:314).
Two motivations partly account for this continuous desire to astonish 
and offend that resurfaces in Baudelaire’s exalted declarations on capi-
tal punishment: literary ambition and a political posture that finds itself 
exacerbated at a particular moment in his career. Like Valéry, albeit less 
severely, a number of critics, such as Pierre Pachet, have underscored 
Baudelaire’s anxiety to make a place for himself on a crowded literary 
scene.7 A letter to his mother confirms that Baudelaire’s interest in the 
spiritual valorization of capital punishment was closely connected to 
a search for literary originality: “I forgot to tell you that I will join the 
Revue des Deux Mondes, with something very sophisticated and very 
bizarre:—either a novel on the ideal of conjugal love,—or a novel that 
legitimizes and explains the holiness of the death penalty” (CB 1:354). 
Both “the ideal of conjugal love” and “the holiness of the death penalty” 
had the potential to surprise the reader by virtue of their ironic quality. 
The bourgeois “ideal of conjugal love” travesties Western literature’s 
model of unattainable, courtly love and that of the impossible passions 
staged in early modern drama. Baudelaire’s century was also concerned 
with another dimension of conjugal love, namely adultery. As for “the 
holiness of the death penalty,” it clearly opposed a number of popular 
nineteenth-century narratives pleading for progressive reforms.8 Thus 
the valorization of capital punishment first seems to have imposed itself 
as a means rather than an end for Baudelaire: an atypical theme and 
thesis, it had the potential to make him elicit a vivid reaction in his 
reader, following in the footsteps of his master Poe who, in “The Phi-
losophy of Composition” (1846), argued that the prime imperative of a 
literary work was to make an impression on its audience.9
Precisely dating all the “retentionist” passages from Baudelaire’s nov-
elistic projects and from Mon cœur mis à nu sometimes proves diffi-
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cult.10 But the above-cited letter, whose content on the death penalty 
mirrors these passages, was written on July 22, 1856. By that time, al-
though the first edition of Les Fleurs du mal had not yet come out, a 
number of Baudelairean poems dissecting human sins had already been 
composed, with about thirty of them published in periodicals. Never-
theless, as Claude Pichois has noted, until 1855, Baudelaire’s composi-
tions were essentially recited within the “cénacles de la bohème” (OCB 
2:1294). Publishing a novel praising decapitation after authoring a 
number of vice-centered compositions would have afforded the poet an 
opportunity to consolidate and further publicize his heterodox persona.
That some sources testify to Baudelaire’s will to portray himself as 
an unconventional man of letters from—at least—the late 1840s on-
ward does not mean that he instrumentalized the celebration of the 
death penalty to this exclusive end. An ideological posture and political 
critique appear to merge with his professional ambition. The presiden-
tial and legislative elections that followed Baudelaire’s revolutionary 
aspirations in 1848 significantly dampened his enthusiasm and faith in 
the people. Likewise, he claimed a posteriori that his “fury” following 
the coup d’état of 1851 had given way to a form of acceptance of the 
Second Empire (OCB 1:679). At the very end of the 1850s and in the 
1860s in particular, Baudelaire increasingly seemed to embrace reaction 
and to associate the various avatars of his era’s progressivism—egali-
tarianism, humanitarianism, pacifism, and abolitionism—with a dread 
that social, political, and, above all, moral hierarchies be annihilated.11 
The poet lamented the decline of the aristocracy, derided the supporters 
of democracy, and rejected all that which, in his view, formed part of a 
collective inclination toward the principle of least effort. “La croyance 
au progrès est une doctrine de paresseux, une doctrine de Belges. C’est 
l’individu qui compte sur ses voisins pour faire sa besogne” (Belief in 
progress is a doctrine for lazy people, a doctrine characteristic of the 
Belgians. It is the individual who relies on his neighbors to do his work 
for him), Mon cœur mis à nu eventually claimed (681; folio 9).
Other statements from this period repeatedly associate militant pro-
gressivism with intellectual laziness, subjection, and conformism: “Les 
poètes de combat. Les littérateurs d’avant-garde. Ces habitudes de 
métaphores militaires dénotent . . . des esprits nés domestiques, des es-
prits belges, qui ne peuvent penser qu’en société” (The militant poets. 
The literary avant-garde. This penchant for military metaphors is the 
sign of . . . minds born servile, Belgian minds, which can only think as 
part of a group; OCB 1:691).12 Ultimately, Baudelaire accused opti-
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mistic and reformist sociopolitical thought of delusively considering all 
people as equal, masking man’s corrupt nature whereas “nature in its 
entirety is part of the original sin” (CB 1:337), and precipitating the 
decadence of nineteenth-century Western society. 
Beyond political change, his main concern seems to have been the 
loss of embodiments of moral superiority. Fusées makes this point 
clear: “L’imagination humaine peut concevoir, sans trop de peine, des 
républiques ou autres états communautaires, dignes de quelque gloire, 
s’ils sont dirigés par des hommes sacrés, par de certains aristocrates. 
Mais ce n’est pas particulièrement par des institutions politiques que se 
manifestera la ruine universelle, ou le progrès universel; car peu m’im-
porte le nom. Ce sera par l’avilissement des cœurs” (Without too much 
difficulty, the human imagination can conceive of republics or other 
community-based states worthy of some glory, if they are led by sacred 
men, by certain types of aristocrats. But universal ruin, or universal 
progress, will not manifest itself through political institutions in partic-
ular; for the name given to these forms of government matters little to 
me. Debasement of the heart is what will cause this ruin; OCB 1:666). 
A fantasy, a fear of moral degeneracy increasingly haunted Baudelaire’s 
writings. 
Such decadence allegedly showed itself in an excessive attachment to 
life. Resisting death instead of being stoic in the face of it is degrading, 
Baudelaire argued, and so is abolitionism, for analogous reasons. Pau-
vre Belgique! reads:
Ils [les Révolutionnaires] croient à toutes les sottises 
lancées par les libéraux français.
(Abolition de la peine de mort. Victor Hugo domine 
comme Courbet. On me dit qu’à Paris 30 000 pétitionnent 
pour l’abolition de la peine de mort. 30 000 personnes qui la 
méritent. Vous tremblez, donc vous êtes déjà coupables. Du 
moins, vous êtes intéressés dans la question. L’amour exces-
sif de la vie est une descente vers l’animalité.) (OCB 2:899; 
folio 196)
They [the Revolutionaries] believe in all the idiotic ideas 
of the French liberals.
(Abolition of the death penalty. Victor Hugo is a dominant 
figure like Courbet. I am told that in Paris 30,000 are peti-
tioning for the abolition of the death penalty. 30,000 people 
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who deserve it. You tremble, so you are already guilty. You 
have some interest in the matter, at least. Excessive love of 
life is a descent into an animal-like state.)
By connecting the progressive abolitionist stance with a cowardly, in-
terested, and animalistic attachment to life, Baudelaire mobilized a core 
argument used by prominent retentionist philosophies of law whose 
genealogy Jacques Derrida has traced: from Kant to Hegel, Bataille, and 
aspects of Blanchot’s thought.13 Following this logic, Derrida remarks, 
life can and should be sacrificed so human dignity, sovereignty, and uni-
versal law occur beyond and above biological existence. Literary con-
servatives, such as Balzac, had also rejected abolitionism as a symptom 
of generalized amorphousness, if not of anarchy, decades before Baude-
laire.14 In a humorous zeugma combining this moral-penal reactionary 
anxiety with a linguistic one, Edgar Poe, sa vie et ses œuvres (1856) 
lamented the possible “abolition de la peine de mort et de l’orthog-
raphe, ces deux folies corrélatives” (abolition of the death penalty and 
of spelling, these two correlated follies; OCB 2:300).
Baudelaire’s figure of the sponte sua can be better understood in this 
politico-ideological context revealing of a moral angst. Although not 
without a biting irony that turns the criminal into a victim, the willing 
condemned man arguably incarnates regained moral distinction and sa-
credness as he embraces death and pain with a view to redeeming a cor-
rupt human race. Through his abnegation, he is taken to reestablish a 
moral order and a spiritual aristocracy of sorts. Hence the insistence on 
his unadulterated experience of suffering in Mon cœur and in one of the 
narrative projects mentioned earlier: “Donner du chloroforme à un con-
damné à mort serait une impiété, car ce serait lui enlever la conscience 
de sa grandeur comme victime et lui supprimer les chances de gagner 
le Paradis” (OCB 1:683; my emphasis); “raté par le bourreau, délivré 
par le peuple, [il] retournerait au bourreau” (598). Pachet has argued 
that the Baudelairean dandy “looks for distinction, singularization, in a 
world in which no procedure can guarantee it for him.”15 The figure of 
the sponte sua who calls for his own execution exemplifies this quest for 
singularization, but he does in fact actualize a selective process, namely 
election, in the religious sense of the term. As a Christ-like savior, he 
symbolizes an antimodern heroism of modern life.
With “‘Le Sublime B. . . . . !’” which Baudelaire mentions as an un-
derestimated heroic subject of modern life (OCB 2:495), the Salon de 
1846 arguably features an avatar of the sponte sua. Dolf Oehler has 
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shown that “B.” is Pierre-Joseph Poulmann, a murderer sentenced to 
death on January 27, 1844. For Baudelaire, the fact that Poulmann de-
clined the support of the priest Jean-François Montès on his way to the 
scaffold made him “sublime.” Instead of seeking comfort, the criminal 
reportedly “couru[t] sus à la guillotine” (threw himself at the guillo-
tine) with “courage” (495)—an anecdote confirmed, indeed magnified 
by Henri Sanson’s Memoirs, which relate the condemned man’s last 
words, a witty blend of irony and charity worthy of Baudelaire.16 Poul-
mann’s remarkable attitude conveniently exemplified the poet’s theory 
that some “happy few” enjoy a redeeming superiority in modern society. 
Mon cœur mis à nu would later contend that these elected figures typi-
cally fall into three categories: “le prêtre, le guerrier, le poète” (the priest, 
the warrior, the poet; OCB 1:684; folio 13), while “le reste est fait pour 
le fouet” (all other men are made to be slaves; 693; folio 16). The sponte 
sua synthesizes these first two models as he assumes both spirituality 
and temerity. As for the poet, a closer look at the very project of Mon 
cœur mis à nu suggests that, to some extent, he was ready to sacrifice 
himself in public.
But Baudelaire also elaborates on the positive nature of capital pun-
ishment after the emergence of this discourse in relatively early writ-
ings that bring together a thirst for literary recognition, the search for 
modern forms of distinction harking back to premodernity, and a cer-
tain irony (namely the Salon de 1846 referring to Poulmann, his article 
published in Châteauroux, the letters to his mother and other interlocu-
tors in the mid-1850s). Some of his above-mentioned reflections on the 
death penalty that expand on a reactionary ideology most aggressively 
date from a later period. Mon cœur mis à nu is considered to have been 
written from 1859 to 1865, with a particular dedication to the project 
in 1861, 1863, and 1865–66 (OCB 1:1468), and Pauvre Belgique! from 
1864 to 1866; Baudelaire wanted Arsène Houssaye to publish Fusées 
in 1862. 
These works belong to a challenging time in the poet’s life. In addi-
tion to such serious personal difficulties as Jeanne Duval’s hemiplegia 
and his suicidal thoughts and cerebral crises, he fought with a num-
ber of publishers, failed to be elected to the Académie française, saw 
Poulet-Malassis imprisoned for his debts, dealt with increasing financial 
difficulties to the point of fearing homelessness, and sold the copyright 
of his translations of Poe to Michel Lévy because he was in such dire 
straits. This led to a failed attempt to find success in Belgium. To un-
derscore these particular circumstances is not to say that the personal 
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explains the political altogether, or that Baudelaire’s trying material and 
professional life thoroughly accounts for an intensified resurgence of 
his praise for the death penalty. Nevertheless, his mounting resentment 
toward a society he deemed debased and hostile helps shed light on his 
increasingly incendiary formulation of the rehabilitation of state killing.
Mon cœur mis à nu, for one, distorts its source of inspiration, namely 
Poe’s idea that man’s most profound literary ambition and will to attain 
fame can be fulfilled through the completion of a tell-all book of sorts:
If any ambitious man have a fancy to revolutionize, at one 
effort, the universal world of human thought, human opin-
ion, and human sentiment, the opportunity is his own—the 
road to immortal renown lies straight, open, and unencum-
bered before him. All that he has to do is to write and pub-
lish a very little book. Its title should be simple—a few plain 
words—“My Heart Laid Bare.” But—this little book must 
be true to its title.
Now, is it not very singular that, with the rabid thirst 
for notoriety which distinguishes so many of mankind—so 
many, too, who care not a fig what is thought of them after 
death, there should not be found one man having sufficient 
hardihood to write this little book? To write, I say. There 
are ten thousand men who, if the book were once written, 
would laugh at the notion of being disturbed by its publica-
tion during their life, and who could not even conceive why 
they should object to its being published after their death. 
But to write it—there is the rub. No man dare write it. No 
man ever will dare write it. No man could write it, even if he 
dared. The paper would shrivel and blaze at every touch of 
the fiery pen.17
Baudelaire openly rose to the challenge that Poe deemed both destructive 
and liable to secure the visibility and originality to which the poet’s corre-
spondence had repeatedly referred. At the same time, however, he replaced 
his American peer’s rather open-ended, exploratory ambition of truthful-
ness with the display of his psyche’s darkest corners. “A great book I’ve 
been meditating over the last two years: My Heart Laid Bare, in which 
I will accumulate all my rage. Ah! If it ever sees the light of day, J[ean]-
J[acques]’s Confessions will pale in comparison. You can see that I am 
dreaming again” (CB 2:141; letter to Madame Aupick, April 1, 1861).18 
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Later correspondence from 1861 and 1863 stresses Baudelaire’s pro-
found ambition for his anger-filled project and plan to publish it only 
after having secured a more comfortable position for himself.19 It also 
confirms the replacement of Poe by Rousseau, and the use of the latter 
both as the ultimate reference for confessional writing and as a coun-
termodel whose self-serving autobiography was to be overturned (182, 
302). On June 5, 1863, he plainly informed a skeptical Madame Aupick 
of his project’s vengeful nature:
Well, yes! The book of which I dreamt for so long will be 
a book of rancours. Of course, my mother, and even my 
step-father, will be respected. Yet while relating my educa-
tion, the manner in which my ideas and sentiments were 
fashioned, I wish to make it feel unceasingly, that I consider 
myself a stranger to the world and to its beliefs. I shall turn 
against the whole of France my real talent for insult. My 
craving for vengeance is like a tired man’s craving for a bath. 
(CB 2:305)20
Baudelaire’s celebration of the death penalty in Mon cœur mis à nu is 
therefore to be read with an added pinch of salt. It finds itself reinte-
grated into a wider, self-staging whole designed to antagonize and re-
taliate against a modern France portrayed as both alien and alienating 
to the artist.
Some of the hate-filled maxims contained in Fusées and Pauvre Bel-
gique! further this intent and extend it to Belgium. The latter work 
echoes and even surpasses the virulence of Baudelaire’s anti-Confes-
sions. It is replete with vindictive charges that point back to the issue 
of literary ambition and nonrecognition. From 1863 to 1866, Baude-
laire went from disappointment to disappointment while in Brussels, 
where his lectures turned out to be neither very profitable nor condu-
cive to the coveted publication of his complete works by Lacroix and 
Verboeckhoven, the publishers of Les Misérables. His notes indicate 
that he considered combining his grievances against Belgium with 
those concerning France as a debased nation:
Entremêler les considérations sur les mœurs des Belges 
d’entremets français.
Nadar. Janin. Le réalisme
(Guiard) [sic];
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La peine de Mort, Les chiens.
Les exilés volontaires;
La Vie de César (Dialogue de Lucien)
Pour ceux-ci particulièrement quelque chose de très soi-
gné. Leur révoltante familiarité.
Pères Loriquet de la Démocratie.
Les Coblentz.
Vérités de Télémaque.
Vieilles bêtes, vieux Lapalisse.
Propres à rien, fruits secs.
Elèves de Béranger.
Philosophie de maîtres de pension et de préparateurs au 
baccalauréat.
Je n’ai jamais si bien compris qu’en la voyant la sottise 
absolue des convictions.
Ajoutons que quand on leur parle de révolution pour de 
bon, on les épouvante. (OCB 2:960–61)
Intersperse the considerations on the customs of the 
Belgians with French treats.
Nadar. Janin. Realism.
(Guiard) [sic];
The Death penalty, dogs.
Voluntary exiles;
The Life of Caesar (Dialogue à la Lucian)
For the following in particular something very special 
[indeed]. Their revolting commonness.
Jesuits of Democracy.
Avatars of the 1789 émigrés.
Didactic truths à la Télémaque.
Old dons, old truisms.
Worthless, dry as can be.
Béranger’s pupils.
Philosophy of boarding school teachers and baccalaure-
ate tutors.
I have never understood as clearly as when I saw for my-
self the utter foolishness of convictions.
Let us add that when they are told about revolution for 
real, they get scared.
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In the last years of Baudelaire’s life, the death penalty thus finds it-
self immersed in a damning hodgepodge of ideas taken to encapsulate 
France’s moral decadence as the poet faces a number of career setbacks. 
It includes several entities and men he had criticized previously: artists 
and intellectuals in favor of progress and democracy, photography, the 
realist movement, the proponents of free education (Auguste Guyard), 
the exiles who, like Hugo, refused to return to France following Napo-
leon III’s amnesty, and art marked by democratic ideas and a perceived 
liberal conformism. Baudelaire, who confessed to Narcisse Ancelle that 
his rhetoric in Belgium was deliberately uncouth (“But here . . . you 
have to be uncouth to make yourself understood”; CB 2:409), lumps 
them together to symbolize his era’s supposedly uncreative imagination, 
cowardice, truthlessness, intellectual mediocrity, and foolish commit-
ment to social improvement and democracy.
In context, Baudelaire’s laudatory evocations of capital punishment 
and turn to the theme of sacrifice therefore appear to result from his 
aspiration for artistic originality, a nostalgic stance, and search for 
forms of moral distinction, but also, increasingly, and following a num-
ber of disappointments, from his will to take on the vocal proponents 
of pro-democratic, progressive politics and to disprove their optimis-
tic convictions. Yet the poet’s conception of the death penalty not only 
depends on these biographical and contextual data. As is beginning to 
become clear, it also inscribes itself in a related critical quarrel about the 
relationship between literature and ideology.
Clash of the Titans: Baudelaire vs. Hugo  
on Capital Punishment
Besides Rousseau, whose Confessions he aimed to emulate and sub-
vert in Mon cœur mis à nu by proposing a truly ruthless self-portrait, 
Baudelaire took aim at the liberal Hugo when defending the death pen-
alty.21 The idolized poet-prophet had conquered publishers and a vast 
audience, both erudite and popular, and could not be opposed more 
dramatically than through Baudelaire’s promotion of state killing and 
insistence on man’s scarcely redeemable corruption. As noted earlier, 
one of Baudelaire’s most explicit challenges to Hugo’s convictions and 
art is found in his projects of essays and short stories:
L’envers de Claude Gueux. Théorie du sacrifice.
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Légitimation de la peine de mort. Le sacrifice n’est com-
plet que par le sponte sua de la victime. (OCB 1:598)
Why is Claude Gueux to be overturned? This question begs another: 
what is Claude Gueux? Formally, it is the anti–Dernier Jour d’un con-
damné in that it makes no secret of its wish to “save mankind,” in 
Baudelaire’s words (OCB 2:936). Just as Les Misérables would about 
thirty years later, it defends social progress and criticizes the death pen-
alty in an overt and didactic way. Inspired by a fait divers, the narrative 
is based on a rather Manichaean plot, sentimentalism, pathos, explicit 
reflections on the socioeconomic injustices of the day, and a certain her-
oism. Its eponymous protagonist, who is eventually executed, is the ar-
chetype, or rather the prototype, of the exemplary criminal whom Jean 
Valjean will later duplicate and turn into an icon. In brief, Claude Gueux 
typifies an openly edifying reformist and humanitarian literature.22
Published five years after Le Dernier Jour, Claude Gueux did not 
pursue the revolutionary representational and narrative techniques 
tried out in the earlier novel to undermine the legitimacy of state killing. 
Baudelaire knew Le Dernier Jour: he had read it in 1837.23 But he did 
not choose it as his target despite the fact that it tackled the issue of 
capital punishment more clearly than did Claude Gueux. “La poésie ne 
peut pas, sous peine de mort ou de défaillance, s’assimiler à la science 
ou à la morale; elle n’a pas la Vérité pour objet, elle n’a qu’Elle-même” 
(Poetry cannot, without risking death or decay, be assimilated to science 
or morality; the pursuit of Truth is not its aim, it has nothing outside it-
self), he stated in 1857 and in 1859, rewriting Poe’s “Poetic Principle.”24 
For Baudelaire then, Le Dernier Jour does not seem to have run the risk 
of sentencing poetry to death by associating it with explicit practical 
and moral ends, as opposed to Claude Gueux.
Behind this focus on Claude Gueux looms a critique of the function 
and form of literature. What is its primary goal? Where and how do ide-
ology and morality fit into literature? How can or should they emerge 
in literary works? Is there any room at all for ideology in the literary 
realm? Baudelaire poses the question in an article on Les Misérables of 
April 20, 1862. The beginning of its second section, in which he refrains 
from expressing his view too openly, reads:
L’âge mûr, au contraire, se tourne avec inquiétude et curi-
osité vers les problèmes et les mystères. Il y a quelque chose 
de si absolument étrange dans cette tache noire que fait la 
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pauvreté sur le soleil de la richesse . . . qu’il faudrait qu’un 
poète, qu’un philosophe, qu’un littérateur fût bien parfait-
ement monstrueux pour ne pas s’en trouver parfois ému et 
intrigué jusqu’à l’angoisse. Certainement ce littérateur-là 
n’existe pas; il ne peut pas exister. Donc tout ce qui divise 
celui-ci d’avec celui-là, l’unique divergence c’est de savoir si 
l’œuvre d’art doit n’avoir d’autre but que l’art, si l’art ne doit 
exprimer d’adoration que pour lui-même, ou si un but, plus 
noble ou moins noble, inférieur ou supérieur, peut lui être 
imposé. (OCB 2:219)
Conversely, mature age turns to problems and mysteries 
with anxiety and curiosity. There is something so profoundly 
strange in this black stain that poverty makes on the sun 
of wealth . . . that a poet, a philosopher, or a man of letters 
should really be an absolute monster not to feel occasionally 
moved or intrigued by it to the point of anxiety. Such a lit-
erary man surely does not exist; he cannot exist. So the only 
thing that sets apart this literary man from that literary man, 
their one divergence lies in knowing whether the work of 
art should have any goal other than art, whether art should 
express adoration towards itself only, or whether a nobler 
or less noble goal, inferior or superior to it, can be imposed 
on it.
While the beginning of these considerations, uttered by a writer nine-
teen years younger than Hugo, sound skillfully derisive (at least in part), 
the last sentence points to a more fundamental rift between the two 
authors.25 A substantial part of Hugo’s works indicates that “progress” 
should be literature’s primary goal. Baudelaire disqualifies the “vignette 
politique” that he believes has characterized these writings by Hugo 
(OCB 2:106; “Théophile Gautier”). He contrasts it with the more “mys-
terious” parts of his peer’s production.26 The review of Les Misérables, a 
novel that Baudelaire confessed to hating in his private correspondence 
(254), is therefore at pains not to criticize Hugo for the explicit intro-
duction of morality into his prose. Yet it partly solves the conundrum 
by returning to the opposition to which “Théophile Gautier” alludes: 
it praises the “invisible” penetration of some inspired morality into lit-
erature, not as a goal but as a function of the richness of “la matière 
poétique” (217–18).
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In sum, Baudelaire’s criticism of Les Misérables, like that of Gautier 
inspired by Poe, illuminates his notes on Claude Gueux. The object of 
his discontent is “l’idée d’utilité directe,” which, following in Poe’s foot-
steps here again, he perceived as “la grande hérésie poétique des temps 
modernes” (OCB 2:263; “Edgar Allan Poe, sa vie et ses ouvrages”). 
Like his American model, he resented the “humanitarian poets . . . po-
ets of universal suffrage . . . poets supporting the abolition of the Corn 
Laws; poets who want to have workhouses built” (262).
Specific textual exchanges shed further light on the divergence between 
Hugo and Baudelaire on the question of openly moralizing literature : 
letters in 1859, first, and, second, a dialogue established in a small num-
ber of revealing passages from their literary works. In September 1859, 
Baudelaire asked Hugo for a preface to his “Théophile Gautier” in a mis-
sive containing two prose poems dedicated to the poet-prophet, “Les Sept 
Vieillards” (The Seven Old Men) and “Les Petites Vieilles” (The Little 
Old Women). Baudelaire’s previous criticism of didacticism put him in an 
uncomfortable position he felt the need to justify and mitigate:27
So now I owe you some explanations. I know your works by 
heart and your prefaces show me that I’ve overstepped the 
theory you generally put forward on the alliance of morality 
and poetry. But at a time when society turns away from art 
with such disgust, when men allow themselves to be debased 
by purely utilitarian concerns, I think there’s no great harm 
in exaggerating a little in the other direction. It’s possible 
that I’ve protested too much. But that was in order to obtain 
what was needed. (CB 1:597)28
The point made in the above-cited letter to Ancelle about Baudelaire’s 
need for exaggeration (CB 2:409) can already be seen here, and may 
not be purely rhetorical. Yet although Hugo’s reply of October 6, 1859 
famously complimented the younger poet on the “frisson nouveau” 
(new shiver) emanating from his writing , l’homme-siècle firmly held his 
ground regarding the association of literature and progressive ideology:
You are not mistaken in anticipating some dissidence be-
tween you and me. I understand your whole philosophy (for, 
like any poet, you are also a philosopher); I understand it 
and more, I admit it; but I shall keep mine. I have never said: 
Art for Art’s sake; I have always said: Art for the sake of 
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Progress. All things considered, it is the same thing, and your 
mind is too perceptive not to feel it. Onwards! Such is the 
word of Progress; such is also the cry of Art. . . . The whole 
language of poetry is contained therein. Ite! . . .
Art is not perfectible, I was among the first to say so, I 
think, so I know it; nobody will surprass Aeschylus, nobody 
will surpass Phidias; but we can be as good as they were, and 
to be as good as they were, we must displace the horizon of 
Art, go higher, further, walk. The poet cannot walk alone, 
man must also move along. The steps of humanity are thus 
the very steps of Art.—So, glory to Progress. 29
Baudelaire soon parodied Hugo’s solemn declaration in a letter to Pou-
let-Malassis. It revealed how unbridgeable the theoretical gap between 
the two authors remained, and how Baudelaire’s formal discourse on 
and to Hugo differed from his more disapproving private thoughts:
Don’t fail to give a fierce punch in De Broise’s solar plexus 
either. This is necessary for the correction of the proofs and 
the Progress of Typography. It is the Language and the cry 
of Art. Ite!
(Don’t print those last lines.) (CB 1:608)
Within this debate on the status of literature, its self-sufficiency or, 
conversely, its functional character, Baudelaire was not the only one 
who invoked capital punishment—cursing Claude Gueux. Hugo in 
turn used the death penalty as a point of reference. He dubbed it “the 
most insolent of affronts to human dignity, to civilization, to progress” 
and a “permanent crime” (OCH 12:897), identified the end of lethal 
justice as the condition sine qua non of progress supported by the 
first of all human rights (named “l’inviolabilité de la vie humaine”), 
and insisted that it was incumbent upon the writers of his century to 
abolish capital punishment.30 “The writers of the 18th century abol-
ished torture; the writers of the 19th century, I have no doubt, will 
abolish the death penalty.”31 In other words, while, as Derrida has 
noted, Hugo anticipated “the right to life” formulated in the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Baudelaire defended the right 
to death—the right to acknowledge man’s murderous and suicidal dis-
positions—and, with it, the right of literature to challenge modernity’s 
abstract and universal humanitarian ideals.32
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Jean-Marc Hovasse has shown that three works prolong the au-
thors’ key epistolary exchange from 1859: the poem from Les Fleurs 
du mal “Le Cygne,” a passage of Les Misérables, and the prose poem 
“Le Gâteau.” I would argue that capital punishment occupies a priv-
ileged place in this intertextual dialogue. The first extract to which 
Hovasse points is from part 5 of Les Misérables. In the presence of 
two poor children, a bourgeois father feeds two swans in the Luxem-
bourg Gardens, using the brioche his son has spat out crying because 
he is no longer hungry. When the bourgeois and his progeny then walk 
away, content with the humaneness they have shown toward the two 
animals, the children in rags pick up the crumbs. This swan-centered 
scene operates what Hovasse calls a “déformation transgénérique car-
icaturale.”33 It reappropriates Baudelaire’s “Le Cygne” in a highly crit-
ical piece of prose fiction. Not incidentally, Hugo’s chilling vignette 
is preceded by a moral critique about those artists who appear to 
express indifference toward others:
Chose étrange, l’infini leur suffit. Ce grand besoin de 
l’homme, le fini, qui admet l’embrassement, ils l’ignorent. Le 
fini, qui admet le progrès, ce travail sublime, ils n’y songent 
pas. . . . Dieu leur éclipse l’âme. C’est là une famille d’esprits, 
à la fois petits et grands. Horace en était, Goethe en était, 
La Fontaine peut-être; magnifiques égoïstes de l’infini, spec-
tateurs tranquilles de la douleur, qui ne voient pas Néron 
s’il fait beau, auxquels le soleil cache le bûcher, qui regard-
eraient guillotiner en y cherchant un effet de lumière, qui 
n’entendent ni le cri, ni le sanglot, ni le râle, ni le tocsin. 
(OCH 12:851–52; part 5, book 1, chapter 16)
Strangely enough, infinity is enough for them. They ignore 
that great need in man, the finite, which admits of an em-
brace. They do not think about the finite, which admits of 
progress, that sublime toil. . . . God eclipses their soul. Theirs 
is a family of minds at once little and great. Homer belonged 
to it, Goethe belonged to it, La Fontaine possibly; magnifi-
cent egotists of the infinite, calm spectators of pain, who do 
not see Nero if the weather is fine, from whom the sun hides 
the stake, who would look at a decapitation to seek the play 
of light therein, who do not hear the cry, nor the sob, nor the 
death-rattle, nor the bell toll.
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Like the bourgeois father in the Luxembourg Gardens, Baudelaire could 
be seen as a dangerously clueless privileged individual interested in 
graceful swans, not in starving human beings. 
Hovasse demonstrates that Baudelaire responded to this criticism in 
“Le Gâteau,” which pitilessly refutes the existence of human fraternity 
presumed by the bourgeois—writer or spectator. The poem replaces the 
generosity preached by Hugo with “une guerre parfaitement fratricide” 
(a perfectly fratricidal war) between two destitute children fighting over 
a slice of bread, a “spectacle” said to have “embrumé le paysage” (ob-
scured the landscape) enjoyed by the speaker, ruining “la joie calme où 
s’ébaudissait [s]on âme” (the calm joy gladdening his soul). Contrary 
to the aesthetes depicted in Les Misérables, Baudelaire’s persona in “Le 
Gâteau” is not unaware of the violence that surrounds him. After claim-
ing provocatively to be imperceptibly distracted (“embrumé”) by it, he 
expresses his incredulity at one of the children’s use of metaphor: the 
youngster’s hunger is so great that it metamorphoses such basic food as 
bread into a treat, a “gâteau” (italicized in the poem, in addition to be-
ing titular). Albeit ironically, Baudelaire signals that he is no Marie-An-
toinette.34 With “Le Gâteau,” he bitterly shows that he understands 
destitution, the persistent possibility of violence resulting from inequal-
ity, and the language of violence. For Dolf Oehler, he even encourages 
those who starve to have recourse to violence in the very presence of a 
parodied bourgeois audience.35 This rewriting of Les Misérables built 
into “Le Gâteau” is, in my view, another case of Baudelaire’s “envers de 
Claude Gueux.” It shatters Hugo’s valorous characters and transforms 
the exemplary into the amoral or the immoral. Instead of being heroic—
poor yet generous—Baudelaire’s children are selfish and fierce. 
Capital punishment is what ignites this threefold intertextual con-
frontation. Hugo’s vigorous attack on Baudelaire and his fellow aes-
thetes culminates with a reference to executions, presented as situations 
in which the writers’ blindness—literally—to sociopolitical realities 
reaches a climax (“qui ne voient pas Néron”). In this powerful carica-
ture, aesthetic passion proves radically incompatible with human sol-
idarity. The text’s markers of grandeur (“magnifiques,” “tranquilles”) 
become ruthless indictments. By way of oxymoron, Hugo applies them 
to the aesthetes’ selfishness, indifference, and ignorance of their own 
cruelty. He thereby proposes a monstrous portrayal of the writers who 
worship beauty: “Dieu leur éclipse l’âme . . . esprits, à la fois petits et 
grands.” In other words, the author turns the scaffold into the sad and 
ultimate indicator of purely aestheticist literature. Through sarcasm and 
90 ❘ Words That Kill in Baudelaire
somber grotesquerie, the nonopposition of poets to lethal justice comes 
to typify their irresponsibility and, indeed, their inhumanity.
Hugo and Baudelaire’s disagreement on the relationship between lit-
erature and progressive militancy, which symbolically pivots around the 
death penalty, points to a deeper divorce. Two antagonistic visions of 
mankind inform their works. Hugo’s remains optimistic, forward-look-
ing, and may even surpass the Christian doctrine itself in a desire for 
universal charity and forgiveness that does not concern itself with the 
Last Judgment. For him, who takes the murder of the brother to be 
the veritable moment of man’s Fall, the legal killing of other men is 
unacceptable in that it replicates this gesture. By contrast, Baudelaire’s 
vision of the human race proves backward-looking and centers on its 
corrupt nature and intrinsic disposition for evil. What is natural in man 
is the taste for “demolition,” “destruction,” and “crime” (OCB 1:679).36 
Symptomatically, “Notes Nouvelles sur Edgar Poe” distorts Poe’s writ-
ings to underscore the latter’s supposed belief in “la perversité primor-
diale de l’homme”:
Il est agréable que quelques explosions de vieille vérité sau-
tent ainsi au visage de tous ces complimenteurs d’humanité, 
de tous ces dorloteurs et endormeurs qui répètent sur toutes 
les variations possibles de ton: “Je suis né bon, et vous aussi, 
et nous tous, nous sommes nés bons!” oubliant, non! feig-
nant d’oublier, ces égalitaires à contresens, que nous som-
mes tous nés marquis pour [sic] / marqués par le mal! (OCB 
2:323)
It is pleasant that a few old-fashioned truths should thus 
explode in the face of all those who compliment mankind, 
who mollycoddle and lull us to sleep by repeating with every 
possible variation of tone: “I was born good, and so were 
you, and all of us, we were born good!” forgetting, no! pre-
tending to forget, backwards egalitarians that they are, that 
we were all born as marquis for [sic] / branded with the 
mark of evil!
Claiming to transcribe Poe’s thought, Baudelaire remarks that such 
“perversité naturelle” “fait que l’homme est sans cesse et à la fois ho-
micide et suicide, assassin et bourreau” (results in man being constantly 
and simultaneously homicidal and suicidal, murderer and executioner; 
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OCB 2:323). And for the poet, the scaffold and the figure of the willing 
condemned man expose this moral duality: they epitomize man’s simul-
taneous criminal and vulnerable natures.
Hugo comes to play a, indeed the prominent role in Baudelaire’s cri-
tique of his era and country’s “decadence” identified earlier. Baudelaire’s 
remarks on the supposed hidden goals of the celebration of Shake-
speare’s birth in the letter he sent to the director of Le Figaro in April 
1864 are unambiguous in this regard:
selon . . . le crescendo particulier de la bêtise chez les foules 
rassemblées dans un seul lieu, porter des toasts à Jean Val-
jean, à l’abolition de la peine de mort, à l’abolition de la 
misère, à la Fraternité universelle, à la diffusion des lumières, 
au vrai Jésus-Christ, législateur des chrétiens, comme on di-
sait jadis, à M. Renan, à M. Havin, etc. . . . , enfin, à toutes 
les stupidités propres à ce XIXe siècle, où nous avons le fati-
gant bonheur de vivre, et où chacun est, à ce qu’il paraît, 
privé du droit naturel de choisir ses frères. (OCB 2:229)37
depending on . . . the particular crescendo of idiocy in 
crowds gathered in a single place, to drink a toast to Jean 
Valjean, to the abolition of the death penalty, to the aboli-
tion of poverty, to universal Fraternity, to the diffusion of the 
Enlightenment, to the real Christ, legislator of the Christians, 
as they used to say, to Mr. Renan, to Mr. Havin, etc. . . . , 
and finally, to all the stupid ideas characteristic of this 19th 
century in which we have the tiring pleasure of living, and 
in which everyone is, from what it seems, deprived of the 
natural right to choose one’s brothers.
The poet accuses a blind humanitarian progressivism and positivism 
à la Hugo of promoting the monolithic fiction of a universally lov-
ing and benevolent mankind, one that eclipses true criminality (Jean 
Valjean) and places the spiritual leader (Jesus Christ) and the poli-
tician (Havin) or the positivist scholar (Renan) on the same moral 
footing.38
In contrast, Baudelaire demands that we be aware of our duality 
and that we notably acknowledge our active participation in destruc-
tion, literal and figurative. The following passage, which concludes 
a note from Pauvre Belgique! cited earlier, can be understood in this 
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light. It both regrets and reclaims the necessary deadly brutality of 
revolutions:
MOI, quand je consens à être républicain, je fais le mal, 
le sachant. . . .
Mais moi, je ne suis pas dupe! je n’ai jamais été dupe! Je 
dis Vive la Révolution! comme je dirais: Vive la Destruction! 
Vive l’Expiation! Vive le Châtiment! Vive la Mort!
Non seulement, je serais heureux d’être victime, mais je 
ne haïrais pas d’être bourreau,—pour sentir la Révolution 
de deux manières!
Nous avons tous l’esprit républicain dans les veines, 
comme la vérole dans les os. Nous sommes Démocratisés et 
Syphilisés. (OCB 2:961)
When I agree to be a republican, I knowingly cause harm. . . .
But I am not fooled by this! I have never been fooled! I 
say Long live the Revolution! just as I would say Long live 
Destruction! Long live Expiation! Long live Punishment! 
Long live Death!
Not only would I be happy to be a victim, but I wouldn’t 
hate to be an executioner,—so as to feel the Revolution from 
both ends!
We all have the republican spirit in our veins, like the pox 
in our bones. We have been made Democratic and Syphilitic.
Here and elsewhere, Baudelaire therefore redefines progress in oppo-
sition to Hugo, not as sociomoral improvement but as man facing up 
to—and, in some cases, surpassing—the depravity that forms part of his 
nature. The direct, sardonic reference to Hugo’s mystic rituals in Jersey 
in the statement below, from Mon cœur mis à nu, confirms it:
Théorie de la vraie civilisation.
Elle n’est pas dans le gaz, ni dans la vapeur, ni dans les 
tables tournantes, elle est dans la diminution des traces du 
péché originel. (OCB 1:697)39
Theory of true civilization.
It doesn’t lie in gas, or steam, or table-turning, it lies in 
reducing the traces of original sin.
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Lessening these traces of the past, Baudelaire argues, depends on such 
virtues as “dignity” and disinterestedness, on a moral aristocracy of 
sorts which he claims “the West” (OCB 1:697) has largely lost.
Baudelaire’s conviction that we are in part viscerally corrupt—a fact 
that only some men may transcend through moral means—translates 
into a demand that literature should show our fallen and miserable 
state, whether in his most provocative, parodic projects or in his verse, 
as the famous epigraph to the first edition of Les Fleurs du mal, bor-
rowed from d’Aubigné, confirms.40 Likewise with the notes to his law-
yer for the trial of 1857 in which he rages against the “prudish, uptight, 
nagging morality” that “would go so far as to say: from now on we 
will only write consoling books serving to demonstrate that 
man was born good, and that all men are happy,—abominable 
hypocrisy!” (OCB 1:196).41 The “envers de Claude Gueux” project is 
testament to this will to produce works that reveal rather than conceal 
man’s immoral and sometimes criminal penchants. If one is to believe 
Asselineau, Baudelaire once exclaimed about the blissful portrayal of 
man presented in Les Misérables: “I will write a novel in which I will 
feature a villain, but a real villain, an assassin, a thief, an arsonist and 
privateer, and it will end with this sentence: ‘And under the shade of 
these trees I planted, surrounded by a family who reveres me, by chil-
dren who cherish me and by a wife who adores me, I am relishing the 
fruits of all my crimes in peace!’” (JIB 301). For Baudelaire, then, the 
double immorality resulting from human depravity and from the pos-
sibility that society may not punish it is to be explored by literary cre-
ation, as opposed to the fabrication of a myth of justice.
Ultimately, a certain kind of Hugolian literature is not just sus-
pected of “functionalism” (i.e., of serving a politico-ideological goal) 
and paternalism, but also of concealing man’s supposed spiritual and 
anthropological truth, by promoting or promising widespread human 
happiness. Pauvre Belgique! specifically condemns the painter Wiertz, 
“Christ des humanitaires,” whom Baudelaire accuses of foolishness and 
compares with “Hugo at the end of Les Contemplations,” before not-
ing: “Abolition de la peine de mort,” “Wiertz et V. Hugo veulent sauver 
l’humanité” (Wiertz and V. Hugo want to save mankind; OCB 2:935–
36). The end of Les Contemplations to which Baudelaire alludes here 
includes “Ce que dit la bouche d’ombre” (What the mouth of darkness 
says). This poem portrays a pantheistic infini that overflows with life 
but also evokes God’s creation of man as imperfect, and a resulting hor-
rendous human existence plagued by suffering, crime, wandering, and 
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death. It calls for pity, narrates the sympathy of an animated nature, and 
ends with a hopeful conclusion that heralds the disappearance of evil 
and pain. Les Contemplations thus assures the reader of the transfigu-
ration of darkness into light.
It is this literature celebrating an ascending moral trajectory, either 
through a confident embrace of redemption and forgiveness postmor-
tem or through the implementation on earth of a more humanitarian 
law that does away with killing, that Baudelaire vigorously refuses: “All 
literature derives from sin.—I speak most earnestly,” avers a letter to 
Poulet-Malassis written in late August 1860 (CB 2:85). Nevertheless, 
contrary to what Hugo subtly suggests in the excerpt above from Les 
Misérables, Baudelaire does not promote a literary aestheticism that 
goes so far as to ignore the fate and pain of the man burned at the 
stake. Quite to the contrary: while his later texts increasingly indulge 
in incendiary affront, as early as 1851, he wrote self-critically about 
the life-threatening risk run by the man of letters obsessed only with 
beauty and form at the expense of the outside world and his fellow 
sufferers in a passage from “L’École païenne” (The Pagan School) that 
is arguably similar to Hugo’s text in its forceful tone and content: “The 
immoderate taste for form results in monstrous and unknown disor-
ders” (OCB 2:48–49). But Baudelairean poetry does not promise or 
promote a moral transfiguration as Hugolian poetry does. Rather, it 
explores, and exposes, violence, not just on the scaffold but also in what 
Baudelaire perceives as man’s brutal nature as well as in a modern social 
world plagued by inequalities that idealistic and political discourse may 
recuperate or fail to fully acknowledge.42 Baudelaire does not, in this 
process, turn a blind eye to the executioner’s victim, nor to the execu-
tioner himself, as chapter 4 will show.
Maistre as Master? Baudelaire’s  
Eighteenth-Century Affinities and Beyond
Benjamin Fondane diagnosed Baudelaire’s veneration of Maistre and 
Poe as a means of escape from Hugo.43 The specific question of capital 
punishment makes this Hugo vs. Maistre opposition particularly salient. 
In 1851, Hugo rebuked Maistre’s praise of the executioner in a poem 
entitled “Écrit sur la première page d’un livre de Joseph de Maistre” 
even though, as a young Ultra-Royalist, Hugo had peppered his early 
Han d’Islande with citations by the counter-Revolutionary thinker.44 
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Elaborating on Fondane, Jérôme Thélot has argued that Baudelaire’s 
anti–Claude Gueux project shows that what he aptly terms the poet’s 
“Maistrean proposition, or posture” is a function of his hatred for Hu-
go’s novels.45 The context and material examined so far have led us to 
narrow down this hatred to one that specifically targets the didactic 
Hugolian novel. The exact modalities of Baudelaire’s Maistrean posture 
also invite further qualification.
Baudelaire claimed to have nostalgic affinities with the eighteenth 
century of “public executions against a backdrop of libertinism, which 
were the great festivals of the 18th century,” as Georges Blin has put 
it.46 While the poet appropriated aspects of the works of the marquis 
de Sade, whose thought he interpreted as the lucid portrayal of man’s 
evil nature, according to Blin, he simultaneously opposed part of what 
is commonly remembered of the French eighteenth century, namely the 
Enlightenment, the promotion of rationality and scientificity over spir-
ituality, and the omnipotence that 1789 claimed to give to the people. 
The first official evocation of the abolition of capital punishment was 
formulated during that period, in 1795, in the form of a promise: capital 
punishment was to be abolished once peace was established, accord-
ing to article 1 of the décret du 4 brumaire de l’an IV. As noted in the 
introduction, important eighteenth-century authors repeatedly pleaded 
against the supplices and capital punishment. They included Sade—
probably unbeknownst to Baudelaire—and Voltaire, an admirer and 
commentator of Beccaria, who was himself influenced by such French 
philosophers as Montesquieu.47 The poet’s interest in Joseph de Maistre 
and his theory of sacrifice is part of an ostentatious resistance to these 
eighteenth-century roots of French progressivism.   
Baudelaire knew Maistre as early as 1850 or 1851 (JIB, 284–85) 
and is likely to have read at least his Essai sur le principe générateur des 
constitutions politiques (OCB 1:1513)—which he confused with Con-
sidérations sur la France (OCB 1:709, 2:68, 70)—as well as Lettres et 
opuscules inédits published in 1851 (OCB 2:50, 223)48 and Les Soirées 
de Saint Pétersbourg (OCB 2:251, 298; “L’Héautontimorouménos”). 
Just as Maistre had celebrated bloodshed, the executioner, and the law 
of destruction in his Soirées, Baudelaire repeatedly described mankind 
as bound to and by carnage.49 His previously cited offer to contradict 
Les Misérables by narrating the fortune of “un vrai scélérat, assassin, 
voleur, incendiaire et corsaire” (JIB 301) jokingly illustrates this. So do 
other, more earnest, writings: “Le Voyage” concludes Les Fleurs du mal 
with a lapidary description of
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La chose capitale, . . .
Le spectacle ennuyeux de l’immortel péché. (OCB 1:132)
The most important thing, . . .
The tedious spectacle of immortal sin.50
and includes glimpses into a modern society saturated with violence 
and blood:
Le bourreau qui jouit, le martyr qui sanglote;
La fête qu’assaisonne et parfume le sang. (OCB 1:132)
The executioner relishing his task, the sobbing martyr;
The festival seasoned and perfumed with blood.51
Ghastly cameos reemerge in Baudelaire’s anaphoric listing of man’s in-
toxication with violence in Mon cœur mis à nu, which refers to his plan 
to write
Un chapitre sur l’indestructible, éternelle, universelle et in-
génieuse férocité humaine.
De l’amour du sang.
De l’ivresse du sang.
De l’ivresse des foules.
De l’ivresse du supplicié (Damiens). (OCB 1:693; folio 
26)
A chapter on the indestructible, eternal, universal, and inge-
nious ferociousness of humanity.
On the love of blood.
On the intoxication of blood.
On the intoxication of crowds.
On the intoxication of the drawn and quartered criminal 
(Damiens).
This final reference to the man who attempted to assassinate Louis XV 
and was the last person to undergo drawing and quartering in France con-
firms Baudelaire’s will to foreground an eighteenth century that predates, 
and is at odds with, humanitarian penal reforms. What better words to 
gloss the poet’s apocalyptic paintings of the human race than Maistre’s?
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Thus, from the maggot up to man, the universal law of the 
violent destruction of living things is unceasingly fulfilled. 
The entire earth, perpetually steeped in blood, is nothing but 
an immense altar on which every living thing must be immo-
lated without end, without restraint, without respite, until 
the consummation of the world, until the extinction of evil, 
until the death of death.
But the anathema must strike down man most directly 
and most visibly.52
In addition to mimicking Maistre’s rhetorical and ideological vio-
lence, Baudelaire appears to hark back to the latter’s “Théorie du sac-
rifice” when he apprehends the death penalty through the prism of this 
ritual. The counter-Revolutionary philosopher’s Éclaircissement sur 
les sacrifices conceived of the expiatory shedding of blood in a favor-
able light, on the grounds that “heaven, angered by flesh and blood, 
could only be appeased by blood.”53 In aggrandizing capital punishment 
through this spiritual model of beneficial sacrifice, Baudelaire opposed 
both the humanitarian detractors of the death penalty, such as Hugo, 
and its orthodox partisans, who believed in its ability to guarantee 
society’s material safety. Let us recall Baudelaire’s statement in Mon 
cœur mis à nu: “La peine de mort n’a pas pour but de sauver la société, 
matériellement du moins. Elle a pour but de sauver (spirituellement) la 
société et le coupable” (OCB 1:683). Maistre’s theory, which specifi-
cally defines moral rescue as the product of sacrifice, is patent here.54 
Baudelaire’s recourse to the concept of sponte sua also appears to have 
followed Maistre’s definition of the reversibility of merits, according to 
which a juste agent suffers and is thereby promoted from the status of 
patient to that of victim55 liable to compensate for men’s misdeeds—
which echo original sin.56
Yet it would be erroneous to assert that Baudelaire thoroughly abides 
by Maistre’s model.57 Éclaircissement sur les sacrifices traces the resort 
to sacrifice in the ancient world (in Egypt, India, Greece, pre-Columbian 
America etc.), explaining its persistence and ubiquity by universalizing 
the notion of the Fall across cultures and periods. The act of shedding 
blood, Maistre insists, has the crucial function of enabling society to 
expiate the evil inherent in man. It is beneficial in that it allows for the 
conversion of his “réité” (or “original . . . degradation”).58 Maistre as-
serts that, most probably, human sacrifices were originally carried out 
against condemned men and that this procedure was seen as one of 
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common sense: the elimination of a criminal supposedly led to his salva-
tion and, more important perhaps, to the protection of the community, 
since his execution signaled its members’ will to not be complicit with 
his acts.
To this economy of “compensation” Maistre adds another configu-
ration of sacrifice in which the victim is innocent. Following the pro-
cess of reversibility, the blood of a chosen member of the community 
can be shed to make up for the crimes of guilty men, the underlying 
“logical” connection being that we are all fallen beings and therefore 
potential culprits liable for the offenses of our fellow creatures.59 In this 
second sacrificial configuration, Maistre notably refers to the ritual kill-
ing of animals, whose blood serves as a symbolic substitute for that of 
man. The philosopher severely condemns human sacrifices within this 
framework. But he enthusiastically evokes a third configuration to be 
distinguished from these unacceptable human sacrifices. In it, a “propi-
tiatory victim” belonging to mankind volunteers to die for his brothers’ 
redemption.60 Maistre argues that this supposedly laudable case of sac-
rifice is Christian and corresponds to a true understanding of how the 
institution functions.61 Jesus Christ—followed by others, such as Louis 
XVI—is taken to exemplify this superior sacrificial model.
The figure and concept of the sponte sua Baudelaire proposes differ 
from the various sacrificial scenarios envisaged by the philosopher. It 
situates itself at the crossroads of two types of Maistrean sacrifice: (a) 
the one in which society executes a criminal condemned to death and 
thereby transforms him into an agent of both individual and collective 
redemption; (b) the one in which an innocent man willfully dies for the 
redemption of the human race, by way of reversibility—“the righteous 
[le juste], suffering willingly, fulfill their duty not only towards them-
selves, but towards the guilty, who, on their own, could not expiate 
their own sins.”62 Both Baudelaire’s framework and new willing hero 
are hybrid and subversive. They destabilize the Maistrean typology of 
sacrifice in several ways. First, they establish the moral grandeur of the 
“coupable” (OCB 1:683; folio 12) condemned to death, whereas the 
philosopher attributes this grandeur only to the innocent victim. Sec-
ond, they make “reversibility” take on new meaning: the metamorpho-
sis of a criminal into a saint.
In reinventing the sponte sua, Baudelaire undoes both the strict hi-
erarchy of sacrifices and the history of their evolution as established 
by Maistre, who argues that, from Jesus Christ to Louis XVI, willing 
victims incarnate the ultimate refinement of the sacrificial institution 
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in Christian civilization. The modern poet, for his part, has criminality 
and martyrdom coincide. This association of guilt and saintliness within 
a single being blurs, indeed tarnishes, the Maistrean typology in which 
propitiatory executions are revered. While Baudelaire borrows key no-
tions from the reactionary philosopher—among which the correlation 
of condemned man and sacrificial victim, the notion of voluntary death, 
the superior status of the executioner, and the sanctity of the propi-
tiatory sacrifié—he inserts them in a unique development that moves 
away from Maistre’s tortuous but resolute reflections on the superiority 
of Christian sacrifice. This shatters the sense of order and metaphysical 
confidence the counter-Revolutionary thinker seeks to establish.
A logical lacuna in the passage of Mon cœur mis à nu that centers on 
the spirituality of the death penalty corroborates the idea that Baude-
laire alters Maistre’s methodical teachings on sacrifice. This passage 
(“La peine de mort est le résultat d’une idée mystique…” OCB 1:683) 
is both preceded and followed by ones in which the poet reflects on 
torture. He despises it as an “art de découvrir la vérité” (art of discov-
ering the truth) on the grounds that it relies on the “application d’un 
moyen matériel à un but spirituel” (application of a material means 
to a spiritual end). But Baudelaire’s sacrificial (re)conception of capital 
punishment echoes this very shortcoming. The transcendental process 
it supposedly represents depends on the protagonist’s physical suffering 
and, eventually, annihilation. The sandwiching of Baudelaire’s reflec-
tion on the death penalty between two critical remarks on torture—“ni-
aiserie barbare” (barbaric nonsense) “née de la partie infâme du cœur 
de l’homme” (originating in the vile part of man’s heart)—further warns 
against an excessively literal, or Maistrean, reading of his apology for 
the scaffold. Likewise, Baudelaire’s exaggerated portrayal of the will-
ing condemned man’s “assentiment et joie” (consent and joy) during 
the execution and his general skepticism regarding redemption deepen 
the partly ironic character of his sanctification of capital punishment 
through sacrifice.
Baudelaire’s taste for eccentricity, his “idée fixe de la Différence,” as Blin 
would have it, and preoccupation with the sociomoral de-hierarchiza-
tion produced by the egalitarian ideals that developed in the nineteenth 
century appear to have moved him to revisit capital punishment as a 
desirable form of sacrifice.63 From the late 1850s onward in particular, 
the poet vigorously challenged the proponents of social progressivism 
through the redefinition and praise of the death penalty as sacrifice. This 
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archaic practice conveniently went against the forward-looking impera-
tive of the “inviolabilité de la vie humaine” (inviolability of human life) 
defended by Hugo and his peers at the same time as it refuted the lat-
ter’s demand that art should contribute to society’s improvement. In this 
respect, Baudelaire’s praise of sacrifice may be read as the culmination 
of an anti-Hugolian enterprise—literary, but also deeply ideological in 
nature. Beyond the refusal to “functionalize” works of art in flagrant 
ways, the modern poet, through the provocative defense of executions, 
expresses his belief in man’s indelible violence. He turns to the eigh-
teenth century of sadism, the supplices, and the counter-Enlightenment 
to bolster this stance. Maistre’s concepts, rhetoric, and imaginary are 
used in his reconception of the death penalty for this very reason. Nev-
ertheless, Baudelaire does not follow them à la lettre, far from it. He 
associates the figure of the juste with that of the criminal and rejects tor-
ture because it relies on the very material-spiritual dynamic he applies 
to the sponte sua. Baudelaire thereby subverts both Maistre’s purport-
edly reassuring typology of sacrifice and his own defense of capital pun-
ishment. The condemned man, sponte sua, is both criminal and saint, 
impure and pure.64 He points back to the contradictory etymology of 
“sacred” and to Baudelaire’s insistence that a “double postulation,” one 
toward God, the other toward Satan (OCB 1:682), structures the hu-
man psyche. Baudelaire embraces the duality of the sacred in opposition 
to a false, adulterated modern sacredness that has moved away from 
this complexity. In Fusées, this repugnant, self-celebrating “sacerdoce,” 
this loss of a genuine sacred, is incarnated by none other than Hugo:
Hugo pense souvent à Prométhée. Il s’applique un vautour 
imaginaire sur une poitrine qui n’est lancinée que par les 
moxas de la vanité. Puis, l’hallucination se compliquant, se 
variant, mais suivant la marche progressive décrite par les 
médecins, il croit que, par un fiat de la Providence, Sainte-
Hélène a pris la place de Jersey.
Cet homme est si peu élégiaque, si peu éthéré, qu’il ferait 
horreur même à un notaire.
Hugo-Sacerdoce, a toujours le front penché,—trop penché 
pour rien voir, excepté son nombril.
Qu’est-ce qui n’est pas un sacerdoce aujourd’hui? La jeu-
nesse, elle-même, est un sacerdoce,—à ce que dit la jeunesse.
Et qu’est-ce qui n’est pas une prière? Chier est une prière, 
à ce que disent les démocrates, quand ils chient. . . .
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L’homme, c’est-à-dire chacun, est si naturellement dépravé 
qu’il souffre moins de l’abaissement universel que de l’étab-
lissement d’une hiérarchie raisonnable. (OCB 1:664–65)
Hugo often thinks of Prometheus. He places an imaginary 
vulture onto a chest that nothing lacerates other than the 
moxa of vanity. Then, as his hallucination becomes increas-
ingly complex and varied, but following the progression de-
scribed by the doctors, he believes that, through a fiat of 
Providence, the island of Saint Helena has replaced Jersey.
This man so lacks any sense of the elegiac and the ethereal 
that even a notary would be appalled by him.
Sacerdotal Hugo, always with his forehead leaning for-
ward—too bent over to see anything, except for his own 
navel.
What isn’t sacerdotal nowadays? Young people them-
selves are sacerdotal,—according to what young people say.
What isn’t a prayer? Crapping is a prayer, according to 
what the Democrats say, when they have a crap. . . .
Man, that is to say everyone, is so naturally corrupt that 
universal debasement makes him suffer less than the estab-
lishment of a reasonable hierarchy.
Baudelaire’s laudatory remarks on lethal justice therefore constitute a 
discourse of reaction against a perceived modern moral corruption and 
liberal doxa. Opposing Hugo, he sets out to highlight the extremities 
that coexist in man, away from both didactic progressive art and art for 
art’s sake. Yet like any “system,” which the poet himself deemed bound 
to abjuration (OCB 2:577), Baudelaire’s recasting of the death penalty 
as sacrifice in his prose is ultimately disavowed, not least by his poetry.
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Chapter 4
Poeticized Slaughter? 
Execution in Les Fleurs du mal
La tête se détachait du cou, une grosse tête blanche et rouge, 
et roulait avec bruit devant le trou du souffleur, montrant le 
disque saignant du cou, la vertèbre scindée, et tous les détails 
d’une viande de boucherie récemment taillée pour l’étalage.
His head was severed from his neck, a big white and red 
head, which rolled down loudly in front of the prompter’s 
box, exposing the bleeding disc of the neck, the severed verte-
bra, and all the details of a piece of butcher’s meat freshly cut 
for the stall.
—Charles Baudelaire, “De l’essence du rire et généralement 
du comique dans les arts plastiques,” in Œuvres complètes
“Poetry of mass graves and slaughterhouses.” This is the phrase that Louis 
Goudall used to summarize the eighteen poems Baudelaire published un-
der the title Les Fleurs du mal in the June 1855 issue of the Revue des 
Deux Mondes.1 That same year, with an essay titled “De l’essence du rire 
et généralement du comique dans les arts plastiques,” the poet took full re-
sponsibility for his peculiar thematic and imagistic tastes and anticipated 
by the aim of his verse as he would later describe it, “extraire la beauté 
du mal” (to extract beauty from evil):2 “Chose curieuse et vraiment digne 
d’attention que l’introduction de cet élément insaisissable du beau jusque 
dans les œuvres destinées à représenter à l’homme sa propre laideur mo-
rale et physique!” (The introduction of this elusive element of beauty, 
even into works destined to show men their own moral and physical ugli-
ness, is a thing [that is] both curious and truly worthy of attention!; OCB 
2:526). Once it was published as a complete book of poems in 1857, and 
then again in 1861, Les Fleurs du mal thoroughly confirmed this premise 
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that beauty seeps into the figuration of man’s physical and moral vileness, 
notably through the most graphic poems that so displeased Goudall. In 
them and others, chopped flesh, severed heads, killers, and executioners 
abound. These compositions that elaborate on the imaginary of capital 
crime and punishment allow for a better understanding of Baudelaire’s 
literary use of execution, across its literal and artistic meanings. They also 
shed a critical light on the poet’s—already problematized, as we have 
seen—turn to Maistre in his prose pieces claiming to legitimize the death 
penalty as sacrifice.
Bloody Aesthetics
As something of a “boucherie,” Baudelaire’s poetry brings grist to Gou-
dall’s mill. Le Grand Dictionnaire universel du XIXe siècle first defines 
boucherie as the “abattoir, endroit où l’on tue les animaux, dont la vi-
ande se vend ensuite en détail” (slaughterhouse, place where animals are 
killed and where the meat is then sold) and second as the “établissement 
où l’on vend au détail la chair des mêmes animaux” (establishment in 
which the flesh of these animals is sold).3 While executions take on a 
variety of forms in Les Fleurs du mal—from hanging to poisoning and 
strangulation—they frequently emphasize some of the procedures and 
attributes reminiscent of the slaughterhouse and the butcher’s shop: the 
slaying of bodies, the use of the knife, the presence of blood, and the 
display and commerce of dead flesh.
Some of the most memorable quatrains from “Une charogne” (A 
Carcass) foreground this dead flesh:
Les mouches bourdonnaient sur ce ventre putride,
D’où sortaient de noirs bataillons
De larves, qui coulaient comme un épais liquide
Le long de ces vivants haillons.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alors, ô ma beauté! dites à la vermine
Qui vous mangera de baisers,
Que j’ai gardé la forme et l’essence divine
De mes amours décomposés! (OCB 1:31–32)
The flies were buzzing on that putrid belly,
From which issued black battalions
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Of larvae, flowing like a thick liquid
Along those living rags.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Then, o my beauty, say to the vermin
Who will devour you with kisses,
That I have kept the form and the divine essence
Of my decomposed loves!4
Decay, rather than slaughter, affects the animal body here. Nevertheless, 
the well-known ars poetica this poem constitutes is a useful point of de-
parture in that Baudelaire specifically constructs it around the reality of 
dead flesh. In keeping with the observation from “De l’essence du rire,” 
this flesh, which attracts swarms of flies and in which ugliness prolifer-
ates, is associated with aesthetic blossoming. Carnal decomposition con-
ditions poetic composition: the carcass that elicits horror acts not just as 
a prolepsis for the future death of the beloved, as becomes clear in the last 
three quatrains, but also, both directly (in and of itself) and by analogy 
(through this prolepsis), as the subject and matrix of the perennial poetic 
form with which we are presented and on which the speaker eventually 
prides himself. While the meat is rotten, boucherie does operate at a sym-
bolic level: speaker and text are able to preserve the body of the dead 
animal—and, soon, that of the woman—despite its disintegration (stanza 
8) and “sell” it to the beloved and to the scene’s other witness, the reader. 
It finds itself consumed visually and aurally by them.
Other poems feature both the literal brutality and the figurative sense 
of boucherie more directly. In the sonnet “Le Tonneau de la haine” (The 
Cask of Hate), two quatrains stage an allegorized “Vengeance” whose 
“bras rouges et forts” and “grands seaux” of blood evoke the archetypal 
butcher—before the two tercets turn revenge into another prosaic fig-
ure, that of a drunkard in a tavern:
La Haine est le tonneau des pâles Danaïdes;
La Vengeance éperdue aux bras rouges et forts
A beau précipiter dans ses ténèbres vides
De grands seaux pleins du sang et des larmes des morts,
Le Démon fait des trous secrets à ces abîmes,
Par où fuiraient mille ans de sueurs et d’efforts,
Quand même elle saurait ranimer ses victimes,
Et pour les pressurer ressusciter leurs corps. (OCB 1:71)
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Hate is the cask of the pale Danaïdes;
Vengeance distraught has red and brawny arms
With which she hurls into her empty dark
Buckets of blood and tears from dead men’s eyes,
Satan makes secret holes in these depths
Through which would seep out a thousand years of pain and toils,
Even if she knew how to bring her victims back to life,
And to resuscitate them before squeezing them dry.5
This Vengeance-butcher works not in a shop but in hell. Combining 
myth and raw materiality, Baudelaire’s allegorical vision takes on an 
especially gory quality. It substitutes the water that the daughters of Da-
naus are condemned to carry and pour for eternity with epic quantities 
of human bodily fluids—blood, tears, and sweat, all synonymous with 
pain. Both the opening portrait of the exsanguine Danaids, marked by 
a chromatic contrast (whiteness, redness, blackness of the “ténèbres”), 
and the elongated and ruptured syntax of the second sentence, stretched 
by six consecutive enjambments and punctured by an inversion in line 
8 which together mirror uncontainability and violence, further hyper-
bolize the figuration of death, violence, and suffering. Expanding on the 
poem’s inaugural metaphor about the insatiability of hate (“La Haine 
est le tonneau des pâles Danaïdes”), this dramatic tableau climaxes in 
the hypothesis of a useless “resuscit[ation]” of the deceased. The image 
is doubly blasphemous, since hell is no place for resurrection and since 
this resuscitating would serve to kill again (“pour les pressurer”). A 
veritable liquidation of human shadows thus activates the meaning by 
extension of the term boucherie, which refers to the “mort sanglante et 
assurée d’un grand nombre de personnes” (bloody and assured death of 
a great number of individuals).6
Exalted killing also pierces through “L’Héautontimorouménos” (The 
Self-Tormenter):
Je te frapperai sans colère
Et sans haine, comme un boucher,
Comme Moïse le rocher!
Et je ferai de ta paupière,
Pour abreuver mon Sahara,
Jaillir les eaux de la souffrance.
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Mon désir gonflé d’espérance
Sur tes pleurs salés nagera. (OCB 1:78)
I’ll strike you without rage or hate,
The way a butcher strikes his block,
The way that Moses smote the rock!
So that your eyes may irrigate
My dry Sahara, I’ll allow
The tears to flow from your distress.
Desire that hope embellishes
Will swim along the overflow.7
The opening stanza denies the literal meaning of boucher, that of an 
impassive, “hateless” worker, as claimed in line 2 and brings out its 
figurative sense instead: the spectacle of an eminently hostile violence 
imposes itself from the poem’s first words (“Je te frapperai”). As in “Le 
Tonneau de la haine,” aquatic images hyperbolize the scene. Mytholog-
ical and epic overtones characterize the destruction of the other. This 
time, they are biblical. Comparing the aggressor’s action with that of 
Moses in line 3, Baudelaire subverts the Old Testament to underscore 
the speaker’s brutality as well as the close association—indeed, the pos-
sible substitution—of word and violence. Where, in both Exodus and 
the Book of Numbers, Moses hits the rock to give water to his people, 
that is to say sustains them with a stone that stands for Christ (Corinthi-
ans 10), the poem’s speaker, on the other hand, plans to hit the woman, 
that is to say destroy a being that stands for carnal, rather than spiritual, 
love (l. 7). And where, in the Book of Numbers, Moses fails to follow 
God’s orders, using his stick instead of speaking to the water-bearing 
rock, Baudelaire’s protagonist uses speaking, but to promise hitting. In 
so doing, he restores confidence in language, but a language that is hu-
man, not divine, and that heralds violence against humanity. In the third 
sentence (“Mon désir gonflé d’espérance / Sur tes pleurs salés nagera”), 
the sadistic perversity of the speaker’s premeditation becomes so over-
whelming that it sets it into motion. Metaphors of swelling, gushing, 
and swimming animate his larger-than-life plan, and a vitalist aesthetic 
paradoxically emerges from the vicious, and potentially fatal, molesta-
tion he plots.
“À une Madone” (To a Madonna) epitomizes this inscription of cru-
elty within a slow, excruciating process of planned execution:
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Enfin, pour compléter ton rôle de Marie,
Et pour mêler l’amour avec la barbarie,
Volupté noire! Des sept Péchés capitaux,
Bourreau plein de remords, je ferai sept Couteaux
Bien affilés, et, comme un jongleur insensible,
Prenant le plus profond de ton amour pour cible,
Je les planterai tous dans ton Cœur pantelant,
Dans ton Cœur sanglotant, dans ton Cœur ruisselant! (OCB 1:59)
Finally, to complete your role as Mary,
And to mingle love with barbarity,
Black delight! From the seven deadly Sins,
I shall, an executioner filled with remorse, make seven well-honed 
knives, 
And like an unheeding juggler,
Taking the deepest springs of your love as my target,
I shall plant every one of them in your panting Heart,
In your sobbing Heart, in you streaming heart!8
In these final lines, an alliterative network composed of hard consonants 
[p / k / t], the antiphrastic periphrasis “Bourreau plein de remords,” and 
the epizeuxis “dans ton Cœur” cap the gradation in violence that struc-
tures the poem. Together, they seal the triumph of a murderous desire 
presented as irrepressible and ironically mystical.9
To understand better this recourse to knives, flesh, blood, and the 
exhibition of dead bodies characteristic of the imaginary of butchery 
and execution in some of Les Fleurs du mal, it is helpful to return to “De 
l’essence du rire.” This essay, which takes as its subject matter the habil-
itation of caricature as a pictorial genre and the examination of the me-
chanics behind human laughter, establishes a hierarchy of comic forms 
that consecrates the “comique absolu” (absolute comic; OCB 2:535). 
For Baudelaire, the “comique absolu” is the alternate name of the gro-
tesque, “une création . . . une idéalité artistique” (a creation . . . an artis-
tic ideality; 535) that contrasts with vile imitation. He considers the first 
English pantomime he saw performed as its quintessence. Pierrot, the 
protagonist, finds himself guillotined at the end of the show:
Après avoir lutté et beuglé comme un bœuf qui flaire l’ab-
attoir, Pierrot subissait enfin son destin. La tête se détachait 
du cou, une grosse tête blanche et rouge, et roulait avec bruit 
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devant le trou du souffleur, montrant le disque saignant du 
cou, la vertèbre scindée, et tous les détails d’une viande de 
boucherie récemment taillée pour l’étalage. Mais voilà que, 
subitement, le torse raccourci, mû par la monomanie irrésist-
ible du vol, se dressait, escamotait victorieusement sa propre 
tête comme un jambon ou une bouteille de vin, et, bien plus 
avisé que le grand saint Denis, la fourrait dans sa poche! 
(OCB 2:539)
After struggling and bellowing like an ox that senses the 
slaughterhouse, Pierrot was finally subjected to his destiny. 
His head was severed from his neck, a big white and red 
head, which rolled down loudly in front of the prompter’s 
box, exposing the bleeding disc of the neck, the severed ver-
tebra, and all the details of a piece of butcher’s meat freshly 
cut for the display. But then, all of a sudden, the truncated 
torso, driven by the irresistible monomania of theft, drew 
itself up, triumphantly snatched its own head like a ham or 
a bottle of wine, and, much wiser than the great Saint Denis, 
shoved it in its pocket!
In this scene of “boucherie-charcuterie,” guignolesque gestures, noises, 
forms, and colors contribute to a saturated sensory landscape. Compar-
ing this caricatural mime show and literature, Baudelaire laments the 
weakness of words to convey the energy that emanates from grotesque 
theatrical representation. “Avec une plume tout cela est pâle et glacé. 
Comment la plume pourrait-elle rivaliser avec la pantomime?” (With a 
quill, all this is pale and icy. How could the quill compete with panto-
mime?; OCB 2:540).
Arguably, the boucherie present in some Fleurs du mal as both 
a motif and a trope enables Baudelaire to equal “le vertige de l’hy-
perbole” (OCB 2:539) he perceives in this absolute comic, the “ap-
anage des artistes supérieurs” (prerogative of superior artists; 536). 
It brings out violence, colorfulness, and crudity.10 It also allows the 
writer to re-create the motion and life of dramatic performance, as 
well as what he deems to be the extreme ferocity of the grotesque 
(538). Baudelaire’s portrait of Pierrot as a raw, vivacious, and exces-
sive figure illustrates the “artistic ideality” (535) of the absolute comic 
and illuminates these characteristics he cultivates through the bloody 
aesthetics of some poems: 
110 ❘ Words That Kill in Baudelaire
Par-dessus la farine de son visage, il avait collé crûment, sans 
gradation, sans transition, deux énormes plaques de rouge 
pur. La bouche était agrandie par une prolongation simulée 
des lèvres au moyen de deux bandes de carmin, de sorte 
que, quand il riait, la gueule avait l’air de courir jusqu’aux 
oreilles. 
Over his face’s white makeup, he had pasted crudely, with-
out gradation, without transition, two huge blotches of pure 
red. The mouth was widened by a feigned prolongation of 
the lips, by means of two crimson stripes, so that, when he 
laughed, the mouth seemed to run from ear to ear. (OCB 
2:538–39). 
The most graphic Fleurs du mal integrate this coarse redness—a syn-
thetic metonymy for violence, colorfulness, and crudity—caricatural 
traits, and dynamism (“collé,” “agrandie,” “riait,” “courir”). But they do 
so away from the clownish potential of this pantomime that dampens 
cruelty and pathos. Instead, they combine these traits with the palette 
and “desolation” (760) of Eugène Delacroix’s massacres and Francisco 
Goya’s monstrous gloom.11 The wealth of blood, limbs, and organs (hu-
man hearts, intestines, eyes, trunks, shoulders), red blotches, and quar-
tered contours found in Les Fleurs du mal thus constitutes the site and 
the means of a visual and theatrical emulation, but one that undergoes 
sinister adaptation. Baudelaire’s ut pictura poesis must be in sanguinem 
and leaves no room for laughter.  
This exacerbated dialogue with the visual and performing arts trans-
lates into the simultaneous magnification and deconstruction of picto-
rial elements in the poems, as is manifest in the texts I have begun to 
examine. “À une Madone” encloses in a full-length portrait a statue-like 
virgin saturated with finery that is turned into a series of vices and fail-
ings that soil her increasingly before the final murder. Through a syntax 
made up of accumulations, a prosody fraught with alliterative redun-
dancies, and the imbrication of incriminating metaphors, Baudelaire 
transposes in writing the density characteristic of baroque iconography. 
A materiality “dans le goût espagnol” that comes to verge on the rococo 
gradually entraps and crushes the Madonna-like mistress, wrapped in 
“un Manteau . . . / Barbare, roide et lourd, et doublé de soupçon” (a 
Cloak . . . / Of barbarous fashion, stiff and heavy and lined with suspi-
cion; OCB 1:58). The poem’s closing homeoptoton, “pantelant,” “san-
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glotant,” “ruisselant,” introduces a trembling and ominous motion into 
this artistic production. 
Likewise, “L’Héautontimorouménos” destroys the subject through a 
sophisticated and dynamic visual demonstration. Its highly rhythmic 
penultimate quatrain magnifies the vision of a body undergoing dis-
memberment through a kaleidoscopic perspective:
Je suis la plaie et le couteau!
Je suis le soufflet et la joue!
Je suis les membres et la roue,
Et la victime et le bourreau! (OCB 1:79)
I am the wound, and rapier!
I am the cheek, I am the slap!
I am the limbs I am the rack,
The prisoner the torturer!12
A fixed and bare grammatical structure (subject, copula, attribute), 
which Baudelaire mechanizes further with an anaphora and in which 
only one paradigmatic component changes, makes the reader visualize 
the swift circulation of body parts and lethal utensils. That they are dif-
ferent yet unchanging is symbolically reinforced by alternating feminine 
and masculine nouns of one and two syllables (“plaie” and “couteau,” 
“soufflet” and “joue,” “membres” and “roue”). The diffraction effect 
thereby created heightens the dynamism of the tableau that emerges 
from the close-up on the eyelid at the beginning of the poem.
“Une martyre,” which bears the revealing subtitle “dessin d’un 
maître inconnu” (drawing by an unknown master), offers a final and 
most telling instance of how Baudelaire maximizes his poems’ pictorial 
and performative potential through butchery:
Au milieu des flacons, des étoffes lamées
Et des meubles voluptueux,
Des marbres, des tableaux, des robes parfumées
Qui traînent à plis somptueux,
Dans une chambre tiède où, comme en une serre,
L’air est dangereux et fatal,
Où des bouquets mourants dans leurs cercueils de verre
Exhalent leur soupir final,
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Un cadavre sans tête épanche, comme un fleuve,
Sur l’oreiller désaltéré
Un sang rouge et vivant, dont la toile s’abreuve
Avec l’avidité d’un pré. (OCB 1:111–12)
Surrounded by flasks, and by spangled lamés,
All matter of sumptuous goods,
Marble sculptures, fine paintings, and perfumed peignoirs
That trail in voluptuous folds,
In a room like a greenhouse, both stuffy and warm,
An atmosphere heavy with death,
Where arrangements of flowers encoffined in glass
Exhale their ultimate breath
A headless cadaver spills out, like a stream,
On a pillow adorning the bed
A flow of red blood, which the linen drinks up
With a thirsty meadow’s greed.13
An actual frame, in the form of a pillow (made of “toile,” which reveal-
ingly means both “cloth” and “canvas”), girds the woman’s severed and 
bleeding neck. The reader-viewer discovers it only after glimpsing the 
picture’s rich background and decorative components. In yet another 
remarkable mise en abyme, these include pictures. In this still life, or 
rather this still death, the blood of the female body is paradoxically 
presented as being in motion. Like the bouquets, the reader is trapped 
in the airless bedroom and made to absorb its increasingly deadly ma-
terial abundance. Placed next to the headless corpse in the third stanza, 
and in a highly visible and vulnerable space (where glass and entrap-
ment—“serre” and “verre”—rhyme and prevail), we symbolically be-
come a potential murder suspect. I will return to this poem’s subsequent 
stanzas later. For now, suffice it to note that Baudelaire’s bloody aes-
thetics finds itself caught up in such an intense bid to capture, or outdo, 
the efficiency of the visual and performing arts that it may absorb the 
reader into its violence. He may make us dangerously complicit with it, 
as we walk a thin line between voyeur and actor, between collaborator 
and (second) victim.
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p o é s i e-b o u c h e r i e :  From the Outside In
The pain and horror of Baudelaire’s poetic butchery is aesthetically 
productive. An apparent indifference toward the politics of killing and 
unconcern for the suffering of the Other—the victim in the poem and, 
to some extent, the reader—accompany this visual feast. Under the em-
phatic heading “politique,” Mon cœur mis à nu claims that Baude-
laire did not to have any “convictions, comme l’entendent les gens de 
[s]on siècle” (convictions, as the people of [his] century understand 
them; OCB 1:680).14 The folio of Mon cœur that provocatively lauds 
the supposed moral nobility of capital punishment and the related need 
for the condemned man to suffer “with joy” (folio 12; 683) also offers 
a critical reflection on torture that associates “cruauté et volupté,” pre-
senting them as identical sensations for which man’s basest instincts 
yearn, “comme l’extrême chaud et l’extrême froid” (like extreme heat 
and extreme cold). The exaltation of brutality in both these citations 
and Baudelaire’s narrative projects featuring the death penalty (598) 
appear to fit neatly with the imagery of bloodshed in which some Fleurs 
du mal indulge.
Upon closer examination, however, there are limits to this aesthetic 
celebration of executions in Baudelaire’s verse. They certainly allow 
Baudelaire to “glorifier le culte des images ([sa] grande, [son] unique, 
[sa] primitive passion)” (glorify the cult of images, [his] great, [his] only, 
[his] primitive passion; OCB 1:701). But they also disclose a profound 
discomfort in the face of killing. The figuration of boucherie functions 
as a crude and strategic call for ethics, or what the poet himself termed 
a “terrible moralité” (193).15 Several clues testify to the difficulties that 
undermine the poems’ affected posture of detachment vis-à-vis death, 
blood, and slayed flesh. Through moments of interpellation, the dis-
tance and distinction between the butcher and his meat—or their ana-
logues, the executioner and his or her victim—collapse.16
Doubt, irony, and laughter make this suspension of clear differen-
tiation manifest. “L’Héautontimorouménos” illustrates each of these 
forms of fracture. A searing negative interrogation placed at the center 
of the poem turns it on its head as the speaker who initially presented 
himself as a boucher-bourreau declares:
Ne suis-je pas un faux accord
Dans la divine symphonie,
Grâce à la vorace Ironie
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Qui me secoue et qui me mord?
Elle est dans ma voix, la criarde!
C’est tout mon sang ce poison noir!
Je suis le sinistre miroir
Où la mégère se regarde. (OCB 1:78)
But am I not a false accord
Within the holy symphony,
Thanks to voracious Irony
Who gnaws on me and shakes me hard?
She’s in my voice, in all I do!
Her poison flows in all my veins!
I am the looking-glass of pain
Where she regards herself, the shrew.17
Robert Wilcocks and Debarati Sanyal have shown the deep investment 
of the “je” in the processes of pain infliction and killing depicted by 
this poem. Wilcocks refutes a traditional reading according to which 
“L’Héautontimorouménos” combines sadistic eroticism with “a dash of 
self-flagellation at the end.” Instead, he argues, the progression of the 
stanzas points to a divided poetic self.18 Sanyal takes up this thesis and 
qualifies it. She notes that the poem reveals a wounded “je”: in the cen-
tral stanza, the speaker is annexed by a personified irony and finds that 
his initial victim, his Other, is in fact constitutive of himself, enclosing 
both his subjectivity and the poem in a self-reflexive spiral.19
In “L’Héautontimoroumémos,” reflection and reflexivity are thus 
twofold. On the one hand, they pertain to the self and the Other, with 
this Other taking on various forms: that of the “t[u]” whose alterity one 
presupposes before it merges with the “je,” and, at the end of the piece, 
that of the collective marginal figure formed by the “grands abandon-
nés.”20 On the other hand, reflexivity and diffraction are to be found 
within the “je” itself. Sanyal asserts that, ultimately, Baudelaire main-
tains a distinction between subject and object, or between executioner 
and victim, by resorting to intertextuality, irony, and interpellation.21 
Although such strategies are set up in the poem, its progression never-
theless both implements and stresses an endlessly unstable and multiple 
identity torn between destructive agency and passive victimhood: “Je 
suis de mon cœur le vampire . . . / Au rire éternel condamnés” (I am 
of my own heart the vampire . . . / To eternal laughter condemned).22 
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Elsewhere in Les Fleurs du mal (“Le Vampire,” “Les Métamorphoses du 
vampire”), the vampire is the beloved woman, who initially emerges as 
the speaker’s prey in “L’Héautontimorouménos.” Such interchangeabil-
ity of positions at the level of the collection as a whole reinforces the 
volatility of the speaker’s self in this poem. In addition, the sixth stanza 
(“Je suis la plaie .  .  .”), whose anaphoric structure, multiple exclama-
tions, and revelation of a paradox regarding identity simultaneously 
strike eye, ear, and mind, combines with the closing quatrain to seal a 
self-enclosed space within which a vertiginous waltz takes place. In a 
manner that is both chaotic and hermetic, the text’s two alterities—the 
external other (the initial “tu” and the “grands abandonnés”) and the 
split self—ultimately merge in the all-absorbing image of an autopha-
gous and prostrate speaker.
As “L’Héautontimorouménos” gradually morphs from a brutal love 
poem into one that explores self-suffering and self-alienation, one may 
think that it returns to the psychological examination conducted in the 
classical plays by Menander and Terence whose title Baudelaire bor-
rows—Ἑαυτὸν τιμωρούμενος / Heauton Timorumenos.23 Yet Terence’s 
comedy about a “self-tormenter” differs quite markedly from Baude-
laire’s homonymous creation. Its protagonist, Menedemus, experi-
ences remorse and guilt after he has disapproved of his son’s love life. 
Menedemus’s self-inflicted tough life enables him to appease his culpa-
bility, and he eventually converts to benevolence, approving his son’s 
wedding.24 His moral evolution contrasts with the tragic trajectory of 
Baudelaire’s piece. “L’Héautontimorouménos” ends with the image of 
ceaseless “laughter,” which “De l’essence du rire” defines as the symp-
tom of the illusory superiority of one subject over another. This hilar-
ity is all the more synonymous with the malaise of delusion as it caps 
the poem’s dramatic power reversal of the molester into a sufferer. The 
speaker irreversibly moves away from the comfort of smiling (“sourire,” 
l. 28), whereas Terence’s socially and morally harmonious denouement 
calls for it.
The other intertext of “L’Héautontimorouménos,” Maistre’s Les 
Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg, is subject to inflection as well. As noted 
in chapter 3, Maistre prescribes redeeming the sins of mankind and the 
guilty through the execution of a “juste.”25 Elements of this theorization 
of sacrifice might seem to be at work in Baudelaire’s poem: it empha-
sizes, and even appears to celebrate, pain (stanzas 1 and 2), highlights 
various means of execution (stanza 6), and features the figure of the 
victim both at the beginning and at the end. Yet Baudelaire departs from 
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Maistre here as he does in his prose writings. He proposes a definition 
of reversibility distinct from the eighteenth-century philosopher’s in that 
it metamorphoses the perpetrator of lethal violence into its object, takes 
place within the subject, and forgoes the purity of the victim. In addition, 
his poem undoes the superior status that Maistre typically conferred on 
the executioner, and makes no reference to redemption.26 What prevails 
in “L’Héautontimorouménos” is an unsteady configuration, a principle 
of nonsuperiority of one being over another, and the forced distribution 
of violence and pain. Terence and Maistre thus make the inner desperate 
violence of Baudelaire’s speaker only stand out more.
Be it less overtly, other poems point to the boucher-bourreau’s vul-
nerability and the impossibility of absolute alterity vis-à-vis his victim. 
Recurring themes and figures throughout Les Fleurs du mal reinforce 
this inflected portrayal of the violent subject: that of a general dam-
nation, borne out by frequent reminders of human sinfulness and in-
corrigibility, and the specific persona of the poet-martyr, for instance. 
“Bénédiction,” “L’Albatros,” and “La Fontaine de sang” are cases in 
point. The speaker of “La Fontaine” falls prey to a hemorrhage whose 
cause and reality he cannot verify. The world around him takes ad-
vantage of his abundant bleeding, through which it literally quenches 
its thirst:
Il me semble parfois que mon sang coule à flots,
Ainsi qu’une fontaine aux rythmiques sanglots.
Je l’entends bien qui coule avec un long murmure,
Mais je me tâte en vain pour trouver la blessure.
À travers la cité, comme dans un champ clos,
Il s’en va, transformant les pavés en îlots,
Désaltérant la soif de chaque créature,
Et partout colorant en rouge la nature. (OCB 1:115)
I sometimes feel that my blood is flowing in waves,
Like a fountain with its rhythmical sobs.
I can hear it clearly, flowing with a long, murmuring sound,
But I touch my body in vain to find the wound.
Through the city, as if in an enclosed field,
It goes, turning the paving-stones into islets,
Slaking the thirst of every creature,
And everywhere colouring nature red.27
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Both imaginary and real in its materiality, the sacrifice of the Christ-
like “I” benefits the insatiable “cité,” which recomposes its geography 
and drapes itself with color and exoticism (“îlots”) by vampirizing its 
victim. Pichois links this gradual loss of blood and life to Baudelaire’s 
idea of the poet’s “moral hemophilia” (OCB 1:1065) in the sonnet 
“À Théodore de Banville”: “—Poète, notre sang nous fuit par chaque 
pore—” (Poet, our blood seeps out from every pore we have; 208). But 
the figure of the poet who risks self-loss in researching and producing 
his art arguably looms over Les Fleurs du mal in its entirety. The very 
structure of the collection underscores his experimenting with various 
perilous modes of escape from boredom and “spleen” (wine, damned 
loves, revolt, and death), and the famous closing lines of “Le Voyage” 
suggest that he is prepared to sacrifice his life for the benefit of poetry’s 
renewal:
Plonger au fond du gouffre, Enfer ou Ciel, qu’importe?
Au fond de l’Inconnu pour trouver du nouveau! (OCB 1:134)
To plunge into the depths of the abyss, Hell or Heaven, what does 
it matter?
To the depths of the Unknown to find something new!28
This poet figure who oscillates between cruelty and vulnerability re-
appears in “À une Madone” and “Une martyre,” complicating the sa-
distic or voyeuristic enthusiasm apparent in the poems’ portrayal of 
bloodshed. “À une Madone” recalls the intimate union and the tension 
that bring together the pronouns “Je te” from the first line of “L’Héau-
tontimorouménos” onward. It traces a specular ballet in which the 
idolized woman’s clothes, that is to say her second skin, originate from 
an unexpected fabric: the speaker’s inner self. Through a unique and 
metaphorical spatial configuration (“au fond de ma détresse” [in the 
depths of my anguish], “dans le coin le plus noir de mon cœur” [in 
the blackest corner of my heart], “dans ma Jalousie” [from my Jeal-
ousy]), the “je” merges her body with his vengeful affectivity turned 
into a figurative altar. The tyrannical subject refuses to live alone in 
his suffering and therefore entraps and mates with a “toi” whom he 
eventually kills in fury.29
Yet this murder is also a suicide.30 The seven knives viciously planted 
in the idol’s heart toll the bell for both victim and slayer, as the human 
anatomy that Baudelaire here recasts interweaves the two individuals. 
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The other’s blood and death are built—engraved—into the speaking 
subject. Like “L’Héautontimorouménos,” of which this poem may be 
said to provide a bi-subjective version, “À une Madone” is engineered 
around an incessant pronominal alternation, reinforced by two crisscross 
alliterative networks. The first centers on the plosive [t], reminiscent of 
the aggressed “toi” and its cognates; the second on the softer phoneme 
[m] and its derivatives, which echo the “moi.” Their co-presence and 
increasingly irregular alternation symbolize a chaotic interdependence:
Je veux bâtir pour toi, Madone, ma maîtresse,
Un autel souterrain au fond de ma détresse,
Et creuser dans le coin le plus noir de mon cœur,
Loin du désir mondain et du regard moqueur,
Une niche, d’azur et d’or tout émaillée,
Où tu te dresseras, Statue émerveillée. (OCB 1:58)
I mean to build for you, Madonna, my mistress,
An underground altar in the depths of my anguish,
And to hollow out, in the blackest corner of my heart,
Far from worldly desires and mocking eyes,
A niche all enameled in azure and gold,
Where you will stand, a wonder-struck Statue.31
Albeit less conspicuously, this interconnectedness of speaker and vic-
tim and suspended omnipotence of the perpetrator of violence also tran-
spire in “Une martyre.” While the “I”-voyeur does have the capacity to 
contemplate and recompose freely the bloody crime scene he portrays, 
thereby controlling it from an empirical and intellectual standpoint, the 
victim is also shown to have power as, in turn, she magnetizes both him 
and the reader:
Semblable aux visions pâles qu’enfante l’ombre
Et qui nous enchaînent les yeux,
La tête, avec l’amas de sa crinière sombre
Et de ses bijoux précieux,
Sur la table de nuit, comme une renoncule,
Repose; et, vide de pensers,
Un regard vague et blanc comme le crépuscule
S’échappe des yeux révulsés. (OCB 1:112)
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Like pale apprehensions born in the dark
And that enchain the eyes,
The head—the pile of its ebony mane
With precious jewels entwined—
On the night table, like a ranunculus,
Reposes; and a gaze,
Mindless and vague and as white as the dusk
Escapes from the pallid face.32
In these quatrains, the viewer falls prey to captivity (chained eyes) 
whereas the dead woman’s revulsed and “empty” gaze unexpectedly 
associates itself with mobility and emancipation through the colloca-
tion “s’échappe.” Her very inertia and silence paradoxically subjugate 
speaker and reader. We first scan her body and undress her visually; 
the eye then slides vertically from her head to her torso down to her 
leg before staring at her body’s contours (“épaule au contour heurté, / 
La hanche un peu pointue et la taille fringante” [the shoulder lean and 
lithe, / The haunch a bit pointed]). Poe’s 1831 poem “The Sleeper” un-
folds in a strikingly similar fashion. Both poems are built around a dou-
ble visual infiltration—of the bedroom and of the dead woman’s body. 
Both feed on the mystery that surrounds the inert lady and fascinates 
the speaker. In each poem, the speaker also calls for her peaceful rest, 
but not without cruel overtones.
Nevertheless, “Une martyre” differs from “The Sleeper” in its twelfth 
and thirteenth stanzas, which add verbal aggression to scopic penetra-
tion. Curiosity and desire prompt the speaker, whose initial position in 
the poem was one of mere observer, to become an actor of the scene. He 
addresses the female corpse with malice:
L’homme vindicatif que tu n’as pu, vivante,
Malgré tant d’amour, assouvir,
Combla-t-il sur ta chair inerte et complaisante
L’immensité de son désir?
Réponds, cadavre impur! Et par tes tresses roides
Te soulevant d’un bras fiévreux,
Dis-moi, tête effrayante, a-t-il sur tes dents froides
Collé les suprêmes adieux? (OCB 1:113)
That intractable man whom alive you could not,
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Despite so much love, satisfy,
Did he there, on your still and amenable corpse,
His appetite gratify?
Tell me, impure cadaver! and by your stiff hair
Raising with feverous hand,
Terrible head, did he paste on your teeth
His kisses again and again?33
The insulting apostrophes (“cadavre impur!” “tête effrayante”) and re-
peated questions that suggest the woman may have been subjected to 
acts of necrophilia symbolically put the speaker in the position of ag-
gressor. Once more, nonetheless, the aggressor is not independent from 
his victim: the reference to the “vindictive[ness]” of a man, whom we 
later discover is the victim’s spouse, as well as the imperious tone of the 
stanzas suggest that the speaker could be the woman’s lover, consumed 
by jealousy. The closing quatrain—keeping the form of a direct ad-
dress—seems to eclipse his closeness to the female protagonist through 
the image of the two spouses being faithful until death. Yet the remark 
is bitterly ironic in light of her implied infidelity. Besides, because of a 
remarkable intertextual detail, the speaker is not altogether removed 
from the stanza:
Ton époux court le monde, et ta forme immortelle
Veille près de lui quand il dort;
Autant que toi sans doute il te sera fidèle,
Et constant jusques à la mort. (OCB 1:113)
Your bridegroom may roam, but the image of you
Stands by him wherever he rests;
As much as you, doubtless, the man will be true,
And faithful even till death.34
The closing reference to the woman’s “forme immortelle” that accom-
panies the husband strikingly echoes “Une charogne,” whose last two 
lines read, “Que j’ai gardé la forme et l’essence divine / De mes amours 
décomposés!” (That I have kept the form and the divine essence / Of my 
decomposed loves!). The woman who was a victim at the beginning of 
“Une martyre”—and at the end of “Une charogne”—now actively re-
places the curator of deadly form found in “Une charogne.” Her “forme 
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immortelle” is no longer “kept” by the speaker-poet, as was the case in 
the other poem, but has gained agency. It “watches over” the spouse. In 
other words, after hinting at the victim’s subduing power throughout, 
“Une martyre” concludes with its female protagonist playing the part 
reserved for the “I”-poet earlier in the collection.
Although the spectacle of slaughter may seem to be observed from 
the outside in Baudelaire’s poésie-boucherie, this exteriority therefore is 
not durable.35 The other’s pain becomes one’s own, homicide turns into 
suicide, and a remarkable proximity, if not an identity or interchange-
ability, between the actual or symbolic perpetrator of violence and 
the victim, whose status turns out to be flexible, often imposes itself.36 
Baudelaire’s slaughters tend to conceal Siamese twins. They greatly 
qualify the sense that his poésie-boucherie is one of sadism or one of 
sheer aestheticism.37
Essential Violence and Self-Criticism
If Baudelaire’s most graphic poems inflect Maistre’s concept of revers-
ibility, and if the masochism that lies behind their sadism calls for a 
reconsideration of the sacrificial dynamic that sometimes appears in his 
poésie-boucherie, of what nature, we may ask, is the violence at play in 
this verse?
The modalities of this violence examined so far include its ability 
to spread, conveyed by rampant liquid metaphors (“Le Tonneau de la 
haine,” “L’Héautontimorouménos,” “La Fontaine de sang,” “Une mar-
tyre”); a principle of embedding (“L’Héautontimorouménos,” “À une 
Madone,” “Une martyre”) or closeness that troubles, and sometimes 
levels out, the distinct positions of the “je” and the “tu” (victim and 
executioner, or flesh and butcher); and the removal of the reader’s 
privileged status through these processes of contagion, imbrication, or 
equalization. These characteristics point to man’s destructive, frail, and 
finite condition, which emerges at the outset of Les Fleurs du mal as 
the inaugural “Au lecteur” establishes an identity pact of sin and misery 
between speaker and reader, “semblable” and “frère.” Besides, from a 
metaphysical standpoint, Baudelaire’s writings repeatedly assert man-
kind’s fundamental violence, presented as the fruit of an innate malevo-
lence. Catherine Toal has rightly noted how they distort Poe’s ideas on 
human perversity to that end.38 Baudelaire reads the American writer 
as affirming that human wickedness is natural, emphasizing man’s fun-
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damental evil, whereas Poe merely observed that all individuals may be 
haunted by a desire for transgression.
Baudelaire’s insistence on this impossible escape of the subject—
whether victim, executioner, or reader-viewer—from an evil that no-
tably takes the form of ruthless violence leads me to name the latter 
“violence essentielle,” following René Girard’s expression.39 For Girard, 
such violence is born of an infinite contagion of brutality and vengeance, 
of an “escalade cataclysmique” that sacrifice sometimes fails to curtail, 
resulting in a sacrificial crisis.40 Beyond an aesthetic exercise, what the 
frequent figuration of slaughter in Baudelaire’s poems reveals is such a 
crisis. Sacrifice aims to establish a sociopolitical stability that benefits 
a given human community in allowing for the evacuation of the latent 
violence that pervades it and for a communion around a sacred order.41 
It works toward concord. Maistre’s Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg and 
Éclaircissement sur les sacrifices play up this beneficial mechanics sup-
posed to underlie spectacular bloodshed. Sacrificial crisis, on the other 
hand, marks the failure of this model. Girard provides two possible 
causes for it: a complete rupture between victim and community or, 
conversely, an excessive continuity between the two.42 In both cases, 
he argues, the sacrificial victims cannot purge violence because of the 
unfitting distance that relates them to the community.
I noted earlier that Baudelaire redefines Maistre’s concept of revers-
ibility and subverts the sacrificial ritual. In light of Girard’s analysis, it 
appears that the poet foregrounds the failure of sacrifice in the second 
of two ways. By ultimately federating the “je,” the “tu,” and sometimes 
the reader, he replaces what the critic names the necessary “contiguity” 
between the victim who is actually killed and the human beings for 
whom it is substituted by an explicit or symbolic interlocking of actors 
bound to unsettle a sacrificial process that requires difference.43 The 
incongruous reconfiguration of spaces and beings in the poems ana-
lyzed earlier—imbricated bodies, dispersed limbs, enlarged fragments, 
role reversals—symbolizes this uncontrolled and proliferating violence.
For Girard, this infinite contamination, or “violence essentielle,” oc-
curs between different members of a given community. Baudelaire goes 
further. The contamination he represents is total, at once pandemic and 
endemic, developing also within the limited space of the alienated self. 
Even inanimate objects morph into the perpetrators or recipients of ex-
treme violence. In “L’Héautontimorouménos,” the speaker mixes, and 
thereby seems to align, not only the actors of violence (“victime” and 
“bourreau”) but also the tools that carry it out (“le couteau,” “la roue”), 
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the act that incarnates it (“le soufflet”), and the aftermath it produces (“la 
plaie”). Within this fundamental undifferentiation between being, object, 
and gesture, between patient and agent, and cause and consequence, a 
loss of meaning looms. Indeed, the poem’s final stanzas, in which violence 
generates a dissolution of identity, a hallucinatory delirium, self-enclo-
sure, and annihilation, are reminiscent of the radical figuration of man’s 
atomization found in Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné.44
Baudelaire and his poems do expose this abysmal spectacle. Although 
this exposure often comes from within and thus seems akin to a testimony, 
many remarkable self-referential moments signal the poetic mastery of the 
speaker-poet as he displays flesh and blood. What, then, becomes of the 
collection’s ethics of negative equality, of the inclusion and indistinction 
of all in essential violence, of a supposedly shared pain and violence?45 In 
“Une martyre,” the severed head on the nightstand resembles a “renon-
cule” (buttercup), that is to say a “fleur du mal” ready for public consump-
tion, as Sanyal has rightly remarked.46 A similar self-referential move can 
be found in “Duellum,” which has the skin of two lovers fighting to the 
blood “fleuri[r] l’aridité des ronces.”47 This poetic gain permitted by bloody 
violence resurfaces in “À une Madone.” Here, poetry serves as the sophis-
ticated tool used for the slaughter. It participates in the murderous monu-
mentalization of the icon through its “Vers” and “rimes” (ll. 7 and 8):
Avec mes Vers polis, treillis d’un pur métal
Savamment constellé de rimes de cristal,
Je ferai pour ta tête une énorme Couronne. (OCB 1:58)
Of my polished verse, cunningly bestarred
With crystal rhymes,
I shall make for your head an enormous Crown.48
The speaker-poet then refers more broadly to his “art diligent” (line 23). 
It gradually aggregates allegories (his “Jalousie,” “Désir,” “Respect”) 
around the Madonna to immobilize and entrap her before the final 
stabbing, thereby giving birth to the poem as a whole. Let us also return 
to the early lines of “L’Héautontimorouménos”:
Et je ferai de ta paupière,
Pour abreuver mon Sahara
Jaillir les eaux de la souffrance.
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Mon désir gonflé d’espérance
Sur tes pleurs salés nagera
Comme un vaisseau qui prend le large, (OCB 1:78)
So that your eyes may irrigate
My dry Sahara, I’ll allow
The tears to flow of your distress.
Desire, that hope embellishes
Will swim along the overflow.
As ships set out for voyaging,49
Massacre and bodily dismantlement find their formal echo in the en-
jambment and blank space that follow “paupière,” as well as in the 
inverted structure “Et je ferai de ta paupière, / . . . / Jaillir les eaux de 
la souffrance” and in the early insertion of the purpose clause “Pour 
abreuver mon Sahara.” But this physical and formal dislocation results 
in the graceful image of marine flight, that is to say in one of the richest 
imagistic networks of Les Fleurs du mal that the author associates with 
poetic and aesthetic ideality (OCB 1:663–64, 696).
The profit that art may derive from killing is a topos present else-
where in Western literature of the nineteenth century. It often focuses on 
painting, from Balzac’s “Le Chef d’œuvre inconnu” to Poe’s “The Oval 
Portrait.” But Baudelaire underscores the fact that the poet is the one who 
manages this transaction. Walter Benjamin has shown how Baudelaire’s 
writings engaged with modern materialism and capitalism. The specific 
background paradigm of the boucherie, literal or figurative, could be 
read as the caricatural illustration of this materiality and commercial 
spirit: like the symbolic butcher of “Une charogne,” the protagonists of 
“Le Tonneau de la haine” and “L’Héautontimorouménos” chop up flesh, 
preserve it, and put it on display. More generally, Baudelaire’s bloodiest 
poems stage a constant business of production and gain based on slayed 
bodies, formal violence, and the reader’s attention and consumption: the 
instances above attest that essential violence produces prominent Baude-
lairean allegories and metaphors, and vice versa. In other words, conta-
gious violence results in and from the devices that define the poetic genre 
in general, and the substance of Baudelaire’s collections in particular: 
the imagery of alienation, the voyage, and escape that the figuration of 
slaughter generates constitutes the heart of Les Fleurs du mal.
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The modern poet, then, is a dealer in human executions of a sort. 
The spectacle of bloodshed enables his art to prosper. In this respect, 
he is not unlike the writer-merchant who, at the beginning of the Salon 
de 1846, pretends that he sympathizes with bourgeois readers taken to 
wish that their work and wealth will be repaid by the “enjoyment . . . of 
the imagination” literature offers (OCB 2:417). But just as biting 
irony undermines this address “to the bourgeois” in the Salon, in the 
poems the speaker distances himself from this trade: the self-referen-
tiality noted earlier also functions as a self-denunciation. It signposts 
his own exploitation of slaughter, which in turn further establishes the 
failure of sacrifice. A basely secular, exploitative, and (self-)criticized 
violence emerges from behind or within the violence whose vaguely rit-
ual appearance at times prefigured spirituality. No transcendent order 
ultimately ennobles bloodshed in Les Fleurs du mal, not even that of 
aesthetic ecstasy. The somber visual and dramatic excess that character-
izes Baudelaire’s poetic executions, like Baudelairean laughter, remains 
inextricably tied to a persistent disquiet and to a deceptively powerful 
subjectivity.
While in his prose Baudelaire claims to present the death penalty as a 
noble sacrificial act, and while numerous poems stage a persona indif-
ferent to or responsible for the agony of others, the depths of Les Fleurs 
du mal show that bloody executions are acts and spectacles that can be 
neither related nor exalted without difficulty. Gory killing and corpses 
constitute a reservoir of powerful images that enables Baudelairean po-
etry to rival other modes of representation, dramatic and visual. Yet 
the imaginary of butchery is not solely a privileged point of access to 
“la beauté dans le mal” (beauty in evil/pain) and to artistic ideality. 
Baudelaire also turns it into an uneasy ethical site. What looms behind 
the garishness of Baudelaire’s scenes of slaughter and tableaux of dis-
mantled flesh is an impossible distancing from killing. He proposes con-
figurations of lethal violence in which the Other points to the self—the 
self of the speaker-poet or of the reader. They institute a painful equality 
between subjects that one thought to be distinct from, if not at odds 
with, one another. Any semblance of the sacrificial in Les Fleurs du mal 
should therefore be relativized. Baudelairean violence is contagious. It 
is not a source of stability resulting from the efficient functioning of 
sacrifice; conversely, it bears witness to a sacrificial rout.  Even when 
the poet seems to extricate himself from a ubiquitous essential violence 
by laying out a space from which he can signal that he is exploiting it, 
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he reinforces the failure of the sacrificial dynamic: far from generating 
salvation or appeasement, the violence of his poetic slaughter remains 
terribly worldly. With Baudelaire, poetic execution both explores and 
rivals the actual practice of execution under the persistent banner of 
anthropological and metaphysical angst.
*  *
*
Capital punishment plays a crucial role in Baudelaire’s opposition to 
Hugo and to what the latter represents in the eyes of the modern poet. It 
acts as a nerve center through which Baudelaire emphasizes major liter-
ary but also political and ideological differences. To be sure, Baudelaire 
conceived the sanctification of the death penalty as an efficient faire-
valoir of his artistic originality and talent for provocation. But his de-
fense—and redefinition—of capital punishment as sacrifice also plunges 
its roots into a deeper substrate, at once reactionary and critical. The 
rejection of Hugo’s abolitionism and didactic fiction is a means of inval-
idating both a sociopolitical platform, promoting equality among men 
and an optimistic vision of mankind, and a literary doctrine, favoring 
progressive art that is explicitly political and moral. In this respect, the 
death penalty as conceived by the two writers can be said to illuminate 
irreconcilable anthropological reflections and theoretical takes on the 
function of literature and the writer within society.
While capital punishment crystallizes certain antagonisms between 
Baudelaire and Hugo, it also complicates them. The close examination 
of Baudelaire’s laudatory statements on the death penalty as sacrifice 
and the analysis of his execution-centered poetry reveals a departure 
from Maistre and a dissatisfaction with bloodshed despite the aesthetic 
ideality that its imaginary is shown to allow. The most brutal poems of 
Les Fleurs du mal point to the failure of controlled violence and display 
the symptoms of a sacrificial crisis. Baudelaire’s verse at once exploits 
and denounces the spectacle—real or poetic—of killing. Thus, on the 
one hand, Baudelaire’s writing sharply contrasts with that of Hugo in 
Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné, whose call for abolition and defense 
of “l’inviolabilité de la vie humaine” are as strong as they are indirect—
these strategies of indirection in fact appear to have spared it the furious 
critique Baudelaire reserves for Hugo’s openly edifying fiction; on the 
other hand, however, Baudelaire’s “poésie-boucherie” undermines his 
own promotion of the death penalty as sacrifice: the bloody imagery of 
Les Fleurs du mal underlines the negativity of the social contract that 
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unites mankind, sheds light on our dual nature as both victim and ex-
ecutioner, and exposes the essential and exponential violence that per-
vades modernity.
In differing ways, and despite profoundly dissimilar ideological 
stances, Hugo and Baudelaire thus critique key claims of lethal jus-
tice through poetics: the alleged painlessness and humanitarianism of 
decapitation for the former, and the theoretical ability of executions 
to federate a community and regulate violence for the latter. This cri-
tique through poetics inflects the monolithic and competing categories 
of “L’Art pour le progrès” and Art for Art’s sake that the two writers 
are usually considered to represent, and that they sometimes do rep-
resent—often not without caricatural insistence on and an awareness 
of the artificiality of such a dichotomy. Part III further investigates the 
role played by this poetic mode of engagement and the crucial part it 
plays in conceiving and critiquing modern state killing, its imaginary, 
and literature itself.

Part III
Camus’s Capital Fiction  
and Literary Responsibility
Shelley: “Les poètes sont les législateurs non reconnus du monde.”
Shelley: “Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world.”
—Albert Camus, Carnets (1945), in Œuvres complètes
Speaking the Truth, Loving Life,  
and the Ultimate “révolté”
Multiform and relentless, Albert Camus’s abolitionism was to the twen-
tieth century what Victor Hugo’s was to the nineteenth. Recent schol-
arship, published from the late 1990s to the early 2010s, has revealed 
the depth and breadth of this commitment. It manifested itself in the 
writer’s public speeches as well as in his articles and editorials, fiction, 
and essays.1 Importantly, it also led him to write numerous letters in 
support of condemned men irrespective of their national, sociopolitical, 
and cultural identities. Having edited and examined these contributions 
elsewhere, I will not return to all of them here, but instead point to a 
few key moments and traits of Camus’s lifelong fight against the death 
penalty that provide an informative background against which to ana-
lyze his works of fiction that feature state killing.
As early as 1931, the young Camus took Hugo’s Le Dernier Jour 
d’un condamné as a point of reference in the first short story he pub-
lished, “Le Dernier Jour d’un mort-né” (The Last Day of a Still-Born). 
The plot bore no trace of the guillotine, but it did relate a young man’s 
sudden sensual attachment to life and desperate anger at the thought 
of his imminent death—as predicted to him by a doctor. Beyond the 
autobiographical echoes this novella may have had for the tubercular 
Camus, the affects it stages recur in his subsequent writings on the death 
penalty. The first book he published, the collection of essays L’Envers et 
130 ❘ Camus’s Capital Fiction and Literary Responsibility
l’endroit (Betwixt and Between; 1937), addressed the question of lethal 
justice directly, warning: “Qu’on ne nous raconte pas d’histoires. Qu’on 
ne nous dise pas du condamné à mort: ‘il va payer sa dette à la société,’ 
mais: ‘On va lui couper le cou.’ Ça n’a l’air de rien. Mais ça fait une pe-
tite difference” (Don’t let them tell us stories. Don’t let them say about 
the man condemned to death: “he is going to pay his debt to society,” 
but: “We’re going to cut off his neck [sic].” It may seem trivial. But it 
makes a small difference; OCC 1:54). Capital punishment is associated 
here with a demand for truth and lucidity. As a falsely casual irony 
indicates, and as the subsequent chapters will show in greater detail, 
one of Camus’s contributions to the critique of modern state killing 
following in Hugo’s footsteps lies in exposing the crucial role played 
by representation, and more particularly by language, in the conception 
and reception of this institution.
Le Mythe de Sisyphe (1942) elaborated on the rejection of capital 
punishment perceptible in the previously cited injunction to lay bare the 
brutality of executions. This time, Camus disqualified the death penalty 
through the philosophical apparatus developed in his reflections on the 
Absurd—part of which grew out of his earlier demand for lucidity. He 
claimed that, while we are all sentenced to death in that we are all mor-
tal, our active, obstinate existence undiminished by the clear awareness 
of our tragic condition should respond to this harsh reality. Such is, in 
part, his definition of “la révolte.” In Camus’s metaphysical framework, 
the man on death row epitomizes this attachment to the “pure flame 
of life,” “a life without consolation”: he wishes to live even as his ex-
ecution is impending (OCC 1:260). The condemned man becomes the 
ultimate, and respectable, incarnation of the “révolté” in that despite 
the programmed death that society imposes on him in addition to, and 
before, the death that awaits all of us, he clings to terrestrial life and 
refuses suicide (256).
The Unacceptable “meurtre légitimé”  
and the Test of History
The mass murders perpetrated under the aegis of Nazism, Fascism, and 
Stalinism intensified Camus’s rejection of what he called “legitimized 
murder.”2 So did Franco’s dictatorial regime after the Spanish Civil 
War (1936–39) and the use of capital punishment overseas by colonial 
France and imperial England—in Algeria during the War of Indepen-
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dence (1954–62) and in Cyprus, Tunisia, and Madagascar. In the 1940s 
and 1950s, Camus became the implacable foe of the organized and le-
gitimized killing of civilians by the state or political parties, regardless 
of the forms such killing took. He distinguished it from “crimes of pas-
sion” (OCC 3:63) and from the recourse to killing as an exceptional 
transgression designed to protect both justice and freedom.
In 1946, the politics of extermination that had characterized World 
War II, as well as contemporary world politics, led him to aver: “There 
is but one problem today which is that of murder” (OCC 2:687). In the 
middle of the twentieth century, murder, he argued, had come to elicit 
a “feeling of indifference or friendly interest or experimentation, or of 
mere passivity” (739), resulting in a veritable “Crisis of Man.” Camus’s 
“cycle of Revolt” (La Peste, Les Justes, L’Homme révolté) as well as 
his many postwar editorials, articles, speeches, and an abundant corre-
spondence picked apart both the right to kill that states and institutions 
may arrogate for themselves and our passive or active condoning of 
murder. L’Homme révolté (1951) encapsulates this anxiety: “We will 
know nothing as long as we don’t know whether we have the right to 
kill this other man standing before us or to consent to his killing” (OCC 
3:64). It also examines in detail the Reign of Terror as a specific moment 
in French history when, in Camus’s view, authentic “revolt” ended and 
was perverted by a bloodthirsty revolution sanctified by the scaffold 
(155).
One exception to Camus’s sustained abolitionist reflections is the pe-
riod of the Épuration (postwar purges). Haunted by the war and the 
loss of his friends from the Resistance, among them the journalist René 
Leynaud, Camus supported the executions of the most active French 
Collaborationists from May to November 1944.3 He accounted for this 
stance, which contradicted both his long-standing opposition to the 
death penalty and some authoritative figures such as François Mauriac, 
in articles and editorials that called for “the immediate repression of the 
most obvious crimes” through “a justice that is prompt and limited in 
time” (OCC 2:558):
It is not the judgment coming from a class or an ideology, it 
is not the verdict reached in the name of an Abstraction that 
is at work here. It is the general cry, the call, the language 
replete with flesh and vivid images, the demand from the 
accused that we have all been for the past four years, [and 
who have] suddenly become strong enough to judge their 
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own judges and to do so without hatred, but without pity 
[either]. (OCC 1:923)4
The language of truth that Camus had previously advocated to lay bare 
the violence of capital punishment was now trumped by a “language 
replete with flesh and vivid images” that he claimed had emerged from 
the experience of “four years” of Nazi and Collaborationist ferocity, 
and that now demanded that justice be done “without hatred, but with-
out pity [either].” When faced with the reality of the purges, Camus 
changed his mind, however; in his opinion, they spared talented rhet-
oricians while sentencing to death journalists who did not deserve it 
(OCC 2:592). In early January 1945, he asserted that the Épuration 
had failed and returned to his vigorous rejection of execution (407–8). 
He even supported the campaign for the pardoning of Collaborators he 
profoundly despised, such as Robert Brasillach (733–34).
Camus’s returning revulsion at legitimized murder after the Épura-
tion, as well as the progressive roots of European penal philosophy and 
the observation of the politics of both the recent past and the present, 
also led him to develop his argument and activism against the death 
penalty on the international scene.5 While in New York City on March 
28, 1946, he pleaded for the universal abolition of capital punishment 
by the United Nations (OCC 2:744). An article entitled “Un nouveau 
contrat social” (A New Social Contract) reiterated his proposal in No-
vember. During the second half of the 1940s and at the beginning of the 
1950s, Camus further clarified his refusal of institutionalized violence, 
arguing that if brutality may be necessary at particular historical mo-
ments, it should always remain extraordinary: “I believe that violence 
is inevitable, the years of Occupation taught me as much. To be frank, 
there was, at that time, terrible violence which posed no problem for 
me. . . . Violence is both inevitable and unjustifiable. I believe we should 
preserve its exceptional character and keep it confined within limits as 
much as possible” (457).6 The death penalty contradicts this principle: 
its violence is inscribed within the law, unexceptional, and consequently 
strikes the author as indefensible. In a sense, it grants institutional legit-
imacy to what Camus called man’s “death instinct” (OCC 4:138).
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“La solidarité contre la mort”
Camus’s work of nonfiction that deals with lethal justice most explicitly 
and extensively, the essay “Réflexions sur la guillotine,” originally came 
out as a two-part article in 1957. It was soon included in a multiau-
thored volume entitled Réflexions sur la peine capitale to which Ar-
thur Koestler and Jean Bloch-Michel also contributed. Camus’s tightly 
argued “Réflexions” invalidate the traditional arguments leveled by 
the supporters of capital punishment and dissect the violence imposed 
on the condemned man’s body and mind. They partly follow in the 
footsteps of Hugo’s 1832 preface to Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné, 
pointing to the inefficiency, preventive or retributive, of capital pun-
ishment; to the confusion of man’s vengeful impulses with the duty of 
the law, which is to place itself above individual instincts; and to the 
fact that the bloody spectacle of execution may in fact invite some in-
dividuals to indulge in violence. Camus’s essay is profoundly critical of 
the state. Defining executions as premeditated and organized killing, he 
condemns the state’s erroneous logic according to which they constitute 
an appropriate punishment for crimes driven by passion or pathology. 
In addition, he holds the state partly responsible for certain murders 
committed by individuals whom he views as the victims of criminogenic 
socioeconomic factors, including the commercialization of alcohol fa-
cilitated by the law. Camus argues that, although punishment is neces-
sary, individual responsibility exists, and the killer and his victim should 
never be confused, state justice cannot have recourse to a penalty that 
is absolute and irreversible, when, as a human institution, it is bound to 
be fallible. Instead, it should be relative and aware of its potential short-
comings and inconsistencies. Lastly, the essay insists that, in the first half 
of the twentieth century, the state committed many more murders than 
individuals did and was therefore not well placed to judge and condemn 
them in a definitive manner.
“Réflexions sur la guillotine” and Camus’s prior and subsequent ar-
ticles, novels, plays, and letters on capital punishment tend to put forth 
life as an ultimate value. They stress the fact that significant external 
factors or uncontrollable passions may partly account for individual 
capital crimes, and, to a lesser extent, signal the potential perfectibility 
of human beings. Camus’s ethics and reasoning are partly reminiscent 
of Hugo’s abolitionism. Unlike Hugo, however, the Nobel laureate does 
not conceive them in a progressive Christian perspective—especially 
as, in his view, such a perspective could support the death penalty by 
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positing eternal life and the existence of a divine justice liable to cor-
rect the errors of man’s capital justice (OCC 4:161). Camus situates 
the inviolability of human life on a secular, antemortem plane where, 
he argues, a fundamental, “indisputable” solidarity should prevail: our 
solidarity against death (159, 161). Other significant representational 
and ethical dimensions of Camus’s fiction are in dialogue with Hugo’s—
and Baudelaire’s—reflections and literary works on capital punishment. 
What follows sheds light on these contact zones, after analyzing the way 
in which Camus’s major narratives stage lethal justice.
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Chapter 5
Ad nauseam
Camus’s Narrative Roads to Abolitionism
Patrice raconte son histoire de condamné à mort: “Je le vois, 
cet homme. Il est en moi. Et chaque parole qu’il dit m’étreint le 
cœur. Il est vivant et respire avec moi. Il a peur avec moi. . . .
“Je sais maintenant que je vais écrire.”
Patrice tells his story about the man condemned to death: “I 
can see this man. He is in me. And each word he says grabs 
my heart. He is alive and breathes with me. He is afraid with 
me. . . .
“I now know I am going to write.”
—Albert Camus, preparatory notes for La Mort heureuse, 
Carnets (1936), in Œuvres complètes
Camus’s novels give life to the death penalty. They stage characters who 
are directly or indirectly confronted with judicial and penitentiary in-
stitutions or with execution. In L’Étranger, La Peste, and Le Premier 
Homme in particular, the role played by capital punishment, and the por-
trayals to which it is subject, call for examination. L’Étranger, Camus’s 
first published novel, came out in 1942, following several semi-autobi-
ographical projects. Among them was La Mort heureuse. In the author’s 
preparatory notes from 1936 cited in the epigraph, the protagonist of La 
Mort heureuse and forebear of Meursault, Patrice Mersault, expresses 
the wish to become a writer in order to voice the compassion and fear he 
feels for a condemned man (OCC 2:810–11); he also imagines a priest 
attempting to change the mind of this condemned man with whom he 
identifies. A foretaste of L’Étranger appears in this preliminary work: 
Camus’s best-seller returns to this close interest in the condemned man’s 
experience, his face à face with religious authority, and a reflection on, 
as well as the thematization of, a thirst for life and happiness. Distinct 
from Camus’s earlier prose, La Peste (1947), which presents itself as an 
allegorical fiction in the form of a chronicle, also features lethal justice. 
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By way of analogy, the plague epidemic allows for the representation of 
life in Nazi-occupied territories during World War II. In the third part 
of the novel, the narrator, Dr. Bernard Rieux, mentions in passing two 
exemplary executions in Oran (152). In part 4, Jean Tarrou confides 
in the doctor that, as a teenager, he attended a capital trial at the court 
of assizes. This event, during which his father called for a capital sen-
tence, is presented as having deeply affected Tarrou, who also explains 
that he witnessed an execution a few years later. Le Premier Homme 
(1994), an unfinished novel of autobiographical inspiration commenced 
in the early 1950s, found in Camus’s briefcase upon his accidental death 
in January 1960 and published posthumously, returns to the question 
of witnessing legal killing. In its current form—a fraction of what the 
author planned to write—the narrative consists of two parts, entitled 
“Recherche du père” (Search for the Father) and “Le Fils ou le premier 
homme” (The Son or The First Man).1 The latter part echoes the novel’s 
title and chief subject, namely the reconstitution of, and quest for, the 
identity and humble origins of a protagonist named Jacques Cormery. 
On the eve of the Algerian War of Independence, Jacques, Camus’s al-
ter ego, pieces together the story of his parents, and more particularly 
that of his long-deceased father, Henri Cormery. This leads to glimpses 
into the lives of the poorer “pieds-noirs” in colonial Algeria from the 
mid-nineteenth century onward. Jacques’s investigation alternates with 
an account of his childhood and youth—based on Camus’s memories 
rendered in a fictional guise.2 At the crossroads of these narrative planes 
lies an anecdote about the late Henri Cormery that his son had heard in 
his youth and about which his adult self inquires: Henri once attended 
the execution of a farm laborer named Pirette, who had murdered a 
whole family before going home and vomiting repeatedly. Closer exam-
ination of these references to the death penalty in all three novels shows 
it to be essential to their storylines. They converge to chart an original 
path toward the rejection of lethal justice that brings together the phys-
ical, the mythical, and the ethical.
State Killing and Storytelling
That the death penalty occupies a privileged place in Camus’s fiction 
becomes apparent when state killing is situated within the overarching 
structure of each novel. A capital crime lies at the heart of L’Étranger. 
After shooting an Arab man dead—at the end of part 1—Meursault is 
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sentenced to death. The narrative’s elliptic denouement has him await 
and fantasize about his imminent execution, which mirrors the murder 
he has committed in the middle of the narrative. Camus’s fiction thus 
presents capital punishment as both a pivot and the point of arrival 
reached, and somehow surpassed, by an everyman who has unexpect-
edly become a murderer.3 Quantitatively, capital justice makes up the 
whole second half of L’Étranger, which depicts the actors, reasoning, 
and human and judiciary mechanisms that contribute to Meursault’s 
death sentence. 
In this second part of the novel, institutional justice rereads the events 
and affects that the first part had already presented through the perspec-
tive of an individual indifferent to a number of social codes. From his 
meeting with the examining magistrate to the verdict, the protagonist 
finds himself immersed in the “world of the trial,” where displacement 
and distortion prevail.4 So does the reader. The crime for which Meur-
sault is condemned is not the murder he has committed as much as his 
rejection of Christian ideology and his inability to conform to behav-
ioral norms and to small, commonplace lies. A witness (Marie) declares 
that she is made to say the opposite of what she thinks (OCC 1:196), 
and the parricide committed by a man who is to be judged after Meur-
sault is conflated with his crime (200). 
Both within the novel’s overall architecture and within this particular 
judicial space marked by deformation, a moral and penal role reversal 
occurs. The men of law become guilty as they fail to judge the protago-
nist for his actual crime. For his part, the accused—and culprit—comes 
across as innocent insofar as the crime for which he is eventually sen-
tenced, “murder[ing] his mother morally” (200), is not one.5 No longer 
associated with justice, the death penalty is part of a series of entities 
and figures that are implicitly disqualified in L’Étranger. They are the 
very entities and figures that construct the strangeness of the stranger: 
the social codes to which individuals usually subject themselves, judi-
ciary authorities shown to be influenced by ideology, fatigue, and amal-
gam (as we will see in chapter 6), and a Christian spirituality presented 
as unconvincing and ineffective in Meursault’s perspective.
In La Peste, the previously cited passages in which Tarrou encoun-
ters lethal justice lead to the full disclosure of the novel’s allegorical 
meaning, to which the next section will return. But its narrative canvas 
as a whole also relies on capital sentencing understood in both a some-
what inflected literal sense and in a metaphorical one. Oran’s inhabi-
tants are portrayed as prisoners (OCC 2:83) who are soon likened to 
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men condemned to death. The narrator describes himself as follows: 
“Impatients de leur présent, ennemis de leur passé et privés d’avenir, 
nous ressemblions bien ainsi à ceux que la justice ou la haine humaines 
font vivre derrière les barreaux” (Impatient with the present, hostile to 
the past, and deprived of our future, we were much like those whom 
human justice, or hatred, has forced to live behind bars; 83). The com-
parison resurfaces in his account of Father Paneloux’s sermon, which is 
presented as making some Oranians more fully aware of their “claus-
tration” in the prison-like city (102). This partly figurative confinement 
of the inhabitants soon becomes literal, when going out is punished by 
incarceration (110).
Tarrou himself later connects this status of prisoner with that of con-
demned man.6 Disapproving of the use of convicts for “les gros travaux” 
(the heavy lifting) that the epidemic requires from a sanitary standpoint, 
he blurts out, “‘J’ai horreur des condamnations à mort’” (I loathe death 
sentences; OCC 2:119). As the disease spreads, capital sentencing takes 
on a metaphorical value, but without altogether losing its literal mean-
ing. While this passage does not refer to any judicial process resulting 
in a death sentence, for example, Oran’s administration does know that 
the measures that have been adopted will lead to the contamination of 
the prisoners. The authorities therefore deliberately send them to their 
deaths. Elsewhere, the metaphorical and the literal senses of “the death 
penalty” also coexist given “la certitude commune à tous les habitants 
qu’une peine de prison équivalait à une peine de mort par suite de l’ex-
cessive mortalité qu’on relevait dans la geôle municipale” (the certainty 
shared by all the inhabitants that being sent to prison was tantamount 
to a death sentence due to the disproportionately high mortality in the 
city jail; 151). Again, no capital trial leads to the violent demise of the 
incarcerated population, but a certain death penalty is at work in that 
nonlethal punishment (imprisonment) is requalified as an assured death. 
Midway between image and reality, capital sentencing in fact applies 
to the population as a whole: “Avec la peste, plus question d’enquêtes 
secrètes, de dossiers, de fiches, d’instructions mystérieuses et d’arresta-
tion imminente. À proprement parler, il n’y a plus de police, plus de 
crimes anciens ou nouveaux, plus de coupables, il n’y a que des con-
damnés qui attendent la plus arbitraire des grâces, et, parmi, eux, les 
policiers eux-mêmes” (With the plague, gone are the secret inquiries, the 
files, the records, the mysterious investigations and imminent arrests. 
Strictly speaking, there are no police left, no more crimes old or new, no 
more guilty individuals, there are only condemned people awaiting the 
Ad nauseam ❘ 139
most arbitrary pardon, and among them are the police officers them-
selves; 168; my emphasis). The plague is justice gone wrong, turned 
arbitrary through the stripping of the procedures designed to check its 
capriciousness. Tarrou’s negative syntax and judicial lexicon confirm 
this corruption and annihilation of institutional protocols and meth-
ods, which random condemnation alone replaces and to which the very 
guarantors of the state may fall prey.
In Le Premier Homme, the death penalty takes on particular impor-
tance insofar as it simultaneously problematizes and structures remem-
brance, that is to say the core of the novel. The anecdote of Pirette’s 
execution is linked to the faint memory of Henri Cormery’s life. The 
fifth chapter, titled “Recherche du père,” reveals that Henri died after 
being hit in the head by shrapnel during the Battle of the Marne, when 
his son was still an infant (OCC 4:778, 781–83). As a consequence, 
Jacques knows very little about his father, whom the narrative presents 
as a man of few words. This motivates the genealogical search of the 
novel’s first part and inscribes Pirette’s decapitation within the trans-
versal problematic of deficient memory. In addition to Jacques’s lack of 
familiarity with and memories of his father, the episode of the behead-
ing both reveals and transcends a double dysmnesia: that of Catherine 
Cormery, Jacques’s mother, who struggles to recall this episode at her 
son’s request, and, more broadly, that of poor people, which is described 
as tenuous. Chapter 6, “La famille,” introduces various portraits of the 
protagonist’s relatives, beginning with Catherine. Jacques’s conversa-
tion with her about the murderer Pirette leads to a critical argument: 
the narrator, whose voice merges with the protagonist’s, claims that the 
memory of lowly people is less detailed than that of the wealthy. Their 
monotonous existence is said to prevent them from isolating from their 
daily routines particular moments for recollection. The arduous life of 
the taiseux (quiet ones) also results in a fatigue that favors faster forget-
ting, according to the narrator. In addition, dysmnesia is presented as 
a protective strategy that helps poor people cope with their harsh lives 
(788).
Such a thesis, which diagnoses the supposedly flawed or impover-
ished memory of modest people as both a social injustice and a neces-
sary evil, sheds new light on the narrative as a whole. It increases the 
value of any fragment of memory to which Jacques—and the reader—
might have access. Camus adds the following note to his chapter title: 
“Un livre sur le manque de mémoire. Le Proust des pauvres vies mais 
le temps y est toujours perdu” (A book about the lack of memory. The 
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Proust of poor people but in which time is always lost; OCC 4:786). 
The main text itself insists on the impossibility of a Temps retrouvé 
(Time Regained): “Le temps perdu ne se retrouve que chez les riches” 
(Time can be regained only by the wealthy; 788). The reader of Le 
Premier Homme is thus presented with both a Proustian text in that it 
seeks to resuscitate the past and piece together an identity, and with a 
non-Proustian text insofar as it simultaneously denies the possibility 
of conjuring up the past of the Cormery parents in its completeness 
and complexity, and the satisfaction that may be derived from such 
a process. De facto, in chapter 5, Catherine is unable to identify her 
late husband’s middle names, her own birth year, their exact age dif-
ference, or the year when Henri lost his parents or when his sister left 
him in an orphanage (776–77).
Catherine Cormery’s relative muteness and “demi-surdité” (semi-deaf-
ness; OCC 4:775) further complicate the challenging “memorial quest” 
that frames the anecdote of the decapitation, a rare vestige of the father 
figure.7 She is the alter ego of the author’s mother, Catherine Camus, 
who appears in the paratext as the novel’s beloved and impossible—for 
illiterate—dedicatee, designated by the two periphrases “Vve Camus” 
(Widow Camus) and “toi qui ne pourras jamais lire ce livre” (you who 
will never be able to read this book; 741). In addition to underscoring 
her uneasy relation to language (786–87), the novel portrays Catherine 
as petrified and inclined to silence.8 Jacques’s interactions with her are 
further complicated by her incoherent answers when he asks about his 
father and the execution he attended. After affirming that she and her 
husband never lived in Algiers, she confirms to her son that Jacques 
Cormery indeed witnessed Pirette’s beheading in the city’s prison, Bar-
berousse. Jacques points out this contradiction, and she concurs some-
what haphazardly:
Elle disait oui, c’était peut-être non, il fallait remonter dans 
le temps à travers une mémoire enténébrée, rien n’était 
sûr. . . . Cette maladie de jeunesse . . . l’avait laissée sourde 
avec un embarras de parole, puis l’avait empêchée d’ap-
prendre ce qu’on enseigne même aux plus déshérités, et 
forcée donc à la résignation muette, mais c’était aussi la 
seule manière qu’elle ait trouvé de faire face à sa vie, et que 
pouvait-elle faire d’autre, qui à sa place aurait trouvé autre 
chose? (OCC 4:788)
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She said yes, maybe it was no, she had to travel back in 
time through a clouded memory, nothing was for sure. . . . A 
childhood disease . . . had left her deaf with a speech imped-
iment, then had prevented her from learning what even the 
most underprivileged are taught, and hence had forced her 
into this mute resignation, but it was also the only way she 
had found to face up to her life, and what else could she do, 
who in her position would have found another way?
The mother’s failure to understand some of her son’s sentences and 
her somewhat fearful confusion (OCC 4:787) trigger speculative and 
compensatory thoughts in Jacques—and, en abyme, the writing of the 
semi-autobiographical novel as a whole.
This section of the novel reports on a critical nœud de mémoire, sees 
the protagonist attempt to disentangle it through a precarious dialectical 
method, and makes perceptible the disheartening effect that Catherine’s 
inability to tell or clarify the desired story has on him. Doubt mixed 
with despair and understanding follows the failure of Jacques’s investi-
gation. Free indirect speech discreetly translates his emotional state, and 
he notes that he cannot even know the exact disease that has caused his 
mother’s speech and hearing impediments: “Là, encore, c’était la nuit” 
(There again, it was dark as night; OCC 4:788).
A gradation then occurs, culminating in identity trouble. As if by 
way of contagion, Jacques goes so far as to question the very love and 
life his parents once shared, and comes to mirror his mother’s partial 
aphasia before her (OCC 4:788). The collapse of both past and present 
intensifies, and he eventually acknowledges that he has reached a dead 
end: “Il fallait renoncer à apprendre quelque chose d’elle” (He had to 
give up on learning anything from her; 788). In making him question 
his parents’ relationship, the mother’s inability to talk much about the 
past comes to endanger his own identity, already destabilized by his 
awareness that, at the age of thirty-nine, he is older than his father at 
the time of his death on the battlefield and is thus placed in an unnatu-
ral position. Conversely, the mother in front of whom the son stands is 
infantilized in the sense that she does not speak—in accordance with the 
term’s etymology (infans).
Although the anecdote of Pirette’s execution crystallizes the mother’s 
dysmnesia, communication failures, and, to some extent, the narrator’s 
theory of the memorial impoverishment from which the proletariat suf-
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fers, and although these combined phenomena obstruct the recovery of 
his roots, the story of the beheading that Henri Cormery is reported to 
have attended sporadically transcends these shortcomings, nevertheless. 
This event is one of the few that the mother is able to corroborate when 
pressed by her son, who ends up resorting to a hand gesture (mimicking 
the decapitation) to make himself understood. While Catherine’s con-
firmation occurs in the midst of a sluggish and sometimes inconsistent 
dialogue, it takes the form of an immediate response (“elle répondit 
aussitôt” [she answered straight away]) and of one of the longest and 
most specific sentences she manages to utter: “Oui, il s’est levé à 3 heu-
res pour aller à Barberousse” (Yes, he got up at 3 a.m. to go to Bar-
berousse; OCC 4:787). With this confirmation, the widowed mother 
does briefly act as the “intercesseur” between her son and his unknown 
father, in keeping with the novel’s dedication (741).
Ultimately, therefore, it is through what could be called an archae-
ological, anamnestic approach that markedly differs from the sponta-
neous Proustian mnèmè that a small but meaningful whole (the anecdote 
of Pirette’s execution) is laboriously reconstituted from a fragment: the 
narrative presents the image of the father going to Barberousse and sub-
sequently suffering from nausea as the only “détail” (OCC 4:788) that 
Jacques has carried with him since childhood, after hearing his grand-
mother talk about it. However imperfectly—the grandmother’s and the 
uncle’s versions of the story are discordant, and the mother seems un-
able to relate the whole event and to recall the nausea—the story of 
the execution functions as the medium that enables Jacques to recover 
a meaningful piece of the past. Through the effect that both the crime 
(the murder of a family) and the scaffold are said to have had on Henri, 
namely indignation and revulsion (789), the father’s psyche and values 
can be better identified. Additionally, Jacques manages to recompose a 
second story on the basis of this narrative fragment: that of the evening 
when, as a child, he himself felt terror when he heard this narrative for 
the first time, and that of the recurring nightmare it caused.
Camus doesn’t just turn the death penalty into a keystone of the 
architecture of his three novels. They rehash various aspects of capital 
justice, with both difference and repetition. From one work to the next, 
the writer dissects and returns to the various moments that precede, 
trigger, and follow the death sentence. L’Étranger stages a man’s crime, 
his sentencing, the wait before his execution, but forgoes the (actual, not 
the fantasized) moment when he is decapitated. La Peste goes back to 
the world of the trial, yet this time, the narrative does evoke execution, 
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twice: it briefly mentions the use of firing squads due to the city’s state 
of siege (OCC 2:152) and, later, provides a clinical account of the shoot-
ing of a likely political prisoner (207). As for Le Premier Homme, after 
evoking indirectly the spectacle of the scaffold, it narrates in detail the 
quintuple murder perpetrated by a “bewildered” man:
Il avait tué à coups de marteau ses maîtres et les trois enfants 
de la maison. “Pour voler?” avait demandé Jacques enfant. 
“Oui,” avait dit l’oncle Étienne. “Non,” avait dit la grand-
mère, mais sans donner d’autres explications. On avait trouvé 
les cadavres défigurés, la maison ensanglantée jusqu’au pla-
fond et, sous l’un des lits, le plus jeune des enfants respirant 
encore, et qui devait mourir aussi, mais qui avait trouvé la 
force d’écrire sur le mur blanchi à la chaux, avec son doigt 
trempé de sang: “C’est Pirette.” (OCC 4:788–89)
He had killed his employers and the three children in the 
house with a hammer. “To rob them?” Jacques had asked as 
a child. “Yes,” his uncle Étienne had said. “No,” the grand-
mother had said, but without any further explanation. The 
disfigured corpses had been found, the house blooded as far 
up as the ceiling and, under one of the beds, the youngest 
of the children still breathing; he too was to die, but had 
found the strength to write on the whitewashed wall, with 
his blood-soaked finger: “It’s Pirette.”
Desperate, sinister, and primitive, the writing of the murderer’s name on 
the wall symbolically mirrors Camus’s rewriting of a childhood memory 
that is also grim. This symmetry dramatizes the horror of killing. So does 
the fact that it is perceived through a child’s eyes, twice: Pirette’s vic-
tim and the young Jacques. Besides, although a narrative ellipsis conceals 
Pirette’s decapitation, the chapter zeroes in on the reaction it elicits in one 
of its witnesses: Jacques’s father, “revenu livide, s’était couché, puis relevé 
pour aller vomir plusieurs fois, puis recouché” (livid upon his return, had 
gone for a lie-down, then got up again to vomit several times, before 
lying down again; OCC 4:789). Mimicking Henri Cormery’s shocked 
mind and body, this sentence staggers by repeating the same prefixes and 
prepositions and is reduced to a bare grammatical minimum, eventually 
omitting two auxiliary verbs. Camus’s fiction thus appears to explore and 
absorb the multiple phases of the capital experience relentlessly.
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The individual and historical perspectives provided in each novel 
also prove complementary. In L’Étranger, the condemned man is the 
subjective filter through which the reader perceives capital justice. With 
La Peste, our attention turns to the spectator of a capital trial and, later, 
of an execution in Hungary. Tarrou encounters the death penalty in a 
somewhat fortuitous way: his father invites him to observe his perfor-
mance in court. In Le Premier Homme, Henri Cormery is the counter-
point of this middle-class figure who witnesses a capital case by chance. 
Jacques’s father, who, at first, believes that the punishment inflicted on 
Pirette is deserved, chooses to go to Barberousse to attend the execution. 
He observes it with the eyes of a humble man to whom the judicial world 
is thoroughly foreign and subsequently abstains from commenting on it, 
as opposed to Tarrou, who, as an adult, is eventually able to verbalize 
his rejection of capital justice. The geopolitical contexts that surround 
lethal justice also vary greatly, from the beheading of two pieds-noirs 
in colonial French Algeria (L’Étranger and Le Premier Homme) to the 
exemplary shooting of thieves in the midst of an epidemic analogous to 
Nazi totalitarianism and the Occupation, which tends to eclipse Oran’s 
particular identity as a colonial city in “194.” (La Peste), to an execu-
tion carried out in a satellite state of the Soviet Union (La Peste). The 
persistent reality of state killing is portrayed as outdoing, and in a way 
as leveling out, this contextual heterogeneity.
Across Camus’s narratives, these iterations, overlaps, and alternating 
focalizations and circumstances add up to form a kaleidoscopic picture. 
He does not neatly separate the writings in which he represents lethal 
justice. Instead, through intertextual echoes, his works appear to weave 
a macro-narrative, or what could be called transtextual representations 
of the death penalty. La Peste mentions Meursault’s condemnation in 
passing (OCC 2:71). The anecdote of the father who vomits after seeing 
a beheading surfaces in L’Étranger (OCC 1:205), is revisited in Le Pre-
mier Homme in more detail, and reappears at the outset of “Réflexions 
sur la guillotine,” in the form of a brief factual narrative (OCC 4:127). 
It thereby becomes a landmark scene. Likewise, the observation accord-
ing to which one should not say of the condemned man “Il va payer sa 
dette à la société” (He is going to pay his debt to society) but rather “On 
va lui couper le cou” (We’re going to cut off his neck) reemerges in mul-
tiple forms, from L’Envers et l’endroit (OCC 1:54) to Camus’s Carnets 
from 1938 (OCC 2:871), La Peste (206), Le Premier Homme, where 
the clinical image of head severance reappears, dramatized by Jacques’s 
miming as he asks his mother “Mais alors quand papa est allé voir 
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couper le cou à Pirette” (But then what about the time when dad went 
to see them cut off Pirette’s head; OCC 4:787), and “Réflexions sur la 
guillotine” (OCC 4:132). This transtextual network both insists on the 
crude reality of the death penalty and makes this punishment stand out 
against a backdrop that features death under other guises.
For Camus’s three “capital novels” emphatically thematize death 
beyond capital punishment. It dominates their plots. “Aujourd’hui, 
maman est morte” (Mom died today; OCC I:141) reads as one of the 
most famous opening sentences of French literature. What follows is the 
account of successive rituals that make this liminary loss stretch in time: 
a night of vigil around the mother’s corpse in an old people’s home, a 
long walk during which Meursault accompanies the mortuary convoy, 
the religious ceremony, and the burial. Meursault’s own name contains 
a conjugated form of the verb mourir. Death pervades La Peste too, 
from the rampant epidemic to Cottard’s attempted suicide, his random 
shooting from his window, and the analogy between the disease and the 
Nazi regime, which Camus highlighted in 1955, when Roland Barthes 
accused his novel of antihistoricism (OCC 2:286). Ultimately, La Peste 
could be said to stage deadly absolutism.9 As for Le Premier Homme, 
its first part, “Recherche du père,” sets out to remedy Henri Cormery’s 
premature death and relative anonymity. Maurice Weyembergh has re-
marked that, more broadly, Camus’s unfinished novel interrogates the 
death of the dead themselves, that is to say the forgetting of the de-
ceased pieds-noirs such as Jacques’s father, who is indeed presented as 
lacking forebears and remembrance (OCC 4:914).10
In parallel to these “natural” deaths, the novels foreground murder. 
In L’Étranger, the murder of the Arab overturns Meursault’s life, the 
plot, as well as the reader’s previous perception of an a priori peaceful 
protagonist. This crime also has two mirror images in the novel: “l’his-
toire du Tchécoslovaque” (the Czechoslovakian’s story; OCC 1:187), 
a man murdered by his mother and sister when he returns home to 
surprise them after making money—Meursault specifies that he has 
read this story (that of Camus’s play Le Malentendu) “des milliers de 
fois” (thousands of times); and the story of the parricide evoked during 
Meursault’s trial (200). Colin Davis has rightly argued that an attrac-
tion to altericide and gratuitous violence seeps through Camus’s fic-
tion.11 Beyond the well-known case of L’Étranger in which murder is 
triply present—without being systematically gratuitous, nevertheless—
La Peste and Le Premier Homme do interrogate a society in which mur-
der, or assassination, persists. Tarrou asserts that this is precisely what 
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he is fighting against (OCC 2:207). Henri Cormery despises murder 
too: as a zouave sent to Morocco in 1905, he comes across the corpse 
of a fellow soldier whose throat has been slit and whose severed penis 
has been placed in his mouth. “Un homme ne fait pas ça. . . . Non, un 
homme, ça s’empêche” (A man doesn’t do that. . . . No, a man keeps 
himself under control), he shouts (OCC 4:779).
These prominent themes of natural death and homicide have a 
contrastive and critical effect. On the one hand, capital punishment is 
shown to distort mortality as an inevitable component of the human 
condition. Camus is familiar with Pascal’s famous use of the figure of 
the “condamnés à mort” to depict this condition. In the philosophy the-
sis written in his youth, “Métaphysique chrétienne et néoplatonisme,” 
he cites it and interprets its pessimism as a way of underscoring Pascal’s 
subsequent “adherence” to Christianity: “Let us imagine a number of 
men in chains, and all of them condemned to death, some of whom have 
their throats slit in plain sight of the others each day, those who remain 
see their own condition in that of their fellow prisoners, and, look-
ing at one another with pain and without hope, await their turn. This 
is the image of the human condition” (OCC 1:1009).12 Camus’s notes 
from 1949 present a tableau that may be read as a rewriting of Pascal’s 
fragment. It replaces the condemned men with tortured men and adds 
a significant chronology to the original analogy: after “millennia” of 
looking away with “the most perfect distraction,” Camus remarks, all 
men eventually watch the persecution of their peers (OCC 4:1062–63). 
In the aftermath of World War II, the author thus replaces the image of 
man’s suffering and hopeless condition that precedes Pascal’s apology of 
Christianity with another in which man’s long-standing indifference to-
ward the pain (and, implicitly, the death) of others gives way to a sense 
of concern and responsibility and to a focus on the terrestrial world and 
human agency.
That the worst human torments, and some deaths, are generated—
and can be prevented—by mankind aside from or in addition to man’s 
mortal condition is precisely what Camus’s fiction stresses. The individ-
ual murders in the novels at once illustrate this idea and serve as points 
of contrast with state killing. The narratives show capital punishment 
to be death decided and organized by society in order to intimidate or 
fascinate the people (OCC 1:189, 206; 4:790), as opposed to an inex-
plicable or a vengeful murderous gesture, such as that of Meursault in 
L’Étranger or that of colonized men mutilating an enemy soldier in Le 
Premier Homme. Neither novel justifies these individual acts, but both 
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do represent them with a certain understanding, whereas, conversely, 
they clearly delegitimize capital punishment.13 
Lethal justice is presented as unstoppable once launched, eliminat-
ing the exceptional and transgressive character of individual violence: 
“La mécanique écrasait tout” (The mechanics crushed everything), says 
Meursault (OCC 1:206), who also repeatedly underscores the “rite im-
placable” (204) and “déroulement imperturbable” (an unfolding that 
nothing could disturb; 205) of the capital sentence.14 “Keep the sense of 
rupture, of crime in violence—that is to say admit it only insofar as it 
relates to a personal responsibility. Otherwise it stems from a command, 
it follows a rule—be it the law or metaphysics. It no longer is a rupture” 
(OCC 2:1093), noted Camus in 1947, anticipating the argument he was 
to develop in L’Homme révolté a few years later. In their own right, his 
works of fiction that feature the death penalty hint at the failure of this 
containment of violence. By way of narrative construction, intertextual-
ity, and symbolic contrasts, they aggregate to elicit a systematic mistrust 
in lethal justice.
Revelations and Visions in the Face of Execution
State killing is also instrumental to the characterization of Camus’s 
novels. Meursault, Tarrou, and Jacques all undergo metamorphoses in 
the face of the death penalty. This process is most patent in La Peste. 
Its fourth section associates capital justice with several epiphanies: it 
narrates how death sentences make manifest to Tarrou what was pre-
viously invisible and unknown to him, and, by ricochet, it discloses the 
polysemous allegory that underlies the novel.15
Tarrou’s first epiphany occurs when he is seventeen and attends a 
trial at the court of assizes; the second one takes place once he has be-
come an adult and witnesses an execution. Retrospection and a first-per-
son account dramatize these two revelations, along with the fact that, 
through this “confession d’un pestiféré” (confession of a plague-stricken 
man; OCC 2:1196), both Tarrou’s interlocutor, Rieux, and the reader 
further “discove[r]” (202) a protagonist about whom little is known at 
this point in the novel.16 Tarrou’s self-unveiling symbolically occurs in 
a postapocalyptic atmosphere associated with spiritual purgation. He 
and Rieux are atop the city, on a terrace, in a “lumière pure et glacée” 
(pure and frozen light), against a cloudless sky that has been cleansed by 
a “deluge” of downpours (202). A cryptic remark inaugurates Tarrou’s 
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narrative: “Je souffrais déjà de la peste bien avant de connaître cette 
ville et cette épidémie” (I already suffered from the plague long before 
encountering this city and this epidemic; 204). Still enigmatically, he 
emphasizes the will he has always had to “get out of” the plague (“sortir 
[de la peste]”; 204). At the end of his confession, the mystery that sur-
rounds these statements is solved.
What follows Tarrou’s mystifying introduction is a portrayal of his 
father. A lawyer and an “honnête homme” (honest man; OCC 2:205), 
at once harmless and imperfect—pernickety, unfaithful, and proud—
he undergoes a radical transformation during a capital trial that he 
invites his son to attend in the hope of impressing him. The death pen-
alty here functions as a developer in the photographic sense. While in 
court, Tarrou’s father demands that the accused be sentenced to death, 
and, through his son’s eyes, the narrative shows his figure, hitherto 
described as deeply human, to metamorphose into a monstrous one. 
Dressed in a blood-red robe, he utters “des phrases immenses” (end-
less sentences), “grouill[ant] . . . comme des serpents” (swarm[ing] 
like snakes; 206). An anacoluthon symbolically dislocates the sen-
tence that describes this transformation. Infernal imagery takes over 
the description, and, just as in L’Étranger, the man of law becomes 
the culprit.17 The depersonalized speech of the father, who invokes “la 
société” as an indeterminate and abstract agent justifying his call for 
the defendant’s decapitation, as well as the euphemizing language he 
uses (“ce qu’on appelait poliment les derniers moments et qu’il faut 
bien nommer le plus abject des assassinats” [what was politely called 
the last moments and which should instead be called the most abject 
of murders; 206]) portray human justice as ignoring the responsibility 
and the reality of punishment. Tarrou’s confession also presents the 
death penalty as the “developer” of his conscience: his experience of 
the assizes triggers a sudden and forced maturation after which he 
breaks away from his careless, disengaged perception of the world, 
perceives the duplicity of the words that decree or describe lethal pen-
alties, and decides to leave home.
This first epiphany relies on an unexpected, close connection between 
Tarrou and the defendant. If, in Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné and, as 
we will see, in L’Étranger, the condemned man and Meursault are ani-
malized in their cells, La Peste accentuates the assimilation of accused 
and beast in the courthouse. “Ce petit homme au poil roux et pauvre” 
(This little man with thinning red hair; OCC 2:205; my emphasis), a 
nameless “hibou effarouché par une lumière trop vive” (owl frightened 
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by too harsh a light; 206), is soon referred to as “le hibou roux” (the 
red-haired owl; 207, 209) only. These periphrases do not only highlight 
the way in which the extreme fear of punishment erases the condemned 
man’s humanity or merely serve a characterization that is both pathetic 
and realistic from a psychological perspective. Beyond these functions, 
the animality of the accused becomes a positive property: in Tarrou’s 
eyes, it testifies to the fact that the criminal belongs to the world of the 
living.
This world contrasts with both that of the father—a deadly figure 
associated with chthonic images during his speech for the prosecution—
and “la catégorie commode d’‘inculpé’” (the “accused” as an all-too 
convenient category; OCC 2:206) through which Tarrou abstractly 
thinks of the “petit homme” (little man) before he witnesses his condem-
nation. Such is the foundation of Tarrou’s first epiphany, emphasized by 
the suddenness of his realization and the rupture it brings about: “À 
partir de ce jour, je m’intéressai avec horreur à la justice. . . . Ce qui 
m’intéressait, c’était la condamnation à mort” (From that day onward, I 
took a horrified interest in justice. . . . What interested me was the death 
sentence; 206–7). Alive just like the defendant in front of him, Tarrou 
feels a solidarity so great that a symbiosis appears to connect him to the 
defendant: he has stomach cramps when watching the accused and feels 
“blind[ly]” drawn to his “côtés” (side) by “un instinct formidable” in an 
“intimité . . . vertigineuse” (206).
A second epiphany both echoes and deviates from the assizes scene. 
As an adult, Tarrou joins “les autres” (other men; OCC 2:207), who, 
like him, have grown critical of society. The group of which he is part 
is reported to sentence individuals to death on occasion: “Mais on me 
disait que ces quelques morts étaient nécessaires pour amener un monde 
où l’on ne tuerait plus personne” (But I was told that these few deaths 
were necessary to bring about a world in which no one would be killed 
anymore; 207). Tarrou initially convinces himself that these condemna-
tions are legitimate by thinking of none other than the “hibou roux.”18 
Yet the spectacle of the execution soon leads him to reject it. The dis-
rupted syntax and prosody used to narrate this episode duplicate those 
of the previous anecdote. And just as Tarrou had earlier shed light on the 
discrepancy between euphemistic language and the reality of decapita-
tion, here he underscores the way literature and iconography may mask 
the crude reality of firing squads. In this second revelation, nevertheless, 
the primary target of criticism no longer is the judicial institution and its 
actors. Tarrou’s realization is self-critical. The condemned man, turned 
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into the mere synecdoche of “le trou dans la poitrine” (the hole in the 
chest), that is to say sheer vulnerability and disfigurement, makes him 
understand that, despite his good intentions, he too is a murderer, “à 
[s]on tour” (in turn) (209).
The establishment of an ethics whose content and formulation are 
both negative and minimal results from this second realization: “n’être 
l’ennemi mortel de personne . . . soulager les hommes et, sinon les sau-
ver, du moins leur faire le moins de mal possible et même parfois un 
peu de bien . . . renonc[er] à tuer . . . refuser d’être avec le fléau” (to be 
nobody’s mortal enemy . . . to bring relief to men and, short of saving 
them, at least to do as little harm as possible to them and even, some-
times, a little good . . . to refuse to kill definitively . . . to refuse to be 
on the same side as the plague; OCC 2:209–10). Yet this simple am-
bition constitutes a trying, if not an impossible task, as suggested by 
the intertwined analogies of physical and military battle (against the 
disease and against a tempest) that Tarrou uses and by the oxymoron 
to which he aspires: to be a “meurtrier innocent” (innocent murderer; 
210).19 He also admits that this ethics is temporary and imperfect in a 
community whose moral categories—from the active executioner to the 
“vrai médecin” (real doctor) or the “meurtrier innocent”—are perme-
able and whose members may act in contradiction to their intentions. 
This second face-to-face with the death penalty therefore complements 
the first and modifies the analysis to which it had led. Legal murder is 
no longer represented or experienced as exterior and collective. Tarrou 
reconceives it as a responsibility that is also interior and individual. 
Furthermore, state killing ceases to be localized and sporadic. Instead, it 
emerges as virtually ubiquitous and permanent, leading Tarrou to adopt 
a principle of constant self-suspicion so as to avoid any legitimation of 
capital condemnation. “Je me disais alors que, si l’on cédait une fois, il 
n’y avait pas de raison de s’arrêter” (I then told myself that, if you gave 
in once, there was no reason to stop; 208).
As a consequence of this solidarity with the condemned, discovered 
in two successive stages, Tarrou engages in a vast fight for life and, at the 
metanarrative level, unveils the novel’s meaning and allegorical layer-
ing. He strives to “refuser tout ce qui, de près ou de loin, pour de bonnes 
ou de mauvaises raisons, fait mourir ou justifie qu’on fasse mourir” 
(reject all that which, in one way or another, for good or bad reasons, 
makes people die or justifies that they be made to die; OCC 2:209). The 
reader therefore learns that, beyond its literal acceptation, the plague 
refers both to death itself, following a disease or human intervention, 
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and to any active contribution to or mere inaction in the face of killing 
(“tuer ou . . . laisser tuer”; 209). In other words, the rejection of the 
death penalty leads to a rejection of a broader deadly paradigm that 
comprises pathology, penalty, and crime—individual or collective, polit-
ical or not.20 This cluster that brings together all that kills consolidates 
the novel around a categorical moral imperative, namely the maximal 
protection of human life. And in identifying active or passive killing as 
highly suspicious means that may be used to serve a cause believed to be 
legitimate, it also activates a political critique.21
Like La Peste, albeit more indirectly, Le Premier Homme has the 
identity of a protagonist develop through a capital scene associated 
with the father figure. In contrasting ways, this figure who convention-
ally incarnates the law brings about the rejection of lethal justice in both 
novels. In the case of the Cormerys, the two recomposed stories men-
tioned earlier (the Pirette anecdote and Jacques’s reaction upon hearing 
it) symbolically represent the rebirth of both father and son: as the ac-
count of the Barberousse scene gives life to Henri as an agent, endowed 
with moral judgment and a reactive body, it confirms the existence and 
nature of Jacques’s origins. In other words, the recollection of Henri 
Cormery’s nausea provides the father with a reality and humanity that 
allows his son to authenticate his own filiation, confirming the resem-
blance between father and son briefly pointed out by the mother in 
chapter 5 (OCC 4:776). A violent physical and moral mimesis actually 
consecrates Jacques and Henri’s likeness and relationship: just as the 
late father is reported to have vomited after the execution, a “nausée 
d’horreur” (nausea of horror) affects the young Jacques. Although he 
manages to “raval[er]” (swallow back) his disgust, the narrator presents 
it as haunting him “sa vie durant” (throughout his life) and consecrates 
it as his “seul héritage évident et certain” (only obvious and definite 
legacy; 789).
What Jacques relies on as he restores this genealogy is a vision of cap-
ital punishment rather than the actual spectacle of the beheading, about 
which his father is said not to utter a word (OCC 4:789). The “images” 
(789) that haunt the child result from an oral narrative created by his 
whole family—with several variants—and upon which he elaborates in 
his mind’s eye (789).22 This narrative provides Jacques with a moral foun-
dation. It also reportedly “impresses” him, “distresses” him, and invades 
his “dreams” (788) and “nightmares” (789). At once an ever-repeated 
story that inspires fear, a collective representation, and a personal appro-
priation that enables the individual to situate or orient himself, Pirette’s 
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story arguably operates as a founding myth.23 It doesn’t contradict reality 
altogether—an illusion to which the young Jacques himself clings (789). 
Rather, it informs reality in a decisive manner. The last part of the section 
titled “La famille” focuses on Jacques once he has reached adulthood 
(“l’âge d’homme”), much like Tarrou in the second half of his confession. 
The “history” and “events” that surround him at that point in time are 
presented as corroborating the meaning of the founding myth in which 
the scaffold makes the father sick: they invalidate the desirability of de-
capitation established by the law and the vox populi (789), suggesting 
that any man, even Jacques himself, could be executed (789).
In 1942, L’Étranger already linked the death penalty both with the 
experience of an epiphany as highlighted in La Peste and with that of a 
vision perceptible in Le Premier Homme. At the end of the novel, Meur-
sault’s acceptance of his fate and apparent metaphysical emancipation 
(he claims that he is ready to relive an existence marked by finitude 
and absurdity) come across as a coup de théâtre. Critics have read this 
plot twist in various ways. For Blanchot, it was a failure in that it con-
tradicted the protagonist’s quasi-subjectlessness throughout the narra-
tive.24 For Sartre, the dénouement illustrated the argument of Le Mythe 
de Sisyphe, which simultaneously asserts the senselessness of terrestrial 
life and the will to embrace it without recourse to either God or sui-
cide. Le Mythe de Sisyphe also finds exemplarity in the man condemned 
to death and his “divine availability” (OCC 1:260) on the day of his 
execution.25 “It is with a view to making us relish this dawn and this 
availability [of the condemned man] that Mr. Camus sentenced his hero 
to the death penalty,” says Sartre.26 His interpretation of L’Étranger as 
the fictional pendant of Camus’s conceptualization of the absurd still 
prevails today—and Camus himself classified his novel in the “cycle of 
the Absurd.” Yet this tends to simplify the complex representation of 
Meursault’s thoughts and behavior as his execution is impending.
Meursault experiences a tortuous mental process at the end of 
L’Étranger. Its progression makes his final “liberation” ambivalent. First 
come imaginary scenarios whereby the protagonist attempts to counter 
the inevitability of his execution: he envisions legal and medical arrange-
ments—bills and drug combinations—that could save him from death. 
The failure of this speculative strategy and Meursault’s concomitant 
criticism of his own inability to be “raisonnable” (OCC 1:205) dryly 
underscore the irreversible, tragic situation in which he finds himself. 
Irony ensues, as the condemned man doubly adheres to lethal justice. 
First, when imagining that he could be freed, he expresses the wish to 
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be able to attend all future executions (205). Here, the spectacle of an-
other’s death is shown to trigger Schadenfreude rather than deterrence. 
Second, the protagonist must admit that it is in the condemned man’s 
best interest that his own beheading unfold smoothly, for a prompt and 
less painful death (206). Dark humor characterizes a further consider-
ation. Meursault notes that, in contrast with the iconic status given to 
the guillotine by the popular imagination since the French Revolution, 
the scaffold is not the site of an apotheosis. Instead of experiencing 
a transcendent “ascension en plein ciel” (ascension into the sky; 206), 
man faces a prosaic device of average size, placed on the ground, and 
even personified as a mere fellow man toward whom the condemned 
man is to walk. Initially believed to be somewhat grandiose, decapita-
tion turns out to be demystified by three adverbial qualifiers: “On était 
tué discrètement, avec un peu de honte et beaucoup de précision” (They 
killed you discreetly, with a little shame and much precision; 206). In 
this sequence, tragedy, irony, and the grotesque follow one another.
The novel’s dénouement then takes a pathetic turn when Meursault 
comes to detail the mental efforts through which he prepares himself for 
his decapitation. That he needs to invert the natural succession of day and 
night to better face his punishment symbolizes its brutality and inhuman-
ity. He is on the lookout after midnight, as this is the time after which he 
may be taken to the scaffold. With remarkable psychological realism, the 
narrative dissects the protective coping mechanisms he deploys at that 
point: his anticipation of the moment when he will be forced out of his 
cell, his rationalization of death, attempt to domesticate the image of the 
execution despite his lack of imagination, and the restraint he imposes 
on himself by thinking about his pardon only in fine. What this internal 
close-up highlights is the convict’s failure to control his terror:
Passé minuit, j’attendais et je guettais. Jamais mon oreille 
n’avait perçu tant de bruits, distingué de sons si ténus. . . . J’au-
rais pu entendre des pas et mon cœur aurait pu éclater. . . . Le 
moindre glissement me jetait à la porte. . . . L’oreille collée 
au bois, j’attendais éperdument jusqu’à ce que j’entende ma 
propre respiration, effrayé de la trouver rauque et si pareille 
au râle d’un chien” (OCC 1:207)
After midnight, I waited and listened out for them. Never be-
fore had my ears perceived so many noises, heard such faint 
sounds. . . . I could have heard footsteps and my heart might 
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have burst. . . . The slightest slipping sound made me rush 
to the door. . . . My ear pressed against the wood, I waited 
desperately until I could hear my own breathing, scared to 
find that it sounded hoarse and so much like the groaning 
of a dog.
Meursault metamorphoses into an animal despite his best efforts, but 
this animalization differs from that of La Peste: it is entirely negative. 
Camus takes up the strategy used by Hugo in Le Dernier Jour d’un 
condamné over a century earlier.27 The individual who awaits a cer-
tain death is portrayed as progressively losing his full human status. 
“Réflexions sur la guillotine” summarizes this transformation during 
which, before the execution, “torture through hopefulness alternates 
with the throes of animal despair” (OCC 4:145), “round[ing] off [the 
condemned man’s] condition as an object.” “According to all witnesses, 
the skin color changes, fear acting like an acid. . . . The actor that re-
sides in every man could come to the rescue of the scared animal then 
and help it put on a brave face, even to himself. But the night and the 
secret are without any recourse” (145, 147–48). On the verge of car-
diac “éclate[ment]” (bursting; OCC 1:207) that renews itself every 
twenty-four hours, Meursault precisely suffers this degenerative state 
and dehumanization. The disavowal of the intellect, and of courage, 
is prolonged by that of spirituality: the idea that all men die sooner or 
later, whether or not they have been sentenced to death, only convinces 
Meursault temporarily (207); he rejects this argument when the chap-
lain formulates it, just as he resolutely, and ultimately angrily, rejects the 
Christian framework that could alleviate his ordeal by giving him hope 
(204, 208–12).28
These antecedents potentially complicate Meursault’s subsequent 
embrace of “cette vie absurde” (this absurd life; OCC 1:212), that is 
to say his apparent metaphysical emancipation at the very end of the 
novel. The dénouement seems to constitute a moment of revelation: 
Meursault declares himself calm, “purgé du mal” (purged of evil), and 
in touch with “la tendre indifférence du monde” (the tender indifference 
of the world; 213) at a liminal moment (“à la limite de la nuit”). But the 
psychological ordeal and dehumanization that precede this could lead 
one to read these remarks and his final masochistic wish that hateful 
shouts “welcome” him when he is put to death (213) as emanating from 
an impaired consciousness, as the paroxysm of despair (“vidé d’espoir”) 
and “épuis[ement]” (exhaustion) for a mind that can no longer cling to 
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anything and is thoroughly alienated. The metaphors that pervade the 
beginning of the novel’s closing paragraph could confirm this interpre-
tation. Meursault appears to lose the sense of time and reality: “Je crois 
que j’ai dormi” (I think I must have slept; 212; my emphasis). He also 
lets go of the prosaism that has largely characterized his self-expression 
hitherto: as in the murder scene, a highly figurative language replaces it 
and appears to signal an état second.
What is more, these metaphors present Meursault as unable to dis-
tinguish his being from his environment. He fuses the two: “Je me suis 
réveillé avec des étoiles sur le visage. Des bruits de campagne montaient 
jusqu’à moi. Des odeurs de nuit, de terre et de sel rafraîchissaient mes 
tempes. La merveilleuse paix de cet été endormi entrait en moi comme 
une marée” (I woke up with stars over my face. Countryside sounds 
were rising up toward me. Scents of the night, earth and salt were cool-
ing my temples. The wonderful peace of this sleeping summer flowed 
into me like a tide; OCC 1:212). One may doubt the possibility of such 
a sensorial symbiosis from within a prison cell and wonder if delusion 
doesn’t underlie or cloud Meursault’s inner liberation. Earlier in the 
narrative, what covers his “face” at night in the jail are not “stars” but 
“des punaises” (bugs) “cour[ant] sur [s]on visage” (crawling over [his] 
face; 183). Could the condemned man be confusing the latter with the 
former in a psychotic moment? There is no need to choose an ultimate 
reading. But it seems necessary to acknowledge that the very language 
used to express the protagonist’s final stance prevents the reader from 
being sure of his lucidity, and hence of the value that his metaphysical 
epiphany should be given.
Regardless of how one interprets the novel’s closing paragraph, 
Meursault’s end marks the failure of the modern death penalty. Either 
the condemned man’s atomized psyche bears witness to the unbearable 
pain caused by the guillotine, contravening the machine’s aim, as we 
have seen; or capital punishment operates as the catalyst for an interior 
deliverance and, in so doing, reveals the inefficacy of the negative ret-
ribution that the judicial authorities and society at large aim to impose 
on the criminal.
Subversion and irony cap Meursault’s ambiguous epiphany through 
a final vision. The scene strikingly echoes that of the crucifixion of 
Christ on Golgotha, a scandalous execution par excellence, concern-
ing as it does an innocent figure.29 Meursault states, “Il me restait à 
souhaiter qu’il y ait beaucoup de spectateurs le jour de mon exécution 
et qu’ils m’accueillent avec des cris de haine” (What was left for me to 
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hope was that there should be many spectators on the day of my execu-
tion and that they should greet me with cries of hatred; OCC 1:213; my 
emphasis). In French, John’s gospel reads:
Jean XIX, 5. . . . Pilate leur dit: Voilà l’homme.
Jean, XIX, 6. Quand les grands prêtres et les gardes le 
virent, ils crièrent: Crucifie! Crucifie! . . .
Jean XIX, 15. Alors ils crièrent: Enlève, enlève, crucifie-le.30
John XIX, 5. . . . Pilate told them: Behold the man.
John XIX, 6. When the great priests and the guards saw 
him, they cried out: Crucify! Crucify! . . .
John XIX, 15. Then they cried out: Take him away, take 
him away, crucify him.
Through this implicit intertext, Camus associates Meursault with a sa-
cred figure in whom his character does not believe, who may have saved 
him had he pretended to “se confier à lui” (confide in him [Christ]; 
OCC 1:181), and whose redeeming potential morphs into a damning 
one: his judges, one of whom calls himself “chrétien” (181), condemn 
the protagonist to death (a death devoid of a possible resurrection, con-
trary to that of Jesus, according to Meursault) because he refuses to 
recognize Jesus. The stranger who, in the magistrate’s eyes, resembles an 
“Antéchrist” (182), expires like Christ.31 The novel’s ultimate revelation 
therefore is that of the carnivalesque, or perverse, potential of capital 
justice.32
In Camus’s three novels, the death penalty could ultimately be said to 
be part of a rite of passage. It leads the protagonists to be temporarily 
separated from their community, marginalized, and subsequently reinte-
grated into the particular, elective community of those who valorize ter-
restrial—and human—life above all else. The characters are represented 
as experiencing a coming of age when embracing this stance: Tarrou 
develops his conscience résistante, Jacques experiences a revulsion that 
we learn stays with him throughout his adult life, and Meursault’s reve-
lation, however equivocal it remains, makes him decide that he is “prêt 
à tout revivre” (ready to relive everything; 213) in true Nietzschean 
fashion. The representation of this moral and existential maturation 
goes hand in hand with the discrediting of the edifying, deterrent, or 
retributive vocation of the death penalty, and the repeated use of visions 
and epiphanies to stage this critique provides it with a sacred aura. And 
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indeed, the stranger resembles Christ, Tarrou wonders about the pos-
sibility of being a saint without God, and Jacques finds in the Pirette 
anecdote the “lien mystérieux” (mysterious bond; OCC 4:789) that 
connects him to his father. This implicit sacralization no longer belongs 
to an intradiegetic myth, as is the case with the young Jacques. Instead, 
the novels sketch an abolitionist mythography of their own through a 
chorus of characters.
Physical Justice and Involuntary Ethics
The systematic critique of the effectiveness or rightfulness of capital 
punishment, as well as the quasi-transcendental character of the pro-
tagonists’ “abolitionist moments,” may lead to the conclusion that the 
death penalty is the site of moral didacticism and exemplary heroism 
in Camus’s fiction. To some extent, this is true. While Meursault the 
discreet clerk, prone to indifference and gratuitous murder, seems more 
akin to an antihero than a hero, his “absolute respect for truth,” “sur-
prising determination,” and “veritable heroism of lucidity” outdo this 
first impression, as Rachel Bespaloff has noted.33 The stranger is also 
heroic insofar as he is subjected to a greater, irresistible force—the 
sun—presented as the agent that makes him commit murder. Meursault 
lives his fatum fully. Even his most innocuous deeds are fatal to him 
when examined by the law.34 Tarrou flirts with heroism more explicitly 
than does Meursault, and through another prism: that of a new saint-
liness paradoxically aspiring to atheism (“être un saint sans Dieu”). A 
host of heroes also surround Tarrou: Rieux, who asserts that he has 
no “goût . . . pour l’héroïsme et la sainteté” (taste . . . for heroism and 
saintliness; OCC 2:211) but nevertheless shows extraordinary dedica-
tion, Grand, Rambert, and Castel.35 This characterization, the overt and 
dramatic promotion of positive values such as solidarity and persever-
ance, and the triumph of a certain humanism over “religious tradition, 
the demand for happiness, and the desire for absolutes,” in Bespaloff’s 
words, turn La Peste into an edifying narrative.36
However, the novels also problematize this clear-cut moral trajectory 
and exemplarity. The condemnation of the death penalty by Camus’s 
résistants is not devoid of difficulty, uncertainty, and, sometimes, con-
tradiction. As mentioned earlier, Meursault’s designation of mortal life 
as the supreme good during his (ambivalent) epiphany occurs after a 
paralyzing fear has assailed him. Bedridden and crushed by anguish, 
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he observes his own febricity: “J’avais si affreusement froid que je 
me recroquevillais sous ma couverture. Je claquais des dents sans 
pouvoir me retenir” (I was so horribly cold that I curled up under 
my blanket. My teeth were chattering uncontrollably; OCC 1:205). 
Remarkably, the young Jacques, struck by “horror” in imagining the 
scaffold, curls up in his bed just like Meursault (OCC 4:789). The 
narratives often highlight the status of patient of those who face or 
witness the death penalty, even if this status is represented as tem-
porary. Camus’s capital scenes establish a maximal proximity with 
their tormented interiority in ways that question their heroism—or 
even their abolitionism, as in the case of Meursault, who wishes to 
see someone else be decapitated.
Not only do some of Camus’s protagonists turn out to be passive and 
crippled by distress; when in a position to judge whether the ultimate 
punishment inflicted on a fellow man is acceptable or desirable, they fall 
prey to doubt and criticism, including self-criticism. Such is the case for 
Tarrou and Henri Cormery. La Peste and Le Premier Homme point to 
their indifference or to the beliefs that lead them to support the killing 
of others, thereby further inflecting the model of the abolitionist hero. 
Tarrou must acknowledge his participation in murder, and he is forced 
to embrace a most modest moral imperative (“soulager les hommes et, 
sinon les sauver, du moins leur faire le moins de mal possible”). Jacques’s 
father is initially attracted to the spectacle of the scaffold and convinced 
of its legitimacy before rejecting his vengeful inclination. Both therefore 
don’t articulate a magisterial critique of lethal justice. On the contrary, 
they highlight human fallibility and the difficulty one may encounter in 
establishing one’s ethics.
A somewhat unexpected moral compass orients these protagonists on 
their challenging ethical journey: the human body. It acts as a common 
denominator that homogenizes the rejection of the death penalty across 
the three narratives. Critics and the novelist himself have underscored 
the preeminence of physical sensations in L’Étranger.37 The body rules 
Meursault’s life, from pleasure to murder (he clenches his gun and pulls 
the trigger because the sun overwhelms him). Whether delusional or 
not, heightened physical perception also characterizes what he presents 
as the inner liberation through which he eventually surpasses, or claims 
to surpass, his sentence. The body plays a key role in the episodes under 
consideration in La Peste and Le Premier Homme as well. With these 
later works, it undergoes the marked “evolution toward solidarity and 
participation” (OCC 2:286) identified by Camus when he compared 
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L’Étranger with La Peste. From La Peste onward, the vulnerable body 
of the Other matters. Rieux and Tarrou aim to “sauver les corps” (save 
the bodies), to take up Camus’s phrase in an editorial from November 
20, 1946. For the protagonists, the death of ailing bodies—on whose 
materiality the text continually insists—must be prevented at all costs.
Additionally, the body matters in that a major symptom of the plague 
is “décharnement” (emaciation; OCC 2:159), understood as the phys-
ical wasting away of the epidemic-stricken Oranians but also as the 
paralysis of memory and the imagination that takes away their abil-
ity to picture the physiognomy of their loved ones.38 This notion of 
“décharnement” illuminates Tarrou’s double epiphany. The trial and 
execution he witnesses, and more particularly his face à face with both 
the “hibou roux” (OCC 2:206) and the “hole” (209) in the chest that 
‘metonymizes’ the Hungarian condemned man, overturn the “abstrac-
tion” through which he conceived justice in his youth. “Un mort n’a de 
poids que si on l’a vu mort” (A dead man has real meaning only if you 
have actually seen him dead; 60), Rieux writes in his chronicle, before 
noting that closing one’s eyes in the face of death and thereby ignoring 
cruelty and pain is sorely tempting. La Peste and Le Premier Homme 
defend a related argument: a condemned man “has real meaning” only 
if one has seen him be sentenced to death or executed.  
There is more. A particular emotional response grounded in the 
body, namely disgust, overwhelms the individual who observes the con-
demned man’s experience or who pictures it with sufficient imagination. 
Tarrou for one suffers from dizziness, feels “un dégoût abominable” 
(abominable disgust; OCC 2:206), and has “le cœur malade” (an up-
set stomach; 207) as well as a “mauvais goût . . . dans la bouche” (bad 
taste . . . in his mouth; 208) in the presence of the firing squad. Later, 
he notes that he has a “gorge nouée” (lump in his throat) and “n’ar-
riv[e] pas à déglutir” (cannot swallow; 208). Henri Cormery too vom-
its after attending Pirette’s execution, and his son inherits this nausea, 
which haunts him throughout his life, as we have seen. Opposite the 
condemned body stands the disgusted body of the witness. Although 
disgust, and sometimes, more broadly, the valorization of biology, is 
commonly used in discourses and reactions that portray the body of the 
criminal as an abject entity whose exclusion or elimination is presented 
as necessary, the sickened bodies of Tarrou, Henri, and Jacques pro-
vide the foundation for the rejection of—in Camus’s words, one might 
say a revolt against—the fate of the condemned individual and for his 
preservation.
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Disgust in the face of state-imposed death surfaces in much of 
Camus’s nonfiction as well. In an interview with Carl Viggiani, the au-
thor referred to “an organic refusal [of the death penalty] when the 
thought of [capital punishment] occurred to [him]” in his youth (OCC 
4:642). Following the execution of Philippe Pétain’s minister of the inte-
rior Pierre Pucheu on March 20, 1944, Camus published an editorial in 
which he repeated that executions had “always filled him with disgust 
and revolt” (OCC 1:921), but this time, he confessed that, “for the first 
time,” and precisely because he had “experienced [this feeling] to the 
point of fury” over the previous four years, the death of this Vichyste 
senior official had not moved him. On January 21, 1948, in a letter 
to Jean Grenier, Camus also underscored “the gut reaction that ma[de 
him] stand up against punishment [le châtiment]” again before recount-
ing that, at the time of the Épuration, he had attended a trial during 
which he felt solidarity with the accused whose guilt he nevertheless 
believed to be established.39
Until the late 1950s, that is to say until shortly before his death, 
the feeling of disgust continued to pervade Camus’s publications and 
speeches about the use of legitimized, rationalized killing by states and 
political parties. These contributions included his criticism of Franco’s 
Spain being admitted to UNESCO in 1952 (OCC 3:435), that of the 
“terrorist” and counterterrorist tactics used by the Front de Libération 
Nationale and the French state during the Algerian War of Indepen-
dence (934), and that of the execution of Imre Nagy, after the Hungar-
ian politician attempted to break free from Moscow and withdrew from 
the Warsaw Pact (OCC 4:599). In 1957, “Réflexions sur la guillotine” 
also insisted on the “disgusting butchery” of execution (166): “No no-
bility whatsoever around the scaffold, but rather disgust, contempt or 
the basest kind of enjoyment” (141). Throughout these texts, the phys-
ical sensation of revulsion causes the rejection of capital punishment, 
but it also tends to blur the difference between capital punishment and 
political assassination.40 La Peste itself gestures toward this conflation 
by not specifying whether the shooting that Tarrou witnesses in Hun-
gary is extrajudicial, following a sham trial, or results from due process. 
If the disgusted body of the witness functions as a moral compass so 
powerful that it occasionally suspends the difference between various 
kinds of state- or party-sponsored execution, conversely, the intellect as 
a moral guide elicits some suspicion. La Peste and Le Premier Homme 
stage the ability of logic or dogma to legitimize the death penalty 
wrongly. Henri initially believes that retaliation is in order for Pirette, 
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and, once an adult in Hungary, Tarrou endorses a certain historicism. 
Camus’s “capital fiction” suggests that the primacy of reasoning should 
give way to a spontaneous, body-based movement of revolt.41 Rieux 
exemplifies this. While he doesn’t reject reasoning altogether, he turns it 
into a secondary process: “Pour le moment, il y a des malades et il faut 
les guérir. Ensuite, ils réfléchiront, et moi aussi. Mais le plus pressé est 
de les guérir. Je les défends comme je peux, voilà tout” (For now, there 
are sick people and they need curing. Then, they will think things over, 
and so will I. But the most pressing task is to make them better. I stick 
up for them as best I can, that’s all; OCC 2:121; my emphasis). Camus’s 
correspondence with Jean Grenier insists: “What Rieux (I) wants to say 
is that we must cure everything that can be cured—while waiting to 
know, or see.”42 This relative demotion of the mind recalls Nietzsche, 
whom Camus revered.43 Yet Nietzsche viewed human compassion as a 
physiological weakness and a sign of moral decadence in Twilight of 
the Idols. For Camus’s characters, quite to the contrary, the sickened 
body constitutes the foundation of an empathy (in the original sense of 
suffering in the other) that may lead them to correct their judgment, as 
in the case of Tarrou and Henri.44
A kind of physical justice surfaces in both La Peste and Le Premier 
Homme, then. Camus himself used this concept when commenting on 
Pucheu and his peers during the purges: “For us, their biggest crime is to 
never have gone near a dead body, be it a tortured body like Politzer’s, 
with the eyes of the body and what I would call the physical notion of 
justice” (OCC 1:922; my emphasis).45 Conversely, Henri, Jacques, and 
Tarrou do perceive capital justice “with the eyes of the body.” All three 
somatize because they see or picture the executions all too well:
Savez-vous que le peloton des fusilleurs se place au contraire 
à un mètre cinquante du condamné? Savez-vous que si le 
condamné faisait deux pas en avant, il heurterait les fusils 
avec sa poitrine? Savez-vous qu’à cette courte distance, les 
fusilleurs concentrent leurs tirs sur la région du cœur et qu’à 
eux tous, avec leurs grosses balles, ils y font un trou où l’on 
pourrait mettre le poing? (OCC 2:208)
Do you know that the firing squad instead stands a yard 
and a half away from the condemned man? Do you know 
that if the condemned man took two steps forward, his chest 
would brush up against the rifles? Do you know that at this 
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short distance, the shooters aim their fire at the area of the 
heart and that together, with their big bullets, they make a 
hole in it, a hole large enough to put your fist into?
Tarrou’s pounding anaphora, gradual close-up, emphasis on the dis-
proportionate number and destructive power of the weapons and gun-
men used to target the heart—a symbol of vulnerability—as well as 
the almost grotesque detail of the gaping hole in the man’s chest bring 
home the reality of what Camus calls the “corps supplicié.” Remark-
ably, Jean’s écœurement (sickness, the bad taste in his mouth that he 
notes is persistent) is sparked by the victim’s literal écœurement, in the 
etymological sense of the term, that is to say the removal of his heart. 
In the sentences that follow, the “bad taste” in Tarrou’s mouth ironi-
cally echoes and responds to the “bad taste” that society associates with 
talking about executions.
It should be noted that this physical justice represented in Camus’s 
post–Second World War novels is not reciprocal. The look that the 
narratives underscore or imply goes only from the witness, direct or 
indirect, to the condemned man. It is unilateral, and, contrary to the 
dynamic of the Levinasian face à face (“autrui me regarde” [the Other 
concerns/looks at me]), the Other concerns Tarrou, Henri, and Jacques 
without looking back at them.46 In the court of assizes, Tarrou observes 
the nervous “hibou roux” without the defendant noticing. The accused 
is actually described as an animal blinded by an excessively strong light 
(OCC 2:206). Interestingly, the focus of Tarrou’s eyes is not just the 
defendant’s face but his whole body insofar as it is marked by human 
banality and imperfection—his right hand, his ill-fitting clothes, his bit-
ten nails. As for Henri Cormery, we know only about his reaction to 
the decollation. No mention is made of a visual exchange between him 
and Pirette. Here again, a centrifugal ethics that originates in the wit-
ness operates. The ellipsis of the decapitation in the narrative and the 
fast-forwarding to Henri’s nausea highlight the shocking nature of the 
spectacle and the irresistible physiological response elicited by a legal 
system that operates through pure force. Camus focuses on the loss of 
agency of the witness—mirroring that of the executed man, which is so 
great that the scene symbolically obliterates him.  
The body as bearer of justice is not universal either.47 The ubiquity 
of murder throughout Camus’s novels, the “cries of hatred” emanating 
from the crowd around the scaffold that Meursault imagines at the end 
of L’Étranger, and the fact that most Oranians don’t join the Resistance 
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against the plague confirm this nonuniversality. Furthermore, the sick-
ened body of the witness does not guarantee any rescue either. Even if 
Rieux sometimes succeeds in securing it, and if Tarrou’s mantra as an 
adult focuses on preserving human lives, in the capital scenes we have 
examined, the body that is exposed to and disgusted by the execution 
is in fact powerless. Nevertheless, its recurring presence, which leads 
to the humble and inevitable acknowledgment of a living status com-
mon to the man who is killed and the witness, is meaningful. Through 
the detailed description of this corps justicier, La Peste and Le Premier 
Homme represent an organic, physiological ethics that is not an end in 
and of itself but constitutes the precursor to a possible solidarity (for the 
better “médecins de la peste”) or, more modestly, a possible partaking 
in the suffering of the other and the radical rejection of his elimination 
(Le Premier Homme). What the Camusian novel sketches after 1947 
through the original notion of physical justice is an involuntary and 
nonunanimous ethics of solidarity with the condemned that is both un-
comfortable and resolute.
In his notebooks of 1949 and in 1957, when he was awarded the 
Nobel Prize in Literature, Camus referred to the seemingly paradoxical 
concept of “engagement involontaire” (OCC 4:247, 1066). To develop 
this idea, he used the metaphor of the artist as forcibly “embarked” on 
the “ship of his era,” thereby taking up the image of Pascal’s wager: 
“Cela n’est pas volontaire, vous êtes embarqué” (That is not voluntary, 
you are forcibly taken on board; Pensées). This notion of embarque-
ment enabled Camus to distance himself from the Sartrian notion of 
littérature engagée all the while expressing his interest in contemporary 
social and political realities; for if, like Camus, Sartre employed the im-
age of embarking in Qu’est-ce que la littérature?, he did so to promote a 
particular literary model in which political prescription, or dogmatism, 
prevailed.48 Camus begged to differ, as his notebooks from 1950 make 
clear: “Engagement. I have the most noble, and most passionate, idea 
of art. Much too noble to consent to subjecting it to anything. Much 
too passionate to want to separate it from anything” (1094). Camus’s 
concept of “involuntary engagement” and his commitment not to sep-
arate literature from anything—or anyone—while at the same time 
resisting the rigidity of dogmatism illuminate his fictional representa-
tions of lethal punishment. His novels’ physical justice, which acts as 
the foundation for a possible ethics of solidarity with the condemned 
man, converges with involuntary engagement: it puts forth the visceral 
inability of some characters to ignore or support state killing, all the 
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while steering clear of universalizing this body-based rejection of capital 
punishment, of celebrating reciprocity, and of ignoring man’s interest in 
murder.
Camus’s narrative prose fiction carves out a space in which to critique 
the death penalty. It complements the argumentative and normative 
forms of abolitionist discourse that the writer develops in his essays, 
editorials, speeches, and correspondence. To some extent, it anticipates 
the Kantian reasoning which, as Philippe Vanney and Denis Salas have 
noted, appears in “Réflexions sur la guillotine” through the moral im-
perative of preserving human life a maxima.49 In L’Étranger, La Peste, 
and Le Premier Homme, the death penalty functions as a key architec-
tural component: it structures the narratives in depth. It is also subject to 
a veritable ressassement and to transtextual representations that stress 
the rejection of state killing. While the capital scenes take on various 
forms, they all include revelations or visions in the face of execution. 
Camus portrays the confrontation with capital punishment as causing 
a somewhat mysterious, if not mythical, maturation in his protagonists. 
Related in detail, decomposed, and repeated, these “capital episodes” 
nonetheless eschew conventional heroism through a dramatic empha-
sis on fear, doubt, (self-)critique, or thoughtlessness. After the Second 
World War, Camus turns the body of his characters into an instrument 
that enables them to contest the death penalty or, rather, into one that 
makes it impossible for them to ignore—or support—its violence. It is 
from the acknowledgment of the condemned man’s vulnerable flesh by 
the (direct or indirect) spectator of his execution that a profound but 
unilateral connection to the Other emerges in the unexpected form of 
an overwhelming nausea. Both literally and figuratively, this vomiting 
marks the rejection of the organized, bloody, and irreversible exclusion 
of a fellow man from society by the state or a political party. With this 
spontaneous, corporeal, nontheoretical, and nonuniversal reaction of 
his protagonists, Camus puts forth an involuntary ethics that actualizes 
the notion of “engagement involontaire” he uses to designate the inter-
mediary place he assigns to literature: a place in which fiction is neither 
programmatic nor blind to the outside world. The resistance to lethal 
justice occurs against the grain of society and against the self, whose 
penchant for indifference, homicide, revenge, or morbid fascination, 
that is to say for various kinds of “de-solidarization” the narratives also 
acknowledge.
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Chapter 6
Poetic Accountability
Critical Language and Its Limits
Tolstoï, dans l’affaire Chibounine plaide devant le tribunal 
pour le malheureux, coupable d’avoir frappé son capitaine—
fait appel pour lui après la condamnation—écrit à sa tante 
pour lui demander d’intervenir auprès du ministre de la guerre. 
Celui-ci remarque seulement que Tolstoï a oublié de donner 
l’adresse du régiment, ce qui l’empêche d’intervenir. Le len-
demain du jour où Tolstoï reçoit la lettre qui lui demande de 
combler cette lacune, Chibounine est exécuté par la faute de 
Tolstoï.
Tolstoy, in the Chibounine affair, pleads in court in favor of 
the poor man, guilty of hitting his captain—appeals on his be-
half after the sentence—writes to his aunt, asking her to inter-
vene with the Minister of War. The latter simply remarks that 
Tolstoy has forgotten to give the regiment’s address, which 
prevents him from interceding. The day after Tolstoy receives 
the letter asking him to remedy this omission, Chibounine is 
executed through Tolstoy’s fault.
—Albert Camus, Carnets (1949)
Camus’s narrative fiction chimes with Hugo and Baudelaire in provid-
ing glimpses into the human inclination to support executions, be it 
motivated by hatred, Schadenfreude, curiosity, or a spirit of revenge. 
The endings of Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné and of L’Étranger, as 
well as Baudelaire’s verse and Mon cœur mis à nu (OCB 1:132, 693) 
all highlight the popular ecstasy that the spectacle of state killing may 
elicit. Where and how do the writers situate themselves within this an-
thropological landscape where the crowd responds to lethal justice with 
fervor? What does their craft do with and to these responses? Camus’s 
“Réflexions sur la guillotine” are based on the premise that “speaking 
crudely” (OCC 4:128) about capital punishment is a precondition to 
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thinking about it critically for state killing is subject to silence and rhe-
torical manipulations that thwart our understanding of its reality. This 
argument implies that authors, whose raw material is language, take on 
a major responsibility in representing the death penalty. The role played 
by words in this institution is all the greater as, more dramatically than 
any other punishment, the death penalty is born out of the performa-
tive utterance “Condamné à mort!” Camus, Hugo, and Baudelaire thus 
have reason to reflect on their positioning and potentially participate in 
“capital violence” on two counts: as members of a human collectivity 
that they portray as easily captivated by or supportive of state killing, 
and as the artisans of a language that not only brings about capital 
punishment but also shapes its reception. This closing chapter examines 
Camus’s fiction and its anxiety about the shortcomings of the words 
chosen to paint the death penalty, before comparing his poetic strategies 
and critique of the writer’s responsibility vis-à-vis the scaffold to those 
of Hugo and Baudelaire.
Dubious Tongues:  Camus between Metaphor  
and Silence
Camus’s evocations of capital punishment insistently return to the fact 
that language tends to mask this institution. Hugo had already de-
nounced the danger—and indecency—of such rhetorical concealment 
in his mordant 1832 preface to Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné. He 
argued that the royal prosecutor made his case as if he were a writer and 
usurped the tools of this profession: 
Son réquisitoire, c’est son œuvre littéraire, il le fleurit de méta-
phores. . . . Il gaze le couperet. Il estompe la bascule. Il entorti-
lle le panier rouge dans une périphrase. On ne sait plus ce que 
c’est. C’est douceâtre et décent. . . . Remarquez-vous comme 
il fait infuser dans un gâchis de tropes et de synecdoches deux 
ou trois textes vénéneux pour en exprimer et en extraire à 
grand’peine la mort d’un homme? (OCH 4:491–92)
His summing up for the prosecution is his literary work, and 
he adorns it with metaphors. . . . He puts gauze on the blade. 
He fades out the bascule. He puts ribbons of periphrases 
around the red basket. One no longer knows what it is. It 
Poetic Accountability ❘ 167
is sickly sweet with decency. . . . Do you notice the way in 
which he has two or three poisonous texts brewing away in 
an overabundance of tropes and synecdoches so as to press 
out and extract from with much effort the death of a man? 
With Camus, this blame ad professionem morphs into a broader con-
cern about the power of speech to legitimize executions through formal 
pirouettes. His “Réflexions sur la guillotine” begin with a condemnation 
of the stock and dissimulative language used by “journalists and state 
employees” to refer to the death penalty before widening the accusation 
to the all-inclusive subjects “on” and “tout le monde” (everyone; 128).1 
While Hugo’s denunciation of the prosecutor’s cosmetic metaphors 
(“raffinements,” “gaze,” “déguisements”), and witch-worthy stylistic 
devices (“fait infuser . . . deux ou trois textes vénéneux”) itself relies 
on figurative language, Camus uses direct turns of phrase to command 
adherence to a sort of linguistic transparency, as his previously cited 
injunction confirms: “Qu’on ne nous raconte pas d’histoires. Qu’on ne 
nous dise pas du condamné à mort: ‘Il va payer sa dette à la société,’ 
mais: ‘On va lui couper le cou.’ Ça n’a l’air de rien. Mais ça fait une 
petite différence” (OCC 1:54).2
I noted in chapter 5 that there exist numerous variants of this argu-
ment in Camus’s notebooks, fiction, and nonfiction. They make explicit 
the reason euphemistic expressions about lethal punishment are unac-
ceptable to him: in Meursault’s words, “Cela ne parle pas à l’imagina-
tion” (That doesn’t speak to the imagination; 204). Camus’s “Réflexions 
sur la guillotine” reread the recurrent anecdote of the father’s nausea in 
this light (OCC 4:129), asserting that “grand formulae” had concealed 
the reality of beheading from Lucien Camus until he witnessed it (127). 
Camus argues that language has the ability to render the materiality of 
state killing (129), which is itself a precondition to our full understand-
ing of the punishment. According to this logic, language is responsible 
for our a priori acceptance of the death penalty when it eclipses the 
latter’s violence from our mental representations. In other words, and 
as Camus reiterates in his reflections on the Second World War and the 
rise of totalitarian ideologies in L’Homme révolté (OCC 3:304), a lan-
guage that distances itself from direct referentiality—notably through a 
certain use of metaphor—makes killing possible.
While the Nobel laureate places embellishing metaphors and nonspe-
cific phrasing at one end of the spectrum of dubious language, the other 
end of this spectrum features silence: not the silence that the writer as-
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sociates with profound affection—the silence through which a mother 
and her son can communicate, for instance—but the silence that may 
cover up violence, deliberately or not.3 Meursault’s father in L’Étranger, 
Camus’s father in “Réflexions,” Jacques’s father in Le Premier Homme 
do not utter a word after witnessing an execution (OCC 1:205; 4:127, 
789). They are unable to. That ellipses prevail when it comes to repre-
senting the beheadings they attend reinforces this sense of unsayability. 
Another form of obliteration, bourgeois propriety, is found in Tarrou’s 
family. They avoid the topic of capital punishment, despite the fact that 
it causes the young man to leave his home (OCC 2:206, 207).
La Peste likewise warns against the danger of silence after individ-
uals have witnessed (preventable) death and may be tempted to then 
forget (248) it: as the novel eventually discloses the narrator’s identity, 
it stresses that Rieux’s chronicle originates in the desire to puncture 
or compensate for such muteness. Rieux’s perspective converges with 
the idea expressed by Camus in 1948, that “to act, man must speak” 
(478), even if part of his fiction suspends this means-end relation be-
tween word and action and has action trump words through highly 
likable characters who do not fully master language, from Grand in La 
Peste to Jacques’s uncle in Le Premier Homme. The novels’ reflections 
on silence as allowing for the smooth functioning or persistence of cap-
ital punishment (represented both literally and allegorically in La Peste) 
certainly have some basis in fact. The guillotine was not named in the 
article of the French penal code that implicitly prescribed its use (“Any 
person sentenced to death shall have their head cut off”), and the omis-
sion of this key word went hand in hand with a certain discretion and 
the absence of investigative publications after executions took place. 
Until the 1970s, the French state punished any breach of the muteness 
it prescribed.4
How do Camus and some of his protagonists propose to undercut 
both the concealing metaphors and the (self-)censorship that surround 
the scaffold? How do they expose what the writer perceives as “the 
obscenity that is hiding under the cloak of words” (OCC 4:128)? By 
resorting to “le langage clair, le mot simple” (clear language, the simple 
word; OCC 3:304), answer both La Peste and L’Homme révolté. Tar-
rou’s most famous declaration in the novel echoes Camus’s journalistic 
publications during the war: “J’ai entendu tant de raisonnements qui 
ont failli me tourner la tête, et qui ont tourné suffisamment d’autres 
têtes pour les faire consentir à l’assassinat, que j’ai compris que tout le 
malheur des hommes venait de ce qu’ils ne tenaient pas un langage clair. 
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J’ai pris le parti alors de parler et d’agir clairement, pour me mettre sur 
le bon chemin” (I’ve heard so many arguments that almost turned my 
mind, and that made a large enough number of other people lose theirs 
and had them approve of murder that I’ve come to understand that all 
human unhappiness stems from men’s failure to use plain language. So 
I’ve resolved to speak and to act clearly, to put myself on the right path; 
OCC 2:210; my emphasis).5 By “langage clair,” a number of Camus’s 
characters, and, en abyme, the author himself, seem to mean a strict 
relation of facts.
This aspiration to factual reporting infuses all of the author’s “capital 
writings.” In L’Étranger, “Réflexions sur la guillotine,” and Le Premier 
Homme, the founding scene of the father’s nausea is reported in short, 
unadorned narrative sequences—voiced by Meursault’s mother and 
himself, by Camus, and by Jacques, who acts as his mother’s substitute.6 
In La Peste, Rieux glosses the genre chosen for his testimony, the chron-
icle—also the form of the book itself—underscoring the need for what 
he calls the “objective” tone of the voice of the “witness” and for a rela-
tion of facts that steers clear of both hostility and sensationalism (OCC 
2:128–29). Later, the narrative advocates “restraint” and the avoidance 
of speculation (243). Throughout the novel, counterexamples make this 
demand stand out by contrast. They include the epic tone of newspapers 
and radio news (129), the prophecy that capitalizes on men’s despair 
and is relayed by opportunists (186–87), the sermon, or even notebooks 
that indulge in obscure remarks and give in to personal curiosity.7
“Le langage clair” emerges through other forms and devices, but all 
of them conform to the same aesthetic principles, which are also ethical 
principles. Camus may render state killing through photographic cap-
ture, as with his close-ups on particular parts of the condemned body 
(the “hibou roux”’s right hand and nails, for instance), through asyn-
detic parataxis, or stichomythia. The way in which the execution of the 
Russian Revolutionary hero Kaliayev is related at the end of Les Justes 
is a case in point:
dora, la tête dans les mains: Un peu de boue!
annenkov, brusquement: Comment sais-tu cela?
 Stepan se tait.
Tu as tout demandé à Orlov? Pourquoi?
stepan, détournant les yeux: Il y avait quelque chose entre 
Yanek et moi.
annenkov: Quoi donc?
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stepan: Je l’enviais.
dora: Après, Stepan, après?
stepan: Le père Florinski est venu lui présenter le crucifix. 
Il a refusé de l’embrasser. Et il a déclaré: “Je vous ai déjà 
dit que j’en ai fini avec la vie et que je suis en règle avec 
la mort.”
dora: Comment était sa voix?
stepan: La même exactement. Moins la fièvre et l’impa-
tience que vous lui connaissez.
dora: Avait-il l’air heureux?
. . .
stepan: Il a marché. On chantait sur le fleuve en contrebas, 
avec un accordéon. Des chiens ont aboyé à ce moment.
dora: C’est alors qu’il est monté . . .
stepan: Il est monté. Il s’est enfoncé dans la nuit. On a vu 
vaguement le linceul dont le bourreau l’a recouvert tout 
entier.
dora: Et puis, et puis . . .
stepan: Des bruits sourds.
dora: Des bruits sourds. Yanek! Et ensuite . . .
 Stepan se tait.
dora: avec violence: Ensuite, te dis-je. (Stepan se tait.) 
Parle, Alexis. Ensuite?
voinov: Un bruit terrible. (OCC 3:50–51)
dora, her head in her hands: A bit of mud!
annenkov, abruptly: How do you know all this?
 Stepan falls silent.
You asked Orlov about all this? Why?
stepan, looking away: Something came between Yanek and me.
annenkov: What was it?
stepan: I envied him.
dora: What happened next, Stepan, what next?
stepan: Father Florinski came up to present him with the 
crucifix. He refused to kiss it. And he said: “I’ve already 
told you that I’m done with life and I’m at peace with 
death.”
dora: How did he sound?
stepan: Exactly the same as usual. Minus the fever and his 
characteristic impatience that you know of.
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dora: Did he seem happy?
. . .
stepan: He walked. People were singing down by the river, 
with an accordion. Some dogs barked at that moment.
dora: That’s when he went up the steps . . .
stepan: He went up. He walked into the night. We caught 
a glimpse of the shroud with which the executioner had 
covered him up entirely.
dora: And then, and then . . .
stepan: Muffled sounds.
dora: Muffled sounds. Yanek! And then . . .
Stepan falls silent.
dora, forcefully: Then, do tell me. (Stepan keeps quiet.) 
Speak, Alexis. Then?
voinov: A horrible sound.
Dora’s character leads the interrogation that allows Yanek’s relatively 
clandestine end to be reconstituted. Stepan (Kaliayev’s former contra-
dictor and competitor) and she are, respectively, two and three steps 
removed from the hanging: we are made to understand that Stepan has 
already asked Orlov about it in detail as Dora presses the former and, 
to a lesser extent, Voinov to report the scene to her. The shape taken by 
the account is plain, clinical, and chronological. She and the spectator 
are therefore not in direct contact with the event but close enough to 
it through the interface of a minimal form of language. It foregrounds 
fragments of perception (the image of the mud stain, that of the unk-
issed crucifix, the tone of Yanek’s voice, the surrounding noises) and 
microfacts that take on dramatic and symbolic significance, from the 
hangman’s gestures before the execution to the shroud in which he is 
wrapped. This language achieves directness and precision, although the 
relation of Kaliayev’s last moments remains filtered by multiple perspec-
tives: that of the witnesses Orlov and Annenkov implicitly, and, explic-
itly, that of Stepan, whose subjectivity is acknowledged by his avowal 
that he “envied” Yanek. Here again, the unbearable (albeit indirect) wit-
nessing of the death penalty results in silence. “Stepan se tait” (Stepan 
falls silent) twice. Yet this silence is symbolically broken as Voinov takes 
up where Stepan left off and as the triple repetition of the telling noun 
“bruits” by the three characters creates an echo effect.
This tentative poetics of clarity fulfills several functions. It forms part 
of Camus’s quest to “always be a little understated in one’s expression” 
172 ❘ Camus’s Capital Fiction and Literary Responsibility
(OCC 2:856), a strategy designed to increase the suggestiveness of writ-
ing. In the specific case of capital punishment, restrained and factual 
language exposes pure violence and suggests a certain gratuitousness, 
as the closing scene of Les Justes illustrates.8 In addition, it presents this 
violence as irrefutable. Rieux insists on the need to leave a written trace 
of the plague (37) in a city prone to denial: “Ils niaient tranquillement, 
contre toute évidence, que nous ayons jamais connu ce monde insensé 
où le meurtre d’un homme était aussi quotidien que celui des mouches” 
(They calmly denied, despite all evidence to the contrary, that we had 
ever known that senseless world in which men were killed off as com-
monly as flies; 240). In barring “peace[ful]” denial, straightforward lan-
guage serves as a first precondition to remembrance, a process on which 
the novel’s cautionary ending insists, pointing to itself and to literature 
at large in a self-reflexive climax: “On peut lire dans les livres, que le 
bacille de la peste ne meurt ni ne disparaît jamais” (Books tell us that the 
plague bacillus never dies or disappears for good; 248). 
Last but not least, Camus’s poetics of clarity actively de-romanticizes 
state killing. The dénouement of Les Justes divulges the stages, banal 
details, and sinister sounds that characterize a hanging. In doing so, it 
completes the play’s increasing de-idealization of killing—Yanek gradu-
ally loses his naïveté as a young revolutionary enthusiast in accordance 
with Dora’s gentle warning in Act I; in L’Étranger, Meursault’s final 
delusion of grandeur as he pictures his persecution on the scaffold is 
undermined by the hour-by-hour account of the nightly anxiety from 
which he suffers and by his detailed reflections on the logistics of the 
guillotine. Both in this novel and in La Peste and Le Premier Homme, 
the terse reporting of the father’s vomiting also annihilates the idealized 
representation of which the condemned individual may be the subject—
as seen in much of the literature and iconography of the nineteenth 
century.9 
Evidently, the notion of a “langage clair” is nevertheless problematic, 
if not utopian. While Camus’s literary works promote this model and 
repeatedly actualize it, they also reveal its shortcomings.10 There are 
many, beginning with the fact that the mediating nature of language fore-
closes the translucence of the “diamond” that Camus uses as an analogy 
for the writing, and the œuvre, to which he aspires (OCC 2:862). To 
this fundamental issue, La Peste adds the fact that “le langage conven-
tionnel” (129) is inadequate to express the subtlety and complexity of 
human behavior and affectivity, a fortiori in extreme situations where 
life is at stake. But equally, a language that considers itself to be “sans 
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réserves” (41) runs the risk of deadly absolutism, as Rambert teasingly 
points out to Rieux, comparing his rhetoric to “le langage de Saint-Just” 
(41). The doctor himself concedes that his demand that the journalist be 
able to tell nothing but the truth in a “total” manner is more strategic 
than literal.
Speaking plainly also proves challenging and, at times, undesirable 
in La Peste:
—Allons, dit Rieux, il faut peut-être se décider à appeler 
cette maladie par son nom. Jusqu’à présent, nous avons 
piétiné. . . .
—Oui, oui, disait Grand en descendant les escaliers der-
rière le docteur. Il faut appeler les choses par leur nom. Mais 
quel est ce nom?
—Je ne puis vous le dire, et d’ailleurs cela ne vous serait 
pas utile.
—Vous voyez, sourit l’employé. Ce n’est pas si facile. 
(OCC 2:62)
“Now,” said Rieux, “we should perhaps resolve to call 
this disease by its name. So far we’ve not got very far.” . . .
“You’re right, you’re right,” said Grand as he followed 
the doctor down the stairs. “We should call things by their 
name. But what is this name?”
“That I can’t say, and anyhow it wouldn’t be of use to 
you.”
“You see,” smiled the employee. “It’s not that easy.”
Rieux, who is the very proponent of the truth—and an individual whose 
intellectual and social status should enable him to use a wealth of words 
with precision—declines to name the epidemic at this stage of the narra-
tive. Although he has identified the disease, he chooses to spare Grand 
and prevent the spread of panic. The town hall employee gently points 
out that the doctor paradoxically fails to abide by his own standards 
of clarity. Elsewhere, the narrator of La Peste also reveals the difficulty, 
if not the impossibility, of the claim to objectivity that underlies the 
chronicle. Tarrou’s notebooks are said to forgo neutrality intermittently 
and lapse into personal considerations (OCC 2:224–25), for instance. 
They symbolically signal the tension that lies at the heart of the novel as 
it attempts to reconcile the promotion of objectivity with an emphasis 
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on the vital role of witnessing, which necessarily implies subjectivity.11 
The very structure of La Peste, which invites rereading as it ends with 
the revelation of the narrator’s identity (243), acknowledges this rift. 
Furthermore, a crucial scene radically disavows truthful language and 
objectivity. To spare Othon, Tarrou denies that the death of his young 
son, Philippe, was excruciating (201), after an extensive description has 
detailed the boy’s agony through the combined dramatic analogies of a 
shipwreck and a “grotesque” crucifixion (180–82).
In sum, Camus’s capital fiction features forms of “langage clair” and 
conspicuously problematizes this poetico-ethical ideal upheld by the au-
thor and several of his characters. Between the lines, the narrator of La 
Peste himself acknowledges the impossibility of an entirely direct and 
unadulterated relationship between experience and language: “C’est 
ainsi, soit dit entre parenthèses, que pour ne rien trahir et surtout pour 
ne pas se trahir lui-même, le narrateur a tendu à l’objectivité. Il n’a pr-
esque rien voulu modifier par les effets de l’art, sauf en ce qui concerne 
les besoins élémentaires d’une relation à peu près cohérente” (That is 
why, it may be noted in passing, in order not to betray anything and in 
particular not to betray himself, the narrator has striven for objectivity. 
He has hardly wanted to make changes to anything for the sake of artis-
tic effect, except for the basic adjustments needed to present a coherent 
enough narrative; OCC 2:158–59; my emphasis). At the diegetic level, 
Rieux is forced to concede that objectivity is a relative goal rather than 
an absolute one (“a tendu à”), that it is first and foremost a strategy of 
self-discipline (“pour ne pas se trahir lui-même”), and that the strict 
transcription of facts is a fiction (“les besoins élémentaires . . . à peu 
près cohérente”). At the metafictional level, the doctor’s admission is of 
course magnified by the fact that his “relation” is the novel. In it, “les 
effets de l’art” are omnipresent—from careful narrative construction 
to intense dramatization and the juxtaposition of discursive types, to-
nalities, and subjectivities. Above all, the “art” of this novel lies in its 
allegorical character, that is to say in a most indirect form of language 
whereby one reality is represented by another, as the epigraph by Defoe 
avers.
Although La Peste may be more visibly critical of Camus’s own model 
of linguistic transparency than his other works, the claim that language 
should be the bearer of truth, maximal limpidity, and objectivity coex-
ists with a distancing from this model in the rest of his “capital fiction.” 
Camus’s own poetics of clarity is thus represented as both necessary and 
relative. It is not an absolute and cohabits with strategies of indirect ex-
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pression deemed liable to render the intensity of lethal violence and the 
unacceptability of state killing. Metaphor itself finds itself relegitimized 
in this context, under specific conditions.
Strategies of Exposure in Hugo and Camus
While, for both Camus and Hugo, metaphors and periphrases are un-
acceptable ways of referring to capital punishment, both writers do 
sometimes mobilize these very tropes and other representational strate-
gies that move away from literality and “le mot simple” (OCC 3:304). 
Their capital fiction turns to these transformative devices in two main 
contexts: the disclosure of the condemned man’s perspective, and the 
portrayal of the judicial world.
Drawing a parallel between the poetic strategies developed in Hu-
go’s and Camus’s writings on capital punishment may seem unwelcome 
given the latter’s misgivings about the representation of criminals on 
which his predecessor based part of his abolitionist argumentation. Ap-
parently referring to Les Misérables—as Baudelaire had a century ear-
lier—Camus criticized Hugo’s “good convicts” and the “conventional 
imagery” to which they had given rise (OCC 4:159). Nevertheless, as 
critics have noted, both Hugo’s 1832 preface to Le Dernier Jour d’un 
condamné and “Réflexions sur la guillotine” display the same verve 
and prescriptions.12 L’Étranger and Le Dernier Jour also share several 
common denominators. Both novels feature unorthodox criminals who 
are guilty of a relatively unexplained crime de sang, experience capital 
justice with a certain bewilderment, and await the scaffold alone after 
rejecting the help of a religious representative.
Beyond these narrative intersections, a major overlap between the 
two works lies in their reliance on an intimate subjective realism.13 Part 
I has showed that Hugo even goes so far as to create a form of hyperre-
alism for his novel-diary. In his own way, Camus also has Meursault’s 
mind and body infuse the content and form of L’Étranger. The con-
junction of at least three components that enforce subjectivity in Le 
Dernier Jour can also be traced in L’Étranger. First is the use of the “I” 
as both a dominant pronoun and a fundamental focal point shaping 
the narrative. In both novels, events are perceived through the exclusive 
lens of an increasingly isolated mind—even when it intermittently turns 
to what others think and say. With Camus as with Hugo, this close-up 
on subjectivity is not contradicted by the use of a tone of voice that is 
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often clinical and objective: this very tone translates the protagonist’s 
passive experiencing of lethal justice.14 Second is the close connection of 
this subjectivity to the present, which reinforces a sense of lived expe-
rience. If the anchoring of Hugo’s fictional diary in the present tense is 
one of the devices through which Le Dernier Jour immerses the reader 
in the capital experience, Camus’s use of the passé-composé follows 
an analogous logic in L’Étranger, not one of perfect instantaneity but 
one that nonetheless abolishes temporal distance and has immediate 
anteriority encroach on the present. Third, as seen in the previous chap-
ter, and by Meursault’s own avowal (OCC 1:178), sensations suffuse 
L’Étranger, just as they permeate Le Dernier Jour. Besides, although 
the multiple forms of linguistic cutting that anticipate the condemned 
man’s physical suffering on the day of his decapitation in Hugo’s novel 
are not prominent in Camus’s, they nevertheless surface at critical mo-
ments in L’Étranger, through rhythmic breaks, an intensified asyndetic 
syntax, and aposiopesis: “La cour est revenue. Très vite, on a lu aux 
jurés une série de questions. J’ai entendu ‘coupable de meurtre’  .  .  . 
‘préméditation’ . . . ‘circonstances atténuantes’” (The judges came back 
in. They read out a series of questions to the jury, very quickly. I could 
hear “guilty of murder” . . . “premeditation” . . . “extenuating circum-
stances”; 203). Marie Naudin also points out that Meursault’s self-ad-
dressed reflections about his appeal recall the staccato rhythm of Hugo’s 
intellectual autopsy of the condemned man.15
Because of the distinct narrative frameworks of the two novels—
Meursault is presented as living a full life before his sentence, whereas 
the life of Hugo’s protagonist is merely alluded to in an impressionistic 
fashion—the poetics of sensations do play out differently in L’Étranger: 
Meursault’s sentencing appears to block his sensorial approach to the 
world. His life, processed through his body from the outset of the narra-
tive, suddenly retracts in part, absorbed by a mind obsessed with mental 
calculations about how to avoid death. The “I” tends to turn inward 
and somewhat away from the body, thus reorienting the text’s intimate 
subjective realism before the dénouement returns to the senses.
This first-person subjective realism, closely informed by the present 
and sensations that Le Dernier Jour and L’Étranger share, constitutes 
the first site of what Hugo and Camus appear to conceive as desir-
able, as opposed to deceitful, figurative language. Preparatory notes for 
Le Premier Homme argue that “D’un corps on ne peut parler que par 
métaphores” (One can only speak about a body through metaphors; 
OCC 4:982). Camus’s fiction indicates that this is all the more appli-
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cable to a body that awaits execution. We have seen that animalization 
by way of metaphor affects both Meursault after his trial and the man 
that Tarrou’s father seeks to sentence to death. Additionally, Meursault 
and Hugo’s protagonists use figurative language when they experience 
(semi-)hallucinations, whether before their judges or prior to their be-
heading. Hugo’s condemned man views himself as a puppet-like figure 
in the courtroom, “le centre auquel se rattachaient les fils qui faisaient 
se mouvoir toutes ces faces béantes et penchées” (the center from which 
the threads led off and that gave motion to all these gaping and tilted 
faces; II, 659), before seeing the faces of past criminals appear on the 
walls of his cell and imagining that he is in the presence of an incarna-
tion of death, as seen in chapter 1. Metaphors likewise convey Meur-
sault’s self-admittedly distorted perception of reality before, during, and 
after his trial: he claims that, from within the prison, the same nameless 
and wave-like day “déferl[e]” (washes over [him]; OCC 1:187, 188); he 
is then under the impression that the jurors make up “une banquette 
de tramway et tous ces voyageurs anonymes épi[ent] le nouvel arriv-
ant pour en apercevoir les ridicules” (a row of seats on a tram and all 
these anonymous passengers are scrutinizing the new arrival to spot his 
peculiarities; 189) and eventually states that the starry night sky cov-
ers his face shortly before his execution, as noted in chapter 5. All the 
temps forts of the condemned man’s experience thus rely on imagistic 
language that allows for the representation of the bestialization, objec-
tification, and estrangement from reality that affect him alternatively.
The “language replete with flesh and vivid images” (OCC 1:923) that 
Camus referred to in May 1944 thus also serves to represent the interi-
ority of the individual who faces capital sentencing. In both Hugo and 
Camus, a certain disregard for the guilt of this individual comes through, 
unless, as for Camus, the individual in question is responsible for insti-
tutional lethal violence; the reader is invited to side with the condemned 
man’s perspective whether he be a criminal murderer (Meursault), an in-
dividual who shed blood in an unknown context (Hugo’s condemned 
man), or neither (the Hungarian political prisoner in La Peste). In other 
words, firsthand experience of state violence, however varied, seems to 
legitimize, and even necessitate, figuration as a way of triggering sympa-
thetic identification. What could be called Camus’s and Hugo’s “experi-
ential metaphors” expose critically what is usually unseen and unknown, 
namely the alienated perspective of the target of such violence.
A second locus in which Camus cultivates figurative language and 
rhetorical devices is the judicial world. In it, metaphors no longer act as 
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a vessel designed to shine a light on the condemned man’s experience. 
Rather, they form part of an imitative strategy designed to satirize a 
fraudulent use of words. Both Hugo and Camus portray the courtroom 
as a space of comedy, or rather tragicomedy, on several counts. Both 
underscore the ordinariness and ridiculousness of key actors in the trial. 
Hugo uses dark humor to contrast the judges’ power of life and death 
over the condemned man with their “air satisfait, probablement de la 
joie d’avoir bientôt fini” (self-satisfied air, probably due to the joy of 
their work being soon finished; II, 660), for instance. A fleeting descrip-
tion presents the assessor as flirting with a lady placed behind him “par 
faveur,” and the jurors as “bons bourgeois” who yawn and are “very 
sleepy” (660). The death sentence is thereby shown to emanate from 
individuals who display a mediocrity and frivolity that would otherwise 
be innocuous. This frail morality that underlies capital justice culmi-
nates with the bailiff declaring that it is convenient for him to write 
the minutes of two executions at the same time (XXIII, 686), as men-
tioned in chapter 1. Some critics have argued that Hugo’s novel tends 
to steer clear of condemning the judiciary.16 Yet similarly to L’Étranger, 
Hugo’s fictional diary denounces the social comedy and ceremony that 
accompany lethal justice and heightens its cruelty and absurdity.17 Both 
narratives also scathingly deride the judicial thoughtlessness and ad-
ministrative pettiness that surround the scaffold.
To be sure, Camus pushes further the critical representation of this 
judicial theater. We have seen that L’Étranger revolves around a dra-
matic displacement of the object and actors of the trial: the crime and 
the guilty are not those one would expect on the basis of facts and due 
process. Through Meursault’s eyes, the narrative also sheds light on the 
courtroom as a space of pure performance:
Nous avons attendu, assis près d’une porte derrière laquelle 
on entendait des voix, des appels, des bruits de chaises et 
tout un remue-ménage qui m’a fait penser à ces fêtes de 
quartier où, après le concert, on range la salle pour pouvoir 
danser. . . . [L’un des journalistes] a serré la main du gen-
darme avec beaucoup de chaleur. J’ai remarqué à ce moment 
que tout le monde se rencontrait, s’interpellait et conversait, 
comme dans un club où l’on est heureux de se retrouver 
entre gens du même monde. . . . Mon avocat est arrivé, en 
robe, entouré de beaucoup d’autres confrères. Il est allé vers 
les journalistes, a serré des mains. Ils ont plaisanté, ri et ils 
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avaient l’air tout à fait à leur aise, jusqu’au moment où la 
sonnerie a retenti dans le prétoire. (OCC 1:188–90)
We waited, sitting next to a door behind which we could 
hear voices, names being called out, chairs being moved and 
a whole commotion that made me think of these neighbor-
hood social events when, after the concert, the furniture is 
cleared away to make room for dancing. . . . [One of the 
journalists] shook the policeman’s hand very warmly. At that 
point, I noticed that everyone was greeting everyone else, 
calling each other’s names and chatting away as if in a club 
where people are happy to find themselves together amongst 
their peers. . . . My lawyer arrived, in his robe, surrounded 
by lots of other colleagues. He went over to the journal-
ists, shook hands. They joked, laughed and seemed totally 
at ease, right until the moment when the bell rang in the 
courtroom.
By way of analogy, the courtroom becomes a concert hall or salle des 
fêtes. The individuals that occupy it belong to the same troupe, and they 
warmly interact as actors do—some of them dressed up (“en robe”)—
before the bell rings, signaling the start of their role-play. This art of 
performance emerges as early as Meursault’s first meeting with the com-
mitting magistrate in a room adorned with curtains, not unlike a stage, 
and in which “un jeu” (a game/acting; OCC 1:177) seems to be taking 
place.
Later, this histrionic setup becomes more prominent. Meursault and 
the reader discover that make-believe is part and parcel of the judicia-
ry’s modus operandi. The protagonist himself picks up on the judge’s 
simulation of courtesy and on his talent for acting: “Personne, en ces 
heures-là, n’était méchant avec moi. Tout était si naturel, si bien réglé 
et si sobrement joué que j’avais l’impression ridicule de ‘faire partie de 
la famille.’ . . . Le juge me reconduisait à la porte de son cabinet en me 
frappant sur l’épaule et en me disant d’un air cordial: ‘C’est fini pour 
aujourd’hui, monsieur l’Antéchrist’” (No one was unkind to me during 
these meetings. Everything was so natural, so well organized and so 
soberly acted out that I had the ridiculous impression that I was “part 
of the family.” . . . The judge would walk me back to the door of his 
office, slap me on the shoulder and say in a friendly voice: “That’s it 
for today, Mr. Antichrist”; OCC 1:182). The accusatory vocative that 
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unexpectedly concludes the exchange, the lexical field of pretense, and 
Meursault’s awareness of his own naïveté stress the fact that inauthen-
ticity characterizes the interaction between the law court and the defen-
dant, as is the case at several other moments in the narrative, with the 
president of the court or his own lawyer (191, 203). The courtroom is 
not a place in which truth is sought and certified, then. Rather, it is the 
place in which truth proves highly pliable, to such an extent that it may 
stop existing: “Tout est vrai et rien n’est vrai!” (Everything is true and 
yet nothing is true!; 194). Within the judicial institution, verity becomes 
a function of the talent, or lack of talent, of its performers: they can be 
congratulated for their dramatic skills (“Magnifique, mon cher”; 202), 
suffer from stage fright as Meursault does, or make the audience laugh 
with or at them (194, 197, 201).
In this space of pure performance that sidelines the truth, Camus 
replicates judicial diction in order to denounce it. He does so in his 
novel, whereas Hugo condemned the judges’ “doucereux verbiage” 
(saccharine verbiage; OCH 4:491) in the preface to Le Dernier Jour, 
that is to say outside of the fictional framework. L’Étranger dissects the 
rhetorical tricks and sociolect performed by courtroom professionals 
to discuss a defendant’s personality and actions. The fact that Meur-
sault’s good-faith reporting filters their hyperbole, pompous phrasing, 
stock symbolism, and the gestures that complement them increases the 
critical distance to which this use of words and chest-thumping are sub-
ject. Senseless disproportion, for instance, characterizes the speech of 
Meursault’s lawyer, who is described as “triomph[ant] bruyamment” 
(exult[ing] loudly) after hearing the concierge declare to the protago-
nist in Marengo that “c’était lui qui . . . avait offert le café au lait” (he 
was the one who had offered . . . some white coffee; OCC 1:194). The 
scene’s absurdity then crescendoes as several actors in the trial resort 
to the same formulae (“Messieurs les jurys apprécieront”) whose gro-
tesque solemnity with regard to the topic at hand, namely the white 
coffee drunk by Meursault during the vigil, is reinforced by false mark-
ers of grandeur and gravity. They include the verb tonner, the future 
tense, and a pompous periphrasis referring to Meursault’s mother: “Le 
procureur a tonné au-dessus de nos têtes et il a dit: ‘Oui, messieurs les 
jurés apprécieront. Et ils concluront qu’un étranger pouvait proposer 
du café, mais qu’un fils devait le refuser devant le corps de celle qui lui 
avait donné le jour’” (The prosecutor shouted from over our heads and 
said: “Yes, the gentlemen of the jury will take note. And they will con-
clude that a stranger might offer a coffee, but that a son should refuse 
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it when next to the corpse of the woman who brought him into this 
world”; 194). Symbolically, the prosecutor’s rhetoric here misrepresents 
Meursault to such an extent that the substantive used to designate him 
in the novel’s title (“étranger”) ends up being applied to the concierge; 
a resounding misattribution.
The overkill of grandiloquence continues with a clichéd running met-
aphor of brightness and darkness in the prosecutor’s plea against the de-
fendant: “J’en ferai la preuve, Messieurs, et je la ferai doublement. Sous 
l’aveuglante clarté des faits d’abord et ensuite dans l’éclairage sombre 
que me fournira la psychologie de cette âme criminelle” (I shall prove 
it to you, gentlemen, and I shall do so in two ways. First in the blinding 
light of the facts, and then through the darkness that this criminal soul 
harbors; OCC 1:198–99). Free indirect speech (197) or the collision of 
indirect and direct speech in the same sentence establish a further dis-
tance between the cliché-ridden metaphors he wields and us, allowing 
for a more potent critique: “Il disait qu’il s’était penché sur [mon âme] 
et qu’il n’avait rien trouvé, messieurs les jurés” (He said that he had 
looked into [my soul] and had found nothing, gentlemen of the jury; 
200).
At once shrewd and jocular, Camus’s satire of judicial rhetoric also 
has serious accusatory implications. These linguistic pirouettes are 
shown to cause the radical distortion of reality during the trial and the 
inflection of due process—from the silencing of the witnesses to the 
dialogue de sourds on which it relies (OCC 1:195–97) to the confusion 
of people and crimes (178–79, 191, 197) and the replacement of the 
examination of the defendant’s acts by that of his alleged personality 
(198). The prosecutor’s speech climaxes with an unfounded accusa-
tion that feigns attention to causality yet contravenes it gravely: “J’en 
suis persuadé, messieurs. . . . Vous ne trouverez pas ma pensée trop au-
dacieuse, si je dis que l’homme qui est assis sur ce banc est coupable 
aussi du meurtre que cette cour devra juger demain. Il doit être puni en 
conséquence” (I am convinced, gentlemen. . . . You will not deem my 
thought too rash if I say that the man sitting in this dock is also guilty 
of the murder that this court will have to judge tomorrow. He must be 
punished accordingly; 200; my emphasis). Such language of persuasion 
at all costs combines emphasis, litotes, and captatio to support a falla-
cious logic that reinvents Meursault’s crime as a parricide and falsifies 
his identity, replacing it with that of another.
That the words of justice erase the defendant’s identity is brought 
home by his feeling of exteriority and self-dispossession during the trial 
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(“En quelque sorte, on avait l’air de traiter cette affaire en dehors de 
moi” [In a way, they seemed to be trying this case independently of me; 
OCC 1:198) as well as by a spectacular usurpation of his “je”: 
À un moment donné, cependant, je l’ai écouté [mon avocat] 
parce qu’il disait: “Il est vrai que j’ai tué.” Puis il a continué 
sur ce ton, disant “je” chaque fois qu’il parlait de moi. J’étais 
très étonné. Je me suis penché vers un gendarme et je lui ai 
demandé pourquoi. Il m’a dit de me taire et, après un mo-
ment, il a ajouté: “Tous les avocats font ça.” Moi, j’ai pensé 
que c’était m’écarter encore de l’affaire, me réduire à zéro et, 
en un certain sens, se substituer à moi. (OCC 1:201)
At one point, however, I listened to him [my lawyer] because 
he said: “It is true that I killed a man.” Then he carried on 
like that, saying “I” every time he talked about me. I was 
very surprised. I leaned over to one of the policemen and 
asked him why he was doing that. He told me to be quiet 
and, after a while, he added: “All lawyers do that.” I thought 
that this was another way of excluding me from proceedings, 
reducing me to nothing and, in a way, of taking my place. 
Two “je”s compete in this passage: Meursault’s and that of his counsel 
pretending to be him. Be it for his client’s good, the lawyer silences him 
and violates his identity; indeed, “lawyers” in general do so, as the gen-
darme makes clear by noting that the technique is widespread.
In short, judicial rhetoric is portrayed as enabling falsification, the 
illogical, exclusion, and usurpation. It thereby fabricates “the stranger’ 
and does so with fatal consequences. Hyperbole ultimately enables the 
prosecutor to ask for Meursault’s death with “le cœur léger” (a light 
heart) by transforming the defendant into “rien que de monstrueux” 
(nothing but a monster; OCC 1:201). Judicial language here appears 
to go so far as to convince the very individual who utters it that his 
performance is not really one, that he has accessed the certainty of truth 
and is in the right. Meursault’s lawyer is also shown to be convinced 
by his own rhetoric. “Very voluble” and satisfied with his speech for 
the defense, he guarantees to his client that the decision of the court 
will be favorable to him (203). Shortly thereafter, the statement that 
concludes the trial again hints at formal pyrotechnics and dubious proc-
uration: “Le président m’a dit dans une forme bizarre que j’aurais la 
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tête tranchée sur une place publique au nom du peuple français” (The 
presiding judge told me in a peculiar way that my head would be cut off 
in a public square in the name of the French people; 203; my emphasis).
Hugo and, more visibly even, Camus therefore tap into figurative 
language and a wealth of rhetorical devices that do not contradict their 
indictment of the metaphors to which society turns in adopting and 
implementing the death penalty. Theirs is an imagistic and rhetorical 
discourse designed either to supplement common language with a view 
to conveying fully the condemned man’s experience or, conversely, to 
point to the travesty of justice for which certain manipulations of words 
allow. Symbolically, both writers sometimes depict those who twist re-
ality through language to arrive at a death sentence through the same 
incriminating metaphors. Tarrou’s father and the judges of Le Dernier 
Jour are associated with red and black, a chromatism that turns them 
into devilish or bloodstained figures, “chargés de haillons ensanglantés” 
(II, 659). But if language bears at least part of the responsibility for 
state-imposed death, what of the authors themselves, arguably the most 
zealous manipulators of language?
Mirror Moments:  Writer, Art, and State  
Killing in Hugo, Baudelaire, and Camus
The works by Hugo, Baudelaire, and Camus under examination all re-
fer to the act of wording lethal justice by staging scenes and poetic 
moments that feature the figure of the artist or the writer. They provide 
information about how the three authors understand and problematize 
the stakes and risks of their “capital writings.”
We have seen that Hugo makes references to himself and his pro-
fession in Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné. He lends some of his fea-
tures to the protagonist and repeatedly thematizes writing—through 
an original paratext that includes the facsimile of a song, references 
to the condemned man’s penning his experience and to the materiality 
of this enterprise, and his interrogations on a posthumous readership. 
The author’s relationship to his abolitionist work in these self-refer-
ential instances is one of relative confidence in the potential of artistic 
expression to relay both pain and experience effectively. Additionally, 
Le Dernier Jour as a whole symbolically compensates for the blank 
section of the diary in which the condemned man’s personal “histoire” 
is missing (chapter XLVII). Albeit with sinister irony, the novel redeems 
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this silence by rendering his ultimate and most confidential story—that 
of his mental alteration in the face of death.
Hugo’s postfactum preface also features a telling anecdote about 
what prompted the writing of his novel. He claims to have wanted to 
wash away the drop of blood that he, like all members of society, feels 
dripping on his forehead in the presence of the scaffold. Le Dernier 
Jour, he concludes, allowed for this figurative cleaning (481). Although 
he is quick to add that “se laver les mains est bien, empêcher le sang de 
couler serait mieux” (washing one’s hands is a good thing, preventing 
bloodletting would be better), his work effectively satisfies the impera-
tive to “donner mal aux nerfs aux femmes des procureurs du roi” (pinch 
the nerves of the wives of the king’s prosecutors; 486) that he presents 
as a means of bringing about abolition. The novel is therefore implicitly 
recognized as a salutary vehicle that prevents, or is about to prevent, 
the shedding of blood. A certain trust in literature, and the abolitionist 
mission it sets for itself, thereby pierces through Le Dernier Jour, and 
even morphs into imperious satisfaction in 1832: “À l’époque où ce 
livre fut publié, l’auteur ne jugea pas à propos de dire dès lors toute sa 
pensée. Il aima mieux qu’elle fût comprise et voir si elle le serait. Elle 
l’a été” (At the time when this book was published, the author did not 
deem it necessary to express his opinions in their entirety. He preferred 
to let them be understood and to see whether they would be. They were 
indeed; OCH 4:479–80).
The same underlying contentment and trust in the transcendent 
power of art do not characterize Camus’s fiction and Baudelaire’s po-
etry. While Hugo and Camus share the same profound abolitionist con-
viction, the latter does not believe in the former’s utilitarian vision of 
art. He writes plainly in L’Homme révolté, “‘Art for the sake of prog-
ress’ is a commonplace that pervaded the whole century and that Hugo 
took up without succeeding in making it convincing” (OCC 3:278–79). 
Camus also rebukes Maistre, Baudelaire’s supposed philosophical point 
of reference. A section of “La Révolte historique” titled “La Prophétie 
bourgeoise” draws a parallel between Marx and the theocrat based on 
their shared “fatalism,” justification of “the established order,” and fo-
cus on “political realism, discipline, force” (225). The analogy is deeply 
critical: it underscores a common homicidal messianism, with Maistre 
calling for the complete “immol[ation]” of the earth (225) and Marx 
relying on a nonreligious version of “the historical sense of totality that 
Christianity has invented” and that has threatened to kill Europe, in 
Camus’s eyes (226). L’Homme révolté does not spare the figure of the 
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dandy either, and presents Baudelaire as the “poet of crime” (105), in 
constant need of an audience and of performing (104–5).
Camus’s “Réflexions sur la guillotine” return to Baudelaire’s favored 
reactionary figure. They comment on Maistre’s praise of the executioner. 
Camus cites the testimony of an assistant executioner before using it to 
gloss the Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg with scathing irony:
The new executioner is a guillotine fanatic. He sometimes 
spends days on end at home sitting on a chair, all ready to 
go, with his hat and coat on, waiting to be called in by the 
Ministry.
Yes, here is the man about whom Joseph de Maistre said 
that, for him to exist, there had to be a special decree from 
divine power and that, without him, “order gives way to 
chaos, thrones collapse and society disappears.” Here is the 
man through whom society rids itself of the guilty for good, 
since the executioner signs the prison release and a free man 
is then handed over to his discretion. (OCC 4:142)
Camus radically demystifies Maistre’s figuration of the executioner. No 
longer the heroic and god-ordained guarantor of social order on earth, 
he is represented as both pitiful and dangerous—mentally disabled, 
used as a recipient of social waste, and endowed with the exorbitant 
power to dispose of a fellow man’s freedom. Although Baudelaire does 
not faithfully abide by Maistre’s theories, as seen in part II, the mysti-
cal potential for violence found in the counter-Revolutionary thinker’s 
theory does fascinates him, however much of an illusion he shows it to 
be. Camus, for his part, conceives of violence pragmatically and sees no 
possible opportunity for sacredness or desirable aristocratic distinction 
in execution or sacrificial acts.
Nevertheless, in his notebooks, Camus picks up on a few of Baude-
laire’s aphorisms to which he appears to be sensitive (OCC 2:881, 942). 
They highlight the weakness and instability inherent in the individual: 
man’s changes of heart, passions, and struggle to maintain fortitude. 
The Carnets also reproduce a quotation from Maistre on human wan-
tonness that one would expect to find in Baudelaire’s notes: “J. de Mais-
tre: I do not know what the soul of the rascal is, but I believe that I 
know what the soul of a gentleman is, and that sends shivers down one’s 
spine” (OCC 4:1093). Camus comes to an analogous conclusion: “I 
know like everyone else does that an intellectual is a dangerous animal 
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to whom treason comes easily” (OCC 2:425). Baudelaire and Camus 
appear to agree through the figure of Maistre here: however morally, 
socially, or intellectually sophisticated man is, he is not to be trusted.
A possible cause for this, and an additional point of convergence 
between the two authors, lies in man’s complexity of character. Part II 
has shown it to pervade Baudelaire’s poetry centered on lethal violence, 
whose actors are frequently portrayed as both victims and execution-
ers. Camus’s fiction also morally oscillates when it comes to violence: 
Meursault the harmless clerk commits murder, Tarrou temporarily and 
passively condones an execution in Hungary, and Henri Cormery is ini-
tially supportive of a beheading, before it makes him sick to his stom-
ach. “Réflexions sur la guillotine” likewise argue that the death penalty 
cannot be dissuasive precisely because human nature is neither “stable” 
nor “serene” (OCC 4:137–38). Duality, the precise form of moral insta-
bility underlined by Baudelaire, is prominent in Camus’s postwar writ-
ings in particular: “For four years, at home, we witnessed the reasoned 
enforcement of this hatred. Men like you and me, who in the morning 
would pat children in the metro, at night would morph into meticulous 
executioners. They would become the state employees of hatred and 
torture” (424). Camus meditates the moral reversibility of the man on 
the street in its worst possible context, one in which it fully developed 
under historico-political circumstances that gave free rein to murder. 
Mutatis mutandis, Baudelaire, for his part, refers to Marat and Robes-
pierre during the Reign of Terror, as we saw in chapter 3.
One difference between the nineteenth-century poet and the twenti-
eth-century novelist lies in the fact that the former consistently affirms 
the coexistence of victim and executioner within the self, whereas after 
the Second World War, and more particularly after the Épuration that 
Camus supported before siding with the condemned, not unlike some 
of his characters, the Nobel laureate comes to a different conclusion:
I am less and less inclined to believe that man is innocent. 
Only I still have this gut reaction that makes me stand up 
against punishment. After the Liberation, I attended one of 
the trials of the Épuration. The defendant was guilty in my 
opinion. I left the trial before it ended however, because I 
was on his side and I never again attended one of these trials. 
In any guilty man, there is an innocent streak. This is what 
makes any absolute sentencing totally unacceptable. People 
don’t take pain sufficiently into consideration.
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Man is not innocent and he is not guilty. How to get out 
of that one? 18
What coexists in man, Camus argues at the end of the 1940s, is the ab-
sence of complete innocence and the absence of complete guilt, rather 
than alternating innocence and guilt in their acute forms. He thereby 
arrives at a picture of mankind that is at once darker and brighter than 
Baudelaire’s. Together, the war, agnosticism, and humanism lead the 
novelist to distance himself from a Christian imaginary constructed—
contrastively—around a figure that incarnates moral purity, but they 
also lead him to consider pain as mitigating human guilt and to abstain 
from passing a definitive negative moral judgment on the accused. The 
works of fiction examined in the previous chapter echo this positioning.
These nuances regarding the understanding and representation 
of man’s moral nature in Baudelaire’s and Camus’s works shouldn’t 
conceal their shared acknowledgment of man’s fundamental violence. 
Chapter 3 contrasted Hugo’s forward-looking and optimistic view of 
mankind with Baudelaire’s insistence on humanity’s taste for destruc-
tion. Like Baudelaire, Camus does not mask man’s brutality. As noted 
previously, his fiction repeatedly features killing. “Réflexions sur la guil-
lotine” drives home, and indeed generalizes, this homicidal inclination, 
arguing that “behind the most peaceful and the most familiar faces 
lurks the impulse to torture and kill” (OCC 4:142) and that “murder 
is in human nature” (143). In 1942, Camus went so far as to see this 
potentially ubiquitous act as “exhausting” life both in the victim and the 
murderer and even noted that this might explain why society wishes to 
put the latter to death (OCC 2:949).
If it is true that crime exhausts the ability to live in a man (see 
above . . .). It is in that respect that Cain’s crime (and not Ad-
am’s which, in comparison, comes across as a venial sin) has ex-
hausted our strength and our love of life. Insofar as we are part 
of his nature and his damnation, we suffer from this strange 
void and this melancholy feeling of inadequacy that follows 
excessive effusion and exhausting actions. Cain has used up all 
the possibilities of actual life for us. That is what hell is. But we 
can clearly see that it is on earth. (OCC 2:971–72)
In this reframing of Christian mythology, the protagonist is Adam and 
Eve’s fratricidal son, not his parents; man’s original sin is lethal violence, 
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not disobedience or access to the knowledge of good and evil; and dam-
nation takes a new form, namely the suspension of the love of life. The 
state that ensues from this disinterest is defined as hell, which Camus 
relocates on earth.
Such a representation of murder as devouring all life, which the twen-
tieth-century writer initially formulates in metaphysical and existential 
terms, gains new currency both at the end of the Second World War and 
during the Algerian War of Independence. These two moments in contem-
porary history compel him to describe collective, organized violence as 
dangerously contagious. In “Défense de l’intelligence,” the speech he de-
livered at the Mutualité in March 1945, Camus mentioned the mutability 
of decent-looking men into murderers of children in the context of Nazism 
and Collaborationism. He also remarked that “The hatred of the victims 
came in response to the hatred of the executioners” (OCC 2:424) after 
the conflict, as shown by the recourse to lynchings. Likewise, on May 10, 
1947, his article “La Contagion” (published in Combat) expressed concern 
at the signs of racism and antisemitism found in the French press and so-
ciety at large in the context of the Malagasy uprisings of March 1947. It 
also condemned the collective repression perpetrated by the French state in 
Algeria following the Sétif massacres of May 1945. France, he argued, was 
embracing the same denial of equality and the terror against which part of 
the country had fought when the Nazis occupied its territory. Highlighting 
the same threat of contagion, the 1954 article “Terrorisme et amnistie” and 
the foreword to Chroniques algériennes (1958) respectively denounced the 
“surenchère dégoûtante entre les crimes” (disgusting way in which crimes 
outcompete each other; OCC 3:934) of anticolonial violence and repres-
sion in various colonized territories, and diagnosed the justification of both 
the “terrorism” of the Front de Libération Nationale in Algeria and that of 
the counterterrorism of the French state as a “casuistique du sang” (OCC 
4:300). Camus’s consistent critique of human violence as infectious and eas-
ily expansive anticipates Girard’s reflections on mimetic violence and sacri-
ficial malfunction. Indeed, Denis Salas has argued that Girard’s thought on 
violence finds an antecedent in Camus’s postwar diagnoses. Following this 
plausible argument, when I had recourse to Girard’s concepts of “sacrificial 
crisis” and “essential violence” to shed light on Les Fleurs du mal in chapter 
4, I turned to Camus’s thought in order to qualify Baudelaire’s figuration 
of violence.
Although the overlap between Baudelaire’s and Camus’s views on 
pandemic violence and our intrinsically homicidal human nature is 
striking, the writers come to differing conclusions. The poet seems to 
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see few chances to escape from this brutality—and his poetic imaginary 
of capital punishment, with “le bourreau qui jouit” and “le martyr qui 
sanglote,” illustrates this view. By contrast, the novelist calls for resis-
tance to our violent inclinations and for solidarity. He insists on the 
possibility that instinctive reactions such as disgust may counter our 
drive to kill or to witness killing, and on the need for a “reconfiguring 
of our political mentality” (OCC 2:425). 
These diverging conclusions aside, Baudelaire and Camus’s common 
vision of human interiority and shared appraisal of the nature of lethal 
violence in the polis lead one to wonder if the writers conceived sim-
ilarly of their own potential participation in such violence. Both seem 
willing to explore it reflexively and without complacency. As noted 
above, Camus’s criticizes the intellectual as a dangerous animal (OCC 
2:425), and his Nobel Prize speech interrogates the engagement (in the 
English sense) of art and the artist with the most sinister realities of his 
time, while Baudelaire’s “Au lecteur” (OCB 1:5–6) and turn to Agrippa 
d’Aubigné’s Tragiques in the apologetic epigraph to the first edition of 
Les Fleurs advocate the need to provide a no-holds-barred picture of 
man’s flawed nature, including the poet’s. 
L’Étranger and La Peste feature a few explicit depictions of the 
I-writer, either through self-portraits or through the thematization of 
literary writing. When Meursault is in the courtroom, he catches sight 
of a journalist that turns out to be his mirror image:
L’un d’entre eux, beaucoup plus jeune, habillé en flanelle grise 
avec une cravate bleue, avait laissé son stylo devant lui et me 
regardait. Dans son visage un peu asymétrique, je ne voyais 
que ses deux yeux, très clairs, qui m’examinaient attentive-
ment, sans rien exprimer qui fût définissable. Et j’ai eu l’im-
pression bizarre d’être regardé par moi-même. (OCC 1:190)
One of them, much younger, dressed in grey flannel with a 
blue tie, had left his pen lying in front of him and was look-
ing at me. In his slightly asymmetrical face, all I could see 
were his two eyes, which were very light in color, examining 
me intently, without expressing anything clearly discernible. 
And I got the bizarre impression of being watched by myself.
With his physical appearance, interest in judicial matters, and attentive 
yet discreet presence in the courtroom, this fictional journalist is not just 
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Meursault’s mirror image but also Camus’s. He too was a journalist 
reporting on trials (OCC 1:1246–47, 1253). That this face-to-face 
moment occurs in one of the novel’s rare scenes of self-recognition 
(the second one, after the episode during which Meursault sees him-
self in his “gamelle” with perplexity and eventually identifies his own 
voice) makes it all the more noteworthy. Albeit “bizarre,” this specu-
lar moment comes across as promising: viewing himself in the writer, 
the condemned man symbolically establishes a closeness with this 
figure—all the more so as Camus’s avatar quietly stands out against 
a background in which other journalists candidly confess their need 
to write sensationalistic pieces and cover disparate court cases in one 
go (189–90).
Yet if the condemned man’s symbolic communion with the author 
is presented as possible at the beginning of the trial, its conclusion 
suspends this complicity. Very shortly before the pronouncement 
of the verdict, the writer’s avatar looks away from the condemned 
man, without the narrative specifying what may motivate this new 
body language—indifference, journalistic interest in the court’s deci-
sion exclusively, or an identification so profound with the defendant 
that this moment proves unbearable to the witness, as is the case 
in La Peste and in Camus’s own experience, if we are to believe his 
correspondence.
Nous étions là, tous, à attendre. Et ce qu’ensemble nous at-
tendions ne concernait que moi. . . . J’ai rencontré le regard 
du journaliste à la veste grise. . . . Puis j’ai entendu une voix 
sourde lire quelque chose dans la salle. Quand la sonnerie 
a encore retenti, que la porte du box s’est ouverte, c’est le 
silence de la salle qui est monté vers moi, le silence, et cette 
singulière sensation que j’ai eue lorsque j’ai constaté que le 
jeune journaliste avait détourné ses yeux. (OCC 1:202–3)
We were all there, waiting. And what we were waiting for 
together was of interest only to me. . . . My gaze crossed that 
of the journalist in the grey jacket. . . . Then I heard a muf-
fled voice read something out in the courtroom. When the 
bell rang again, and when the gate of the dock opened, what 
rose up toward me was the silence of the courtroom, the 
silence and that strange sensation I had when I noticed that 
the young journalist had turned his gaze away from me.
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Through this unexplained looking away, the figure of the previously 
attentive writer ultimately shows itself to be unresponsive to the con-
demned man’s utter exclusion from society. The strangeness of “the 
stranger,” which had been somewhat reduced by his sameness with the 
journalist, returns. Fatally so. 
Agnès Spiquel has compared this self-portrait in L’Étranger with a 
passage from Le Dernier Jour in which Hugo seems to discreetly repre-
sent himself as a young journalist:19
Un jeune homme, près de la fenêtre, qui écrivait, avec un 
crayon, sur un portefeuille, a demandé à un des guichetiers 
ce qu’on faisait là.
—La toilette du condamné, a répondu l’autre.
J’ai compris que cela serait demain dans le journal. (XL-
VIII, 707)
By the window, a young man who was writing in a 
pocketbook with a pencil asked one of the clerks what was 
happening.
“The condemned man is being got ready,” replied the 
other.
I assumed that that would be in tomorrow’s newspaper.
The parallel is indeed striking; all the more so as both Hugo and Camus 
had closely observed the judicial world prior to writing their novels. 
Spiquel remarks that both authors stress the contradiction, if not the 
“imposture,” of their use of a first-person pronoun to capture an ex-
perience eventually shown to be that of absolute solitude.20 While this 
is true, a distinction also sets the two scenes apart. In Hugo’s text, the 
journalist is presented as actively investigating the way in which the 
condemned man is treated. He inquires about his “toilette” and then 
successfully fulfills his role as a relay, be it for voyeuristic ends. Once 
again, the faith that Hugo’s early novel allusively places in writing is 
absent from Camus’s narrative. Besides, in L’Étranger, the “histoire du 
Tchécoslovaque” (OCC 1:187) implicitly furthers the distrust for the 
printed word crystallized by the young journalist’s failure to maintain 
visual contact with Meursault. This anecdote that the protagonist dis-
covers on the old scrap of a press article in his cell pertains to a sor-
did fait divers, on which Camus’s own play Le Malentendu is based.21 
At the metafictional level, L’Étranger therefore suggests that literature, 
192 ❘ Camus’s Capital Fiction and Literary Responsibility
and not just base journalism, may use violence as its fonds de com-
merce—the Czech’s story being a real one, reported in L’Écho d’Alger 
and La Dépêche algérienne in early January 1935. The critical nature 
of this self-reference recalls the self-reflexive moments through which 
Baudelaire points to his own use of lethal violence for the sake of poetic 
production.
Both Camus’s and Baudelaire’s works further critique the relation 
of their own written words to capital crime and punishment by under-
lining another, opposite tendency of literature—and, more broadly, of 
art: that which consists in blocking out reality from creation. La Peste 
examines this occlusion through the character of Joseph Grand, a late 
and meaningful addition to Camus’s first version of the novel (OCC 
2:1185). Grand, whose last name sounds antiphrastic in light of his 
unassuming character and seeming lack of literary talent but is in fact 
deserved given his capacity to act with courage and solidarity, struggles 
with the opening sentence of the literary work he dreams of publishing:
—Ne regardez pas, dit Grand. C’est ma première phrase. 
Elle me donne du mal, beaucoup de mal.
Lui aussi contemplait toutes ces feuilles et sa main parut 
invinciblement attirée par l’une d’elles qu’il éleva en trans-
parence devant l’ampoule électrique sans abat-jour. La 
feuille tremblait dans sa main. Rieux remarqua que le front 
de l’employé était moite.
—Asseyez-vous, dit-il, et lisez-la-moi.
L’autre le regarda et sourit avec une sorte de gratitude.
—Oui, dit-il, je crois que j’en ai envie.
Il attendit un peu, regardant toujours la feuille, puis 
s’assit. Rieux écoutait en même temps une sorte de bour-
donnement confus qui, dans la ville, semblait répondre aux 
sifflements du fléau. Il avait, à ce moment précis, une per-
ception extraordinairement aiguë de cette ville qui s’étendait 
à ses pieds, du monde clos qu’elle formait et des terribles 
hurlements qu’elle étouffait dans la nuit. La voix de Grand 
s’éleva sourdement: “Par une belle matinée du mois de mai, 
une élégante amazone parcourait, sur une superbe jument 
alezane, les allées fleuries du Bois de Boulogne.” Le silence 
revint et, avec lui, l’indistincte rumeur de la ville en souf-
france. (OCC 2:104–5)
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“Don’t look, said Grand. It’s my first sentence. I am strug-
gling with it, a lot.”
He too was looking at all these sheets of paper and his 
hand seemed irresistibly drawn to one of them; he picked 
it up and held it in front of the shadeless light bulb to let 
the light shine through. The sheet was shaking in his hand. 
Rieux noticed that the forehead of the municipal clerk was 
moist with sweat.
“Sit down,” he said, “and read it to me.”
Grand looked at him and smiled with a sort of gratitude.
“Yes,” he said, “I think I feel like I need to.”
He waited for a while, still looking at the sheet, then sat 
down. At the same time, Rieux was listening to a sort of in-
distinct buzzing from the city that seemed to be in reaction 
to the hissing of the plague. At that precise moment, he had 
an extraordinarily acute perception of this city spread out 
below, of the confined world it formed and of the terrible 
howling it stifled in the night. Grand’s dull voice rose up: 
“On a fine morning in the month of May, an elegant Ama-
zon/horsewoman was riding a superb chestnut mare through 
the flowery avenues of the Bois de Boulogne.” The silence 
returned and, with it, the confused rumbling of a city that 
was suffering.
Derision mixed with pathos dominates this passage in which the ner-
vous writer strives to find a verbal form liable to give “perfect” shape 
to the subject he has chosen, namely a horseback-riding Amazon—at 
once mythical and, in the context of the Bois de Boulogne, somewhat 
kitsch. The temporality, locus, character, and aesthetics of Grand’s text 
seem at odds with the morbid reality of the plague that overwhelms 
Oran; in addition, while the moment that precedes Grand reading his 
first sentence is associated with an increasingly acute audibility of the 
city’s ordeal (“écoutait,” “bourdonnement,” “sifflements,” “percep-
tion . . . aiguë,” “terribles hurlements”), and a metaphorical visibility of 
this reality (“qui s’étendait à ses pieds”), his embryonic literary work 
erases this perception of the pain of others. Reality returns only after the 
pause that concludes the reading. This symbolic narrative segment en-
capsulates literature’s capacity to ignore, and indeed silence, the outside 
world, even in its most violent manifestations.
194 ❘ Camus’s Capital Fiction and Literary Responsibility
A similar claim underlies the structure of “Un voyage à Cythère,” one 
of Baudelaire’s poems that features the death penalty most prominently. 
The first stanzas draw a stark opposition between the pleasant artistic 
representations that have traditionally portrayed the Greek island of 
Kythira, the birthplace of Aphrodite, and the somber reality of this site:
Quelle est cette île triste et noire?—C’est Cythère,
Nous dit-on, un pays fameux dans les chansons,
Eldorado banal de tous les vieux garçons.
Regardez, après tout, c’est une pauvre terre.
—Île des doux secrets et des fêtes du cœur!
De l’antique Vénus le superbe fantôme
Au-dessus de tes mers plane comme un arôme
Et charge les esprits d’amour et de langueur.
Belle île aux myrtes verts, pleine de fleurs écloses,
Vénérée à jamais par toute nation,
Où les soupirs des cœurs en adoration
Roulent comme l’encens sur un jardin de roses
Ou le roucoulement éternel d’un ramier!
—Cythère n’était plus qu’un terrain des plus maigres,
Un désert rocailleux troublé par des cris aigres.
J’entrevoyais pourtant un objet singulier!
Ce n’était pas un temple aux ombres bocagères,
Où la jeune prêtresse, amoureuse des fleurs,
Allait, le corps brûlé de secrètes chaleurs,
Entrebâillant sa robe aux brises passagères. (OCB 1:118)
What is this black, gloomy island?—It is Cythera,
They said, a land famous in songs,
The banal Eldorado of all old bachelors.
Look: after all, it’s not much of a place.
—Isle of sweet secrets and joys of the heart!
The proud ghost of the Venus of antiquity
Floats like a perfume above your seas,
Filling minds with love and languor.
Fair isle of green myrtles, covered in full-blown flowers,
Ever venerated by all peoples,
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Where the sighs of adoring hearts
Waft like incense over a rose garden
Or the eternal cooing of a dove!
—Cythera was now nothing but the most meager of lands,
A rocky desert disturbed by sharp cries.
I could half make out, however, a remarkable object!
It was not a temple set in bosky shades,
Where the young priestess, in love with the flowers,
Went forth, her body burning with secret heats,
Half-opening her robe to the passing breezes.22
From the opening line of the first cited stanza, a web of antitheses 
prevails. Hyphens punctuate a back-and-forth movement between 
the artistic idealization of the island and its deadly actuality. The re-
peated juxtaposition of dramatically incompatible figurations of Kyth-
ira shows the idyll with which it is associated to be mere fiction. That 
Baudelaire’s poem draws his inspiration from Nerval’s August 1844 
publication of extracts from his future Voyage en Orient on the Greek 
island only highlights the play of contrasts at the heart of “Un voyage 
à Cythère” (OCB 1:1069–70): Nerval’s text too stresses the asymmetry 
of two locations with irony, pitching the island’s mythical or pastoral 
representation against its new, nineteenth-century reality, affected by 
British imperialism that Nerval sought to denounce by writing about a 
hanging.23
Baudelaire’s poem quickly attributes the responsibility for the mis-
representation of Kythira to “songs,” that is to say to a certain popular 
poetry. Painting also implicitly comes across as the culprit. The gallant 
aesthetics of Watteau’s well-known 1717 Pèlerinage à l’île de Cythère 
is perceptible in the second and third stanzas above. The clichéd and 
anachronistic image of the “amazone” in a flowery park at the begin-
ning of Grand’s novel, whose first sentence he vainly refashions while 
capital sentences figuratively surround him, recalls the critique of art 
that underlies several of Baudelaire’s stanzas. In the poem’s first move-
ment, art proves to be based on “banal” if appealing commonplaces 
(an idyllic island, Venus, an Edenic rose garden, a dove, a thinly clothed 
and exoticized young woman) as much as it is oblivious to the worst 
forms of violence: the suspense that builds up as the reader discovers the 
island through the increasingly disillusioned gaze of the speaker, who is 
embarked on a boat approaching Kythira, reaches a first climax when 
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the “je” reveals the “objet singulier” he comes to make out in the middle 
of this desolate landscape. A hanged man on a gibbet, assailed by necro-
phagous animals that mutilate the victim’s genitals, appears before his 
eyes, and before ours.
This dramatic revelation presaged by Kythira’s gloomy geography, 
which poetry and painting are presented as concealing at the beginning 
of the poem, precedes a further surprise at the end of it:
Habitant de Cythère, enfant d’un ciel si beau,
Silencieusement tu souffrais ces insultes
En expiation de tes infâmes cultes
Et des péchés qui t’ont interdit le tombeau.
Ridicule pendu, tes douleurs sont les miennes!
Je sentis, à l’aspect de tes membres flottants,
Comme un vomissement, remonter vers mes dents
Le long fleuve de fiel des douleurs anciennes;
Devant toi, pauvre diable au souvenir si cher,
J’ai senti tous les becs et toutes les mâchoires
Des corbeaux lancinants et des panthères noires
Qui jadis aimaient tant à triturer ma chair. (OCB 1:119)
Native of Cythera, born under such a beautiful sky,
You were silently suffering these insults
As an expiation of your infamous religious practices
And of the sins which denied you burial.
Laughable hanged man, your sufferings are my own!
As I looked on your formless limbs, I felt
Rising towards my teeth like vomit,
The long river of gall of ancient sufferings.
Looking at you, poor wretch whose memory is so dear,
I felt all the beaks and all the jaws
Of the tearing crows and the black panthers
Who once so loved to pulverize my flesh.24
The final identification of the lyric “I” with the disfigured corpse 
contests the poem’s first movement according to which art stands 
at an unbridgeable distance from reality. As in some of Camus’s 
narratives, the radical identification of the witness with the exe-
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cuted victim is symbolically conveyed through the former’s nausea. 
This siding of the poem’s speaker with a sufferer who is simulta-
neously subject to humiliation and sacrifice—although in this case, 
sacrifice goes wrong again with the child’s presumably sexual sins 
being subjected to a parody of expiation—recalls the core analogy 
and conclusion of other Fleurs du mal such as “L’Albatros” and “Le 
Cygne.” It appears to restore art’s solidarity with those subjected 
to violence.
However, the poem’s ending also features the resurgence of two 
(related) causes for suspicion mentioned above, namely art’s pro-
duction of clichés contributing to undesirable mystification and its 
exclusion of outside reality. The three stanzas (stanzas 8 to 10) that 
depict the animals eating the hanged corpse in the middle of the 
poem tap into, indeed revel in imagery that aestheticizes the abject. 
This of course constitutes Baudelaire’s trademark in Les Fleurs, 
as exemplified by “Une charogne,” whose abjection “Un voyage 
à Cythère” actually surpasses with its “pourriture” (rottenness), 
“yeux . . . trous” (eyes [as] holes), “ventre effondré” (collapsed 
paunch), “intestins . . . coul[ant] sur les cuisses” (guts . . . spilling 
over the thighs). The clichés of the poetic idyll that the beginning 
of the poem questioned therefore merely find themselves replaced 
by clichés of abjection that secure the reader’s attraction-repul-
sion. Reality does not cease to be mystified: it is mystified anew, 
through graphic images whose caricatural (“ridicule”) character 
echoes—and simply inverts—the idealized caricature denounced in 
the “chansons.” 
As for the relation to the “real” world that the poem seems to intro-
duce by having the speaker eventually see himself in the hanged man, it 
is in fact not one in which the self considers or relates to the other but 
rather one in which the self considers himself through the other.
—Le ciel était charmant, la mer était unie;
Pour moi tout était noir et sanglant désormais,
Hélas! et j’avais, comme en un suaire épais,
Le cœur enseveli dans cette allégorie. (OCB 1:119)
—The sky was delightful, the sea was smooth;
For me now everything was black and bloody,
Alas! and I had, as if in a thick shroud,
My heart buried in this allegory.25
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The other, and reality, remain ignored, as the egocentric (“Pour moi”) 
gesture that repaints the blue sky and sea (“Le ciel était charmant, la 
mer était unie”) in black and red indicates. The “allegory” through 
which the speaker sees and seals the spectacle he has witnessed is one 
that exclusively focuses on self-consideration (“je n’ai trouvé . . . qu’”). 
Moving away from the actual gibbet to focus on its purely “symbolic” 
value and pray for self-reconciliation, the last stanza makes this clear:
Dans ton île, ô Vénus! je n’ai trouvé debout
Qu’un gibet symbolique où pendait mon image . . .
—Ah! Seigneur! donnez-moi la force et le courage
De contempler mon cœur et mon corps sans dégoût! (OCB 1:119)
In your island, o Venus! I found nothing standing
But a symbolic gibbet where my own image hung.
—O Lord! give me the strength and the courage
To look on my heart and my body without disgust!26
Camus’s works find a distinctly different way out of the suspicion 
that weighs over art. While Baudelaire’s speaker sees himself in the 
condemned man, Camus has the condemned man see himself in the 
avatar of the writer, as noted with L’Étranger. There also seems to be 
(literary) room for the subject of violence in La Peste. Grand eventu-
ally edits his sentence that silenced the agony of the plague-stricken 
city (OCC 2:105). He does so drastically, deleting all adjectives (OCC 
2:246) from his prose. In the reading scene with Rieux examined 
above, this sentence reads, “Par une belle matinée du mois de mai, 
une élégante amazone parcourait, sur une superbe jument alezane, les 
allées fleuries du Bois de Boulogne.” The removal of the qualifiers, 
all of which are highly laudatory, allows the syntagm to take on an 
entirely new meaning: “Par une matinée du mois de mai, une ama-
zone parcourait, sur une jument, les allées du Bois de Boulogne.” Sans 
hyperbolic embellishment, the symbol of the Amazon, a warring fig-
ure, comes through clearly, and the text reestablishes contact with the 
outside world. She becomes a potential analogue for what surrounds 
Grand and Rieux, namely the epidemic-as-war, and more specifically 
the epidemic-as-Second-World-War. That a fierce and nonhuman war-
rior is freely roaming one of the largest parks in Paris serves to fig-
ure the Occupation. An allegory of Grand’s design therefore emerges 
within Camus’s own allegorical novel. While Baudelaire’s use of this 
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trope in “Voyage à Cythère” serves to illuminate the speaking sub-
ject’s experience exclusively, Camus, through Grand, shows that art 
can be edited and reshaped into representing a violence liable to affect 
a collectivity.27
Despite starkly dissimilar uses of allegory in their “capital writings,” 
Baudelaire and Camus ultimately converge in underscoring the way 
lethal punishment and art feed off each other. The death penalty re-
lies heavily on representation—as is visible in L’Étranger, Le Premier 
Homme, “Au lecteur,” “Un voyage à Cythère,” “Le voyage”—while cre-
ation often seeks to equal or surpass the intensity of this institutional 
violence and its imaginary. Earlier in this chapter and in chapter 4, I 
pointed to the ways in which Baudelaire and Camus signal the respon-
sibility that their art may bear in relation to state killing and its imagi-
nary: Baudelaire repeatedly flags his own use of their aesthetic potential 
and Camus alerts the reader to the fact that his own raw material, the 
word, and more specifically discursive stylization in particular contexts, 
are part and parcel of capital punishment. 
There is more. Baudelaire and Camus occasionally explore the other 
side of this fraught relationship between figuration and the death pen-
alty. In addition to reflecting on the extent to which artistic representa-
tion may take advantage of, shape, or plainly generate a political reality 
and its imaginary, their works occasionally probe the way this institu-
tion may impede art. In Baudelaire’s case, this critical reflection does 
not emerge as clearly in his verse poetry as it does in his prose poems, 
particularly in “Une mort héroïque.”
Two comparable symbolic moments testify to the way capital pun-
ishment—albeit in a figurative form—may strike back at creation in 
both this prose poem and La Peste. Both instances are self-referential. In 
“Une mort héroïque,” the use of capitalization makes manifest the con-
frontation of state killing and art: that of “le Prince,” “Son Altesse” (His 
Highness), and that of an allegorized “Art,” shown to be subject to a 
peculiar “Martyre” (OCB 1:319, 321, 322). Fancioulle, a beloved jester 
who has attempted a coup against his sovereign, performs a pantomime 
on stage in front of the prince. The ruler, himself keen on the arts, is 
rumored to be inclined to pardon him and his accomplices because of 
the very organization of this show. As if pressed to outdo himself by the 
extreme fear that follows the unmasking of his high treason, Fancioulle 
performs in an unprecedentedly sublime manner. Yet following an order 
from the prince, a whistle is blown in the theater and the strident noise 
causes the performer to collapse on stage. He is thus killed in the mid-
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dle of his artistic apotheosis. Critics have examined this poem closely 
and extensively, so my aim here is not to repeat the exercise or offer a 
drastic alternative to their analyses but rather to look more closely at 
the particular interface of art and capital sentencing in the poem and to 
compare it with an analogous scene in Camus’s novel.28
Not only is Baudelaire’s text interspersed with a fairly vast lexical field 
referring to the death penalty—“condamnés,” “un homme condamné à 
mort,” “expérience . . . d’un intérêt capital,” “supplices,” “bourreau,” 
“coupables.” It also mobilizes, and indeed relies on, key structural 
components of lethal justice: a capital crime, a sovereign authority (the 
prince) who represents the state as a whole (“petit État”) and confronts 
the author of this crime, the possibility of a pardon by this head of 
state, a setting and spatiotemporal configuration making the passing of 
judgment possible (the public venue, the face-to-face encounter between 
the sovereign and an audience-jury on the one hand and the criminal 
on the other), a sequence during which the subject of this judgment is 
weighed by an assembly (Fancioulle’s performance), a verdict (the shrill 
whistling which the reader understands has been ordered by the prince 
and which is presented as having played the role of “le bourreau”), 
and, following it, the brutal death of the accused. Capital punishment 
therefore pervades the poem via an implicit running analogy. Indeed, 
it is doubly present, for more explicit references to the death penalty 
feature before and after Fancioulle’s performance. Before the court and 
the reader “suddenly” (“tout à coup”) find out about the show that Fan-
cioulle has been invited to give, he and his accomplices are presented as 
“voués à une mort certaine,” and, after his death, they too are “effacés 
de la vie” (wiped away from life; OCB 1:323). The jester-artist therefore 
finds himself caught between two death penalties, the first literal and 
expected, and the second (semi-)figurative and unexpected.
How does this double capital punishment affect the jester’s art? First, 
it results in a “parfaite idéalisation” (OCB 1:321) whereby, as Sanyal 
notes, Fancioulle gets the upper hand over state power through aes-
thetics, whereas he had failed to do so through political conspiration.29 
He achieves aesthetic success precisely thanks to the “comique absolu” 
of pantomime praised in “De l’essence du rire” and discussed in chap-
ter 4.30 Yet political (capital) power returns to crush the performer. Al-
though the narrator claims to be unsure of the sovereign’s responsibility 
in the jester’s death and goes so far as to suggest that the killing is 
unintentional, these considerations sound highly rhetorical. Irony con-
spicuously prevails through the italicization of both the phrase “une 
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expérience physiologique d’un intérêt capital” (320), used to designate 
and anticipate the prince toying with his buffoon to death, and that of 
the poem’s last word “faveur” (323), referring to the performer’s unfor-
tunate fate.   
That the prince is portrayed as akin to the artist in many respects 
(“amoureux des beaux-arts,” “véritable artiste lui-même,” pale with 
envy when witnessing Fancioulle’s transcendent performance, and ap-
parently well-versed in the techniques that may sublimate art) is not 
incompatible with his responsibility in the killing. It is precisely because 
the sovereign is endowed with acute artistic sensibility that he can pre-
dict, as the reader is retrospectively led to deduce, that an abrupt rup-
ture of artistic illusion through a mere shrill whistle will annihilate the 
artist. The annihilation of illusion is so brutal that it affects real life, 
beyond the space of representation.31 As opposed to the artist’s failed 
attempt to promote political liberalism (“idée de patrie et de liberté”; 
OCB 1:319) through plotting at the outset of the poem, the power that 
political order has over art, and which is embodied by the literal and the 
figurative forms taken by the death penalty in the poem, is ultimately 
irresistible. This is conveyed through suggestion and ellipsis but nev-
ertheless comes across as indubitable. Political sovereignty definitively 
suppresses performance, performer, and “le mystère de la vie” after hav-
ing sporadically magnified them. As in “Le Confiteor de l’artiste,” the 
artist, if he challenges this power and the ultimate institution that in-
carnates it, namely the death penalty, finds himself “finalement vaincu” 
(ultimately defeated).
“Une mort héroïque” conspicuously recycles and redistributes the 
actors and decisive images that conclude “Au lecteur” in Les Fleurs 
du mal, and this intertextual play both reinforces and nuances some-
what the victory of capital political power over art, nevertheless. On 
the one hand, it strengthens the figuration of defeat and the sense that 
the prince effortlessly, even pleasurably, sides with the violence of the 
scaffold. In the third paragraph of the prose poem, the narrator reveals 
that the ruler’s only enemy is the same allegorized “Ennui” presented 
as a powerful—albeit distressed, for tearful—figure at the end of the 
prefatory poem of Les Fleurs du mal. The scaffolds of which this figure 
dreams in Les Fleurs are implicit yet central in “Une mort héroïque,” the 
crucial difference being that the sovereign who dreads boredom above 
all in “Une mort héroïque” no longer conjures up state killing through 
the imagination (i.e., poetry) as “l’Ennui” did in “Au lecteur” via the 
archetypal incarnation of the Oriental despot who “rêve d’échafauds 
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en fumant son houka” (dreams of scaffolds while puffing his hookah; 
OCB 1:6). Instead, the prince—the Western despot—actualizes spectac-
ular execution through the liquidation of the very being who produces 
images.
On the other hand, the figure of the artist itself is associated with 
despotism, namely that of revolutionary “ideas,” at the beginning of the 
poem, and one factor mitigates the sacrificing of art and its failed at-
tempt to destabilize politics by the end of the prose poem: the “monstre” 
of “Au lecteur,” boredom, reemerges in the form of an “épithète” used 
by the “severe historian” to qualify the prince in “Une mort héroïque,” 
and this monstrous ennui from “Au lecteur” presented by the narrator 
as motivating the sovereign’s actions in “Une mort héroïque” covertly 
remains at the end of the allegorical narrative. The ruler fails to replace 
the extraordinary artist he has executed, and thus implicitly falls prey to 
the ultimate “tyran” that boredom is said to be in the third paragraph. 
The executioner is therefore victim again—especially as his traits are 
those found in Baudelaire’s self-portraits elsewhere and as the poem 
triply refracts the figure of the artist into that of the prince, the jester, 
and the narrator—although he certainly isn’t the first, or the only, ca-
sualty in this story. Capital political power and political vocabulary are 
trumped by an existential angst that only art can alleviate, however 
exposed to political destruction this art may be. 
The poem ultimately combines the fantasy of distinction through 
capital punishment seen in chapter 3—since Fancioulle does tempo-
rarily achieve some form of “heroism” on the symbolic scaffold of the 
stage—and the configuration of failed sacrifice examined in chapter 4.32 
The distinction of the subject (here, the artist) through capital punish-
ment is at once short-lived, given his execution, and long-lasting, given 
his irreplaceability.
La Peste features an episode that raises the same question of the 
intersection of (figurative) capital punishment and art but posits less 
ambiguously the failure of the latter under the irresistible pressure of 
the former. Cottard and Tarrou attend a performance at the Opéra mu-
nicipal in which the plague, that is to say a sort of historical capital 
punishment, gradually creeps in:
Pendant tout le premier acte, Orphée se plaignit avec facilité, 
quelques femmes en tuniques commentèrent avec grâce son 
malheur, et l’amour fut chanté en ariettes. La salle réagit avec 
une chaleur discrète. C’est à peine si on remarqua qu’Orphée 
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introduisait, dans son air du deuxième acte, des tremblem-
ents qui n’y figuraient pas, et demandait avec un léger excès 
de pathétique, au maître des Enfers, de se laisser toucher par 
ses pleurs. Certains gestes saccadés qui lui échappèrent ap-
parurent aux plus avisés comme un effet de stylisation qui 
ajoutait encore à l’interprétation du chanteur.
Il fallut le grand duo d’Orphée et d’Eurydice au troisième 
acte (c’était le moment où Eurydice échappait à son amant) 
pour qu’une certaine surprise courût dans la salle. Et comme 
si le chanteur n’avait attendu que ce mouvement du public, 
ou, plus certainement encore, comme si la rumeur venue du 
parterre l’avait confirmé dans ce qu’il ressentait, il choisit ce 
moment pour avancer vers la rampe d’une façon grotesque, 
bras et jambes écartés dans son costume à l’antique, et pour 
s’écrouler au milieu des bergeries du décor qui n’avaient 
jamais cessé d’être anachroniques mais qui, aux yeux des 
spectateurs, le devinrent pour la première fois, et de terrible 
façon. . . . Peu à peu, le mouvement se précipita, le chuchote-
ment devint exclamation et la foule afflua vers les sorties et 
s’y pressa, pour finir par s’y bousculer en criant. Cottard et 
Tarrou, qui s’étaient seulement levés, restaient seuls en face 
d’une des images de ce qui était leur vie d’alors: la peste sur 
la scène sous l’aspect d’un histrion désarticulé et, dans la 
salle, tout un luxe devenu inutile, sous la forme d’éventails 
oubliés et de dentelles traînant sur le rouge des fauteuils. 
(OCC 2:171)
Throughout the first act, Orpheus lamented with ease, a few 
tunic-clad women gracefully commented on his plight, and 
love was sung through ariette. The audience responded with 
subdued appreciation. It was hardly noticed that in his song 
during the second act Orpheus introduced tremolos that 
were not in the score, and asked the Lord of the Underworld 
to be moved by his tears with slightly excessive pathos. Some 
jerky movements he failed to control appeared to the con-
noisseurs in the audience as stylized affectation that enriched 
the singer’s performance.
It wasn’t until Orpheus and Eurydice’s big duet in the 
third act (that was the moment when Eurydice was lost to 
her lover) that a certain sense of surprise spread through the 
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audience. And as though the singer had been waiting for this 
response, or, more likely, as though the murmur emanating 
from the stalls had confirmed what he was feeling, he chose 
this moment to totter toward the footlights in a grotesque 
manner, his arms and legs wide apart in his antique robe 
and collapsed in the middle of the set’s makeshift sheep-pen, 
which had never ceased to look anachronistic but which, 
in the eyes of the spectators, now came across as such for 
the first time, and horribly so. . . . Gradually, the reaction in-
creased, whispers turned into exclamations, and the crowd 
rushed toward the exits and pressed against them before 
stampeding out to loud cries. Cottard and Tarrou, who had 
merely risen from their seats, stood alone, opposite an image 
of what their life was in those days: the plague on stage in 
the guise of a disarticulated histrio and, in the stalls, a whole 
array of luxurious items that were now useless, forgotten 
fans and lace shawls lying around the red theater seats.
Here too, art is killed by an authoritarian (indeed, totalitarian) political 
order, if one takes the allegorical meaning of the plague into account. 
And again, this killing happens after art has been magnified by this 
domineering order, but this time in a caricatural and artistically unsat-
isfactory way. This scene prefigures the critique of unimpressive and 
anachronistic art found in the subsequent passage that presents Grand’s 
writing as clichéd. The obsolescence that the narrator describes as inher-
ent in operatic aesthetics (“ariettes,” “bergeries du décor qui n’avaient 
jamais cessé d’être anachroniques”) is amplified and, for the spectators 
of the performance, suddenly made visible by the deadly crescendo that 
the epidemic introduces on stage.
Art, and more specifically, through Orpheus’s figure, music and po-
etry, is subject to destruction in multiple ways. The main performance 
becomes that of this destruction itself, and not the opera. The suspension 
of artistic illusion is gradual and derisive here, whereas it was sudden 
and sublime in Baudelaire. Physically, the performer undergoes a meta-
morphosis that begins with “tremblements” and ends with his drop-
ping dead on stage, seemingly dismembered (“bras et jambes écartés,” 
“histrion désarticulé”). Aesthetically, the symptoms of the plague result 
in slips in register within the performance (unwanted pathos and a dra-
matization initially misread as deliberate “stylization”), the mounting 
irony of the narrative voice, and increasingly grotesque descriptions. To-
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gether, they further undercut the grandeur for which both the operatic 
genre and the tragic, mythical subject matter of Orpheus and Eurydice 
would appear to call. Ultimately, the growing anxiety of the audience 
that climaxes with a collective panic (from “surprise” to “rumeur” to 
“mouvement” and “bouscul[ade]”) and the spectators rushing to exit 
the theater show the performance neither to be sustainable nor to fulfill 
its social function. 
But the death of art is most prominently symbolized by the existen-
tial desolation that the plague brings about, when the disease eventually 
substitutes itself for the entire performance and leaves the protagonists 
alone, facing a lifeless image composed of a corpse and abandoned ob-
jects. The gradual move away from the initial close-up on the stage to 
take in the whole theater, as well as the gaze of the audience giving 
way to Cottard and Tarrou’s observation of the scene as they remain 
standing, frame this mini-apocalypse most dramatically. So does the 
fact that the narrator introduces such a “récit”-within-the-chronicle as 
a conclusion to Tarrou’s notes; a conclusion taken to “illustre[r] cette 
conscience singulière qui venait . . . aux pestiférés” (illustrate this pe-
culiar consciousness that came over . . . the plague-stricken Oranians; 
OCC 2:170).
In both Baudelaire’s vortical prose poem and Camus’s tragi-sarcastic 
scene, the shadow of capital condemnation becomes literal death. Artis-
tic tragedies merge with real-life ones. Figuratively, Fancioulle and the 
actor playing Orpheus interrogate the dangerous closeness of art with 
deadly politics and hint at the possibility of such politics taking over 
creation—even if, in Baudelaire’s case, creation retains some power. 
Read as parables, the texts seem to expose the uncertain position in 
which the writers too place themselves, in between a distancing from 
and an absorption into the lethal political practice and imaginary to 
which they strive to give form.
*  *
*
Camus places plain language at the heart of his reflection on the guil-
lotine and, more broadly, on organized lethal violence. Yet his prose 
fiction reveals that, just like the bodily ethos on which his protagonists 
sometimes rely to reject the death penalty, this remedy is imperfect and 
unsystematic. Our temptation to be silent, to lie, or to fail to put into 
words the full horror of executions inflects it. These shortcomings are 
not denied but rather uncovered by Camus’s narratives. In fact, both 
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he and Hugo establish, in L’Étranger and Le Dernier Jour d’un con-
damné, that plain language does not suffice to counter the concealing 
metaphors with which society at large, and the legal and judicial pow-
ers in particular, perpetrate capital punishment. For the two novelists, 
this veiled discourse must be overcome by images and vivid tropes that 
they mobilize in two main contexts: the revelation of the condemned 
man’s experience and the satire of judicial jargon. In resorting to these 
strategies of linguistic monstratio, Hugo and Camus delegitimize state 
killing through poetics. Yet Camus also problematizes his own art, and 
thereby recalls the reflections at play in some of Baudelaire’s poems, 
whereas Hugo’s fiction implies a more uncritical faith in the power of 
the written work to relay “capital experience.” Despite the obvious dif-
ferences that set them apart, Baudelaire and Camus share a common 
vision of man’s violent nature and of the potential degeneration of so-
ciopolitical violence. The violence featured in Baudelaire’s verse could 
be deemed Camusian on account of the novelist’s pre-Girardian em-
phasis on the pandemic nature of murder. Conversely, key moments in 
Camus’s fiction echo the anxiety and mistrust for mankind perceptible 
in Baudelaire’s writings. L’Étranger, La Peste, and Le Premier Homme 
display symbols and strategies of outright resistance to executions that 
seem at odds with the imaginary deployed in Les Fleurs du mal and Le 
Spleen de Paris. Both the novelist and the poet show some awareness of 
their possible symbolic complicity with lethal justice and its imaginary, 
however. They suggest that art may ignore the lethal state altogether, 
but also respond to this suspicion by staging moments when the literary 
realm reintegrates this deadly reality, either through the prism of self-ex-
ploration or through that of solidarity enabled by a particular kind of 
language. Sporadically, their works also identify how the killing state 
may encroach upon creation. When this eventuality is envisaged by way 
of parables, Baudelaire’s verse leaves open the possibility that sovereign 
power may ultimately be both murderous and vulnerable without art. 
Camus’s fiction, conversely, acknowledges that a homicidal state might 
turn art into a self-parody, atomize it, and leave man helpless.
207
Conclusion
Я думал в ту минуту, что весть о казни убьет тебя.
I thought that the news of the execution would kill you.
—Fyodor Dostoevsky, letter to his brother Mikhail following 
the writer’s mock execution (December 22, 1849)
How do some major modern literary works respond to society’s most 
violent legal institution, the death penalty? In what ways do they both 
shape and find themselves shaped by its imaginary in the country of the 
guillotine? What intersections of poetics and ethics come to light in this 
process?
Capital Letters has attempted to reflect on these questions by exam-
ining a trio of renowned French authors and uncovering the dialogue 
in which they engaged while representing state killing. Although they 
portray it in distinct ways and hold entirely or subtly different political 
views about lethal justice and the grounds for its (il)legitimacy, their 
prose and poetry converge in several respects. On the one hand, Hugo, 
Baudelaire, and Camus represent the death penalty as a practice that 
exceeds human solidarity and, sometimes, understanding. On the other, 
they show that it defies conventional literary representations and plays 
a significant role in their reflections on what the modalities and place of 
literature should be in post-Revolutionary French society.
Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné radically breaks away from a classi-
cal, Aristotelian mode of representation and replaces it with a “regime 
of expression” (Rancière) that exposes the experience of capital punish-
ment from within. Hugo stages a crisis of communication that overlaps 
with this shift in regime. He effectively turns on its head the traditional 
spectacle of execution and replaces the viewer’s perspective with that 
of its main actor. The condemned man’s cry, literal and figurative, gives 
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the fiction its rhythm and consistency, against narrative, aesthetic, and 
linguistic conventions. Le Dernier Jour also investigates the reality of 
penal modernity through this innovative expressive regime. While head 
severance by guillotine was conceived as a replacement for the excru-
ciating supplices, and was thus considered a major penal improvement 
bequeathed by the Enlightenment, Hugo’s manipulation of language 
brings to the fore both the mental ordeal inflicted upon the condemned 
man anticipating his execution and the brutality of decapitation as a 
method of killing. The novel therefore exposes the double perpetration 
of violence inherent in, if not magnified by, the systematic use of the 
guillotine. It goes so far as to suggest that this produces a new form of 
torture. Indeed, the condemned man finds himself slowly but sensibly 
tortured in the original sense of the word, that is to say “distorted” into 
what Agamben, following Benjamin and Aristotle, names zoē, or “bare 
life”: a carnal self devoid of political status. Poetic craft exposes this 
excruciating metamorphosis that culminates in absolute silence.
Baudelaire’s aesthetics of violence, evil, and sacrifice appears to op-
pose spectacularly the abolitionist commitment to which Hugo gives 
an original expression in his early narrative. The modern poet’s prose, 
verse, and unfinished projects feature a political and artistic enthusiasm 
for lethal justice and its imagery. Nevertheless, this double enthusiasm 
cannot be taken at face value. Baudelaire’s prose in favor of capital 
punishment, a practice he redefines as sacrifice, should be understood 
within a larger polemic against both progress and the overtly didactic, 
utilitarian literature he takes Hugo to incarnate—especially, but not ex-
clusively, toward the end of his life. The “poète maudit” uses the death 
penalty as a means of literary, social, and moral distinction. His praise 
of sacrifice partly leans on the ideas of the reactionary Maistre, cham-
pion of the virtues of bloodletting. Yet it does not rigorously follow 
Maistre’s thought. Instead, the poet complicates, if not subverts, the 
theocratic thinker’s typology of sacrifice. His celebration of a sacrificial 
death penalty conflates or inverts a number of figures, including the 
innocent and the criminal, and the human and the animal, in contrast 
with Maistre. 
Moreover, De l’essence du rire and Les Fleurs du mal show that 
Baudelaire essentially turns the dark imagery that capital punishment 
offers into an aesthetic reservoir. It serves both to compete with such 
plastic and dramatic arts as caricature and pantomime, whose inten-
sity Baudelaire envies, and to puncture the moralism and pharisaism 
of his age. The poet also further contests the Maistrean logic of sac-
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rifice in key compositions that stage lethal violence and present it as 
far less galvanizing than the mystic justification of capital punishment 
seemingly present in Baudelaire’s provocative prose pieces. In a num-
ber of “slaughter poems,” sacrifice fails to fulfill its role as a controlled 
and beneficial homicidal mechanics providing society with social and 
spiritual stability and grandeur. Instead, whoever perpetrates execution 
soon becomes subject to it. Baudelaire disrupts, in fact overturns the 
redeeming and regulatory function of sacrifice identified respectively by 
Maistre and contemporary critic René Girard. While his capital imag-
inary is aesthetically productive, a “sacrificial crisis” in which violence 
proliferates simultaneously plagues it.
Camus’s prose fiction at once prolongs and responds to the com-
plex relationships between lethal punishment, ethical questioning, and 
the craft of writing perceptible in Hugo’s and Baudelaire’s works. The 
reactions and convictions elicited by the death penalty are so powerful 
in L’Étranger, La Peste, and Le Premier Homme that this institution, 
which appears to constitute a mere recurring motif in these plots, re-
veals itself both as a critical narrative pivot and as the foundation of 
an abolitionist myth and involuntary ethics. All three novels turn the 
refusal of capital punishment into a sort of initiatory rite through which 
the protagonists appear to attain maturity, sometimes after developing 
an unexpected and visceral ethos of resistance through their body. Al-
though this central role of the corporeal and the novels’ underlying im-
perative of what Hugo termed “inviolabilité de la vie humaine” (OCH 
4:482) echo aspects of Le Dernier Jour, Camus’s fiction concurrently 
avoids staging universal abolitionism. It narrates man’s possible fas-
cination, silence, or support in the face of state killing, acknowledges 
the human inclination to kill, and questions the possibility of making 
a work of art explicitly and unambiguously promote political—and 
moral—principles. Much like Baudelaire, surprisingly, Camus rejects 
a utilitarian view of literature and his fiction acknowledges a malaise 
mixing attraction and repulsion vis-à-vis lethal violence, suggesting that 
man can be both tempted and mesmerized by killing and profoundly 
troubled by the execution of others.
Camus’s nuanced positioning and the involuntary, body-centered 
abolitionist ethics deployed in his novels continue the complex forms 
of engagement with the death penalty found in Le Dernier Jour’s co-
vert, poetics-based abolitionism and in Baudelaire’s supposed but in 
fact inoperative praise of sacrificial executions that his poetry further 
disavows. All three writers favor strategies of indirection, in the form 
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of original modes of representation that maximize the symbolic possi-
bilities of language, image, and narration, to critique lethal justice and 
its imaginary. 
All three also come together in posing the crucial question of their 
own use of words, and that of the law, as death penalty stories are 
told. The relationship between expression and lethal justice is central 
to Camus’s works, which set out to reject both the silence and the met-
aphors surrounding the scaffold and to replace them with “plain lan-
guage”—an objective reminiscent of Hugo’s critique of judicial rhetoric 
in his preface of 1832. For Camus, discourse on legal killing must come 
as close as possible to reality and, to do so, must strip itself of its trans-
formative devices, metaphorical and euphemizing. This project verges 
on a linguistic utopia, and his narratives contradict it. Nevertheless, 
both his and Hugo’s novels manage to craft devices that lay bare the 
weaknesses, arbitrariness, and unacceptability of human justice. Their 
fiction satirizes those who determine whether or not a man should live, 
point to the duplicitous language of lethal law and its representatives, 
and dissect the human distress and fascination before the guillotine. 
But the two writers and Baudelaire also pick apart their own poetic 
gestures and liability. Key “mirror moments” symbolically expose this 
reflection. They reveal that Baudelaire and Camus converge in suggest-
ing that some degree of participation in the practice of violence, even if 
it remains purely rhetorical, may well be the price to pay for the literary 
representation of the death penalty.
Although some key distinctions set apart the writings of Hugo, 
Baudelaire, and Camus, unexpected points of convergence also link 
them. Ultimately, their works undo two crucial preconceptions: one pe-
nal, and the other literary. First, despite their differing political stances 
on lethal justice, with Hugo and Camus opposing the death penalty and 
Baudelaire provocatively claiming to support it, the three authors inval-
idate, explicitly or implicitly, the premises that legitimated the guillotine 
from the French Revolution until the abolition of capital punishment 
in 1981. The novel poetics they develop are distinct: Hugo employs 
a fictional diaristic writing that maximizes internal focalization and 
alternates between the clinical and the hallucinatory; Baudelaire sets 
up a hyperbolic and falsely bloodthirsty aesthetic; Camus alternatively 
abides by and moves away from transparency and the strict reporting 
of legal lethal violence. The first writer could be said to have poetics, 
and not argument, serve ethics, the second to have poetic excess tease 
out ethical concerns, and the third to expose such concerns through 
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the concomitant implementation and destabilization of a poetic regi-
men of strict restraint. Beyond their diversity, the poetic choices of all 
three writers result in a pointed criticism of the enlightened philosophy 
and pragmatic arguments that led to the reconception and the pres-
ervation of capital punishment in the modern period. They associate 
lethal justice with dehumanization, the proliferation of violence, and 
revulsion, thereby questioning the supposed painlessness and immedi-
acy of beheading and the guillotine’s ability to maintain order in soci-
ety—whether objectively, by excising “dangerous” individuals from it, 
or subjectively, by using lethal retribution to provoke a sense of safety 
or satisfaction among its members.
Second, this invalidation of the alleged virtues of head severance by 
guillotine emerges from texts that complicate the apparent divide be-
tween politically committed writing and strictly aesthetic literature. As 
they mobilize and interrogate the resources of language, these works 
open up a space contesting this reductive opposition established by 
Hugo and Baudelaire themselves in their most vehement exchanges and 
public poses—an opposition continued into the twentieth century by 
Sartre’s definition of “engagement” as limited to prose and calling for 
a certain political prescriptiveness. In Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné, 
Hugo keeps overt militancy at bay: the novel relies on an activist poetics 
instead of the explicit abolitionist political discourse and edifying sen-
timentalism he mobilizes elsewhere. Also original is Baudelaire’s stance 
on lethal violence, which, below the surface of voluble glorification and 
detachment from the Other’s pain, is at least in part one of concern. 
The poet points to the impossibility of an actual “désengagement” and 
rejoicing in suffering by presenting homicidal brutality as a process in 
which all partake, both as perpetrators and as victims. Camus further 
undoes the neat partition of “engagement” and disengagement. His fic-
tion actualizes the concept of “engagement involontaire” (OCC 4:1066) 
or “embarquement,” which it defines as direct and supportive partici-
pation in sociopolitical realities that require intervention but without 
subjecting this solidarity to programmatic dogmatism. In their literary 
treatment of the death penalty, all three writers consequently go beyond 
the most commonly established models used to envisage the modern re-
lationship between poetics and politics—aestheticist art and “littérature 
engagée.”
Instead, they cultivate literary transgression to represent state kill-
ing. Hugo’s fiction challenges decorum and verisimilitude to present, in 
blunt language, the improbable considerations of a prematurely dead 
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man almost until the moment of his killing. Baudelaire’s prose and verse 
test the boundaries of the aesthetically bearable and the author’s own 
assertion that the realm of beauty is sovereign, impervious to moral 
considerations, and fecundated by all “voluptés,” however brutal they 
may be. And Camus’s novels at once reject and are caught within the 
limitations of language when it comes to wording legal killing. All the 
works at hand also strive to preserve a certain artistic autonomy even 
as they do not detach art from worldly politics.
A literature in extremis, which both represents the limit experience of 
state-sanctioned death and probes the limits of aesthetics and politics, 
could be said to emerge from the “capital works” of the three writers. In 
it, poetic expression and self-reflexivity impose themselves as particular 
modes of ethical discourse. They critique the inadequacy of state killing 
without using discourse and argument. Instead, they craft forms that 
both capture and expose this violence. In other words, the language that 
Hugo, Baudelaire, and Camus invent to represent state killing unsettles 
the aesthetic standards and theoretical frameworks that successively de-
fine literature’s role throughout French modernity while at the same 
time contesting the politico-moral agenda, and the rhetoric, used by 
post-Revolutionary society to render the guillotine acceptable. In thus 
inking the scaffold, the authors make palpable the poetic dimension of 
ethics and the ethical dimension of language.
While the issue of literature’s interface with ethics is age-old, through 
the fundamental moral question of the death penalty, these authors shed 
light on it in a way that is arguably more profound and disquieting than 
that found in the works of many of their peers. The ultimate trademark 
of the “capital writings” examined here may be their poetics of dis-
comfort. By this phrase, I mean that all three writers have poetic work 
generate profound unease in the reader. It forces us to take on board 
the experience, violence, failures, and troubling mechanisms—judicial 
and human—that underlie state killing. In Hugo’s novel, this discom-
fort stems from a poetics that renders the crushing of the subject in 
real time, in a manner that forecloses any distancing from lethal state 
violence. Purification, or mere relief, is consequently unattainable for 
the reader-voyeur. In Baudelaire, poetic strategies constantly destabilize 
the positions of the subject and object of violence and portray this vio-
lence as uncontainable. Poet and Other are caught within an ever-failing 
sacrificial ritual. Such markers as laughter and irony testify to this un-
comfortable positioning. With Camus, discomfort lies in the awareness 
of a possible complicity with lethal violence, which, in its institutional 
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form, is shown to rely largely on a language that his own writing seeks 
to denounce despite the fact that it must rely on the same material—
words—to do so and in the physical disgust that execution may elicit in 
some individuals.
Critics have reflected on emotions as a means of ethical formation 
and on literature’s ability to generate such emotions, with a marked 
preference for compassion.1 Away from this affect that posits a distance 
between the suffering individual and the sympathetic one, the works un-
der consideration frequently entrap the reader in their representations 
of state killing. Through their language and anthropological symbolism, 
these writings block the possibility of perception from afar and of a se-
cure posture, whether exterior, conservative, or humanistic. They place 
the reader in what Camus’s novel La Chute (The Fall; 1956) calls le 
malconfort: a medieval dungeon whose reduced dimensions prevent one 
from adopting a comfortable position, either standing or lying down.
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introduction
1. Speech to the Assemblée Constituante of September 15, 1848. Because of 
limited space, French citations that do not originate from literary texts or are 
not subject to close reading are provided in English only throughout the book. 
Translations are my own unless otherwise stated.
2. The “Frenchness” of the guillotine should be relativized, nonetheless: a 
German harpsichord maker constructed the machine, and it had ancestors in 
the Italian mannaia, the Scottish maiden, and the Halifax gibbet.
3. While there are many ways the state can kill, the phrase “state killing,” no-
tably used by Austin Sarat in his numerous significant publications on the death 
penalty in the United States, is often employed to refer to capital punishment in 
particular. See, for instance, his When the State Kills.
4. Julia Kristeva notes that calls for the reinstatement of capital punishment 
are still heard “in times of popular depression” (Visions capitales, 101) despite 
the abolition, and she argues that one of the political functions of the numerous 
artistic representations of the death penalty might be to quench this thirst for a 
“restoration” of state killing. 
5. The use of lethal injection in the United States today provides another exam-
ple of the reliance of state killing on figuration. It consists of three phases. The sec-
ond, informally called the “cosmetic” one, brings about muscular paralysis designed 
to render the condemned prisoners’ suffering imperceptible to the audience around 
them. On capital punishment in the United States, see work by David Garland, Ste-
phen John Hartnett, Austin Sarat, and David Von Drehle, among others.
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6. Numerous philosophers and critics have argued that literary texts have the 
ability to hone our moral and political imagination and that some can be con-
sidered works of moral philosophy. See, for instance, Iris Murdoch’s The Fire 
and the Sun and Existentialists and Mystics and Martha Nussbaum’s Love’s 
Knowledge (125–67 and 195–219, in particular). Peter Brooks has specifically 
underlined the way Hugo’s capital fiction compensates for possible failures 
of the moral imagination (“Death in the First Person,” 543–44). In the social 
sciences, psychology, and the neurosciences, an increasing body of scholarship 
has reinforced this claim over the past two decades. See, for example, Jèmeljan 
Hakemulder, The Moral Laboratory and Keith Oatley, “Fiction.”
7. For studies on the representation of the death penalty in other national 
contexts, and specifically in British and American literature and culture, see 
Wendy Lesser, David Guest, Kristin Boudreau, Mark Canuel, Paul Christian 
Jones, and John Cyril Barton.
8. Their research has tended to concentrate on one author only (Hugo), on 
a single school and era (Romanticism or, to a lesser extent, Realism), or on a 
particular genre (the novel, and, more rarely, drama).
9. The major studies on the Romantic-era death penalty in France, evoked 
in the forthcoming chapters, include Paul Savey-Casard’s Le Crime et la peine 
dans l’œuvre de Victor Hugo, Elizabeth Riley’s “La Voix qui sort de l’ombre,” 
Christine Marcandier-Colard’s Crimes de sang et scènes capitales, Laura J. Pou-
losky’s Severed Heads and Martyred Souls, Sonja Martin Hamilton’s “La Plume 
et le couperet,” and Loïc Guyon’s Les Martyrs de la veuve. 
10. Among them, Daniel Arasse’s seminal essay La Guillotine et l’imaginaire 
de la Terreur, Daniel Gerould’s Guillotine, and Patrick Wald Lasowski’s Les 
Échafauds du romanesque, as well as his less academic Guillotinez-moi!
11. The most significant contributions of this kind are Paul Savey-Casard’s 
La Peine de mort, Paul-Henri Stahl’s Histoire de la décapitation, Linda Orr’s 
Headless History, Régis Bertrand and Anne Carol’s edited volume L’Exécution 
capitale, and Regina Janes’s Losing Our Heads.
12. Exceptions were made in times of war, when the death penalty could be 
carried out by firing squads.
13. Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, 66.
14. Morellet freely rearranges Beccaria’s argument in his translation.
15. Badinter, L’Abolition de la peine de mort, 69.
16. For an extensive investigation of the guillotine during the French Revolu-
tion, see Arasse, La Guillotine et l’imaginaire de la Terreur, 17–42.
17. See Article 13 of the Code pénal of 1810.
18. Farcy, “La Peine de mort: Pratique judiciaire et débats.”
19. Arasse, La Guillotine et l’imaginaire de la Terreur, 95–98.
20. If one includes civil war deaths in addition to the judicial terror, the 
number of casualties amounts to between 250,000 and 400,000. On the Terror, 
see, for instance, Greer, The Incidence of the Terror; Jones, The Longman Com-
panion to the French Revolution.
21. See Wald Lasowski, Les Échafauds du romanesque, 30; Farcy, “La Peine 
de mort en France: Deux siècles pour une abolition”; Aubusson de Cavarlay, 
Huré, and Pottier, “Les Statistiques criminelles de 1831 à 1981,” 182–83.
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22. This is true not only from philosophical and legal standpoints, but 
also from a scientific perspective. Phrenology, pioneered by Franz Joseph Gall 
(1758–1828), criminal anthropology, invented and promoted by Cesare Lom-
broso (1835–1909), as well as anthropometry and craniometry, which such 
French figures as Alphonse Bertillon and Georges Vacher de Lapouge respec-
tively supported, claimed to contribute to the understanding of criminality.
23. In the 1850s, Hugo famously summarized his shifting political orien-
tations as follows: “1818.—Royaliste. / 1824.—Royaliste libéral. / 1827.—
Libéral. / 1828.—Libéral-socialiste. / 1830.—Libéral-socialiste-démocrate. / 
1849.—Libéral-socialiste-démocrate-républicain” (OCH 9:1019–20).
24. See “Théophile Gautier” (OCB 2:113) and “Notes nouvelles sur Edgar 
Poe” (OCB 2:333), two essays in which Baudelaire condemns the “heresy” of 
“morality” in poetry by taking up Poe’s criticism of didacticism in his Poetic 
Principle.
25. Barthes, Le Degré zéro de l’écriture, 108.
26. Baudelaire, JIB, 301.
27. “The theater of the guillotine culminates in an instant of invisibility” 
(Arasse, La Guillotine et l’imaginaire de la Terreur, 49).
28. Valéry, “Enseignement de la poétique,” in Variété V, 291.
29. Ricœur, “Éthique et morale,” 260.
part i
1. See chapters 6, 21, and 22 of Adèle Hugo’s Victor Hugo raconté par un 
témoin de sa vie.
2. See the 1832 preface to Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné. Chapter XXVIII 
of the novel also refers to the greasing of the guillotine.
3. Several edited volumes have provided an overview of Hugo’s substantial 
textual production pertaining to capital punishment. Among them are Ray-
mond Jean’s Écrits de Victor Hugo sur la peine de mort, Jérôme Picon and Isabel 
Violante’s Victor Hugo contre la peine de mort, and Paul F. Smets’s shorter Le 
Combat pour l’abolition de la peine de mort. The landmark study analyzing this 
production in its entirety remains Paul Savey-Casard’s Le Crime et la peine dans 
l’œuvre de Victor Hugo. See also the opening section of Stéphanie Boulard’s 
Rouge Hugo, which focuses on the writer’s obsession with and aesthetics of 
“Dame guillotine” (21–93). On the broader question of Hugo as “lawgiver,” see 
part VII of Roger Pearson’s Unacknowledged Legislators. 
4. More than thirty years before the publication of the eponymous novel, 
Hugo uses the term “misérables” in the preface of Le Dernier Jour d’un con-
damné. According to Benoît Chabert, of the 1,775 people who were sentenced 
to death in France between 1833 and 1880, only 38 benefited from higher ed-
ucation, whereas 812 were illiterate, and 925 knew how to read and write but 
had not had access to an education (“Sur la peine de mort en France,” 173).
5. Chevalier, Classes laborieuses et classes dangereuses, 314–15; Gohin, “Les 
Réalités du crime et de la justice pour Victor Hugo avant 1829,” xviii.
6. For Monestier (Peines de mort, 216) and Lascoumes (“Révolution ou ré-
forme juridique?,” 65), there are thirty-nine crimes punishable by death in the 
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1810 Code pénal. For Chabert, there are thirty-six (“Sur la peine de mort en 
France,” 169). Depending on how one considers what constitutes a distinct cap-
ital crime or what is simply a variant of another, the number may therefore vary. 
About the harshness of the 1810 Code pénal and its move away from the idea of 
human perfectibility promoted in 1791, see Lascoumes (68–69).
7. Among the capital cases defined by the 1810 Code pénal, one also finds 
a number of nonlethal crimes: illegal arrests executed by an individual wearing 
a fake officer’s uniform; tampering with a witness of a capital crime; certain 
offenses committed against property, private or public, such as theft with five 
aggravating circumstances; certain cases of arson. See Chabert, “Sur la peine de 
mort en France,” 169.
8. See, for instance, Guizot’s De la peine de mort en matière politique (1822), 
Jean-Baptiste Salaville’s De la peine de mort et du système pénal dans ses rap-
ports avec la morale et la politique (1826), Lucas’s Du système pénal et du 
système répressif en général et de la peine de mort en particulier (1827), and 
Ballanche’s “Abolition de la peine de mort et de toute loi répressive” (1834). 
For a thorough study of the debate on capital punishment during the Second 
Restoration, see Martin Hamilton, “La Plume et le couperet,” 12–95.
9. The law allowing for the consideration of extenuating circumstances, the 
elimination of nine capital cases, and of the most brutal bodily punishments was 
not adopted until April 1832.
10. Gohin, “Les Réalités du crime et de la justice,” xviii. Du Camp asserts 
that a total of 554 death sentences were pronounced between 1826 and 1830, 
leading to 360 effective executions (“La Guillotine,” 394). In Peines de mort, 
Monestier writes that 4,520 people were guillotined between 1811 and 1825, 
and 1029 between 1826 and 1850—a decrease for which the adoption of exten-
uating circumstances in 1832 partly accounts. 
11. See Farcy, “La Peine de mort: Pratique judiciaire et débats.”
12. See Biré, Victor Hugo avant 1830, 473–74; Nisard (?), review published 
in Journal des Débats, February 26, 1829; the 1963 edition Le Dernier Jour 
d’un condamné presented by Guillemin, 205; Vallois, “Écrire ou décrire,” 92.
13. See Jules Lefèvre-Deumier’s Un poète romantique contre la peine de mort 
in Guyon’s online critical edition.
14. Vidocq, Mémoires de Vidocq; Anicet Bourgeois and Victor Ducange, Sept 
heures.
15. See, respectively, the ode “Contre la peine de mort” (Against the Death 
Penalty; 1830), La Maréchale d’Ancre (1831), and “Histoire d’Hélène Gillet” 
(1832). 
16. See for example, Benjamin Antier, Alexis Decomberousse, and J.-S. Raf-
fard-Brienne’s melodrama L’Abolition de la peine de mort, Anne Bignan’s novel 
L’Échafaud, or Charles Rabou’s fantastic tale “Le Ministère public,” all pub-
lished in the collective volume Contes bruns in 1832.
17. A proposition supported by the famous abolitionist figure Victor Destutt 
de Tracy. See Bowman, “The Intertextuality of Victor Hugo’s Le Dernier Jour 
d’un condamné,” 37–38.
18. The 1832 preface can legitimately be said to constitute a separate work 
in and of itself. It is a direct address from the writer to the reader and came out 
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in a different historico-political context—after the events of July 1830 and after 
December 1830, when four ex-ministers of Charles X accused of high treason 
were sentenced not to death but to exile. Their accusal had led the Chambre des 
députés to support the abolition of capital punishment for political crimes only; 
this measure was actually adopted only in 1848. Hugo denounces an abolition 
intended for these “happy few” in his preface of 1832. Shortly thereafter, nine 
capital cases were also removed from the Code pénal (law of April 28, 1832); so 
were the mutilation of the parricide’s hand and the use of branding and iron col-
lars. In addition, extenuating circumstances were generalized. Along with other 
critics, including Flaubert (Correspondance, 204), Massin (in OCH 3:606, 
4:473), Brombert (“Le Condamné de Hugo,” 75), Roman (“Le Dernier Jour 
d’un condamné,” 35), Rosa (“Commentaire du Dernier Jour d’un condamné,” 
268), and Martin Hamilton (“La Plume et le couperet,” 174), I would argue that 
the preface of 1832 is a text in itself, to be considered either as separate from the 
condemned man’s journal or as shedding a different light on it.
19. Part I mainly focuses on the narrative as it was available to readers when 
the book first came out in 1829. For an examination of the book’s multiple 
para- or pre-texts, see Grossman’s insightful The Early Novels of Victor Hugo, 
111–58, and Halsall, “Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné à mort [sic],” 408–34.
chapter 1
1. For a survey of the various forms of late eighteenth- and early-nineteenth 
century abolitionist thought, see, for instance, Bowman, “The Intertextuality of 
Victor Hugo’s Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné,” 28–30.
2. Bowman also argues that Hugo is quite indifferent to another consid-
eration that interests Beccaria and others, namely that man cannot alienate 
his right to life in a social contract (“The Intertextuality of Victor Hugo’s Le 
Dernier Jour d’un condamné,” 30). Chapter 2 nuances this claim. 
3. Badinter, “Je vote l’abolition de la peine de mort,” 56. It is noteworthy 
that a laudatory review by Duvergier from February 7, 1829, published in the 
Gazette des Tribunaux made the very same point. Several other readers have 
analyzed the book’s imagistic—but also poetic—power that this chapter seeks 
to investigate further. They include Victor Brombert, Jean Rousset, Lucien Däl-
lenbach, Guy Rosa, Delphine Gleizes, and Myriam Roman, in particular. 
Like Badinter, Guizot and Broglie had underlined the necessity to rely on 
emotion as well as reason to critique capital punishment (Bowman, “The Inter-
textuality of Victor Hugo’s Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné,” 41–42). 
4. Hugo’s praise was published in a review for Le Réveil on February 19, 
1823.
5. For an examination of the central role played by the literary representa-
tions of capital punishment in the “querelle des Classiques et des Modernes” 
and the innovativeness of the Romantic works that dealt with the death penalty, 
including but not limited to Le Dernier Jour, see Guyon, Martyrs de la veuve, 
81–124. The analysis proposed in this chapter complements his. On French 
Romantic aesthetics in its relation to bloody and capital scenes, see Marcan-
dier-Colard, Crimes de sang et scènes capitales, 277, 279. Politically speaking, 
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Hugo claims to have been “liberal-royalist” in 1824, “liberal” in 1827, and “so-
cialist-liberal” in 1828 (OCH 9:1019–20).
6. Gohin, “Les Réalités du crime et de la justice,” iv–v.
7. About the anticlassical character of Han, see, for instance, Nodier’s re-
view in La Quotidienne, March 12, 1823. About the influence of the genre 
frénétique, the roman noir, and British and German fiction on Hugo’s Han d’Is-
lande, see Massin, in OCH 2:58–59.
8. It is no coincidence that the first epigraph of chapter XLVIII is an excerpt 
from “Parisina,” one of the poems in Lefèvre-Deumier’s Le Parricide.
9. See Nisard (?), review of Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné, for instance.
10. See, for example, Corre, “À propos de la peine de mort et du livre du 
Professeur Lacassagne, Peine de mort et criminalité,” 231, 238. See also Farcy, 
“La Peine de mort: Pratique judiciaire et débats.”
11. Rousset (“Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné ou l’invention d’un genre 
littéraire,” 40–41) also points to these passages that I call “moments of 
interpellation.” 
12. See Massin, in OCH 3:611–13. Hugo interestingly expanded on the bi-
ographical traits he shared with his character when revising his text. 
13. Dostoevsky underlines this very point in his preface to A Gentle Crea-
ture, 216.
14. Rousset, “Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné,” 42.
15. “Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné, roman; par M. Victor Hugo,” Le 
Globe, February 4, 1829.
16. Giornale, incominciato li 25 Novembre dell’anno 1821 da Luc’Anto-
nio Viterbi, condannato alla pena di morte, published in its entirety by Robert 
Benson in 1825 as Sketches of Corsica; Or, A Journal Written during a Visit to 
That Island in 1823, then taken up in the London Magazine, before a passage 
translated into French came out in the Revue Britannique in May 1826. 
17. “Angleterre: Dernières sensations d’un homme condamné à mort,” Le 
Globe, January 3, 1828.
18. Hugo visited Bicêtre with David d’Angers in October 1827, and again in 
October 1828. They also went to the jail of the Conciergerie in 1827. In addi-
tion, Hugo relied on reports from the Gazette des Tribunaux and on Vidocq’s 
evocations of the convict’s carceral life and argot (Charlier, “Comment fut écrit 
Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné?,” 345). The review of Le Dernier Jour pub-
lished in Le Globe on February 4, 1829, criticized this quest for the picturesque.
19. Dostoevsky, preface to “A Gentle Creature,” 216. Rousset (“Le Dernier 
Jour d’un condamné,” 35) and Brombert (Victor Hugo and the Visionary Novel, 
29, 248) briefly mention this Dostoevskian connection as well.
20. On Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné as a nouveau roman, see also Lowe-
Dupas (“Innommable guillotine,” 343), following in France Vernier’s footsteps, 
and Guyon (Les Martyrs de la veuve, 115–20). In one of the best studies of Le 
Dernier Jour ever published, Lucien Dällenbach has argued that the book could 
have been written by Butor or Robbe-Grillet in the 1950s (“Le Vide plein,” 52).
21. See Bozon, L’Expression du moi, 18. For the criticism leveled against 
Le Dernier Jour by Hugo’s contemporaries, see, for instance, the review by 
Nisard (?), who suggested that every breach of fiction and classical representa-
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tion discussed here be remedied by a more conventional rewriting of the novel. 
The review of Le Dernier Jour published in Le Globe on February 4, 1829 also 
deplores the reader’s absence of knowledge regarding the protagonist’s past and 
identity.
22. Hugo points to two potential eighteenth-century predecessors, Xavier 
de Maistre and Laurence Sterne, only to signal the originality of his work with 
more emphasis. Maistre’s A Journey around My Room and Sterne’s A Sentimen-
tal Journey through France and Italy differ from Le Dernier Jour in that they 
mainly resort to retrospection, include an addressee, and are often humorous 
and playful in substance and tone.
23. Rancière, Mute Speech, 50.
24. See the speaker’s unambiguous judgment: “Les forçats, les patients sont 
du ressort de son éloquence. Il les confesse et les assiste, parce qu’il a sa place 
à faire” (Those doing hard labor, the patients come under the remit of his elo-
quence. He confesses and assists them because he must climb the ladder; 693).
25. See also II, 659.
26. Meschonnic (“Vers le roman-poème,” vii–viii, xii), Brombert, and Rosa 
(“Commentaires du Dernier Jour,” 250) have also pointed to the condemned 
man’s cris, which I connect to an extensive poetic strategy here.
27. Rancière, Mute Speech, 50.
28. Rancière, Mute Speech, 42.
29. Charlier’s study of the evolution of the manuscript of Le Dernier Jour 
indicates that Hugo avidly sought to heighten the imagistic quality of his work.
30. Meschonnic points out that “the attention that Hugo pays to the pow-
ers of language is the basis for his word plays” (“Vers le roman-poème,” viii). 
Guyon notes that the image of the head saturates the novel, with thirty-eight 
utterances (Martyrs de la veuve, 101).
31. Meschonnic rightly called Le Dernier Jour a proto-“roman-poème.” For 
a detailed examination of the alliterations, echoes, and sound plays that make 
up what Meschonnic calls the novel’s chiseled and powerful “phrasé,” see the 
section entitled “La Prosodie” in “Vers le roman-poème” (xi–xiii).
32. Yvette Parent has shown that a few of the terms that Hugo presents as 
argotiques are in fact poissards (another form of popular dialect) and that a 
small number of his words does not appear in argot dictionaries (“L’emploi de 
l’argot”). On the reinvention of argot in Hugo’s fiction, see also Boulard, Rouge 
Hugo, 319–20.
33. The condamné himself is able to play with this disincarnate speech spo-
radically: he uses a “dead” language, Latin, to impress the prison concierge, who 
does not understand it but perceives its prestige. As a consequence, he allows the 
convict to go on weekly walks inside the jail (V, 663).
34. The idiomatic phrase “langue de bois” prolongs the analogy between 
vegetation and language that Hugo sketches through the metaphor of the 
grafted tongue—thereby harking back to a long-standing ambition to enrich 
the French language, as exemplified by du Bellay’s Défense et illustration de la 
langue française (1549). Thus in Le Dernier Jour, one finds, on the one hand, 
the hideous but living graft of the argot and, on the other, the bois mort of “la 
langue générale” as it is used by officials.
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35. For a survey of hallucinations and the guillotine in Hugo’s works other 
than Le Dernier Jour, see Boulard, Rouge Hugo, 38–44.
36. For an overview of the crimes and executions of these figures, see Gohin’s 
“Les Réalités du crime et de la justice” (iv–ix, xii–xiii).
37. Meschonnic, “Vers le roman-poème,” ix.
38. Flaubert, letter to Louise Colet, December 9, 1852, Correspondance, 204.
chapter 2
1. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 16–17. Although Foucault’s diagnosis 
concerns punishment at large, the first part of his book addresses the particular 
issue of the death penalty. I use it to summarize the progressive redefinition of 
penalty in the modern period and do not purport to discuss Foucault’s larger 
demonstration regarding the development of insidious modes of disciplining 
and the modern rise of surveillance.
2. The preface of 1832 denounces the way in which, from this year onward, 
France carried out its executions surreptitiously, at dawn and far from the cen-
ter of Paris, by the barrière Saint-Jacques (OCH 4:491). When Le Dernier Jour 
came out in 1829, the guillotine was still used on the place de Grève. 
3. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, 138.
4. The opening of the 1832 preface remarkably goes as far as to suppress the 
one element that makes Hugo’s character suspicious, his guilt, by calling atten-
tion to the book’s focus on “les accusés” (the accused), and not “les condamnés” 
(the condemned; OCH 4:480).
5. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 18. Regarding this qualification of the 
individual, Foucault argues that the misinterpretation of article 64 of the 1810 
Code pénal stipulating that it is impossible to condemn lawbreakers who were 
declared insane illustrates, early on in the nineteenth century, the use of personal 
data to inflect a legal judgment. Law courts did not rule that there were no 
grounds for prosecution regarding these criminals but instead settled either for 
acquittal or the consideration of extenuating circumstances. About the growing 
interest in moral characterization, Lascoumes also notes that the 1810 Code 
pénal is highly “individualizing” (“Révolution ou réforme juridique?” 68).
6. See Renneville, Le Langage des crânes, 70.
7. Brombert has also identified the recurring parallels that conjoin these two 
poles of the social ladder, one subaltern and the other sovereign (“Le Condamné 
de Hugo,” 76–77, 79–80).
8. Agamben, Homo Sacer, 73.
9. Agamben, Homo Sacer, 18, 183.
10. Nevertheless, like the condemned man, the homo sacer is to be killed 
within a framework strictly prescribed by the law. Given the ban on his sacrifice, 
he does not escape legal prescription. Regarding the fact that the condemned 
man is to be killed in a prescribed context, see Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné, 
XXV, 690.
11. See Rousseau, “The Right of Life and Death” in The Social Contract. 
Although, like Montesquieu and Beccaria, Rousseau notes that “frequent pun-
ishments are always a sign of weakness or remission on the part of the gov-
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ernment,” and that “the State has no right to put to death, even for the sake 
of making an example, any one whom it can leave alive without danger,” these 
remarks are preceded by considerations on what the philosopher views as the 
end of the social contract, namely “the preservation of the contracting parties,” 
an end that allows the state to terminate life (The Social Contract, 208–9).
12. Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, 66.
13. Quoted in Badinter, L’Abolition de la peine de mort, 46–47.
14. Martin Hamilton also identifies these moments as revealing of the pro-
tagonist’s untimely death (“La Plume et le couperet,” 181).
15. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 11.
16. Benjamin mentions “das bloße Leben” in “Destiny and Character” and in 
“The Critique of Violence.” Agamben’s essay engages in a direct dialogue with 
Foucault, and more particularly with the thesis according to which a key char-
acteristic of modern politics is “the inclusion of zoē in the polis” (Homo Sacer, 
9). Agamben revises it by suggesting that, in fact, “together with the process by 
which the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare life—which 
is originally situated at the margins of the political order—gradually begins to 
coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and in-
side, bios and zoē, right and fact, enter a zone of irreducible indistinction” (9).
17. Dällenbach has also noted that the book acts on our nerves through a 
“rush of affects” that nevertheless blocks a standard identificatory reading (“Le 
Vide plein,” 52).
18. Review of Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné in Journal des Débats, Feb-
ruary 26, 1829.
19. Review of Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné in La Quotidienne, February 
3, 1829. 
20. The phrase is Arasse’s in La Guillotine et l’imaginaire de la Terreur, 49.
21. Hugo’s concern with the moral torture inherent in modern capital pun-
ishment finds a striking echo in more recent testimonies. See Fernand Meys-
sonnier, assistant executioner in Algeria in the 1940s and 1950s, in Bessette, 
“L’Exécution,” 26.
22. The preface of 1832 calls for a time when “the gentle law of Christ will 
enter the [Penal] Code at last and shine through it.” Derrida calls this para-
text “logico-teleological.” Regarding materialism and empiricism in Le Dernier 
Jour, Martin Hamilton notes that the depiction of moral suffering in the novel 
depends on that of pathologies (“La Plume et le couperet,” 186). 
23. Hugo also suggests that, while capital punishment exalts horror, it im-
pedes all repentance and, consequently, any salvation, for only death obsesses 
the condemned man (XXXIV, 698). 
24. This is not to say that the French Church supported capital punishment 
unilaterally. In 1825, Charles X associated it with an expansion of capital cases 
by passing the “law on sacrilege,” but such Christian associations as the Société 
de la morale chrétienne actively promoted the abolition. In 1836 and 1837, La-
martine delivered speeches against the death penalty before this society, which 
also organized essay competitions on the issue in 1826 and 1836.
25. Although modern law based the legitimacy of mechanized decapitation 
on painlessness, a number of scientists, including Samuel Thomas von Söm-
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mering, Jean-Joseph Sue, the Swiss physiologist Albrecht von Haller, Weicard, 
Oelsner, and Leveling, questioned this thesis. Reservations were also expressed 
in an anonymous Notice historique et physiologique sur les supplices de la guil-
lotine from 1830 and in literary works and newspaper articles discussing the 
fact that certain limbs or the head seem to show signs of life after their sever-
ance (the most famous example being Charlotte Corday). See also Carol, “La 
Question de la douleur,” 73–75; Millingen, “Decapitation”; Jordanova, “Med-
ical Mediations.”
26. Louis, “Avis motivé sur le mode de la décollation,” 39:686; my emphasis.
27. Monestier, Peines de mort, 212, 211. The parliamentary archives simply 
summarize Guillotin’s intervention as follows: “M. Guillotin reads out a report 
on the Penal Code. He establishes that in principle the law must be the same, 
when it punishes as when it protects” (Guillotin, “M. Guillotin lit un travail sur 
le Code pénal,” 10:346).
28. A long passage from Louis’s “Avis motivé sur le mode de décollation” 
(March 1792) was reproduced in Bourg Saint-Edme’s Dictionnaire de la pénal-
ité (4:161–63) in 1828, the year Hugo wrote Le Dernier Jour.
29. Several critics have commented on these devices. See Lowe-Dupas, “In-
nommable guillotine,” 343–45; Guyon, Les Martyrs de la veuve, 92–95, 120; 
Martin Hamilton, “La Plume et le couperet,” 187–88.
30. Guyon also underlines this use of synecdoche in Les Martyrs de la veuve, 
100.
31. Without pointing to this particular passage, Boulard also contends that 
linguistics is one of the means by which Hugo attacks the guillotine (Rouge 
Hugo, 14).
32. In his preface of 1832, Hugo himself comments on the way his novel 
plainly puts on display the question of capital punishment (OCH 4:480).
33. Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” 52.
34. Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” 66.
35. Badinter, L’Abolition de la peine de mort, 63.
36. On February 19, 1829, a negative review of Hugo’s book published in La 
Gazette de France vehemently condemned the novel’s denunciation of the moral 
torture that formed part of capital punishment by decapitation.
37. Scarry, The Body in Pain, 30, 31, 38.
38. Scarry, The Body in Pain, 28.
39. Scarry, The Body in Pain, 29.
40. “The same bare life that in the ancien régime was politically neutral and 
belonged to God as creaturely life and in the classical world was (at least appar-
ently) clearly distinguished as zoē from political life (bios) now fully enters into 
the structure of the state and even becomes the earthly foundation of the state’s 
legitimacy and sovereignty” (Agamben, Homo Sacer, 127).
41. Agamben, Homo Sacer, 128.
42. Agamben, Homo Sacer, 183–84; my emphasis.
43. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 14.
44. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 9.
45. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 9.
46. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 12.
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47. Some critics have tended to overlook the importance of Le Dernier Jour 
d’un condamné independently of its 1832 preface. See Halsall, Victor Hugo et 
l’art de convaincre, 408. In the first volume of his seminar on the death penalty, 
Derrida mentions Le Dernier Jour in passing, insisting on the preface (Sémi-
naire: La Peine de mort, 154–55). Yet the components of Hugo’s abolitionism 
he identifies and praises in this later paratext are already present in the main 
body of the novel. Despite his overarching thesis on the indissociability of lit-
erature (of the work done by poetics, then) and the “contestation” of capital 
punishment (59), Derrida focuses on explicit argumentation and philosophy. 
Even when it comes to the preface only, he concedes that Hugo’s writing and 
“poetics” should be analyzed in and of themselves (291).
48. Review published in La Gazette de France on February 19, 1829, and 
Hugo, Écrits sur la peine de mort, 189.
49. See, in particular, the first “vision” of the scaffold that occurs in Les 
Misérables (OCH 2:64), or the beginning of “Cependant le soleil se lève” in 
Quatrevingt-Treize (OCH 15:505).
50. Hugo also defends this idea in the previously cited article he published 
on Le Parricide in Le Réveil on February 19, 1823, and in the preface to the 
Nouvelles odes from March 1824 (OCH 2:472). 
part ii
1. Three critics in particular have examined Baudelairean violence thor-
oughly, sometimes pointing to aspects of the poet’s “capital imaginaire.” Jérôme 
Thélot has shown that Baudelairean poetry is aware of the fact that it is rooted 
in violence (Baudelaire, 495). He has demonstrated that it both perpetrates and 
illuminates this violence and that it opens up the possibility of sympathy. De-
barati Sanyal has called into question the representation and consecration of 
Baudelaire as a “traumatophile,” and instead proposes considering his “myriad 
structures of ‘victime’ and of ‘bourreau’” and complex use of “[textual] vio-
lence, counterviolence, and irony” (The Violence of Modernity, 30, 12). Pierre 
Pachet has investigated the issue of capital punishment more carefully than any 
other critic through the notion of distinction. He has connected Baudelaire’s 
thought on the death penalty, suicide, and solitude to what underlies sacrifice, 
namely “the impossibility of a contractual interhuman relation” (Le Premier 
venu: Baudelaire, 161).
2. This introduction provides a brief overview of the capital imaginary in 
Baudelaire’s life and works. For a more detailed reconstitution and chronology, 
see Morisi, “Baudelaire’s Death Penalty.”
3. Barral, “L’Hôtel des colonnes à Mont-Saint-Jean,” 17.
4. Quoted in Crépet and Crépet, Charles Baudelaire, 110, 130.
5. See, for instance, Barral, Cinq journées avec Ch. Baudelaire, 25; OCB 
1:184, 668, 685; CB 1:303; CB 2:142; and Morisi, “Baudelaire’s Death Pen-
alty,” 143–47.
6. In the section of the 1954 Pléiade edition dedicated to Mon cœur mis à 
nu, Y.-G. Le Dantec seems to have mistakenly grouped together in a single para-
graph the passage beginning with “Un condamné à mort,” the section of folio 
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12 stating “La peine de mort est le résultat d’une idée mystique,” another on tor-
ture and cruelty (OCB 1:683; folio 12), and “L’envers de Claude Gueux” (OCB 
1:598; folio 24). “L’envers de Claude Gueux” and “Un condamné à mort” do 
not belong to Mon cœur mis à nu. Several editions have also added the title 
“Dandies” to folios 24 and 25, but it seems that this word never appeared in 
the original folios.
7. Sanyal has shown how this prose poem blurs, if not collapses, the con-
trast between executioner and victim—just as it undermines the demarcation 
between despotism and resistance, the political and the aesthetic, agency and 
passivity, complicity and innocence. It therefore echoes a number of poems from 
Les Fleurs du mal discussed in what follows (The Violence of Modernity, 65).
chapter 3
1.  About the law of 1832, see Monestier, Peines de mort, 223.
2. In 1870, the décret Crémieux was to stipulate that only one executioner 
would work in the métropole and that the guillotine would no longer be placed 
on a scaffold. Another evolution testifying to the desacralization and the 
de-spectacularization of executions is the resort to faster, portable guillotines, 
called “accélératrices” (Monestier, Peines de mort, 224). 
3. See especially Léon Cellier’s extensive study Baudelaire et Hugo. More 
recently, André Guyaux’s “Baudelaire et Victor Hugo” and Giovanni Dotoli’s 
Baudelaire-Hugo have traced the story of this relationship.
4. Cellier, Baudelaire et Hugo, 169.
5. Valéry, Variété II, 233, and letter from Valéry to Paul Souday, 1923, Œu-
vres 1:1715.
6. Crépet and Crépet, Charles Baudelaire, 85–86. See also OCB 2:1563–64.
7. Pachet, Le Premier Venu: Essai sur la politique baudelairienne, 86.
8. See, for instance, George Sand’s novels and Eugène Sue’s romans-feuille-
tons, which periodicals such as Le Globe and La Réforme tended to promote. 
The following section examines Hugo’s particular case.
9. Poe, Essays and Reviews, 13.
10. Thélot dates a passage from the poet’s prose projects in folio 24 (on vo-
luptuousness and conversion) to 1859 (“La Conversion baudelairienne,” 120). 
Baudelaire’s remarks on Claude Gueux and on the condemned man going back 
to the executioner after he has been freed by the people are therefore likely to 
date from 1859 too.
11. On Baudelaire’s reactionary suspicion toward equality, universal suf-
frage, and the belief in progress, see, for instance, Compagnon, Les Antimod-
ernes, 31–33, 57–58. 
12. See also folio 14 of Mon cœur mis à nu, OCB 1:684–85.
13. Derrida, Séminaire: La peine de mort, 170.
14. Balzac, Le Curé de village, 591.
15. Pachet, Le Premier Venu: Baudelaire, 84.
16. Sanson, Memoirs of the Sansons, 285–86.
17. Poe, The Brevities, 322–23. Claude Pichois notes that the terms that 
define the project of which Poe dreamed and that Baudelaire executed are taken 
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up in Maître Chaix d’Est-Ange’s defense speech during Baudelaire’s trial (OCB 
1:1491). The argument made in this speech recalls the preemptive epigraph to 
the first edition of Les Fleurs du mal excerpted from d’Aubigné’s Tragiques. 
The defensive aim of both texts differs markedly from the offensiveness of Mon 
cœur mis à nu, however.
18. Baudelaire, Selected Letters of Charles Baudelaire, 166; translation 
modified.
19. CB 2:305. On January 13, 1863, Hetzel committed to publishing Mon 
cœur mis à nu (OCB 1:1468), a project that did not come to fruition: the text 
first appeared in Eugène Crépet’s edition of Baudelaire’s Œuvres posthumes in 
1887.
20. Baudelaire, The Letters of Charles Baudelaire to His Mother, 216. 
21. I agree with Guyaux (“Baudelaire et Victor Hugo,” 144, 147) that Cel-
lier’s optimistic view regarding the way Baudelaire considered Hugo—with 
increased benevolence, supposedly—should be qualified in light of the later 
Baudelaire’s hostile comments about his peer.
22. As opposed to Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné, Claude Gueux does not 
concern itself exclusively with the death penalty. Rather, it emphasizes the need 
to reform unsuitable laws and judiciary institutions that criminalize misery. For 
a comparison of the two works, see, for example, Lewis, “The Making of a 
Condamné.” 
23. See Baudelaire’s letter to his mother, December 5, 1837 (CB 1:48). 
24. “Notes nouvelles sur Edgar Poe” (OCB 2:333) and “Théophile Gautier” 
(OCB 2:113); my emphasis. The passage from “Théophile Gautier” (1859) in 
which Baudelaire recycles his remarks from “Notes nouvelles sur Edgar Poe” 
(1857) replaces “défaillance” with “déchéance,” thereby moving toward a more 
damning view of morality in art.
25. So derisive that Baudelaire dampens his considerations later on.
26. The same point is made in Baudelaire’s letter to Armand Fraisse, Febru-
ary 18, 1860 (CB 1:675).
27. See also “Notes nouvelles sur Edgar Poe” (1857), OCB 2:337. 
28. Baudelaire, Selected Letters of Charles Baudelaire, 134.
29. Pichois, Lettres à Baudelaire, 187–88.
30. Hugo, letter to Baudelaire, October 18, 1859 (Pichois, Lettres à Baude-
laire, 189). See also Hugo’s letters to Antonio-Maria Padilla, minister of the Re-
public of Colombia, October 12, 1863 (OCH 12:1229), and to the members of 
the Central Italian Committee for the Abolition of the Death Penalty, February 
4, 1865 (OCH 12:897). 
31. Hugo, Écrits sur la peine de mort, 189.
32. On the right to life and Hugo’s emphasis on the inviolability of human 
life, see Derrida, Séminaire: La peine de mort, 150, 152, 153, 164, 170; on the 
right to death, see 164 and in particular 171.
33. Hovasse, “Les Signes de Hugo,” 374.
34. In his Confessions, Rousseau does not attribute the anecdote of a “great 
princess” exclaiming about starving peasants “qu’ils mangent de la brioche” to 
Marie-Antoinette, but the phrase is commonly—albeit mistakenly—associated 
with her.
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35. See the fine reading proposed by Oehler, Le Spleen contre l’oubli, 323, 
329, 331, 332–33.
36. For an insightful analysis of Baudelaire’s disagreement with Hugo on this 
question and that of original sin in the review of Les Misérables, see the fifth 
chapter of Rosemary Lloyd’s Baudelaire’s Literary Criticism, and in particular 
185–87.
37. Letter of April 14, 1864.
38. The fact that Renan’s Histoire des origines du christianisme supported 
the then-controversial idea that Jesus was to be considered as a physical human 
being highlights this contrast between the spiritual (Christ) and the scientific 
(Renan).
39. An impossible task, if one is to believe the conclusion of Baudelaire’s 
review of Les Misérables (OCB 2:224).
40. “On dit qu’il faut couler les exécrables choses / Dans le puits de l’oubli 
et au sépulchre encloses, / Et que par les escrits le mal ressuscité / Infectera les 
mœurs de la postérité; / Mais le vice n’a point pour mère la science, / Et la vertu 
n’est pas fille de l’ignorance” (It is said that atrocious things must be drowned 
/ In the well of oblivion and in the sepulcher be enclosed, / And that through 
texts evil resuscitated / Shall infect the mores of posterity; / But vice is not born 
of science, / And virtue is not the daughter of ignorance; OCB 1:807).
41. A similar, vehement rejection of optimistic and consoling literature ap-
pears in Baudelaire’s draft response to Jules Janin, the despised author of Les 
Petits Bonheurs and La Religieuse de Toulouse (1850)—a book “À tuer” (to 
be killed), in the poet’s words (OCB 2:50). Not the Janin of L’Âne mort et la 
femme guillotine, which sought to parody Hugo’s Le Dernier Jour, then, but the 
Janin who did not appreciate Heine and whom Baudelaire took to be critical of 
sinister and ironic poetry (OCB 2:233–34).
42. On October 20, 1848, an article by Baudelaire portrayed the people 
of Paris as viewing the abolition of the death penalty for political crimes as a 
way of compensating for the government’s inability to curb joblessness (OCB 
2:1061). For a thorough examination of Baudelaire’s political critique of his era, 
and particularly of June 1848 and its aftermath, see the fifth and sixth chapters 
of Oehler’s Le Spleen contre l’oubli.
43. Fondane, Baudelaire et l’expérience du gouffre, 159.
44. The poem was later inserted in Les Quatre Vents de l’esprit.
45. Thélot, Baudelaire, 50.
46. Blin, Le Sadisme de Baudelaire, 20–21. Of Sade’s works (OCB 1:595; 
2:39, 68), Baudelaire knew at least Justine, ou les malheurs de la vertu (letter to 
Poulet-Malassis, October 1, 1865; CB 2:532).
47. Sade evokes capital punishment in La Philosophie dans le boudoir 
through the voice of one of his libertins, who posits an opposition between mur-
der committed by individuals and the abstract perpetration of murder through 
the law (505). On August 2, 1793, as the president of the section des Picques, he 
refused to organize the vote of measures serving the Terror (letter to Gaufridy, 
August 3, 1793; Bourdin, Correspondance inédite du marquis de Sade, 342). 
Two years later, he told the same interlocutor that the spectacle of the guillotine 
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hurt him more than his stay in the Bastille (letter, January 21, 1795; Bourdin, 
365). 
48. Baudelaire remembers this title as Lettres et mélanges.
49. See the first, ninth, and seventh “entretiens” of the Soirées, respectively 
(Œuvres, 470–71, 651, 714, 661).
50. Baudelaire, Selected Poems, 142. 
51. Baudelaire, Selected Poems, 142.
52. Maistre, St Petersburg Dialogues, 217–18.
53. Maistre, Œuvres, 812; Maistre, St Petersburg Dialogues, 358; translation 
modified.
54. This theory is contrasted with that of René Girard in what follows. 
55. See Maistre’s “Discours à Mme La Marquise de Costa sur la vie et la 
mort de son fils Alexis-Louis-Eugène de Costa”: “Rather, let us suffer, suffer 
with thoughtful resignation. If we can unite our reason to eternal reason, in-
stead of being only patients, we will at least be victims” (Discourse for Madam 
La Marquise de Costa on the Life and Death of Her Son, 274).  
56. I return to this concept of reversibility in chapter 4. 
57. Daniel Vouga has tended to defend this thesis in Baudelaire et Joseph de 
Maistre. So has Compagnon in Les Antimodernes, 118, 119, 146.
58. Maistre, Œuvres, “Des sacrifices humains,” Éclaircissement, 817.
59. Maistre, Œuvres, “Des sacrifices en général,” Éclaircissement, 812–13.
60. Maistre, Œuvres, Éclaircissement, 833.
61. See the third chapter of Éclaircissement sur les sacrifices, entitled “Théorie 
chrétienne des sacrifices,” Œuvres, 833.
62. Maistre, Œuvres, 706; Maistre, St Petersburg Dialogues, 264; translation 
modified.
63. Blin, Le Sadisme de Baudelaire, 188.
64. Maistre himself reflects on this semantic duality in Éclaircissement (Œu-
vres, 816).
chapter 4
1. Louis Goudall, “Revue littéraire,” Le Figaro, November 4, 1855; Guyaux, 
Baudelaire, 147.
2. Baudelaire, “Projet de préface” for the second edition of Les Fleurs du mal.
3. “Boucherie,” in Larousse, Grand Dictionnaire universel du XIXe siècle, 
1053.
4. Baudelaire, Selected Poems, 29–30.
5. Baudelaire, The Flowers of Evil, 143; translation modified in l. 1, 5–8.
6. “Boucherie,” in Larousse, Grand Dictionnaire universel du XIXe siècle, 
1053.
7. Baudelaire, The Flowers of Evil, 155, 157.
8. Baudelaire, Selected Poems, 68.
9. For Pichois, “À une Madone” and “L’Héautontimorouménos” belong to 
the same class of poems, namely the “vengeance-poem” (OCB 1:985). This cat-
egorization seems relevant in view of the deliberate harming of others that they 
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feature. However, we will see that, upon closer examination, the existence of 
two distinct agents required by vengeance fades away in these poems.
10. Baudelaire himself notes that violence is the “distinctive sign” of the ab-
solute comic (OCB 2:538). On Baudelaire’s interest in color in general, and red 
in particular, see also the well-known section “De la couleur” in Salon de 1846 
(OCB 2:423, 426) and “La Fanfarlo” (OCB 1:577). 
11. On Delacroix, see Salon de 1846 (OCB 2:431–32), “L’Œuvre et la vie de 
Delacroix” (OCB 2:760), and the well-known stanza of “Les Phares” dedicated 
to the painter’s use of color to represent human torment. Interestingly, Baude-
laire describes him as capable of “tearing out the guts” of his subject (OCB 
2:432). The painter is also a butcher of sorts, then. Goya’s brutal imagination 
features in “Les Phares” as well.
12. Baudelaire, The Flowers of Evil, 157.
13. Baudelaire, The Flowers of Evil, 229, 231.
14. Drawing an opposition between politics and spiritual, moral, and perhaps 
anthropological beliefs, Baudelaire adds that he does “have a few convictions, in a 
more elevated sense” (OCB 1:680). The references to the 1848 Revolution in Mon 
cœur mis à nu and Baudelaire’s agitation at the time qualify the claim that he had no 
political convictions, but he famously declared himself “physically depoliticized” (CB 
1:188) in 1852. A posteriori, he also provocatively attributed his actions in 1848 to a 
mere “taste for destruction” and “literary intoxication” (OCB 1:679). For a summary 
of the poet’s iconoclastic political trajectory, see Clark, Image of the People, 68.
15. Edward Kaplan makes a similar point, highlighting the “screen of ethi-
cal ambiguity” in Baudelaire’s most sinister and provocative writings (“Baude-
lairean Ethics,” 89).
16. The proximity of the terms boucher and bourreau is striking: beyond 
their phonemic and graphemic similarities, bourreau has the same second mean-
ing as boucher, according to Larousse. By extension, it refers to a “murderer,” 
a “cruel individual” (Larousse, Grand Dictionnaire universel du XIXe siècle, 
1137). 
17. Baudelaire, The Flowers of Evil, 157.
18. Wilcocks, “Towards a Re-examination of L’Héautontimorouménos,” 
567, 569.
19. Sanyal, The Violence of Modernity, 31–33.
20. Sanyal, The Violence of Modernity, 34. In “Les Foules,” Baudelaire fa-
mously wrote, “Le poète jouit de cet incomparable privilège, qu’il peut être à sa 
guise lui-même et autrui” (The poet enjoys the incomparable privilege of being 
able to be both himself and another, as he pleases; OCB 1:291). In the context 
of lethal violence, the privilege appears to turn into a curse.
21. Sanyal, The Violence of Modernity, 36.
22. Baudelaire, The Flowers of Evil, 157; translation modified. On the pas-
sivity of the allegorized and depersonalized self in the last stanzas of the poem, 
see Starobinski, La Mélancolie au miroir, 35.
23. Baudelaire and Malassis discuss the possible spellings of the French 
retranscription of “heautontimoroumenos” in the poem’s proofs from 1857 
(OCB 1:987). Maistre also uses the term in Les Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg 
(Œuvres, 539), acknowledging Terence as a source.
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24. Terence, L’Héautontimorouménos, 27; l. 147–48.
25. “The righteous one, in suffering voluntarily, makes amends not only 
for himself, but for the guilty one by way of reversibility,” according to the 
“Huitième entretien” of Les Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg (Maistre, Œuvres, 
693). The concept of reversibility is central to Maistre’s reflection, since it en-
ables him to answer a crucial question regarding divine justice: Why do inno-
cent people suffer?
26. On nonredemption, or a-redemption, in Les Fleurs du mal, see “L’Irrémé-
diable” and Acquisto’s study of Baudelaire’s “poetics of the unredeemable” in 
The Fall Out of Redemption, in particular chapters 1 and 2, 19–98. 
27. Baudelaire, Selected Poems, 117; translation modified in l. 5.
28. Baudelaire, Selected Poems, 145.
29. The mating is literal, since the imagery of sexual consummation runs 
through the text.
30. This poem about the imbrication of killer and victim and about a murder 
that is also suicidal is not an isolated instance. See also “Le Vampire,” a pendant 
to “À une Madone” in which the murderer is the woman. 
31. Baudelaire, Selected Poems, 66; translation modified in l. 1.
32. Baudelaire, The Flowers of Evil, 231; translation modified in l. 7.
33. Baudelaire, The Flowers of Evil, 233; translation modified in l. 5.
34. Baudelaire, The Flowers of Evil, 233.
35. Similarly, Pachet highlights the indistinction that characterizes focaliza-
tion and subjectivity in Spleen de Paris (“Baudelaire et le sacrifice,” 446).
36. This flexible status of the victim and the perpetrator of violence is fa-
mously evoked in Mon cœur mis à nu: “alternativement victime et bourreau” 
(alternately victim and executioner; OCB 1:676).
37. Corroborating this reading, Pachet has also contended that plainly op-
posing Hugo’s humanism to Baudelaire’s sadism would be erroneous, whether 
it comes to crime, its repression, or death sentences, with whose depiction Hugo 
remains fascinated (Le Premier venu: Baudelaire, 105–6). 
38. Toal, The Entrapments of Form, 19–26, 32–36 in particular.
39. Girard, La Violence et le sacré, 49. 
40. Girard, La Violence et le sacré, 50, 63–104. Girard defines the sacrifi-
cial crisis as follows: “The sacrificial crisis, that is to say the disappearance of 
sacrifice, is the disappearance of the difference between impure violence and 
purifying violence. When this difference is lost, purification is no longer possi-
ble, and impure, contagious violence, that is to say reciprocal violence, spreads 
throughout the community” (77). In his seminal article entitled “Baudelaire et 
le sacrifice,” Pachet has also argued that Baudelaire “surpasses” Maistre (443), 
but without focusing on Baudelairean poetry.
41. Girard, La Violence et le sacré, 18.
42. Girard, La Violence et le sacré, 64.
43. Girard, La Violence et le sacré, 77–78, inter alia.
44. Bernard Degout has argued that Hugo’s position regarding the executioner 
in Han d’Islande opposes Maistre’s not only because of the novelist’s abolitionism 
de principe and belief in Christian charity but also because of the executioner’s 
failure to contain or to halt violence (“De Joseph de Maistre à Victor Hugo,” 649).
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45. Oehler rightly applies Levinas’s polysemous aphorism “Autrui me re-
garde” (The Other looks at/concerns me) to Baudelaire (“Baudelaire’s Politics,” 
25). Thélot also underscores the role played by, and the conflict that originates 
in, the Other’s weakness in Baudelaire’s oeuvre and art (“La Conversion baude-
lairienne,” 129).
46. Sanyal, The Violence of Modernity, 107.
47. For a reading of this poem, in which Thélot locates a “violence fon-
datrice” that also draws on Girard, see Baudelaire, 399–411.
48. Baudelaire, Selected Poems, 66.
49. Baudelaire, The Flowers of Evil, 155, 157.
part iii
1. All of Camus’s writings on the subject, including previously unpublished 
documents that shed light on his defense of condemned men during the Al-
gerian War of Independence, are collected in Morisi, Albert Camus contre la 
peine de mort. For a synthetic reconstitution of Camus’s abolitionism based on 
these various writings, see Morisi, Albert Camus: Le souci des autres, 65–90, 
and Morisi, “To Kill a Human Being.” For a survey of the multiform presence 
of death sentences in his works and thought, see also Baciu, Albert Camus et 
la condamnation à mort. His reflections on the killing state are examined in 
Salas, Albert Camus: La juste révolte. In “Le Partage de la souffrance” and 
“Camus et le droit de mort de l’État,” Philippe Vanney offers a very insightful 
analysis of Camus’s critique of the right of the state to kill in “Réflexions sur 
la guillotine.”
2. Camus, “Le Siècle de la peur” and “Sauver les corps” (1946), in CC 612–
16. See also the beginning of L’Homme révolté, in OCC 3:66.
3. The Germans executed Camus’s friend René Leynaud, a fellow member of 
the “Combat” group, on June 13, 1944. 
4. See also the editorials published in Combat from August 22 to November 
2, 1944.
5. I trace these progressive roots of European penal philosophy in “European 
Visions in Albert Camus’s Abolitionism.”
6. First reply to Vigerie’s critique of “Ni Victimes ni bourreaux” titled “Arra-
chez la victime aux bourreaux,” in Œuvres complètes.
chapter 5
1. Camus’s notes from 1953 suggest that, had he been able to complete this 
work, it may have been three times as long as it is today (OCC 4:1176). 
2. Camus’s biography and his notes for Le Premier Homme confirm the 
novel’s autobiographical basis (OCC 4:926, 940).
3. Camus noted that the “meaning” of his novel emerges “precisely” from 
“the parallelism of [its] two parts” (OCC 2:951).
4. Camus wrote in 1954, in the draft of a reply to Rolf Hädrich, who wished 
to adapt L’Étranger for the stage: “The frontal attack here doesn’t target moral-
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ity but the world of the trial that is bourgeois as much as Nazi and Communist, 
and which, in a word, is today’s cancer” (OCC 1:1269; my emphasis). 
5. Jacqueline Lévi-Valensi and other critics have noted that Meursault him-
self initially does not feel guilty and fails to regret his crime (“L’Étranger: Un 
‘meurtrier innocent’?,” 85–86). 
6. In the novel’s tentative outline, Camus also repeatedly nicknames his char-
acters “les condamnés à mort” (the men condemned to death; OCC 2:249–50).
7. In some passages of Camus’s manuscript, Catherine’s first name is changed 
to Lucie.
8. Catherine Cormery’s difficulty in communicating is not isolated in the 
novel. On the whole, Jacques’s family, including his father, uncle, and grand-
mother, are either quiet or use approximative language. Edward J. Hughes has 
rightly highlighted the “hymn of praise to inarticulateness and animal physical-
ity” (Albert Camus, 14) that underlies the novel’s characterization. See also “Les 
Taiseux” in Morisi, Albert Camus: Le souci des autres, 119–44. In the passage 
under consideration, however, the limits of this praise become apparent.
9. “La société des vivants craignait à longueur de journée d’être obligée de 
céder la place à la société des morts” (Day in and day out, the society of the 
living feared that it would have to give way to the society of the dead; OCC 
2:153).
10. Weyembergh, Albert Camus ou la mémoire des origines, 13.
11. Davis, “Violence and Ethics in Camus,” 109, 115. See also Davis, 
“Camus, Encounters, Reading” and “The Cost of Being Ethical.”
12. Like Gaëtan Picon (“Remarques sur La Peste d’Albert Camus”) before 
him, Roger Quilliot draws a parallel between this pensée and La Peste (“Un 
exemple d’influence pascalienne,” 123). Lévi-Valensi underscores the same anal-
ogy (Jacqueline Lévi-Valensi présente La Peste d’Albert Camus, 39). Camus’s 
admiration for Pascal is well-known; see OCC 4:640, 646, 1236.
13. The metaphors used to narrate the scene in which Meursault kills the 
Arab turn the protagonist into the victim of the sun. As for the murder and 
mutilation of the soldier in Morocco, while Henri Cormery condemns them 
vehemently, Mr. Levesque, the schoolteacher who is with him, begs to differ.
14. On the possibility of interrupting violence when it is perpetrated by an 
individual in Camus’s fiction, see Blanchot’s reading of Kaliayev’s inability to 
throw the bomb at the Grand Duke when he sees the faces of his nephew and 
niece in Les Justes (“Tu peux tuer cet Homme,” 1068–69).
15. The religiosity inherent in the notion of epiphany is also found in the 
biblical echoes of the novel’s title, although Camus draws on a wide variety of 
sources, including scientific, historical, and literary (Artaud, Defoe, etc.) texts. 
See Lévi-Valensi, Jacqueline Lévi-Valensi présente La Peste d’Albert Camus, 38.
16. This “confession” is a belated addendum to the typescript and replaces 
a brief and somewhat stereotypical scene of Alpine retreat in which Tarrou re-
flects on the “lies” and “futility” (OCC 2:1196) of his life.
17. In the second half of L’Étranger, the magistrates are also reduced to red and 
dark patches of color that turn the courtroom into a hellish space (OCC 1:190).
18. See Quilliot, La Mer et les prisons, 169. A non-negligible autobiograph-
ical background informs several passages of the “Confession d’un pestiféré.” 
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For instance, although Camus briefly supported the Communist Party in his 
youth, he subsequently denounced the crimes committed in the name of its ide-
ology, thereby opposing a large part of his era’s leftist intelligentsia, including 
Sartre and Beauvoir. The publication of L’Homme révolté in 1951 sealed this 
antagonism. Furthermore, like Tarrou, Camus witnessed a number of trials as a 
journalist; those of Hodent and Pétain, for example.
19. Les Justes (1949) examines this thorny concept. Earlier texts explore the 
question of responsibility and extreme violence as well. See for instance “La 
Crise de l’homme” (OCC 2:744) and “Nous autres meurtriers” (OCC 2:686–
87), which anticipate Tarrou’s confession in several respects. For a study of the 
points of contact between La Peste and Ni victimes ni bourreaux, see Jeanyves 
Guérin’s “Jalons pour une lecture politique de La Peste.” Lévi-Valensi also pro-
poses a useful census of the main overlaps between Combat and La Peste (Jac-
queline Lévi-Valensi présente La Peste d’Albert Camus, 164–68).
20. Dismissing critics such as Claude Roy and Barthes, who objected to the 
lack of realism in La Peste, and going further than Camus himself, Quilliot has 
suggested that the plague, which stands for a multiplicity of evils, appears in 
many of Camus’s works, including Noces, Caligula, L’Étranger, and Le Malen-
tendu (La Mer et les prisons, 170).
21. Camus develops further this political reflection on lethal violence in 
other fictional and non-fictional works, including Les Justes and “Réponse à 
Emmanuel d’Astier de la Vigerie.” See Morisi, “Staging the Limit.”
22. At the metafictional level, judicial records confirm that this narrative 
is (re)invented: no Pirette was ever executed in Algiers. The beheading that 
Camus’s father witnessed must have been that of Juan Vidal, also known as 
“Figarette.” It took place on May 24, 1910. “Pirette” is the name of a town 
where another capital crime was committed, on November 27, 1913. It also 
led to an execution, but in Tizi-Ouzou, on January 29, 1914, that is to say after 
the death of Camus’s father/Henri Cormery (L’Express du midi, “Exécutions 
capitales,” May 25, 1910). 
23. The mother, the uncle, and the grandmother refer to it in turn. Moreover, 
a “ressasse[ment]” (rehash[ing]) of the narrative occurs in Jacques’s mind. 
24. Blanchot, “Le Roman de l’étranger,” 248, 252. Camus disagreed. He ar-
gued that there was no rupture in his character, and that, at the end of his novel, 
Meursault “merely” keeps “answering the questions” he is asked (OCC 2:950). 
While the protagonist indeed applies himself to responding to the events and 
discourses with which he is confronted throughout, his sudden readiness to be 
executed does contrast with his persistent hope to escape capital punishment 
after the sentence is pronounced (OCC 1:204, 207).
25. Sartre, “Explication de L’Étranger,” 93, 95, 97, 98. Although Sartre con-
cedes that L’Étranger isn’t a roman à thèse (97) and that there is some gratu-
itousness to it (98), he nonetheless asserts that “Le Mythe de Sisyphe has given 
us the exact commentary” (93) of the novel, and that this essay “is going to 
teach us the way in which our author’s novel is to be read” (97).
26. Sartre, “Explication de L’Étranger,” 101.
27. And like Hugo, Camus seems to have been influenced by a newspaper 
report on the experience of an actual condemned man (OCC 1:1453). 
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28. Likewise, Camus’s notebooks from 1944 read, “We mustn’t sentence to 
death since we have been turned into men condemned by death [des condamnés 
de mort (sic)]” (OCC 2:1019).
29. Golgotha is symbolically connected with decapitation, the punishment 
that awaits Meursault. It is the “place of the skull” in Aramaic.
30. La Bible: Nouveau Testament, 333–34; my emphasis.
31. While this intertext is covert in the novel, Camus makes Meursault’s 
Christ-like character explicit in the preface to the American edition of L’Étranger 
(OCC 1:216). On the resemblance between Meursault and Jesus Christ, see also 
Auroy, “Jésus-Christ,” 441.
32. La Chute (The Fall) arguably picks up on this reversal: Clamence the 
thief and false prophet briefly fantasizes about his possible decapitation and the 
paradoxical apotheosis that this would allow him to enjoy postmortem, if his 
severed head were “lifted” above the people. 
33. Bespaloff, “Le Monde du condamné à mort,” 3–6.
34. See Girard, “Camus’s Stranger Retried,” 522, as well as Blanchot, “Le 
Roman de l’étranger,” 250, 251.
35. See the narrator’s well-known comment on Grand, OCC 2: 128.
36. Bespaloff, “Le Monde du condamné à mort,” 16, 13.
37. See Camus, OCC 1:215; Blanchot, “Le Roman de l’étranger,” 249; Be-
spaloff, “Le Monde du condamné à mort,” 2.
38. This lack of imagination, which Camus also calls the danger of “ab-
straction,” comes to authorize capital punishment, the perpetration of mass 
murder, and the flourishing of homicidal ideologies, in his view. See his 1944 
article “Tout ne s’arrange pas” (OCC 1:922), his editorial from November 2, 
1944 (CC 302), passages from “Sauver les corps” (CC 613) and “L’Incroyant 
et les chrétiens” (OCC 2:506), and the reference to the “imagination” made in 
a collective letter sent to the president of the Greek Republic in 1951 to ask 
for the pardon of thousands of condemned men and women (including former 
résistants) waiting to be liberated or executed after the Greek Civil War (Morisi, 
Albert Camus contre la peine de mort, 137–39).
39. Camus, Correspondance: 1932–1960, 141.
40. “Réflexions sur la guillotine” insists that all crimes should not be equated, 
but the essay also argues that “Supreme justice . . . is no less repulsive than the 
crime” (OCC 4:128) and defines the death penalty as the most premeditated of 
murders.
41. Here, one may think of the rewriting of the Cartesian cogito in L’Homme 
révolté (OCC 3:79).
42. Camus, Correspondance: 1932–1960, 141.
43. See, for instance, Frantz Favre, “Camus et Nietzsche: Philosophie et exis-
tence,” 73, 74. 
44. In 1957, Camus clarifies this importance and use of compassion in the 
context of capital justice: “Of course, compassion can only be the feeling of a 
common suffering here, and not some frivolous indulgence that would pay no 
attention to the sufferings and the rights of the victim. It doesn’t exclude pun-
ishment, but it suspends the ultimate sentence” (OCC 4:156).
45. See also the conclusion of “Réflexions sur la guillotine” (OCC 4:167).
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46. Lévinas, Éthique et infini, 92.
47. A passage from “Réflexions sur la guillotine” specifies, about the Pirette 
anecdote, “On the day of the execution, around my father, there must have been 
a large enough number of criminals who, unlike him, did not throw up” (OCC 
4:137).
48. On this mode of engagement promoted by Sartre in Qu’est-ce que la 
littérature, see, for instance, Benoît Denis, Littérature et engagement, de Pascal 
à Sartre, 270. 
49. While Kant’s and Camus’s views on the death penalty are diametrically 
opposed, Vanney and Salas note that, in “Réflexions sur la guillotine,” the writer 
puts forth a moral imperative, much like the philosopher. Like Kant, he also de-
fines (but, for his part, condemns) capital punishment as a lex talionis. Vanney, 
“Le partage de la souffrance,” 103; Salas, Albert Camus: La juste révolte, 47.
chapter 6
1. This rhetoric includes “formules stéréotypées” (stereotypical formulae), 
“ruses du langage” (tricks of language), and “phrases cérémonieuses” (ceremo-
nious sentences) for Camus (OCC 4:128–29).
2. Using a similar vocabulary, Hugo’s 1832 preface exhorted the “gens du 
roi” (the king’s people) to “ne . . . plus nous demander des têtes . . . en nous ad-
jurant d’une voix caressante au nom de la société” (not to ask us for behead-
ings . . . imploring us with a caressing voice in the name of society; OCH 4:491; 
my emphasis).
3. On the euphemization of silence in Camus’s œuvre, see Hiroshi Mino, Le 
Silence dans l’œuvre d’Albert Camus.
4. Monestier, Peines de mort, 227–28.
5. In November and December 1946, the article “Nous autres meurtriers” 
(Franchise, nº3), reminiscent of two lectures Camus gave in the United States 
earlier that year (“La Crise de l’homme” [The Crisis of Man] and “Sommes-nous 
des pessimistes?” [Are we pessimists?]) insisted, “The words of hope are cour-
age, clear speech, and friendship” (OCC 2:686). 
6. Barthes famously referred to Camus’s “blank . . . amodal . . . neutral writ-
ing” more generally (Le Degré zéro de l’écriture, 108–9).
7. The père Paneloux delivers two sermons that both tap into a pompous and 
moralizing rhetoric, although they differ from each other in other ways.
8. This disclosure of pure violence is found in Le Dernier Jour d’un con-
damné as well, although Hugo doesn’t only or mainly rely on a clinical style, as 
we have seen.
9. Camus himself taps into this imaginary in Le Mythe de Sisyphe when 
referring to the “divine disponibilité” of the man awaiting his execution, but all 
his works of fiction rebuff such romanticization.
10. Davis has underscored a disconnect between the theory and the 
practice of linguistic transparency in Camus’s works and has shown their 
force to emerge precisely from moments when “meaning is made unsta-
ble” and “resists easy conceptualization” (“Violence and Ethics in Camus,” 
114).
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11. On the question of witnessing in La Peste, see the fourth chapter of Fel-
man and Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, 
and History, 93–119, and Jennifer Cooke’s critical response to Felman in “Writ-
ing Plague: Transforming Narrative, Witnessing, and History,” 21–42. 
12. See Naudin, “Hugo et Camus face à la peine capitale,” 265, and Vanney, 
“Le Partage de la souffrance,” 98. 
13. This intimate subjective realism distinguishes itself from the subjective 
realism found in such writers as Flaubert and Stendhal by virtue of the fact that 
it is dependent on a first-person narrator who is the novel’s protagonist. 
14. Barthes, Le Degré zéro de l’écriture, 108.
15. Naudin, “Hugo et Camus face à la peine capitale,” 265–66.
16. Bowman, “The Intertextuality of Victor Hugo’s Le Dernier Jour d’un 
condamné,” 38, 41.
17. Beccaria notices this too. On Crimes and Punishments, 70.
18. Letter from January 21, 1948, in Camus and Grenier, Correspondance: 
1932–1960, 141. 
19. Spiquel, “L’Étranger et Le Dernier Jour,” 116.
20. Spiquel, “L’Étranger et Le Dernier Jour,” 117.
21. Camus sketched the play in 1939, completed and published its first ver-
sion in 1943, published it in 1943, and produced a definitive version in 1958.
22. Baudelaire, Selected Poems, 118–9.
23.  Even if this criticism wasn’t apparent to some of his contemporaries. 
For a summary of the Greek political context that inspired Nerval’s publication 
and the dispute it brought about between Nerval and Champfleury, see Richard 
D. E. Burton, Baudelaire and the Second Republic: Writing and Revolution, 
311–12. Burton also proposes a political reading of this poem centered on the 
context of 1849–51 and “the castration of the Second Republic” (315–19). For 
a comparative examination of Nerval’s and Baudelaire’s texts, see the eighth 
chapter of John E. Jackson, Baudelaire sans fin, essai sur Les Fleurs du mal.
24. Baudelaire, Selected Poems, 119–21.
25. Baudelaire, Selected Poems, 119–21.
26. Baudelaire, Selected Poems, 119–21.
27. Baudelaire also uses allegory to project the self onto the outside world in 
“Le Cygne”: “Tout pour moi devient allégorie” (Everything to me becomes an 
allegory; OCB 1:86).
28. Sanyal’s analysis is especially rich. It highlights the proximity of the two 
protagonists, the “sabotage of aesthetic sovereignty and autonomy” (The Violence 
of Modernity, 75), and a conspiratorial poetics staged in the context of a Second 
Empire in which absolute authority somehow ends up being preserved (65–79). 
On this prose poem, see also, among others, Starobinski, “Sur quelques répondants 
allégoriques du poète”; Virginia Swain, “The Legitimation Crisis: Event and Mean-
ing in ‘Le Vieux Saltimbanque’ and ‘Une Mort héroïque’”; Thélot, Baudelaire, 142–
44; and Patrick Labarthe, Baudelaire et la tradition de l’allégorie, 544–47. 
29. Sanyal, The Violence of Modernity, 68–69.
30. Sanyal interestingly views the narrator of the poem as incarnating the 
“comique significatif” that Baudelaire distinguishes from the “comique absolu” 
(The Violence of Modernity, 73).
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31. Starobinski attributes Fancioulle’s death following the strident blowing 
of the whistle to his being “désavoué dans son orgueil d’artiste” (disavowed in 
his pride as an artist; La Mélancolie au miroir, 408).
32. Thélot also talks about the prince as a “sacrificator fascinated by his vic-
tim” and rightly reads the representation of the (murderous) preservation of po-
litical order as a boring and tragic “buffoonery” unmasked by the narrator-poet 
(Baudelaire, 144). Labarthe likewise argues that this narrative allegory presents 
“a ‘sacrificial’ conception of art” (Baudelaire et la tradition de l’allégorie, 110).
conclusion
1. See, for instance, Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge; Cultivating Humanity; 
Upheavals of Thought; Suzanne Keen, Empathy and the Novel. 
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